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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Rese aRch inteRest and Rese aRch questions
1.1.1 Research interest
In 1965, the category ›transvestitism‹ appeared as a ›sexual deviation‹ in the 
eighth version of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) International Sta-
tistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-8). Ten 
years later, the term ›transvestitism‹ vanished from the ICD-9, and the terms 
›trans-sexualism‹ [sic!] and ›transvestism‹ were added to the ›sexual deviations‹ 
in the ICD-9. When the ICD-10 appeared in 1990, ›transsexualism‹1 was reclas-
sified as a ›gender identity disorder‹ and placed in the mental health section of 
chapter V Disorders of adult behaviour and personality, along with a number of 
other forms of gender identity deemed pathological (Drescher 2014: 141).
The effects of entering ›transsexualism‹ into medical classification sys-
tems, such as the ICD and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
were twofold on the subjects subsumed under this category. On the one hand, 
psychiatrists acknowledged that some individuals experience a gender that is 
not socially associated with their assigned sex and frequently seek medical and/
or surgical interventions to alter gendered parts of their bodies to match their 
identity. On the other hand, ›transsexualism‹ was conceptualised as a mental 
health problem rather than as one of many equally legitimate possibilities to 
relate to ›gender‹. 
Social marginalisation and lacking legal recognition and health insurance 
assumption of sex reassignment measures provided points of departure for 
social and political struggles in several liberal democracies. These struggles 
1 | In 1923, the sexologist and physician Magnus Hirschfeld coined the term ›Transsexu-
alismus‹. The general practitioner Cauldwell translated the term as ›transsexualism‹ into 
English, whereas the physician and endocrinologist Benjamin popularised the term in his 
book The Transsexual Phenomenon, which appeared in 1966 (Stryker 2008: 18; idem/
Whittle 2006: 28-57).
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developed unevenly, depending on the healthcare system, the medical, the 
national2 and occasionally supranational legal and political environment and 
developments in related and in part overlapping social struggles, such as e. g. 
lesbian and gay movement struggles, to name a few factors, and the (tempo-
rary) outcomes differ.
This book examines how struggles over trans(sexuality)3 evolved in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Soon after sexology consolidated transsexual-
ism as a distinct and pathologised form of embodying gender in the course of 
the 1970s,4 legal and political conflicts over recognising transsexual subjects 
and securing health-insured access to healthcare unfolded. Having gained the 
right to change first names and revise gender status as early as in 19815 and 
having achieved statutory health insurance assumption of costs for hormonal 
and surgical interventions in 1987, these struggles continued to develop into 
an ongoing battle over the terms of recognition and access to transition-relat-
ed healthcare in an increasingly complex and changing mesh of concepts of 
trans(sexuality), practices and institutions. They also were, and continue to be, 
2 | For the impact of, for example, state structures on social movements, see Johnston 
2011; for country-specific developments of the trans movement in the USA and the UK, 
see Stryker 2006: 5 f.
3 | The terminology used to describe the population addressed here in sexology, 
law, federal politics and in the social movement varied historically and is frequently 
contested in historically-specific settings. Seeking a historically correct term and one 
that respects the self-definitions the subjects of this study addresses is a challenging 
endeavour. ›Trans(sexuality)‹ is my proposed solution when referring to the whole period 
of investigation. Whenever historically-specific sexological, legal, political or social 
movement concepts are subject to analysis, I take up the terms that happen to be 
used in this specific context, and wherever possible, I refer to individuals the way they 
describe themselves. The term ›trans‹ (Trans*) is frequently used in the trans movement in 
Germany since the late 1990s as a self-description of, and category for a broad spectrum 
of individuals who temporarily or permanently do not consider themselves adequately 
described by the gender assignment at birth. In this sense, ›trans‹ may include e. g. 
›transgender‹, ›transsexual‹, ›non-binary‹ individuals and ›cross-dressers‹. Whenever I am 
not bound by an analysis, I use the term ›trans‹ as a non-pathologising umbrella term for 
the population described above.
4 | For historical developments on sexing the body, see Balzer 2008: 84-105, Klöppel 
2010 and Meyer 2015: 223-299. For earlier developments on transvestitism and trans-
sexuality in sexology, see Herrn 2005 and Weiß 2009.
5 | The Federal Republic of Germany was second only to Sweden, which passed an act 
to revise gender status called Lag om fästställande av könstillhörighet I visa fall in 1972 
(Scherpe 2004: 62). For a report on committee proceedings leading to the Swedish Act, 
see Carsten 1970.
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disputes over definitions of gender and challenges to a gender regime, which 
is based on the assumption that there are ›by nature‹ two ›healthy‹ genders 
(›man‹ and ›woman‹) that can be derived from one particular of exclusively two 
polarised sexes (›male‹ and ›female‹).
This project addresses the period prior to, and during the processes leading 
to the Act to change first names and establish gender status in special cases 
(Transsexual Act [TSG])6 in 1980, the period of the transsexual law reform de-
bate between 2000 and 2009 and developments in the immediate aftermath 
of the Act to amend the Transsexual Act (Transsexuellen-Änderungsgesetz [TSG-
ÄndG]). The motivation for conducting this research was to find out how social 
change evolved in the broader contexts of the legislative processes related to a 
change of first names and a revision of gender status with regard to considering 
trans a viable way of embodying gender in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Developments and debates on trans(sexuality) within and between the ma-
jor actors involved in these processes were uneven. This study covers develop-
ments and debates in sexology from the 1970s to the early 1980s and from the 
early 1990s to 2014. It traces developments and debates in law from the late 
1950s to 2013. The project deals with the trans movement from the mid-1970s 
to the mid-1990s briefly and in depth with a focus on major trans organisa-
tions and networks with a decidedly political agenda between the mid-1990s 
to the time of writing in 2014. Finally, this study addresses federal politics as it 
relates to the Transsexual Act from the early 1970s to the beginning of 1981 in 
detail and briefly from the beginning of the reform period in 2000 to the Act 
to amend the Transsexual Act in 2009.
1.1.2 Research questions
The major question is how sexology, the law, the political branch of the trans 
movement and federal politics interacted prior to, and during the above-
mentioned processes to either generate, establish or challenge concepts of 
trans(sexuality). While this project addresses a number of issues, it focuses on 
three questions to answer the main question:
1. How did sexology, the law, the political branch of the trans movement and 
federal politics, mirrored in the practices and mediated by the procedures of the 
respective discipline and area, construct trans(sexuality) in relation to socially 
accepted genders? This project relates concepts of trans(sexuality) to concepts 
6 | The German name of the Act is Gesetz zur Änderung des Vornamens und die Feststel­
lung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen (Transsexuellengesetz [TSG]). 
The Act to change first names and establish gender status in special cases will be referred 
to as the Transsexual Act.
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of socially accepted genders, i. e. cismen and ciswomen7 as they emerge in the 
respective debates, practices and procedures for three reasons. First, a compari-
son reveals the degree of accepting or rejecting trans(sexuality) as a socially 
viable way of relating to gender. Second, naturalised genders are frequently 
the yardstick according to which trans individuals are granted or denied access 
to legal and medical provisions. Third, a comparison allows conclusions to be 
drawn from how negotiations over trans(sexuality) impacted on the gender bi-
nary, or more specifically, how outcomes of legal and political struggles for rec-
ognition challenged hegemonic notions of gender, sexuality and embodiment.
2. What dynamics developed within sexology, the law, the social movement 
and federal politics with regard to trans(sexuality)? Sexology, the law, the social 
movement and federal politics are sites of conflict and power struggles involv-
ing various perspectives on trans(sexuality), gender and gender regime. How 
did some concepts become authoritative and others marginalised?
3. What dynamics developed between sexology, the law, the social move-
ment and federal politics with regard to trans(sexuality)? The interplay of sex-
ology, the law, the political branch of the trans movement and federal politics 
highlights how and what concepts of trans(sexuality) entered other disciplines 
and fields and how concepts of trans(sexuality) were read into, or challenged in 
the respective parameters of the disciplines or social arenas in an uneven and 
frequently conflictual process.
1.2 state of the art and conte x tualIsatIon 
 of the project
1.2.1 State of the art
No study has to date dealt with the constructions of trans(sexuality) and chal-
lenges to these constructions, in sexology, the law, the political branch of the 
trans movement and federal politics, dynamics within, and the interplay of 
these disciplines and arenas and the effects on the gender regime in the entire 
period this project addresses. Previous studies have overall been disciplinary, 
7 | Sigusch coined the term ›cissexuality‹ (Zissexualität) in his concept of depatho logising 
transsexuality. Cissexuality denotes the unquestioned, seemingly natural concurrence 
of sex and gender identity (Sigusch 1991: 338). In doing so, he ruptured the assumed 
naturalness of gender based on anatomy. I will frequently use either the phrase ›socially 
accepted genders‹ or, drawing upon Bauer, attach the prefix ›cis‹ to men and women who 
live according to the gender they were assigned to at birth. In addition to pointing to all 
genders as socially constructed, the prefix avoids privileging morphology as a point of 
reference (cf. Bauer 2014: 257).
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only randomly refer to other disciplines involved, cover other or shorter periods 
and/or focus on other research questions. I will briefly address the studies that 
have dealt with either discourses or concepts of trans(sexuality) before turning 
to the research situation regarding the dynamics within and between the disci-
plines and fields under investigation.
Constructions of trans(sexualit y)
Most of the studies engage with the medical construction of transsexuality. 
Contextualised within a genealogy of the change from the concept of genital 
homology of male and female sexes to a radical difference, based on social in-
teractionist premises and using an ethnographic approach, Hirschauer’s study 
(1999) traces the way professionals carry out medical transitions and how psy-
cho-medical and transsexual individuals interact in transition processes, i. e. 
the production of knowledge in the concrete setting of a medical transition 
from a micro-sociological perspective. While offering insights into the medical 
construction of transsexuality as part of the contemporary construction of the 
gender binary, he does not deal with the dynamics within sexology. Rather, he 
constructs medicine as monolithic.
In contrast, Weiß (2009) deals with the medical construction of transsexu-
ality over a longer historical period. He approaches the subject by analysing 
medical discourses. He distinguishes between three periods: the ›formative 
phase‹, beginning with early experimental surgery in the 1910s; the ›construc-
tion phase‹, starting with the establishment of gender clinics in the USA in the 
mid-1960s, and the ›management phase‹, beginning with the entry of trans-
sexuality as a disease in the DSM-III, published by the APA in 1980. His study 
focuses on the first period.
The approach to constructions of trans(sexuality) in sexology in this book 
differs from Weiß’s study in several ways. First, rather than skip from one con-
tinent to the other, this project, wherever applicable, examines how US develop-
ments influenced the debate in sexology in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and in which ways sexology diverted from international developments. Moreo-
ver, rather than consider sexology as a monolithic bloc, the approach used here 
allows uncovering dynamics and power struggles within the discipline in a 
particular national political and legal setting. Third, every phase involved spe-
cific constructions and developments in the management of transsexuality that 
warrant attention.
Medical constructions of transsexuality have also been subject to investiga-
tion in sexology itself. In contrast to the sociological studies mentioned above, 
sexological introspections into medical constructions of transsexuality have so 
far been unsystematic and based on limited sources. In the second of his two-
part article published in the Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung (German Journal for 
Sex Research [ZfS]) in 1991, Sigusch self-critically assesses the medical totalisa-
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tion and clinical pathologisation he and his colleagues had contributed to when 
developing cardinal symptoms of transsexuality in the late 1970s. Moreover, he 
criticises the pathologising impetus of aetiological research on transsexuality. 
Hence, Sigusch focuses on a small, albeit momentous episode in the sexologi-
cal construction of transsexuality. 
Richter-Appelt (2012) traces developments of trans(sexuality) and intersex 
over a period of 25 years. While being insightful, her article only summarises 
articles on trans(sexuality) that appeared in the sexological journal Zeitschrift 
für Sexualforschung. Becker (2013) briefly points out to major social factors that 
contributed to a pluralisation of trans in the 1990s and offers a well-grounded 
critique of the recent re-essentialisation of trans in sexology. In contrast to the 
aforementioned sexological studies, this study offers a broader and systematic 
analysis of constructions of trans(sexuality) in sexology.
Despite having generated a large body of publications on trans(sexuality) 
in law and while being informed by various notions of gender and trans, few 
legal scholars have engaged with legal constructions of trans(sexuality). In the 
course of developing the concept of gender as an expectation to improve anti-
discrimination law on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation, Adamietz 
(2011) addresses concepts of trans in Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BVerfG]) decisions on the Transsexual Act. She identifies scru-
tinising the applicants’ past, distinctions from other ›disorders‹ and the por-
trayal of transsexual individuals as either victims of an irreversible disease or 
discrimination in everyday life as major patterns Federal Constitutional Court 
jurisdiction related to in contradictory ways (ibid: 153-162).
This analysis of Federal Constitutional Court decisions on the Trans-
sexual Act confirms her conclusion (ibid: 161-171) that over time basic rights 
and dilemmas posed by rules of the Transsexual Act became more pertinent 
to Federal Constitutional Court reasoning and ultimately led to shifts within 
the heteronormative gender binary. However, this analysis of legal concepts 
of trans(sexuality) in law differs from Adamietz’s study in three ways. First 
and in addition, this study addresses the period prior to the Transsexual Act 
in order to show the conflictual process of accepting sexological concepts in 
law in the field under investigation. Since concepts or perceptions of gender 
and trans(sexuality) in legal scholarship and jurisdiction were heterogeneous at 
the time, this study also addresses constructions of trans(sexuality) in reported 
lower court cases.8 Second, once sexology had established its power to define 
8 | I will refer to local (Amtsgerichte [AG]) and regional courts (Landesgerichte 
[LG]) as lower courts and to high regional courts (Oberlandesgerichte [OLG]), the 
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]), the Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG]) and the Federal Constitutional Court as higher 
courts.
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trans(sexuality) vis-à-vis the law, this project focuses less on legal perceptions 
of individual applicants than on the way transsexuality was conceptualised in 
relation to hegemonic notions of gender in procedures for recognising a claim. 
Third, this study also analyses concepts of trans(sexuality) in legal scholarship, 
rather than in jurisdiction only.
Sieß’s project (1996) offers a concise account of the legislative process lead-
ing to the Transsexual Act. His chronology of the process serves as a back-
ground for dealing with procedural aspects regarding non-contentious juris-
diction rather than the construction of transsexuality in this political process.
So far there has been little research on constructions of trans(sexuality) in 
the social movement. In hir analysis of developments of self-imagery and self-
organisation of transgender cultures from the 1960s to the beginning of the 21st 
century, Balzer (2008) focuses on the emergence of transgender movements 
in Rio de Janeiro, New York and Berlin. While hir research meticulously analy-
ses the transgender subculture in Berlin, s_he only addresses the Transgender 
Network Berlin (Transgender-Netzwerk Berlin [TGNB]) as a political organisa-
tion, which emerged from the subculture.
Regh’s article (2002) focuses on the early history of the organisation Trans-
Mann e. V. (TransMan), the conflictual relationship between transsexual sup-
port groups and the newly emerging trans movement and outlines the condi-
tions that led to conceptual change in the social movement in the course of the 
mid- to late 1990s in the Federal Republic of Germany. While his research ends 
in the early 2000s, his article has inspired my way of approaching the social 
movement, and I extend the analysis to further trans organisations in the time 
of his research and continue to follow this route until 2014.9
Dynamics among the actors and within the disciplines and areas
Studies so far have barely addressed the dynamics between and within the dis-
ciplines and areas under examination in this project. While Adamietz’s (2011) 
and Wielpütz’s (2012) studies are informed by broader conceptual develop-
ments on trans and in the trans movement, these developments only serve as a 
background for discussing the legal question that is at the heart of their respec-
tive analyses.10
Sieß’s study (1996) comes closest to taking into consideration the interplay 
between law, politics and the social movement during the legislative process on 
the Transsexual Act. However, sexology only serves as background knowledge 
for defining transsexuality, and in contrast to Adamietz (2011) and Wielpütz’s 
9 | For a brief summary of structural and conceptual changes in the trans movement since 
the mid-1990s to 2014 in German, see de Silva 2014.
10 | While Adamietz problematises the medical authority to define trans rather than the 
subjects themselves (Adamietz 2011: 33-38), Sieß and Wielpütz do not.
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studies (2012) does not take developments in sexology into consideration. De 
Silva (2013) has so far dealt with the constructions of transsexuality and the 
dynamics between and within sexology, legal scholarship and jurisdiction in 
the period prior to the Transsexual Act only.
Other contributions have addressed dynamics between law and politics in 
small episodes. In their suggestions for revising the Transsexual Act, Grün-
berger (2007; 2008) and Windel (2008) refer to developments in federal 
politics in this specific point in time only. In contrast to the abovementioned 
studies, this project addresses the developments and conflicts within each dis-
cipline and area and the complex and frequently uneven interrelations between 
sexology, law, federal politics and the political branch of the trans movement 
over a comparatively long period.
1.2.2 Contextualisation of the project
As an interdisciplinary study, this project draws upon, and/or contributes to, a 
larger body of work in gender and queer studies, transgender studies, sexology, 
sociology of law, social movement research in sociology and political science. In 
contrast to institutional developments in academia in the USA, neither queer 
studies, nor transgender studies have so far been institutionalised as separate, 
albeit mutually inspiring foci of academic interrogation in Germany. Rather, 
queer and transgender studies are frequently situated in gender studies. This 
study evolved in the context of various debates within the heterogeneous field 
of gender studies and contributes to the emerging field of transgender studies 
in Germany and internationally.
(Trans)Gender Studies
This project developed against the background of two paradigm shifts in gen-
der studies and one shift in the study of trans(sexuality). Social constructionist 
studies on transsexuality, historicising studies of human bodies and decon-
structionist thought have generated a body of work, which has questioned the 
seemingly natural gender binary. This body of thought is in part shared with, 
or constitutive of, gender, queer and transgender studies.
The first shift set the foundation for a critical investigation of the gender bi-
nary. While ethnomethodological studies on transsexuality have shaped much 
of the Anglo-American interrogations into gender since the mid-1960s, com-
parable studies only appeared in Germany in the early 1990s. Ethnomethodo-
logical studies suggest that gender is achieved in interactive social processes, 
rather than being based on ›natural‹ features of the human body (cf. Garfinkel 
2006; Kessler/McKenna 2006; West/Zimmerman 1987; Hirschauer 1999; 
Lindemann 1993).
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Garfinkel develops a number of propositions on the perceived environment 
of »normally sexed adult individuals« with regard to gender. These propositions 
include that society exists of exclusively two immutable and ›natural‹ sexes, 
›male‹ and ›female‹ of which the possession of a penis by a male and a vagina 
by a female are considered essential insignia (Garfinkel 2006: 62).11 However, 
as Garfinkel notes, rather than being a matter of medical or biological fact, the 
existence of a »dichotomized society is decided as a matter of motivated compli-
ance with this society as a legitimate order« (ibid: 62) and is conditioned upon 
notions of self-respect and the threat of enforcement through others (ibid).
While Garfinkel does not take into consideration the hierarchical organi-
sation of socially accepted genders, Kessler and McKenna specify in their 
examination of cues that lead to gender attribution that genital attribution is 
foremost »penis attribution« (Kessler/McKenna 2006: 173). They conclude that 
the bias towards male gender attribution mirrors social androcentrism (ibid: 
179). Based on an analytical distinction between the natal classification (sex), 
the social allocation to a sex (sex category) and the mutual validation of the sex 
category in social interactions (gender), West and Zimmerman (1987) suggest 
that doing gender is a continuous process.12
Hirschauer (1999) and Lindemann (1993) are major proponents of a so-
cial interactionist approach to transsexuality in Germany. Using in addition a 
phenomenological approach, Lindemann addresses the subjective dimension 
of transsexual individuals’ body experience and examines how the affective di-
mension of bodily materiality is entwined with the objectivised gender binary.
The second paradigm shift deconstructs sex and gender and relates both to 
desire as a structuring element. In an academic context, queer theory emerged 
as a heterogeneous set of theories in the USA in the late 1980s13 and with 
11 | In cases in which males possess vaginas and females possess penises, they must 
nonetheless be classifiable as members of either group, and a person appearing female 
is considered to be entitled to a vagina as well as an individual appearing male is deemed 
entitled to a penis (Garfinkel 2006: 64).
12 | Hirschauer contests the notion of doing gender as a continuous process. While 
he contends that gender congeals to a stable und self-perpetuating social fact through 
interactions and institutional arrangements (Hirschauer 1994; 2004), he suggests that 
assuming an omnirelevance of gender ignores interactions during which participants 
decide not to render gender significant and rather opt to treat gender as a ›seen but 
unnoticed feature‹ (Hirschauer 1994: 677 f.).
13 | Early proponents in the USA were, for example, de Lauretis 1991, Butler 1990, 1993, 
2004, Sedwick-Kosofsky 1990, Fuss 1991, Duggan 1992, Warner 1993, Doty 1993, 
Hennessy 1994, 1995 and Halperin 1995. 
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some delay in Germany.14 Queer theory emerged amidst, and was influenced 
by broader intellectual endeavours in the historically-specific formations of 
late twentieth-century western thought. These were particularly conceptual 
shifts in feminist and postcolonial theory, which question the unitary concept 
of ›woman‹ and denaturalise ›race‹ (Jagose 1996: 77) and critiques of racism 
and sexual normativity by populations marginalised in the lesbian, gay and 
women’s movements (ibid: 62 f.). 
Drawing to varying degrees upon poststructuralist (Foucault, Derrida), 
structuralist (Althusser) and psychoanalytical thought (Freud, Lacan) and 
speech act theory (de Saussure; cf. Jagose 1996: 75-83), queer theory questions 
the notion of a homogeneous, coherent and stable subject and identity (ibid: 77). 
Queer theory identifies heteronormativity (cf. Warner 1993: xxvi), i. e. practices 
and discourses that privilege heterosexuality, as a structuring principle in so-
ciety. Suggesting that sex, gender and sexuality are discursive or performative 
effects,15 queer theory challenges naturalised and binary assumptions on sex 
and gender. Rather than invest in constructing marginalised populations as 
quasi-ethnic minorities, queer theory at its best focuses on intersecting hegem-
onic regimes that bring forth marginalisation.16
14 | In Germany, Hark and Engel developed influential queer theoretical perspectives in 
sociology. Drawing upon Butler, Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe and Arendt, Hark (1996) decon-
structs ›lesbian‹ and explores the conditions for a politics of deviant subjectivities without 
reifying disciplinary differences. In her discussion of options for political and social trans-
formation of a neoliberal regime that increasingly operates with flexible normalisation and 
differentiated social and/or economic integration, Engel (2002) criticises a politics of 
concentrating on modes of subjectivation and normalising regimes and develops a queer-
feminist strategy of rendering gender and sexuality ambiguous (›VerUneindeutigung‹).
15 | I will return to the term ›performativity‹ when discussing Butler’s theorems on sex, 
gender, sexuality, the subject and gender regime.
16 | Critics have pointed to biases in queer theorising toward homonormativity (James 
1996; Stryker 2006), omitting or marginalising bisexuality (cf. James 2006; Gammon/
Isgro 2006; Erickson-Schroth/Mitchell 2009), neglecting race and class (Goldman 
1996), failing to address white queer racism (cf. Haritaworn 2005) or ignoring issues 
related to disability (cf. Teichert 2014). Some have suggested that queer theory cannot 
account for the traumatising split between sex and gender some transsexual individuals 
experience (cf. Prosser 1997) and the complex realities transsexual individuals face 
(cf. Namaste 1996; 2000). As Engel, Schulz and Wedl (self-)critically note, depictions 
of complexly interlocking social differences usually remain programmatic in white queer 
theory (Engels/Schulz/Wedl 2005: 14). Drawing e. g. upon Crenshaw’s (1989) concept of 
intersectionality, postcolonial/decolonial theory and crip theory, others have continued 
to develop queer theory further or to shift its focus to marginalised queers. Prominent 
representatives of what Ferguson (2004) termed ›a queer of colour critique‹ are e. g. 
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In addition to queer investigations into the gender binary, historicising 
studies of the human body reinforce the idea that the gender regime has not 
been a consistent and immutable arrangement based on the notion of two po-
larised sexes. In her socio-historical study, Honegger (1991) traces how medi-
cine and philosophy gradually transformed the assumption of differences be-
tween ›man‹ and ›woman‹ into fundamental differences in the course of the 
late 19th century. In particular, Honegger notes the rise of a ›special female 
anthropology‹ (›weibliche Sonderanthropologie‹) that deduced intellectual and 
psychological properties from female features as a basis for social, political and 
cultural inequality.
Based on a cross-cultural and cross-century analysis of anatomical and 
medical writings from »the Greeks to Freud«, Laqueur (1992) observes an 
epistemic shift from a ›one-sex-model‹ to a ›two-sex-model‹ since the late 18th 
century. According to Laqueur, the ›one-sex-model‹ was based on the assump-
tion that sexes are human variations bearing homologous organs with external 
sex organs in males and internal sex organs in females. In contrast, the ›two-
sex-model‹ is premised upon the notion of a fundamental difference between 
female and male bodies. Lacqueur suggests that this reinterpretation of bodies 
»is explicable only within the context of battles over gender and power« (ibid: 
11).17
In the course of the 1990s in the USA and since the first decade of the 
21st century in Germany, a shift in the study of transsexuality took place. Eth-
nomethodological studies ›dissected‹ transsexual individuals rather than, for 
example, examine cis individuals in order to gain insights into the operations 
of the gender binary (Hoenes 2014: 37). While queer theory in principle allows 
conceptualising gendered practices and embodiments that question the gender 
binary (cf. Schirmer 2010: 24; Hoenes 2014: 35 f.) and has been drawn upon as 
such in Germany, queer theory has, at least in the US, frequently accentuated 
the same-sex choice side in anti-heteronormative enquiries (Stryker 2006: 7). 
In contrast, transgender studies highlights embodiments of »other modes of 
Conerly 1996, Cohen 1997, Gutiérrez Rodriguez 1999, Muñoz 1999, and El-Tayeb 2003, 
2004 and 2012. Castro Varela and Dhawan’s work (2005) is inspired by postcolonial 
perspectives. McRuer (2006) and Raab (2013) render queer theory productive for disability 
studies, whereas e. g. Cromwell (1999), Genschel (2001; 2003), Chase (2003) and Stryker 
(2004; 2006) engage with queer theory as a framework for studies in the field of transgender 
and intersex.
17 | Voß (2010) suggests that Laqueur overrates the ›one-sex-model‹. Based on a 
deconstructionist analysis of biological and medical studies, Voß argues that there were 
binary concepts of sex in the time Laqueur identifies as the ›one-sex-model‹ period and 
that sex was a conglomeration of various assumptions and ascriptions in society at all 
times.
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queer differences« (ibid), e. g., unusual genders, without necessarily neglecting 
issues related to their heterogeneous desires.
According to Stryker, the evolving interdisciplinary field of transgender 
studies, briefly summarised, examines three broad areas. First, transgender 
studies investigates human gender diversity in historically-specific contexts, 
fields and theories. Second, transgender studies examines rearticulations of 
gendered personhood and disruptions to normative assumptions on gender, 
embodiment and theories. Third, this field of investigation analyses how em-
bodied differences are transformed into social hierarchies, including the im-
pact of these systems of power on ›gender atypical‹ persons (Stryker 2003: 3). 
The evolving body of academic work in Germany that according to the defi-
nition above can be classified as contributions to transgender studies cannot be 
detached from subcultural and political developments in the trans movement. 
Balzer’s (2008) ethnological study on self-imagery and forms of self-organi-
sation in transgender subcultures in Rio de Janeiro, New York and Berlin and 
Schirmer’s (2010) empirical study on drag kinging in large German cities at-
test to rearticulations of gender.18 Since the late 1990s, the trans movement has 
grown and diversified which is evidenced, for example, in the rise of national 
lobbying groups and networks with broad political agendas and heterogene-
ous, until then publicly barely noticed trans(gender) subjects (de Silva 2014: 
153). Despite diverse perspectives on gender and trans, social movement politics 
challenges the hegemonic orchestration of gender on the political terrain along 
the lines of heteronomy, gendered embodiment and the limitation of viable 
genders to two. 
In Germany, transgender studies have so far engaged with a number of are-
as of investigation.19 In the humanities, Kilian (2004) explores gender bending 
in contemporary English and North American literature, focusing particularly 
on in- and exclusionary parameters of hegemonic gender discourse, the desta-
bilising potential of gender bending and the epistemic space art and literature 
create to imagine genders that defy classification and render gender boundaries 
18 | For further explorations of dragkinging, gender self-perceptions and realities, see 
Schirmer 2012, 2012a, 2013 and 2014.
19 | For Anglo-American engagements with transgender studies, see e. g. empirical 
studies on trans men (Devor 2016; Cromwell 1999; Rubin 2003; Green 2004). For the 
diversity of trans subjectivities, see e. g. Hines 2006, for legal studies, see Whittle 2002. 
For theoretical perspectives, see Stone 1991, Stryker 1994, Wilchins 1997 and Namaste 
2000 (cf. Whittle 2006: xiv). For the significance of the internet for the trans community, 
see Whittle 1998. For historical accounts, see Meyerowitz 2002 and Stryker 2008, and 
for an examination of the relationship between gender normativity and technologies of 
gender-related bodily alteration, see Spade 2006.
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fluid (cf. Kilian 2004: 250).20 Based on an analysis of visual representations of 
trans masculinities developed in trans and queer subcultures, Hoenes (2014) 
examines rearticulations of trans masculinities that challenge hegemonic un-
derstandings of masculinity as well as the notion of transsexuality as a state 
of being trapped in the ›wrong body‹. In her analysis of Fra Mand til Kvinde, 
its editorial history and historical contextualisation, Meyer (2015) explores how 
the public sphere, medical discourses and practices of normalisation and state 
regulation shaped Lili Elvenes’ subjectivity and gender alterity. 
Transgender studies in the social sciences include examinations of the for-
mation of trans subjectivities and collectivities under the constraints of het-
eronormative hegemony. In addition to Balzer’s and Schirmer’s studies men-
tioned above, Genschel (2001) traces Lou Sullivan’s struggle for a livable life 
as a female transvestite with a homosexual orientation or as a gay transsexual 
individual, respectively in a sexual and gender regime that defines as coherent 
a gendered self that follows a particular morphology and desires heterosexually. 
Another set of social scientific enquiries into the field of transgender stud-
ies deals with self-concepts and community building on the fringes of com-
munity subcultures. Balzer (2007) explores the changes and continuities in 
the self-concepts of queens (›Tunten‹) in Berlin against the background of the 
emerging trans movement towards the end of the 1990s. Embedded in a dis-
cussion of power, consent and boundaries, Bauer (2014) examines a broad spec-
trum of identities and collectivities, including trans, in his empirical study on 
queer BDSM intimacies in Europe and the US.
Social movement research and political community building constitute an-
other field of investigation in social scientific transgender studies. Regh (2002), 
Balzer (2008), de Silva (2014) and Lauwaert (2016; 2016a) address episodes in 
the contemporary trans movement. Regh (2002) and Balzer (2008) deal with 
developments from the mid-1990s to the turn of the century; de Silva (2014) en-
gages with structural and conceptual developments in the period from the late 
1990s to 2014, and Lauwaert (2016; 2016a) addresses political strategies in the 
1980s. In addition, Beger, Franzen and Genschel (2002) discuss trans politics.
Transgender studies in the social sciences also include explorations of regu-
lations and practices that shape trans. De Silva (2013) analyses how sexology 
and law constructed trans in relation to socially accepted genders prior to the 
enactment of the Transsexual Act. He also examines how law and medicine 
produce knowledge on trans from a hegemonic perspective and outlines trans 
movement reactions to the Transsexual Act, including suggestions for law re-
form at the beginning of the 21st century (ibid 2005). Hamm and Sauer (2014) 
point to flaws in the medical management of trans and argue for health service 
provision that responds to the needs of trans individuals, rather than main-
20 | See also Kilian 2004a, 2008 and 2014.
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taining a regime of pathologisation, compulsory medicalisation and psycho-
medical surveillance.
Franzen and Sauer (2010), Fuchs, Ghattas, Reinert and Widmann (2012) 
and LesMigraS e. V. (2012) conducted studies on the life situations of trans indi-
viduals. While Franzen and Sauer (2010) focus on issues related to work, Fuchs 
and her colleagues (2012) conducted an empirical study on experiences of trans 
individuals with the bureaucracy, the psycho-medical assessment process and 
the health system, education, work and private life in North-Rhine Westphalia. 
Informed by an intersectional approach, the study conducted by LesMigraS 
e. V. (2012) covers issues related to violence and multiple discrimination against 
lesbian and bisexual ciswomen and trans individuals.
Further contributions to transgender studies address tensions between 
queer theory and trans (Genschel 2003), concepts that conceal gender norma-
tivity (Hoenes 2007) and address the nexus of gender identity and internation-
al human rights (Sauer/Mittag 2012). Regardless of how diverse studies within 
the interdisciplinary field of transgender studies may be, the abovementioned 
non-exhaustive body of enquiries examines the life situations and subjectivi-
ties and/or collective cultural/political rearticulations of socially marginalised 
genders against the background of the gender binary in historically-specific 
settings.
This study is informed by, and contributes to, the growing body of transgen-
der studies by providing the first in-depth analysis of concepts of gender and 
trans(sexuality), their materialisation in practices and procedures in sexology, 
the law, federal politics and the trans movement and their interactions as well 
as their contestations from within the fields within the initially defined limits.
This project also contributes to the body of non-clinical work on trans(se x-
uality) in sexology. It traces the history of trans(sexuality) in the discipline and 
offers a critical reflection of norms and psycho-medical practices in the period 
from the early 1970s to the early 1980s and from the 1990s to 2014. The latter is 
particularly relevant in the light of the ongoing guideline debate and the debate 
on psycho-medical involvement under the Transsexual Act. 
This study also contributes to sociology of law. It engages with major de-
bates on trans(sexuality) in law from the mid-1960s to 2013, offers a history of 
reported jurisdiction related to the change of first names and revision of gender 
status in cases of transsexuality and provides the first socio-economically con-
textualised and structured account of reported cases in social law with regard 
to trans(sexuality). The study also offers a reflection of concepts of trans and 
gender in legal studies and the abovementioned fields of jurisdiction. 
While there is a study on the trans movement in the US (Stryker 2008), 
studies in Germany have so far dealt with smaller fragments of the social move-
ment. By offering the first in-depth exploration of major trans lobby groups and 
networks in Germany from the late 1990s to 2014, this project adds to these 
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fragments and contributes to social movement research in sociology. Embed-
ded in a concept of heteronormative hegemony, drawing upon premises and pa-
rameters of feminist theories of the state and focusing on the legislative process 
leading to the Transsexual Act, this project also renders issues related to trans 
and the gender regime a subject of investigation in political science.
1.3 sources and approaches
This study is based on sources that lend themselves to an analysis of three as-
pects. These are first, concepts of trans(sexuality), gender and gender regime 
within the disciplines and fields under investigation; second, sources that mir-
ror authoritative concepts within the respective discipline and area and third, 
sources that indicate dynamics between sexology, the law, the trans movement 
and the federal political arena in the period between roughly the 1960s and 
2014. Further sources embed these concepts within the different parameters, 
procedures and practices of the abovementioned disciplines and fields. Due to 
uneven developments and different operational logics, sources and approaches 
will be introduced separately for each discipline and area. Since this study is 
based on a large selection of heterogeneous written sources, they will be men-
tioned cursorily in the following and specified in the introductions of individ-
ual chapters. 
Sexological sources and approaches
Relevant developments and debates on trans(sexuality) in sexology were most 
pronounced in the period between the 1970s and the early 1980s and from the 
early 1990s to 2014. The 1970s, 1990s and the period after the Act to amend the 
Transsexual Act were periods of intense debate in sexology leading to reconcep-
tualisations of trans(sexuality) and the establishment or adjustment, respec-
tively of treatment programmes. While it is too early to assess the outcome of 
the current debate, authoritative concepts of transsexuality that emerged from 
the debates in the earlier periods influenced notions on trans(sexuality) in law 
and federal politics and sparked resistance in the social movement.
Sexological material includes monographs, a comprehensive scientific pa-
per, the national guidelines, disciplinary and interdisciplinary anthologies, ar-
ticles in sexological and psychiatric anthologies and relevant journals, includ-
ing legal journals, published and unpublished submissions and an influential 
article in a weekly news journal. While not sexological material, articles and
the guidelines produced by advisory bodies of statutory health insurance com-
panies are included, because they impact on the psycho-medical management 
of transsexuality and are debated in sexology as well as in the trans movement. 
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Compilations of case studies21 and single case studies22 are not included. 
Compilations of case studies addressed different questions, such as post-
operative satisfaction, and ›reversals‹, which are not the issue in this project. 
While individual case studies lend themselves to an analysis of concepts of 
trans(sexuality), gender and gender regime, they mostly featured individual 
problematic developments. 
Debates on trans children in sexological journals are also excluded. The 
study of trans children warrants a separate analysis that observes further power 
relations, such as for example, between parents or legal guardians and chil-
dren, other parameters and other guidelines.23
Sexological sources are systematised along four sets of material, which oc-
casionally overlap. With few exceptions,24 the sets of material lend themselves 
to an analysis of concepts of trans(sexuality), gender and gender regime, psy-
cho-medical practices and the dynamics within the discipline.
The first set of publications foremost deals with clinical aspects of trans(sex-
uality) and usually involved cis psychologists and psychiatrists, and to a signifi-
cantly lesser degree, surgeons. Clinical publications on trans(sexuality) cover 
issues related to the aetiology, clinical manifestations, diagnostics, differential 
diagnostics and treatment. The clinical debate draws through the entire period 
under investigation and features in individual articles on one or several clinical 
aspects, articles in anthologies and a scientific paper.
The second set of material is composed of authoritative documents. These 
documents represent outcomes of struggles within the discipline and contain 
recommended or binding rules. The national guidelines on transsexuality that 
regulate clinical aspects related to transsexuality as well as assessment pro-
cedures under the Transsexual Act (Becker et al. 1997) are to date the most 
prominent example.
The third set of publications deals with sexological interventions in other 
fields engaged with issues related to trans(sexuality). These sources are par-
ticularly relevant to the analysis of the dynamics between sexology and the law 
and sexology and federal politics. A number of articles published in legal jour-
nals prior to, and in the decade following the enactment of the Transsexual 
Act served to impart state of the art sexological knowledge on transsexuality 
with legal experts and to pave the way for health insurance assumption of costs 
21 | See e. g. Pfäfflin/Junge 1990; 1992.
22 | See e. g. Meyenburg 1992; Laszig/Knauss/Clement 1995; Soyka/Nedopil 1995; 
Becker et al. 1999; Diederichs 1999; Preuss 2005.
23 | For debates and studies on trans children and adolescents, see Cohen-Kettenis 
1994; Meyenburg 1994; Cohen-Kettenis 1995; Franzen 2007; Hellen 2009; Kennedy/
Hellen 2010; Kennedy 2014; Schneider 2015; Schneider/Haufe 2016.
24 | The recent debate on the Transsexual Act is one such exception.
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of sex reassignment surgery. A further source is a sexologist’s address to the 
public in der spiegel amidst the parliamentary debate on the Transsexual Bill 
(Pfäfflin 1980).
Without necessarily neglecting clinical aspects, the last set of publications 
related to trans(sexuality) engages with reflections on clinical practices, theo-
retical reflections on trans and gender and issues related to the overall institu-
tional environment that shapes the conditions for medical and legal transitions 
and psycho-medical professionals working in this field. This set of debates 
frequently involved, in addition to the abovementioned contributors, cis and 
trans sociologists, lawyers, scholars in gender studies and/or trans activists and 
organisations.25
The debates will be briefly contextualised here. Between the enactment of 
the Transsexual Act and the beginning of the reform period, a number of ar-
ticles emerged in sexology, which dealt with interpretations of the Act from a 
medical perspective. One debate dealt with issues related to interpretations of 
somatic requirements. Another set of publications addressed assessment pro-
cedures under the Act and issues related to medical law.
Debates on the overall institutional setting related to medical and surgical 
interventions gained momentum with the enactment of the Transsexual Act in 
1981 and statutory health insurance assumption of costs of medical and surgical 
interventions in 1987. This debate reignited in the late 2000s.
Sigusch’s two-part article on the depathologisation and detotalisation of 
transsexuality (Sigusch 1991; 1991a) sparked an interdisciplinary debate, where-
as reflections on gender and trans in sexology were only taken up several years 
later.
Another extensive and interdisciplinary debate ensued after three sexologi-
cal associations had published national guidelines on the treatment and assess-
ment of transsexual individuals in 1997.
Two major debates have arisen recently. One debate focuses on the guide-
lines on gender dysphoria that will replace the German Standards for the Treat-
ment and Diagnostic Assessment of Transsexuals (Standards der Behandlung 
und Begutachtung von Transsexuellen).26 The other debate addresses the Trans-
sexual Act, in particular, options for future procedures for a change of first 
names and a revision of gender status and the role psycho-medical experts 
should play in these procedures.
25 | With exception of trans organisations and their spokespersons, who are easily 
identifiable, trans individuals will not be marked as such in this book. However, trans 
individuals contributed to debates, if not propelled them, in all academic areas throughout 
the entire period under investigation.
26 | The German Standards for the Treatment and Diagnostic Assessment of Transsexuals 
will be referred to as the German Standards.
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Wherever possible, the clinical, meta-level debates and the German Stand-
ards are systematised according to clinical parameters and discussed within 
these parameters for three reasons. First, such an approach reveals the hetero-
geneity of perspectives and concepts within the discipline. Second, (re)concep-
tualisations and practices can be compared over a long period. Third, an ap-
proach that considers the parameters that limit manoeuver within a discipline 
appears more constructive than an approach that ignores them. Hence, while 
this project is analytical, conclusions can be drawn for sexology.
With regard to the German Standards, the most authoritative document 
to date, I also outlined the document and conducted a separate analysis of 
the concept of transsexuality, gender and gender regime. The discrepancy 
between the heterogeneous concepts within the discipline and the concept 
of transsexuality and diagnostic and treatment scheme laid down in the Ger-
man Standards allows conclusions to be drawn on the power relations within 
the discipline and the authoritative concepts of transsexuality that resulted 
from these dynamics.
Legal sources and approaches
Relevant developments and debates on revisions of gender status in cases of 
trans(sexuality) began in the late 1950s, gained momentum in the mid-1960s 
and have been a continuous process until 2011 and so far from 1987 to 2013 in 
jurisdiction related to statutory health insurance coverage of sex reassignment 
measures. The process of reading gender into the Civil Status Act (Personen-
standsgesetz [PStG]) and revisions of gender status began earlier. Therefore, 
I will also briefly address relevant jurisdiction in the period prior to the late 
1950s.
This study analyses concepts of trans(sexuality), gender and gender regime 
in jurisdiction and in legal debates pertaining to the change of first names and 
the revision of gender status in cases of transsexuality, and jurisdiction in so-
cial law as it relates to the statutory health insurance assumption of costs of sex 
reassigning measures. The latter are included for two reasons. First, jurisdic-
tion on constitutional issues and issues relevant to social law are subject to dif-
ferent parameters and operate according to different principles. Second, with-
out outlining developments in social law in the field of transsexuality, trans 
movement demands can barely be comprehended.
This study draws upon a large selection of different legal sources. These are 
court decisions, legal commentaries, legal comments, individual articles in le-
gal and sexological journals, monographs, statutes and in less quantity articles 
in disciplinary and interdisciplinary anthologies.
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Relevant sources in jurisdiction include all reported court cases on the Civil 
Status Act relating to transsexuality27 before the Transsexual Act was enacted, 
all Federal Constitutional Court decisions prior to, and after the enactment 
of the Transsexual Act, several reported higher and lower court cases on the 
Transsexual Act and a large selection of reported court cases on statutory health 
insurance issues related to the assumption of costs of sex reassignment surgery 
that are available in legal journals and publicly accessible and non-commercial 
online data bases.
A number of legal articles immediately lend themselves to an analysis of 
dynamics between sexology and law that appeared in sexological journals in 
the period prior to the enactment of the Transsexual Act as well as prior to the 
reform process. Written by cis and trans lawyers, these articles problematised 
inaccuracy in medical terminology and engaged in debates related to conceptu-
alising and assessing transsexual individuals.
Developments in jurisdiction and federal politics frequently sparked legal 
academic debates on issues related to the revision of transsexual individuals’ 
gender status or evolved at the same time. This study considers the following 
legal academic debates and developments in jurisdiction. The controversy in 
jurisdiction and in legal scholarship over reading transsexuality into the Civil 
Status Act prior to the Transsexual Act lends itself to an analysis of three as-
pects. These include conflicts over medical and legal concepts of transsexuality 
and gender in law, differences between higher and lower courts as well as the 
selection and interpretations of individual sections of the Civil Status Act, in-
cluding the complex interrelations of these factors.
The fact that the Transsexual Act required somatic measures but did not 
specify concrete medical or surgical inventions also led to debates on the in-
terpretation of relevant rules of the Transsexual Act in jurisdiction and legal 
scholarship. High regional courts and legal scholars engaged in interpretations 
of somatic measures under the Transsexual Act in the 1980s and 1990s.
Somatic requirements under the Transsexual Act once more became a topic 
in the first decade of the 21st century in jurisdiction and in the legal debate. 
The academic debate generated a number of legal comments and articles on 
Federal Constitutional Court decisions and legal designs for a revision of the 
Transsexual Act. In the context of Federal Constitutional Court decisions in 
the course of the first decade of the 21st century and the pending transsexual 
law reform process in federal politics, legal scholars also discussed the issue of 
marriage and registered life partnership.
27 | While this project also draws upon Augstein’s (1982) research on unreported lower 
court decisions on transsexuality and intersexuality prior to the Transsexual Act, I did not 
conduct any research on unreported court decisions.
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Legal and gender studies scholars also discussed trans in anti-discrimina-
tion law throughout the reform period. This debate ties in with the Federal 
Constitutional Court decision on the eligibility of foreigners with permanent 
residency in the Federal Republic of Germany to an application under the 
Transsexual Act.
In addition, the study considers an article, which alerted to constitutional 
issues of the Transsexual Act well before other legal experts did so, and an ar-
ticle on the development of applications under the Act.
Analogously to the sexological debate and for the same reasons, I will ana-
lyse concepts of transsexuality and gender, and wherever applicable, interpreta-
tions of sexological and trans movement concepts of trans in jurisdiction and 
the legal academic debates, within the respective statutory context and param-
eters of the discipline.
Trans movement sources and approaches
Relevant periods of an analysis of concepts of trans(sexuality), gender and 
gender regime in the political branch of the trans movement cover the period 
between the 1970s and the early 1980s and from the mid-1990s to 2014. The 
earlier period was marked by social movement struggles for a change of first 
names and a revision of gender status and for health insurance assumption of 
costs of sex reassignment treatment, whereas the period since the mid-1990s 
saw the rise, consolidation and increasing differentiation of the political branch 
of the trans movement. Among other things, the social movement took issue 
with normative psycho-medical concepts and disciplinary practices, the statu-
tory health insurance management of trans(sexuality), rules of the Transsexual 
Act, and more recently, the Act altogether, and government inactivity.
With exception of researching petitions directed to the federal government 
during the legislative process leading to the Transsexual Act, I did not conduct 
any empirical research on the social movement in the period from the 1970s to 
the mid-1990s. Research for this period is being undertaken elsewhere at the 
time of writing. Sources for the period prior to the Transsexual Act are based 
on references to the social movement in interdisciplinary debates in sexology 
and an activist’s article (Regh 2002). The abovementioned sources offer differ-
ent perspectives on trans in the period prior to the Transsexual Act, the context 
and development of the social movement and assessments of trans movement 
contributions to the Transsexual Act.
The analysis of trans(sexuality), gender and gender regime in the social 
movement from the mid-1990s to 2014 examines all major and long-lived 
trans lobby groups and networks in Germany with a national and occasion-
ally international scope of political involvement. In addition, the most promi-
nent temporary coalitions are considered, especially since formulating political 
demands and suggestions for trans law reform were frequently collaborative 
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endeavours. This study also includes a regional coalition and a nationwide 
network, which has emerged recently and a supranational trans organisation 
of which some of the organisations and networks are members. Regional and 
supranational organisations and networks are included to describe the overall 
structure of trans movement lobby organisations and networks that developed 
in the course of the period under investigation.
Research was conducted on the websites of the selected organisations, net-
works and coalitions. Sources include mission statements, self-presentations, 
presentations of the respective trans organisation or network history, by-laws, 
programmes, reports to various UN organisations, suggestions for law reform, 
declarations, statements and press releases, flyers, frequently asked questions 
(FAQs), brochures, published talks and speeches, submissions to the federal 
government and open letters. Further sources include observations by Whittle 
(1998), Regh (2002) and the German Association for Sex Research (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Sexualforschung [DGfS]).
Considering the lack of research on the trans movement, the sources to 
varying degrees and in partly overlapping ways provide a basis for describing 
trans organisations and networks structurally, conceptually and politically. In 
order to describe the overall structural changes within the trans movement, 
this study draws upon the history of organisations, self-presentations, member-
ship lists and by-laws.
In order to outline trans lobby group and network activities, I divided these 
into information and education, support and outreach, and lobbying and net-
working. The purpose of addressing these fields is to present a brief overview of 
activities before turning to an in-depth analysis of politically relevant issues. I 
drew upon by-laws, mission statements, flyers, announcements of events and 
references to further activities and community services.
Speeches, reports, programmes and a flyer addressed to doctors, by-laws, 
TransMann’s FAQs (TransMann 2004a) and an open letter to psycho-medical 
professionals engaged in assessment procedures (Alter 2008a) provide a back-
ground for outlining trans movement perspectives on legal rules, psycho-med-
ical premises, procedures and practices. The history of the organisations, the 
abovementioned FAQs, talks, speeches and articles published on organisation 
websites, programmes, reports, flyers that present the organisation or network 
and mission statements are used to analyse concepts of trans(sexuality), gender 
and gender regime in the trans movement. While submissions, suggestions for 
trans law reform, suggested drafts for legislation and declarations also provide 
a basis for such an analysis, they additionally reveal how these concepts were 
negotiated within concrete constellations of power, parameters of the legislative 
processes and outcomes of related social struggles.
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Sources and approaches to the legislative processes
Relevant periods of an analysis of concepts of trans(sexuality), gender and gen-
der regime in federal politics cover the period from the early 1970s to the be-
ginning of 1981 and from 2000 to 2009. The first period begins with pre-leg-
islative parliamentary calls for legislation, and ends with the enactment of the 
Transsexual Act in Jan. 1981 and will be dealt with in depth. The second period 
begins with enquiries conducted by the Federal Home Office (Bundesministe-
rium des Innern [BMI]) with trans organisations and sexologists on the Trans-
sexual Act in Oct. 2000 and ends with the enactment of the Act to amend the 
Transsexual Act in July 2009. Since the legislative processes on the federal 
level developed and are treated differently in this study, sources and approaches 
will be described separately, starting with those for the process leading to the 
Transsexual Act.
Sources include one motion, a draft bill, a government bill, minutes of 
plenary debates in the German Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag)28 and in the 
Bundesrat, minutes of committee debates, a sexological submission, one article 
submitted by a Member of Parliament (MP), a questionnaire and a summary of 
answers from sexologists, petitions, letters by petitioners to the Federal Home 
Office, parliamentary enquiries and government responses and the Transsex-
ual Act. 
The sources are organised along four criteria. The first set allows a contex-
tualisation and description of the legislative process, highlighting the overall 
lines of conflict between various state actors over issues related to trans legis-
lation prior to, and during the process. The former erupted between a small 
group of social democratic Members of the Bundestag and the social-liberal 
government. The latter was marked by conflicts between the Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat. In these instances, parliamentary enquiries and government 
responses are particularly relevant sources. With regard to the outline of the 
legislative process, I drew upon a number of sources. These include the Draft 
Bill TSG-R, the Government Bill TSG-E, minutes and recommendations of the 
committees involved in the legislative proceedings, minutes of the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat plenary debates, a statement by the federal government and 
documentation of the compromise negotiated between the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat.
The second set of sources deals with sexological and trans interventions that 
accessed the federal political level during the legislative proceedings. These 
sources lend themselves to an examination of venues sexologists and trans 
individuals were offered to impart their perspectives, trans and sexologists’ 
perspectives on the Transsexual Bill and an in-depth analysis of concepts of 
trans(sexuality). Among these sources are an influential article mentioned ear-
28 | The German Bundestag will be referred to as Bundestag.
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lier on, a summary of the answers to a questionnaire, an article co-authored by 
an MP, petitions29 and letters to the Federal Home Secretary (Bundesinnenmi-
nister) and to the Bundestag Committee on Home Affairs (Deutscher Bundes-
tag – Innenausschuss).
The third set of sources allows an in-depth analysis of concepts of trans(sexua-
lity), gender and gender regime as they were debated along the parameters of 
the Transsexual Bill, balancing rights between trans and cis individuals and 
the way medical and trans knowledge was deployed. The analysis relies on a 
selection of minutes of the plenary debates in the Bundestag, and minutes of 
Bundestag and Bundesrat committee meetings that document debates on trans-
sexuality.
The fourth set lends itself to an analysis of authoritative concepts of 
trans(sexuality), gender and gender regime. The Transsexual Act as the legally 
binding outcome of a conflictual process functions as an authoritative text. 
Therefore, the document will be outlined prior to conducting a separate analy-
sis along the abovementioned criteria.
In addition to minutes of plenary and committee debates and motions, 
sources on the second legislative process include sexological and trans move-
ment submissions on a (failed) initial draft, statements on the initial draft, trans 
movement and psycho-medical responses to the initial draft, submissions for 
a public hearing and minutes of the hearing, draft bills by political parties, the 
Government Bill and the Act to amend the Transsexual Act. 
An initial attempt to reform the Transsexual Act began in 2000 and failed 
in 2009. While there were a number of parliamentary enquiries since Nov. 
200130 and government responses,31 increasingly motions32 and drafts for a re-
vision of the Transsexual Act by political parties,33 there was, with exception 
of devising the Government Bill34 and conducting a public hearing in 2007, 
no substantial government activity related to a revision of the Transsexual Act. 
While several of these sources lend themselves to an analysis of trans, gen-
der and gender regime, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide such an 
analysis. However, I will briefly draw upon draft bills and the Act to amend the 
Transsexual Act to highlight aspects indicating social change.
29 | There were eight petitions in all, two of which were authored by the same person. 
All petitioners are anonymised and not pseudonymised. I numbered the petitioners 
according to the appearance of the documents.
30 | See, e. g. Deutscher Bundestag 2001; 2002; 2004.
31 | See, e. g. Deutscher Bundestag 2001a; 2002a; 2004a.
32 | See, e. g. Deutscher Bundestag 2006; 2008; 2009.
33 | See, e. g. Deutscher Bundestag 2007; 2009a; 2009b.
34 | See Deutscher Bundestag 2009b.
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Documents on the legislative process on the Transsexual Act are compiled 
in vol. 738 and documents on the legislative process on the Act to amend the 
Transsexual Act in vol. XVI/0529 in the Parliamentary Archive (Parlament-
sarchiv) in Berlin.35 Documents regarding the Transsexual Law Reform Bill, 
which never entered the parliamentary debate, were obtained from three plac-
es. The Draft Transsexual Law Reform Bill is published online. Minutes of the 
public hearing on 28 Feb. 2007 that served as one source for devising the bill 
are enclosed in vol. XVI/0529 in the Parliamentary Archive. I obtained submis-
sions by trans organisations and sexological submissions on the Transsexual 
Act in 1999 and 2000 in the Federal Home Office in 2009. The latter are not 
included in the documentation of proceedings on the Act to amend the Trans-
sexual Act and are on file with the author.36
1.4 perspectIves on tr ans and the tr ans movement
1.4.1 Perspectives on trans(sexualit y)
Trans(sexuality) has been conceptualised in a number of ways in sexology, 
jurisdiction, in the trans movement and during the negotiations in federal 
politics in the period this study addresses. The following perspectives emerge 
more or less consistently and for different purposes. They occasionally overlap 
or constitute each other and cross the fields under investigation with shifting 
margins over time, both within the fields as a whole and within individuals 
engaging with issues related to trans(sexuality).
Perspectives range from variations of pathologisation37 to perspectives on 
trans(sexuality) that consider trans(sexuality) one of many viable modes of em-
bodying gender.38 Another set of perspectives suggests that trans(sexuality)
35 | Parliamentary enquiries, suggestions for bills devised by political parties and the 
statutes for the reform period are also available online at https://www.bundestag.de/
parlamentsdokumentation.
36 | While some trans organisations published their submissions online, sexological 
submissions are, with exception of the submission of the DGfS, unpublished.
37 | See, for instance, Becker 1965, Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979 in the period 
prior to the Transsexual Act, and sexological contributions by Hartmann/Becker 2002 and 
Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005 and premises of the neuroscientific research by Bauer 2010 
during the reform period.
38 | See, for example, Sigusch 1991, Hirschauer 1992 and Lindemann 1992 in the 
debate on depathologisation and Lindemann 1997, Kaltenmark/Kasimir/Rauner 1998 
and de Silva 2005 in the debate on the German Standards.
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constitutes a minority,39 whereas others are informed by perspectives that in-
vestigate into processes of minoritisation.40 Some perspectives are informed 
by essentialist premises,41 while others draw upon social constructionist and/
or deconstructionist thought.42 A few perspectives construct trans(sexuality) as 
the privileged subject predestined to eliminating the gender binary.43
Like Bauer (2014), my perspective is premised on the notion of human dif-
ference. I question the validity of dividing certain embodiments of gender into 
›healthy‹ and ›normal‹ on the one hand and others as ›sick‹ and ›abnormal‹ 
on the other hand. Shaped by queer and deonstructionist transgender studies 
thought, I question the heteronormative gender binary as a natural fact and 
consider the gender regime a social construction that operates to establish and 
sustain social hierarchies.
Informed by queer political and legal critiques of liberal thought, I also 
question the assumption that society is inevitably divided into majorities and 
irreducible minorities. With regard to trans, this assumption conceals the op-
erations of power that have transformed gendered embodiments into social hi-
erarchies, i. e. the process of minoritisation (cf. Herman 1994: 38). Moreover, 
minoritising perspectives easily lend themselves to essentialism, paternalism 
and a legitimation of transphobia.44
I also reject the notion of trans individuals as privileged subjects for dis-
mantling the gender binary for two reasons. First, such a perspective neglects 
other political struggles that directly or indirectly challenge the gender binary, 
such as intersex45 politics. Second, rather than place the onus of unmaking the 
39 | See, for example, the plenary debate on the Transsexual Bill and Windel 2008 
and Wielpütz 2012 in the legal debates on marriage and registered life partnership and 
somatic requirements for a revision of gender status under the Transsexual Act.
40 | See, for example, Adamietz 2006, 2011 and Grünberger 2006, 2007 and 2008 in 
the abovementioned debates.
41 | See, for instance, Neumann’s (1970) and Dörner’s (1995) quest for a somatic ›cause‹ 
of transsexuality and in a fraction of the contemporary social movement.
42 | See, for example, Alter 2002 and Adamietz 2006; 2011.
43 | This perspective is most prominently represented by Sigusch (1991).
44 | For an example, see the section »Perspectives on somatic requirements for a 
revision of gender status in legal scholarship since the turn of the century« towards the 
end of chapter 3.3.4.
45 | As I will explain in more detail elsewhere, medical, legal and subcultural terminology 
in Germany language has been, and continues to be heterogeneous with regard to 
intersex. As this study evolved, the term ›inter‹ (›Inter*‹) emerged in intersex subcultures, 
which is used analogously to ›trans‹ (›Trans*‹). I will for pragmatic reasons usually refer to 
this heterogeneous population with the term ›intersex individuals‹, a term that continues 
to be widely accepted within the community.
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gender binary on minoritised subjects (cf. Lindemann 1992: 268), redressing 
social injustice of any kind is a task that necessarily involves society as a whole, 
without however, ignoring the voices of social movements organising for social 
change.
1.4.2 Perspectives on the trans movement
Currently, there is a controversy among social movement lobby organisations 
over the issue whether there are two separate social movements, i. e. a trans 
movement and a transsexual movement or whether we are dealing with one 
social movement, i. e. the trans movement. This rift in the social movement 
features most prominently between the organisation ATME e. V. and other ma-
jor trans movement lobby organisations and networks considered in this study.
Representatives of the perspective that there are two social movements 
present two arguments to support their perspective. First, subsuming trans-
sexuality under any umbrella term, such as ›trans‹ or ›transgender‹ renders 
transsexual individuals invisible. Second, subsuming transsexual individuals 
under the umbrella term ›trans‹ and the ›transsexual movement‹ under ›trans 
movement‹ disregards self-determination (Schicklang 2013). 
Other major organisations and networks suggest that ›trans‹ is a category 
that defies definitional closure and consists of diverse individuals, who cannot, 
or do not want to live according to the gender they were assigned to at the time 
of birth (cf. TrIQ 2009). From this perspective and since the definition and 
policy aimed at an acceptance of gender diversity includes transsexual individu-
als, there is one social movement with different articulations. 
In this study, the contemporary ›trans movement‹ is broadly defined as a 
set of diverse individuals, networks and organisations organising for a range 
of purposes that is not limited to, but includes the goal of achieving the means 
and conditions to live without discrimination based on the embodiment of gen-
der. According to this definition, there is one social movement made of indi-
viduals with diverse perspectives and self-definitions.
1.5 theore tIcal consIder atIons
1.5.1 Sex, gender, sexualit y, the subject and gender regime
Outline of Butler’s concept of sex, gender, sexualit y, 
the subject and gender regime
Butler draws upon a Foucauldian notion of power. Hence, power fulfils two 
functions. On the one hand, power is restrictive and regulatory; on the other 
hand, power is productive (Butler 1990: 2). Power is a constituent feature of all 
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social and cultural interactions. Therefore, there is no position outside the field 
of juridical structures of language and politics (ibid: 5). 
Butler develops her concept of the subject by setting out from a critique of 
a stable, universal and unitary concept of woman as the subject of feminism in 
representational discourse, i. e. a prediscursive subject created and restrained 
within the structures of power (ibid: 1). She argues that a naturalised founda-
tion of ›woman‹ serves to legitimate the law’s regulatory hegemony (ibid: 2) and 
suggests that the subject is constituted of multiple social intersections that can-
not be reduced to a privileged, consistent and coherent subject position (ibid: 3). 
Therefore, any analytical and political decontextualisation from other axes of 
power fails to be exhaustive (ibid).
Noting that gender is historically and culturally diverse, Butler concludes 
that gender cannot be deduced from sex in any one way. Taken to its logical 
limits, Butler suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and cul-
turally constructed genders. Assuming for the sake of the argument that sexes 
and genders are limited to two, ›man‹ and ›masculine‹ could signify a female 
body and ›woman‹ and ›feminine‹ a male body (ibid: 6). Butler deconstructs 
the notion of sex as prediscursive, arguing that if it is e. g. possible to trace the 
discursive production of seemingly natural facts of sex, then ›sex‹ is as cultur-
ally constructed as is ›gender‹ (ibid: 7).
Butler suggests that gender is produced performatively. Performativity de-
scribes a repetition of norms that constitute the subject. ›Gender‹ is the per-
formative effect of a regulatory regime of gender differences in which genders 
are divided and hierarchised under constraint (Butler 1997: 16). The reiteration 
of norms congeals over time to appear as ›natural‹ (ibid 1990: 33). Regulatory 
practices of gender formation produce gender identity as a normative ideal ac-
cording to which only those genders are considered intelligible and sexualities 
not perverse that maintain a coherence of sex, gender, sexual practice and de-
sire. The heterosexualisation of desire demands and reproduces the production 
of distinct and asymmetrical oppositions between the ›feminine‹ and the ›mas-
culine‹ (ibid: 17). Therefore, the gender binary is also heteronormative.
Since gender discourse precedes the subject and drawing upon Althusser, 
Butler suggests that the subject only comes into being through interpellation. 
As a result, the status of individuals who do not follow gender norms of cultural 
intelligibility is called into question. Individuals whose gender does not follow 
from sex and whose desire does not follow from sex or gender appear as disor-
ders or logical impossibilities (ibid).
Critiques of Butler’s concept of sex, gender, sexualit y, 
the subject and gender regime
Butler’s theorems offer three major insights relevant to the subsequent analy-
sis. First, by denaturalising sex, she deconstructs the seemingly causal link 
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between the sexed body as ›female‹ or ›male‹ and gender as ›woman‹ or ›man‹, 
respectively. Theoretically, a ›woman‹ with a ›male‹ body and vice versa can 
be conceptualised. Second, Butler’s axioms call into question the gender bina-
ry.46 Third, she uncovers heterosexuality as one of the governing principles that 
structures the relations between the naturalised sexes.
However, Butler’s concepts of the subject and gender regime in her early 
work are limited. Framing socially minoritised subjects as ›unintelligible‹ sug-
gests that Butler considers these subjects in relation to the hegemonic only 
(cf. Schirmer 2010: 44). Such a perspective precludes conceptualising socially 
minoritised subjectivities and their articulations, social realities and political 
struggles. In his study on FTMs and transmen, Cromwell for example notes 
that, 
Butler discusses the power positions that disallow non-normal (i. e. nonheterosexual) 
identities and identifications. From a legal standpoint (and possibly from her philo-
sophical perspective) such positions are illegitimate. In everyday life, however, the non-
normal occurs with great frequency. Although those in positions of power continually 
try to erase subject-positions outside of what is viewed as culturally legitimate (and 
consequently normal and viable), people who live those subject-positions continue to 
attempt to ar ticulate them. As they find their tongues, they subvert the concept of iden-
tity and the binary construction of bodies, sexes, genders, and sexualities. (Cromwell 
1999: 126)
While Foucault focuses on sexuality, his concept of practices of self in his late 
work offers a theoretical axiom that allows conceptualising heterogeneous ar-
ticulations and modes of becoming a subject without losing sight of the histori-
cally-specific power relations and formations of knowledge through which sub-
jects emerge (cf. Schirmer 2010: 49). Foucault distinguishes between systems 
of rules and values that operate in society in multifarious and contradictory 
ways, and »models proposed for setting up and developing relationships with 
the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipher-
ment of the self by oneself, for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish 
with oneself as object« (Foucault 1990: 29). Foucault notes that while codes of 
behaviour and forms of subjectivation can never be entirely separated, »they 
may develop in independence from one another« (ibid), generating conflicts 
or compromises at different times (ibid: 30). Rather than being relegated to an 
›outside‹, the concept of practices and technologies of self allow trans subjec-
46 | In her earlier work (1990), she indicates that further sexes and genders are 
imaginable, and in her later work (2004), she engages with existential issues related to 
socially minoritised genders (Kilian 2010: 102; 2011: 232).
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tivities to be conceptualised, for example, as a plurality of subjects that relate to 
gender codes differently.47
Second, Butler conceptualises the link between sex, gender and heterosexu-
ality, i. e. the ›heterosexual matrix‹ (Butler 1990: 27) abstractly and ahistorically. 
As a result, historically-specific power relations remain opaque (Ludwig 2012: 
100) and social struggles cannot be conceptualised. Engel suggests that this 
problem occurs, because Butler focuses on normativity and neglects issues re-
lated to normalisation (Engel 2002: 70 f.).48
Engel proposes two solutions. First, she develops a concept of »rigid nor-
mativity and flexible normalisation«49 (ibid: 72 ff.).50 However, as Mesquita 
suggests, heteronormativity and normalisation do not exist apart from each 
other. Rather, mechanisms of normalisation develop from heteronormative as-
sumptions. She argues that normalisation can have exclusionary effects, while 
heteronormativity may operate to normalise. She therefore suggests that the 
relationship between normativity and normalisation can only be determined in 
concrete instances (Mesquita 2012: 51).
However, Engel’s second suggestion contributes to an extension of the ›het-
erosexual matrix‹ that allows conceptualising dynamics and, as an effect, social 
struggles, including their complex interrelationships. Engel suggests taking 
into consideration a plurality of norms that operate simultaneously, possibly 
in contradictory and interwoven ways, rather than focus on a singular norm 
(Engel 2002: 75-80). This way, norms regulating e. g. sexuality and gender, 
and queer and trans struggles can be conceptualised and related to each other. 
The findings in this study underscore Engel’s considerations. Successful 
struggles for the decriminalisation of male homosexuality in 1994 and the rec-
ognition of same-sex partnerships in 2001 e. g. impacted on Federal Constitu-
tional Court jurisdiction on rules of the Transsexual Act since 2005, and they 
47 | While Butler does not integrate the Foucauldian concept of practices of self 
consistently in a theoretical framework, there are hints in her later work that she considers 
practices of self, e. g. when referring to the concept of fantasy. According to Butler, »[f]
antasy is what allows us to imagine ourselves and others otherwise; it establishes the 
possible in excess of the real; it points elsewhere, and when it is embodied, it brings the 
elsewhere home.« (Butler 2004: 29)
48 | In her later work, Butler takes into consideration processes of normalisation (Butler 
2004: 41-43).
49 | With exception of Articles from the Basic Law, the Argentinian Ley de identidad de 
género and ATME e. V.’s bilingual reports, all translations from German to English are mine.
50 | Engel’s concept of normalisation is based on Foucault’s concept of biopower that 
encompasses disciplinary, regulatory as well as technologies of self as means of subjec-
tivation and individualisation (Foucault 1978).
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also offered trans organisations and individual litigants a basis to shape their 
demands in submissions to the government.
Taking into consideration critiques of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony51 
(Ludwig 2011: 81-85), critiques of the omission of gender as an analytical cat-
egory in Foucault’s concept of governmentality and technologies of self as well 
as critiques of the emphasis on normativity and the ahistoricity of Butler’s con-
cept of the ›heterosexual matrix‹, Ludwig (2011) fuses the adjusted concepts to 
develop a queer-feminist theory of the state, subject and heteronormativity as 
a co-constitutive and hegemonic relationship. The focus of this project is not 
on the co-constitutive inscription of state power into the subject and vice versa. 
However, I draw upon Ludwig’s extended concept of Gramsci’s concept of he-
gemony to suggest that the gender binary is a hegemonic regime.52
Inspired by Gramsci, Ludwig suggests that alongside other interlocking he-
gemonic relationships (Ludwig 2012: 106 f.), heteronormative hegemony is an 
integral part of contemporary state formation that operates using coercion and 
consent and an expression and (temporary) result of social struggles53 (ibid: 
104). A hegemonic regime is a contested power formation in which heterogene-
ous demands are articulated and which is sustained precisely by integrating 
demands and heterogeneous perspectives. As such, the dynamics of perma-
nent transformation enables its stability (ibid: 105). Moreover, heteronormative 
hegemony is a historically-specific state formation, i. e. there is no universal 
heteronormative hegemony. It can only be analysed in a concrete and histori-
cally-specific space (Ludwig 2011: 234).
51 | Gramsci’s concept of hegemony includes a state-theoretical dimension and a di-
mension of social transformation (Schreiber 1984: 49 f.). The former dimension provides 
instruments for historically-specifically analysing a state formation, i. e., the state and 
civil society (SPN 1991: 263; cf. Priester 1979: 524; Buci-Glucksmann 1979: 218), or, 
what Gramsci calls the ›integral state‹; the latter a strategy for subalterns to achieve 
hegemony. According to Gramsci, a hegemonic order is maintained economically (SPN 
1991: 345), institutionally, ideologically (ibid: 328), culturally (ibid: 268) and through 
social practices (ibid: 265) in civil society as well as on the level of the state. Laclau and 
Mouffe (1990: 69) criticised his class-reductionist concept and developed the counter-
hegemonic dimension of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony further in their concept of radi-
cal democracy, using poststructuralist theorems.
52 | In the discussion between Butler, Laclau and Zizek (2000), Butler briefly contem-
plates the notion of hegemony (Butler/Laclau/Zizek 2000: 13 f.; cf. Ludwig 2011: 183). 
However, as Ludwig notes, she does not reformulate the ›heterosexual matrix‹ to ›hetero-
sexual hegemony‹ (Ludwig 2011: 184).
53 | ›Consent‹ in a Gramscian sense is a product of cultural and moral leadership (Ludwig 
2011: 57).
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Ludwig relates heteronormative hegemony to contemporary neoliberal pro-
cesses of transformation and considers cismen and -women (ibid: 218-245). 
While I do not rule out that neoliberalism and heteronormative hegemony 
might be interwoven, the focus of this analysis is not on relating trans to neolib-
eralism. Rather, effects of struggles over homosexuality form the background 
developments against which developments and debates on trans are analysed.
1.5.2 The liberal-democratic state
Ludwig (2011; 2012) offers a concept for theorising the macro-level of the state, 
i. e. heteronormative hegemony as a constitutive element of state formation, 
and the micro-level, i. e. subject constitution as an effect of state power and vice 
versa. However, she does not theorise the intermediate level, such as concrete 
state apparatuses, their interrelationship or social struggle on the terrain of the 
state. Therefore, I will turn to feminist theories of the state that address this 
dimension.
Few feminist theories of the state have so far engaged with the gender bi-
nary or the relationship between the state and minoritised genders. Feminist 
theories of the state have so far usually concentrated on the masculinist char-
acter of the state e. g. from its very foundation (Pateman 1988), or as inscribed 
into its procedures (MacKinnon 1989). The same applies to queer or feminist 
theories of the state that address the nexus between the state and sexuality 
(Cooper 1993; 1994; 1995). They nevertheless, albeit to varying degrees, provide 
analytical tools for conceptualising issues relevant to capturing the specifities 
of a concrete national development, such as definitions of the state, the relation-
ship between state apparatuses and state-society dynamics, including the rela-
tive autonomy of the state, state agency, state boundaries and access to the state.
Definitions of the liberal-democratic state, state structure 
and the interrelationship between state apparatuses
Feminist theories of the state have defined the state in various ways, ranging 
from unitary concepts to concepts that stress the fragmentation of the state. 
MacKinnon (1989) developed a unitary concept of the state by equating the 
state with the law. By reducing the state to the law, she develops too unsophis-
ticated a concept of the state. Her concept precludes analysing the relationship 
between state apparatuses, including competing concepts of trans, gender and 
gender regime within and among state apparatuses. 
Moreover, and as Franzway, Court and Connell (1989: 30) note, the law it-
self is not monolithic. With regard to this study, court decisions e. g. differed 
substantially in the period prior to the Transsexual Act. In addition, different 
areas of the law, such as for example jurisdiction in constitutional law and so-
cial law operate according to very different parameters and logics. 
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Socialist feminist (e. g. Franzway/Court/Connell 1989), poststructural-
ist (e. g. Pringle/Watson 1990; Brown 1992) and approaches to the state that 
combine social constructionist and poststructuralist approaches (Cooper 1993; 
1994; 1995) provide more complex definitions of the state and its apparatus-
es. However, they address, and respond to, the complexity of the state in differ-
ent ways.
One response in feminist theorising of the state to the complexity of the 
state has been not to define the state at all. Allen (1990) suggests that the con-
cept of the state is 
too aggregative, too unitary, and too unspecific to be of much use in addressing the dis-
aggregated, diverse and specific (or local) sites that must be of most pressing concern 
to feminists. ›The state‹ is too blunt an instrument to be of much assistance (beyond 
generalizations) in explanations, analyses or the design of workable strategies. (Allen 
1990: 22) 
She suggests focusing on more nuanced theoretical categories, such as the po-
lice, legal, medical or bureaucratic cultures instead, to name a few examples 
(ibid: 35).
This perspective of the state has been contested. While Cooper does not 
deny the usefulness of exploring specific governmental practices, she suggests 
continuing to explore the concept of the state (Cooper 1995: 59). She argues 
that entirely dispersed models of the state cannot adequately consider specific 
racialised, gendered and class inscriptions into the state, which »are articulated 
together in ways that may lead to an intensification of power, or alternatively, 
generate conflict and the subversion of particular state practices« (ibid: 60).
This study suggests that despite different parameters, operational logics, 
practices and rules, and tensions between various state apparatuses and lev-
els of jurisdiction, dominant state apparatuses interacted to restore the gender 
binary as one of its hegemonic inscriptions. Therefore, I suggest maintaining 
a definition of the state that is however based on a complex understanding of 
its composition, operations, institutional interrelations, ideologies and state-
society dynamics.
Franzway, Court and Connell define the state as 
the central institutionalisation of social power […]. As a central institution the state is 
involved with the overall patterning of gender relations, the ›gender order‹ of the society 
as a whole. The state has itself a particular gender regime, but this internal order is not 
necessarily the same as the overall patterning of gender relations, the ›gender order‹ of 
society as a whole. (Franzway/Court/Cornell 1989: 52) 
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They suggest defining the state apparatuses along the lines of gender and 
identify four state instrumentalities. These are the central directorate, i. e. the 
policy-making levels of the bureaucracy and the political leadership (ibid: 42); 
the machinery of coercion and social order, i. e. the military, the police, courts 
and prisons; welfare instrumentalities, such as education, health and social 
security and finally infrastructural services (ibid: 42). The unity of the state 
is established as a limited but constantly renewed accomplishment of which 
administration, finance and ideology are the key instruments (ibid: 45). By de-
termining these factors, the state is also endowed with clear boundaries, a fix-
ity it does not possess (cf. Cooper 1995: 60 f.). However, Franzway, Court and 
Connell outline a number of analytical tools for examining the state, some of 
which I will draw upon. These are the place of the state, state structure and 
state-society dynamics (ibid: 37-55).
In contrast, poststructuralist feminist definitions of the state emphasise 
»the contingency of outcomes, the non-unitary nature of the state, and the plu-
rality of social interests« (Cooper 1994: 7). Pringle and Watson for example 
define the state »not as an institution but as a set of arenas; a by-product of 
political struggles whose coherence is as much established in discourse as in 
shifting and temporary connections« (Pringle/Watson 1990: 229). The state 
features as a historically-specific product of social struggles (ibid). 
Brown’s definition is slightly more specific. She describes the state as »an 
incoherent, multifaceted ensemble of power relations« (Brown 1992: 12). The 
state is not »an ›it‹«, »a thing, system, or subject« (ibid). Rather, it features 
as »a significantly unbounded terrain of powers and techniques, an ensemble 
of discourses, rules and practices, cohabiting in limited, tension-ridden, often 
contradictory relation with one another« (ibid).
However, as Cooper points out, some poststructuralist concepts of the 
state have three major drawbacks. First, they do not distinguish between the 
state and other terrains. Second, by downplaying cultural and economic fac-
tors, poststructuralist state theory frequently »underestimates the difficulty of 
achieving change compared with the relative ease of reproducing (more or less) 
status quo power relations«. Third, the linkages between state bodies are often 
neglected (1994: 7).
Cooper develops a concept that combines social constructionist and post-
structuralist approaches. According to Cooper, the state is »possessed of many 
identities: it is a set of institutions, a condensation of social relations, a national, 
corporate identity, and monopolist of legitimate public violence. These identi-
ties slide over each other, the articulation between them, to the extent it exists, 
temporary and contingent.« (Cooper 1993: 258; 1993a: 192)
Most feminist state theories discussed here agree on the issue that the 
state is a site of conflicts and hierarchies. Cooper, for instance, suggests that 
»even among dominant state forces there is conflict« (Cooper 1993: 259; 1993a: 
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193). Using British local government politics on homosexuality in the 1980s as 
an example, she describes that the latter »gave access to very different forces 
to those welcomed or admitted by central government« (Cooper 1993a: 198). 
Similarly, and using legislation on social security in Australia as an example, 
Pringle and Watson illustrate »conflicts and compromises between different 
state apparatuses« (Pringle/Watson 1990: 238), a perspective the analysis of 
e. g. the conflictual relationship between the federal government and the parlia-
ment prior to the legislative process leading to the Transsexual Act confirms.
State-societ y dynamics, relative autonomy and state agency
As some of the definitions indicate, feminist concepts of the state are inex-
tricably linked to a social analysis of gender. However, the complexity differs 
and, together with the respective definition of the state, have repercussions for 
conceptualising state-society dynamics, including the relative autonomy of the 
state54 and state agency.
Focusing on rape law, pornography and sex equality in a US context, 
MacKinnon sets out from the premise that the liberal-democratic state through 
its norms, procedures and policies coercively constitutes the social order in the 
interest of men (MacKinnon 1989: 161 f.). The supposed neutrality of the state is 
based on the universalisation of ›the‹ male perspective (ibid: 163) and features 
in objectivity as its norm (ibid: 162).
While her unitary concept of ›man‹ and ›woman‹ and social analysis are 
problematic for reasons that have been indicated earlier on, so is her concept of 
state-society dynamics and state agency. Her concept of the state does not allow 
for analysing state-society dynamics adequately, in particular struggles on the 
terrain of the state. By downplaying the outcomes of social struggles (Franz-
way/Court/Connell 1989: 30),55 state and society appear static and ahistorical. 
Second, she does not accord the state relative autonomy, which is for reasons 
of legitimation indispensable in liberal democracies (Franzway/Court/Connell 
1989: 53; Connell 1994: 161; Cooper 1993a: 195) and, I wish to add, to sustain 
its hegemonic orders. Third, MacKinnon focuses on the coercive dimension of 
state agency only.
While Pringle and Watson set out from the premise that the state is a site for 
the construction of gendered power relations (Pringle/Watson 1990: 235) they, 
too, seem to downplay the relative autonomy of the state: 
54 | The term ›relative autonomy‹ was coined by Poulantzas (1978). While Poulantzas 
conceptualised the state as a capitalist state only, this concept is useful to explain how 
limited state independence from dominant forces maintains hegemonic relations.
55 | Hence, successful litigation against unconstitutional rules of the Transsexual Act 
since the early 1980s can e. g. not be conceptualised or appreciated.
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The current collection of practices which we refer to as ›the state‹ are a historical prod-
uct, not structurally a ›given‹. This is not to say that there is no intentionality or purpose. 
But what intentionality there is comes from the success with which various groupings 
are able to impose themselves; it is always likely to be partial and temporary. (Pringle/
Watson 1990: 229; cf. Cooper 1995: 64)
In contrast, Franzway, Court and Connell (1989), Connell (1994) and Cooper 
(1993a) suggest that state and society are mutually constitutive and that the 
state possesses agency. Franzway, Court and Connell set out from the premise 
that the state is a result of historically-specific struggles: »It is the product of 
specific, historically located social processes. Quite specifically, the shape of 
the state is the outcome of particular social struggles. What kind of state we 
have depends on who was mobilised in social struggle, what strategies were 
deployed, and who won.« (Franzway/Court/Connell 1989: 35) In another in-
stance, Franzway, Court and Connell suggest that the state is also an actor in 
social struggle (ibid: 40).
Connell continued to develop this initially collaborative project on state 
theory further. She suggests that, »[t]he state is constructed within gender rela-
tions as the central institutionalization of gendered power. Conversely, gender 
dynamics are a major force constructing the state, both in the historical crea-
tion of state structures and in contemporary politics.« (Connell 1994: 148) With 
regard to state agency, Connell suggests that, »[a]s the central institutionaliza-
tion of power the state has a considerable, though not unlimited, capacity to 
regulate gender relations in the society as a whole.« (Ibid: 155) Since the state 
and social forces mutually shape each other, the state is also an actor.
Cooper offers the most precise and complex concept of state agency and it 
is her concept of state agency I will draw upon. When discussing local govern-
ment politics on homosexuality in Britain in the 1980s, she takes into con-
sideration two dimensions of state agency. The first deals with the complex 
interrelationships between state apparatuses. According to Cooper, »[i]t is not 
simply a matter of certain institutions, or dominant forces within them, mak-
ing decisions that are then transparently implemented. For the making and 
operationalisation of such decisions will themselves be shaped and mediated 
by a range of state processes, practices, and ideologies.« (Cooper 1993a: 193) 
The second dimension of state agency relates to the effects of state agency 
on shaping the politics and identities of those involved in the struggle on the 
terrain of the state. Cooper suggests that, »if we are to go on to understand the 
state as a terrain of struggle, we need also to understand the state’s ability to 
help construct the players before, during, and after the game« (Cooper 1993: 
259). With regard to the subject matter in this study, government activity, or 
more precisely, government inactivity e. g. contributed to shaping the social 
movement structurally as indications towards the bureaucratisation of parts 
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of the movement as a reaction to government unresponsiveness in the period 
after the Act to amend the Transsexual Act suggest.
In her later work, Cooper suggests that it is a matter of perspective, whether 
the state is accorded agency or not: 
In relation to agency, I argue that the state both does and does not possess it. […] Con-
fusion over agency reflects once again the multiple identities at stake when the state is 
discussed. If the state is seen as a corporate body, then it can act through its subject-
hood – the ›We‹ for instance of international relations (although this will be internally 
fractured to reflect competing needs, agendas and interests). On the other hand, as a 
set of arenas, the state constitutes a terrain through which other forces act, facilitating 
and structuring their agency in the way Pringle and Watson (1992) describe. (Cooper 
1995: 63 f.)
However, with regard to the procedures this project deals with her perspective 
outlined earlier on applies. 
State agency is closely related to the concept of relative autonomy. Franzway, 
Court and Connell (1989: 53), Connell (1994: 161) and Cooper suggest that the 
state has relative autonomy from the forces that struggle on the terrain of the 
state. In the context of discussing sexual struggles on the terrain of the state, 
Cooper for example suggests that relative autonomy is a requirement for state 
stability and legitimacy. The latter are achieved through »an overdetermined 
process that combines the interests and agendas of politicians and bureaucrats, 
the hierarchical structures of decision-making and power, electoral considera-
tions, state ideology […], and cultures of governance« (Cooper 1993a: 195). More-
over, she argues that the need for stability and legitimacy may require having 
to respond to social forces, if ignoring them might otherwise mean to »arouse 
disruptive activity and a loss of credibility« (Cooper 1993: 261). The findings in 
this study suggest that the Federal Constitutional Court took on the legitima-
tion role of the state in the face of government inactivity during the transsexual 
law reform period.
Access to the state and the boundaries of the state
In contrast to the other theorists, Cooper addresses the issue of access to the 
state. She gives three reasons for differential access of lesbian and gay groups to 
the state’s terrain in Britain. Among the reasons, she puts forth are the above-
mentioned drive of the state for stability and legitimacy (ibid: 260) and the 
congruence between movement discourses and those of the state and between 
their respective ways of operating (ibid: 261). As an example, she suggests that 
lesbian and gay groups resorting to formal equality »are more congruent with 
the explicit ideologies expressed by the state than are campaigns based on radi-
cal or revolutionary feminism« (ibid).
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While the processes studied in this project confirm Cooper’s observations, 
I suggest adding the issue of structurally unequal access to the terrain of the 
state. With regard to issues related to gender and drawing upon Foucault’s his-
torical findings, Kilian suggests that medicine has since the 19th century be-
come the authoritative voice on issues related to defining a person’s gender (Kil-
ian 2004: 34 f.). As the first legislative process reveals, trans individuals were 
not invited to consultations on the Transsexual Bill or asked for submissions 
and sought other means and channels to influence the process.
Cooper also addresses the issue of state boundaries. She argues that, »how-
ever proliferative, fluid and contingent,« state boundaries need to be considered 
for two reasons: 
First, where people understand the borders of the state to lie will af fect the character of 
their own state engagement, that is, whether they perceive their location and the focus 
of their interest to be inside or outside of the state. Second, notions of legitimate state 
practice dif fer from conceptions of legitimate community activism. Therefore whether a 
site, practice or relationship is considered within or beyond the state will impact upon 
its discursive character and content. For instance, more radical practices may be pos-
sible if they are considered to be taking place outside the state. (Cooper 1995: 63)
Cooper’s insight holds true for the processes examined in this study. A com-
parison between concepts of gender and trans in the social movement and the 
strategic proposals for legislative change in the transsexual law reform period 
suggest that trans movement demands appeared more radical while not di-
rectly confronted with the constraints involved when engaging with the state, 
whereas suggestions for law reform took into consideration anticipated political 
feasibility.
For the purpose of this study, the state will be considered as a historical-
ly-specific and dynamic central condensation of social relations with fuzzy 
boundaries, which contributes to shaping social relations and organises the 
actors before, during and after the proceedings. The state is endowed with rela-
tive autonomy, and it requires legitimacy. The state is a set of hierarchically 
organised institutions in frequently conflict-ridden constellations with specific 
modes and logics of operation.
1.6 structurIng the argument
Despite uneven developments in sexology, the law, the political branch of the 
trans movement and federal politics, conflicts within every discipline and area 
and in the complex interplay between the actors involved in processes related to 
recognising trans, a number of developments have taken place. With regard to 
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sexology, this development can be broadly described as a gradual shift from pa-
thologising and homogenising to depathologising and heterogeneous concepts 
of trans(sexuality). In the course of the abovementioned processes, the trans 
movement has developed from local and dispersed activism to a political actor, 
representing a broad array of heterogeneous subjects. The overall development 
in government politics can be described as a shift from initially reluctant, but 
active government politics to a marked decline of political investment. With 
regard to jurisdiction in the area of constitutional law, the development can be 
broadly described as a shift from initially reluctant higher court jurisdiction 
to becoming a driving force of change on the level of the state. In the face of 
increasing government inactivity, the Federal Constitutional Court has taken 
on the legitimation role of the liberal-democratic state with regard to issues 
concerning changes to the conditions for a change of first names and a revi-
sion of gender status. Overall, these developments have contributed to an ongo-
ing process of social change with regard to trans, without however displacing 
the heteronormative gender binary, which remained in place, albeit in varying, 
historically-specific forms.
This book contains three analytical chapters. Chapter 2 deals with the pe-
riod from the consolidation of transsexuality as a medicalised subject in the 
1970s to generally binding regulations in the Transsexual Act (1980), a period 
marking the gradual recognition of the complexity of gender. This chapter 
starts out with exploring how sexology shaped and managed transsexuality in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, established psycho-medical authority on issues re-
lated to transsexuality vis-à-vis the law, politics and the subjects themselves and 
reorganised marginalised genders. The second part of chapter 2 examines how 
various levels of jurisdiction and legal scholarship dealt with applications for a 
revision of gender status in the course of the 1960s and traces the conflictual 
process of adapting to the sexological notion that sex does not necessarily de-
termine a person’s gender identity. This subchapter takes into account debates 
on the use of pre-legislative legal provisions and instruments, interpretations 
of sexological knowledge and controversies over the public order, marriage and 
gender. These factors interrelated in complex and different ways and finally 
resulted in the legal recognition of a change of first names and a revision of 
gender status in the Federal Constitutional Court decision on 11 Oct. 1978. The 
third part of chapter 2 deals with the legislative process leading to the Trans-
sexual Act, taking into consideration sexological and trans concepts and access 
to the consultations, controversies over transsexuality and marriage as they 
manifested in debates on the structure of the Bill, balancing rights and medi-
cal knowledge. This part ends with an outline and analysis of the Transsexual 
Act, which provides generally binding rules for a change of first names and a 
revision of gender status. Drawing upon debates on the early stage of the trans 
movement, the final part of chapter 2 outlines basic structural and conceptual 
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features of the movement, identifies factors that contributed to the homogene-
ous image and isolation of transsexual individuals, despite heterogeneous self-
concepts, sexual orientations and desired somatic interventions and engages 
with the debate on assessing the trans movement’s contribution to gender rec-
ognition.
Chapter 3 covers the period before and shortly after the Act to amend the 
Transsexual Act in 2009, a period characterised by a publicly discernible plu-
ralisation of genders in the trans movement and a further modification of the 
heteronormative gender binary as an effect of broader discursive changes and 
social movement struggles. The first part of the chapter analyses how the het-
erogeneity and the increasing regulatory complexity regarding transsexuality 
resonated in clinical categories and practices and discusses the national guide-
lines issued by the three major sexological associations. The second part of 
chapter 3 examines structural and conceptual change and differentiation in 
the trans movement, taking into consideration the social and discursive factors 
that contributed to these changes. Thereafter trans perspectives on legal rules, 
procedures and practices as well as psycho-medical premises, procedures and 
practices will be addressed. Finally, the second part of chapter 3 deals with 
trans organisation and network activities in order to promote social change, 
with a special focus on lobbying and networking to achieve trans law reform, 
including a brief consideration of the government response. I decided to place 
developments and debates in the trans movement second to those in sexology 
in order to avoid redundancies, especially since a critique of psycho-medical 
practices and guidelines is only possible after having introduced them. Juris-
diction and legal debates continued soon after the Transsexual Act was enact-
ed. Before turning to legal developments under the Act, the third part of the 
chapter examines developments in jurisdiction on trans(sexuality) in health 
insurance law. Wherever applicable, the rest of the chapter takes into considera-
tion legal interpretations of sexological concepts of transsexuality, sexological 
interpretations of individual rules of the Act and legal debates on court deci-
sions from the 1980s to 2010, and I will briefly address the Act to amend the 
Transsexual Act in this chapter.
Chapter 4 engages with the period from the Federal Constitutional Court 
decision on 11 Jan. 2011 until 2014, the beginning of a period indicating that the 
link between sex and gender is becoming undone under clearly defined circum-
stances. The first part of this chapter discusses the Federal Constitutional Court 
decision, including sexological knowledge it based its decision upon, trans and 
legal critiques of the court reasoning and initial lower court interpretations of the 
decision. The second part of the chapter deals with developments in trans politics 
in the aftermath of the legislative process, featuring major political projects. The 
last part of the chapter deals with renewed debates in sexology on conceptual-
ising, diagnosing and treating trans individuals, the health-insurance manage-
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ment of trans individuals and psycho-medical involvement under the Transsex-
ual Act against the background of social movement struggles for a recognition 
of gender diversity, international guideline developments, the abovementioned 
Federal Constitutional Court decision and increased consideration of social con-
structionist and poststructuralist thought.
2 CONCEPTS OF GENDER AND TRANSSEXUALITY
  PRIOR TO, AND DURING THE LEGISLATIVE 
 PROCESS LEADING TO THE TRANSSEXUAL ACT
2.1 de velopments and debates on tr ansse xualIt y 
 In se xology In the 1970s and e arly 1980s
The 1970s and early 1980s gave rise to four major developments in sexology on 
transsexuality in the Federal Republic of Germany. First, increased sexological 
research on transsexuality contributed to a proliferation of distinct approaches 
to the phenomenon. Second, despite persisting contradictory clinical observa-
tions and scanty surveys, sexologists were to produce the first comprehensive 
and highly influential scheme of treatment by the end of the 1970s. Third, in a
strategic undertaking, sexology established itself as the authoritative voice on 
trans in the course of the decade. Fourth, by trying to pinpoint transsexuality, 
sexology reorganised marginalised genders.
In the following chapter, these issues will be explored in more depth. Start-
ing out from a systematic account of approaches organised around the aetiol-
ogy of transsexuality, the impact of US sexological concepts on West German 
approaches and the management of transsexuality will be outlined. This will 
be followed by a description of the psycho-medical regimen for transsexual 
individuals based on the diagnostic process and the therapy.
The analysis of the aforementioned aspects is based on conference proceed-
ings of the DGfS,1 articles in the sexological journal Sexualmedizin (Sexual 
1 | The DGfS was founded in 1950. It is the oldest and largest German sexological 
association. The association strives to promote sexological research, teaching and medical 
practice. While it hosts members from several disciplines, such as medicine, psychology, 
sociology, law and cultural studies, the DGfS initially was a medical association with 
a distinct normative orientation. Towards the end of the 1960s, the DGfS placed more 
emphasis on social sciences, thereby taking on a more critical stance towards social 
conditions and processes. The DGfS investigates into the theory and history of sexuality, 
and develops and systematically evaluates psychotherapeutical treatment, in particular 
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Medicine), a sexological article (Eicher 1976) in the journal Der Gynäkologe (Gy-
naecologist), a comprehensive and highly influential scientific paper written by 
the sexologists Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche (1979), a monography by Eicher 
(1984) and one article each from the Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschau (Ger-
man Medical Weekly) and an anthology.
Using an influential sexological article by Nevinny-Stickel and Hammer-
stein (1967) in the law journal Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift (New Legal 
Weekly [NJW]), a sexological submission to the Minister of Justice (Krause et 
al. 1974) as quoted in Sigusch (1991) and a sexological appeal to the Bundesrat2 
(Sigusch/Gindorf/Kentler 1979), I will thereafter focus on the steps sexologists 
undertook to gain the power to define transsexualism vis-à-vis the legal realm, 
institutionalised politics and trans individuals.
Finally, this chapter deals with the effects sexological defining power had 
on the fringes of the gender regime. Initially, I will trace sexological construc-
tions of the transsexual subject by analysing clinical pictures of transsexuality. 
Based on an analysis of the differential diagnosis of transsexualism, I will ex-
plore the shifts that occurred on the margins of the gender regime as a result of 
the medicalisation of transsexuality.
Despite unsecured and in part contradictory knowledge on transsexualism, 
the 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a consolidation of the medical manage-
ment of transsexuality, the emergence of a distinct transsexual subject, the es-
in the areas of sexual dysfunctions, so-called perversions, sexual offences, transsexuality, 
intersexuality and disorders resulting from sexual traumatisation. Furthermore, the DGfS 
engages in women’s and gender studies, e. g. through clinical studies on gender-specific 
aspects of sexual disorders and reproductive problems, psychoendocrinology, social 
epidemic aspects of sexual traumatisation and studies on power and violence in gender 
relations. Its social science research focuses on changes in sexuality in adolescence 
and among students, sexual socialisation and changing gender relations, homosexuality 
and HIV/AIDS. The DGfS also conducts research in the area of sexual forensics (DGfS 
undated).
2 | The Bundesrat represents the interests of the eleven Länder prior to unification on 
03 Oct. 1990 and sixteen Länder since then. It is involved in federal state legislation and 
administration as well as in European Union matters (Art. 50 GG). Along with the federal 
government and the Bundestag, the Bundesrat is entitled to initiate legislation (Art. 76[1] 
GG). Legislation that deals with amendments to the Constitution (Art. 79[2] GG), affects 
the budget (Art. 104a[4] GG; Art. 105[3] GG) or administration (Art. 84[1] GG) of the Län­
der require the consent of the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat is also entitled to object to bills 
introduced by the Bundestag (Art. 77[2a] GG; Art. 77[3] GG). Sexologists appealed to the 
Bundesrat dominated by a conservative majority in 1979, since it threatened to thwart 
the Government Bill to change first names and establish gender status in specific cases.
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tablishment of sexological defining power over transsexualism and the shift of 
transvestism from a gender category to a sexual entity.
2.1.1 Approaches to transsexualit y in the West German 
 sexological debate
Drawing heavily upon the US-American sexological debate, several approaches 
to transsexuality emerged in the Federal Republic of Germany throughout the 
decade prior to trans legislation. The approaches offered various aetiologies of 
transsexuality. The frequently eclectic nature of the individual approaches in-
dicates that sexologists were at best groping for an explanation of the phenom-
enon.
Somatic and multi-causal approaches
Despite the fact that every single approach differed from the other, they can 
however be divided into three distinct categories. Some authors attributed 
transsexuality to somatic processes (cf. Dörner 1969; Neumann 1970; Eicher 
et al. 1980). Others located the cause of transsexuality in interlocking somatic, 
psychological and cultural factors (cf. Haynal 1974; Schorsch 1974; Sigusch/
Meyenburg/Reiche 1979; Eicher/Herms 1978). Only few authors suggested that 
any explanation so far was unconvincing (cf. Kockott 1978: 47) or that the caus-
es of a transsexual development were unknown (cf. Richter 1977: 913).
During the 1970s, two variants of somatic explanations for transsexuality 
emerged of which the first and to this day most influential explanation is hor-
monal, the other genetic. Neumann summarised his own and several other 
researchers’ findings, among others, those of the East German endocrinologist 
Dörner, on the effects of pre- and postnatal administration of sex hormones 
on various vertebrates. He set out from socio-biological premises when stat-
ing that, »nearly all vertebrates demonstrate a behavioural pattern that in the 
end serves to maintain the individual and the species. Many of these modes 
of behaviour more or less correlate with the reproductive cycle and are differ-
ent in male and female individuals.« (Neumann 1970: 55) Such an approach 
implies that gender role behaviour ultimately derives from a person’s physical 
substratum.
According to Neumann, transsexuality is caused by a disorder in the hy-
pothalamus. The disorder is produced by sex hormones at a specific point 
during embryonic development or in the postnatal period, depending on the 
species. The sex hormones are assumed to restructure specific centres in the 
hypothalamus, which can thereafter only catalyse a certain behavioural pattern 
(ibid 1970: 54). Neumann assumed that the somatic differentiation of sex in 
humans occurs between the eighth and twelfth week of embryonic develop-
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ment. The differentiation of the hypothalamus is complete by the time of the 
fifth month of embryonic development (ibid: 67).
While Neumann mentioned that it is difficult to apply insights gained 
through animal experiments to human beings, he nevertheless believed that 
hormonal disorders of differentiation could be the cause of transsexuality rath-
er than early childhood impressions (ibid: 67). Since there was no evidence in 
humans for this hypothesis, he backed up his argument with Hinman’s find-
ings. The latter concluded from his research on individuals with congenital 
adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) that they often demonstrate male sexual behaviour, 
even when raised as girls (ibid: 68).
However, it is questionable whether alleged male sexual behaviour in phe-
notypically female or intersex individuals serves as a proof of Neumann’s find-
ings, since gender role behaviour and gender identity are not interchangeable 
variables. While sexual behaviour socially associated with male-bodied persons 
might be demonstrated by female-bodied or intersex individuals, this does not 
necessarily mean that the latter identify as transsexual individuals.
The second somatic approach assumed a genetic cause of transsexuality. 
Eicher observed genetic differences in a majority of his transsexual patients 
in Munich. Eicher and his collaborators discovered that six of eight mtf trans-
sexual individuals were H-Y antigene negative and six of seven female-to-male 
transsexual individuals (ftm) were tested H-Y antigene positive.3 Since Eicher 
believed to have discovered a genetic cause of transsexuality, he tentatively sug-
gested that transsexuality be classified as a form of intersexuality (cf. Eicher 
1979: 476, 15; Eicher et al. 1980).
While another team of researchers observed the same H-Y antigene expres-
sion among its transsexual patients (Engel et al., 1980: 497), they held that it 
was premature to conclude that the H-Y antigene was responsible for gender 
identity, including the »disorder« in transsexual individuals (ibid: 494). First, 
they argued that test procedures of the time were too limited to come up with 
a conclusive answer, since there was no test that would be able to prove the 
existence of H-Y, if the antigene determinants of the H-Y antigene were miss-
ing (ibid: 497). Second, they demanded tests on a control group to find out 
whether the H-Y antigene is related to a transsexual identity in the first place 
(ibid: 498). Indeed Eicher’s thesis proved to be premature, and he repealed it in 
1984 (Eicher 1984; cf. Sigusch 1984: 680).
Proponents of multi-causal approaches did not necessarily rule out biologi-
cal factors as possible explanations for transsexuality. Not only did they discuss 
3 | H-Y antigene stands for the gene product histocompatibility antigene and is a cell 
membrane glycoprotein (Sigusch 1991: 310). It is a part of the male cell membrane and 
the expression of a gene, which Eicher and his collaborators assumed that it was located 
on the Y-chromosome.
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the relevance of the findings in studies on intersex individuals (Haynal 1974: 
112; Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 278), twin research (Haynal 1974: 112) 
and hormone experiments in animals (Haynal 1974: 112 f.; Schorsch 1974: 196; 
Eicher 1976: 39; Eicher/Herms 1978: 35 f.; Kockott 1978: 47; Sigusch/Meyen-
burg/Reiche 1979: 276-278). They added these findings to various assumed 
psychological and/or environmental causes, and the assumption of an unphysi-
ological influence of androgens in a critical phase of embryonic development 
proved to be particularly popular among sexologists.
However, the degree varied to which biological arguments figured in mul-
ti-causal approaches. While Kockott (1978: 47) and Sigusch, Meyenburg and 
Reiche (1979: 278) tentatively suggested that biological grounds might contrib-
ute to a transsexual development, Schorsch’s explanations were contradictory. 
Initially, he argued that genetic and environmental influences structure an in-
dividual’s gender identity (Schorsch 1974: 196). At a later point, he conceded 
that the influence of somatic factors on a transsexual development remains 
insecure. Despite this insecurity, he assumed a hormonal and/or genetic in-
volvement:
According to the current state of research the dif ferentiation of sexes as an effect of in 
detail unknown genetic and/or hormonal influences during the prenatal phase needs 
to be considered an insecure and ambiguous explanation of transsexuality. When the 
child postnatally meets upon environmental influences in the family that reinforce this 
uncertainty or unintentionally operate to affect identification with the gender role that 
contradicts the physical equipment, a transsexual development will evolve. (Ibid: 198)
Taken for themselves, though, none of the alleged biological causes of transsex-
uality appeared conclusive to the proponents of multi-causal approaches. Rath-
er, they assumed that transsexuality was possibly determined by biological, 
psychological and sociological aspects (Haynal 1974: 111; Sigusch/Meyenburg/
Reiche 1979: 275), biological factors and family constellations (Schorsch 1974: 
196 f.) or a set of biological factors, upbringing, gender allocation and envi-
ronmental influences, such as e. g. family structures (Eicher 1976: 39; idem/
Herms 1978: 35).
The relationship between these determinants differed. According to 
Schorsch, biological and environmental influences equally contribute to the 
development of a transsexual identity: »It would definitely be wrong to consider 
somatic-biological and environmental influences as alternatives or contrasts; 
instead, they presumably work together and reinforce each other.« (Schorsch 
1974: 198)
Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche attributed transsexuality foremost to psy-
chological factors, in particular to an unusual degree of early childhood trau-
matisation (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 275). However, they did not rule 
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out that social and biological factors were involved in a transsexual develop-
ment (ibid: 272).
Eicher’s explanations were contradictory. Until he presented the H-Y-an-
tigene-thesis, he assumed that either biological or postnatal factors or a com-
bination of both cause transsexualism (Eicher 1976: 42). Based on studies on 
intersex individuals, however, he was convinced that gender assignment and 
upbringing most definitely determine a person’s gender identity. Hence, in this 
instance, he considered postnatal psychosocial factors in early life, in particular 
the relationship to the parents, crucial to the development of transsexualism 
(ibid: 45).
The US American influence on multi-causal approaches
to transsexualit y
All proponents of multi-causal explanations of transsexuality developed their 
concepts by taking into consideration theories and findings in US-American 
research on transsexuality.4 Schorsch (1974), Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche 
(1979) and Kockott (1978) for instance discussed Stoller’s assumption that par-
ticular family constellations induce transsexuality. However, they arrived at dif-
ferent conclusions.
According to Stoller, family dynamics that trigger a transsexual identity 
are different for male and female children (Stoller 1972: 62; cf. Sigusch/Mey-
enburg/Reiche 1979: 256). The male child is believed to grow up in a setting 
that is shaped by a symbiotic mother/son-relationship and a psychologically ab-
sent father (Stoller 1968: 125). Driven by »penis envy«, the mother encourages 
feminine traits in her child and the father »does not interrupt the process of 
the son’s feminization« (Stoller 1968: 138; cf. Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 
255).
With regard to the female transsexual-to-be, Stoller observed that the moth-
er is in poor health, depressed and barely attends to her child. The masculine 
father distances himself from the mother and the family. The daughter has to 
stand in for the father at a very early age in life and is not encouraged to develop 
a female mode of behaviour (Stoller 1972: 50; cf. Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 
1979: 256; Schorsch 1974: 198; Eicher 1976: 42).
While Schorsch relied on Stoller’s concept (Schorsch 1974: 197), Sigusch, 
Meyenburg and Reiche (1979), and Kockott (1978) refuted Stoller’s notion of 
a particular family constellation that pertains to a transsexual development. 
While the former did not doubt that certain family constellations are found 
more frequently among transsexual individuals, they questioned that there was 
a typical mother-child or parent-child constellation (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Re-
4 | For a comprehensive account of US-American approaches see Meyerowitz 2004: 98-
129 and Weiß 2009: 266-305.
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iche 1979: 274). Kockott did not detect any particular family structure among 
his patients (Kockott 1978: 48).
Several authors discussed Money’s findings. Eicher e. g. referred to Money, 
Hampson and Hampson’s assumptions on gender role development in intersex 
individuals (Money/Hampson/Hampson 1957) to underline the importance of 
socialisation for the development of a gender identity, regardless of the indi-
vidual’s chromosomal, hormonal and phenotypical status (Eicher 1976: 42). 
Schorsch’s concept was influenced by Money and Ehrhardt (1972), Green (1969) 
and Pauly (1969; 1969a), among others. The latter suggested that transsexual 
individuals’ gender identity is fixed in early childhood (Money/Ehrhardt 1972: 
16 f.; Green 1969: 34; Pauly 1969: 57; 1969a: 86). By that time, the child behaves 
according to the ›other‹ sex/gender (Schorsch 1974: 197).
The psychoanalysts Socarides, Person and Ovesey inspired Sigusch, Mey-
enburg and Reiche’s concept of transsexuality. The latter developed their con-
cept of transsexuality by discussing and comparing the psychoanalysts’ per-
spectives with their clinical observations. 
Socarides considered transsexuality a perversion, which develops because 
transsexual individuals are unable to pass the symbiotic and individuation 
phase of early childhood successfully (Socarides 1970: 348; cf. Sigusch/Meyen-
burg/Reiche 1979: 253). While Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche disagreed with 
Socarides’ therapeutic approach,5 they picked up the notion of transsexuality as 
a perversion. According to this concept, transsexuality features as a particularly 
early and with that complete attempt at restitution which, unlike other perver-
sions, is assumed to occur at such an early stage of a child’s development that 
sexualisation is precluded. The authors used this assumption to explain their 
clinical observation that transsexual individuals were asexual (Sigusch/Meyen-
burg/Reiche 1979: 270).
While Person and Ovesey suggested that transsexuality is caused by similar 
factors, they classified transsexuality as a borderline pathology (Person/Ove-
sey 1974: 19; cf. Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 254). Sigusch, Meyenburg 
and Reiche considered this classification convincing, because it was congruent 
with their clinical observation that splitting mechanisms, which are typical of 
borderline pathologies, occur in transsexual individuals, too: The »desire for a 
sex change [is] in a way the sum of manoeuvres that are organised around split-
ting« (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 269).
5 | Socarides disapproved of hormonal and surgical treatment of transsexual indivi-
duals. To him, such measures sanction the »transsexual’s pathological view of reality and 
cannot solve the underlying conflict« (Socarides 1969: 1419; cf. Sigusch/Meyenburg/
Reiche 1979: 254).
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However, Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche disagreed with Person and Ove-
sey’s distinction between primary and secondary transsexuality.6 According to 
Person and Ovesey, primary transsexuality is caused by a severe disorder of the 
core gender identity in early childhood (Person/Ovesey 1974: 5; cf. Sigusch/
Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 257). The category of secondary transsexuality is com-
prised of formerly effeminate homosexual individuals and transvestites. The 
latter are assumed to desire a medical transition after experiencing extremely 
stressful situations. These situations spark a psychodynamic process that pre-
vents the respective person from maintaining his or her emotional equilib-
rium. As a result, the individual is believed to fall back upon an early childhood 
fantasy (Person/Ovesey 1974a: 192; cf. Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 258).
At this point Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche abandoned the psychoanalyti-
cal framework and turned to a historical perspective. They argued that social 
and cultural factors shape the formation of symptoms. Hence, the point in time 
when an individual wishes to transition depends on aspects such as the de-
velopment of medical technology, sex morals and the media. They supported 
this argument with their clinical observation that transvestites have become 
increasingly rare in sexual medical offices and so-called secondary transsexu-
als visit sexologists’ offices more frequently (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 
272).
2.1.2 Developments in the treatment of transsexual individuals
Just as US approaches to transsexuality left a deep imprint on the West German 
sexological debate of the 1970s, so did US developments in the management 
and therapy of the subjects.7 US influence figured strongly in surgery as the 
therapeutic route, the interdisciplinary organisation of the treatment of trans-
6 | However, other authors, such as e. g. Spengler, categorised transsexual individuals 
according to Person and Ovesey’s distinction between the two types of transsexuals 
(Spengler 1980: 102).
7 | In June 1969, the German Association on Sex Research invited Money and Ehrhardt to 
give a paper at the 10th scientific congress featuring their experiences with the diagnostic 
and surgical programme at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. Money and Ehrhardt’s 
report was published in the association’s conference proceedings (Money/Ehrhardt 
1970). West German sexologists continued to refer to the findings in this publication 
throughout the 1970s. In addition, Benjamin’s commitment to transsexual patients and 
sex reassignment surgery deeply impressed sexologists in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Sigusch 1991a: 227 f.). Several sexologists relied on his observations. On one occasion, 
Eicher e. g. stated that, »[t]he surgical method is undisputed nowadays. Benjamin (1954) 
is unaware of any case where an intensive and long psychoanalysis would have been 
successful and considers the attempt a waste of time« (Eicher 1976: 44).
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sexual individuals, extensive diagnostic measures and strict guidelines for an 
indication for surgery. These trends are mirrored in Sigusch, Meyenburg and 
Reiche’s comprehensive and influential programme of treatment that appeared 
in 1979 as well as in several other programmes of the time.
The therapeutic route 8
With few exceptions in the 1970s, medical and surgical interventions became 
the method of choice in the treatment of transsexual individuals. While Haynal 
was convinced that transsexual individuals could be successfully treated with 
psychotherapy (Haynal 1974: 114), the vast majority of West German sexologists 
argued that sex reassignment surgery was the only viable method for treating 
individuals with »an irreversibly transposed gender identity« (Eicher/Herms 
1978: 45). Eicher and Herms noted that in their clinical experience any other 
known treatment in fact had detrimental effects on transsexual persons: »Psy-
chiatric or psychotherapeutic treatments or a hormone treatment according to 
the physical image can be found in the case history. They were unsuccessful 
in all cases and agonising for the patients. They may even lead to attempted 
suicide as we observed in two cases.« (Eicher/Herms 1978: 44)
While there was widespread agreement on surgery as the best available 
treatment (Eicher 1976: 44; Spengler 1980: 103; Schorsch 1974: 197; Richter 
1977: 913), proponents of the surgical route were in part ambiguous about this 
solution. Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche expressed their unease by associat-
ing sex reassignment surgery with »emergency therapy« (Sigusch/Meyenburg/
Reiche 1979: 289).9 In a similar vein, Eicher and Herms suggested that while 
surgery offered a solution, it nevertheless remained »a compromise« (Eicher/
Herms 1978: 45).
8 | A brief outline of the therapeutic route and the medical management of transsexuality 
is published in German in de Silva 2013, 85-87.
9 | In a medical commentary on the Transsexual Act, Sigusch expanded on this notion: 
»Irreversible physical interventions should not be the be-all and end-all of medicine. 
Transsexualism is a psychological disease and therefore needs to be treated with 
psychological means. That this has so far rarely been successful is certainly also up to 
the therapists who, urged by patients and without effective psychotherapeutical means, 
have got more and more used to a type of emergency therapy that was from the beginning 
an act of desperation for both, the therapist and the patient.« (Sigusch 1980: 2745) He 
repealed his statement in an interview in 1992, arguing that he »nowadays no longer had 
the totalitarian illusion that psychiatric examinations or psychological treatment could 
›capture‹, understand or even comprehend a patient’s life« (Sigusch 1992: 656).
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Sexologists who endorsed the surgical route generally agreed on adminis-
tering counter-sexed hormones and surgery in adult female-bodied men and 
male-bodied women, provided there were no serious contraindications.10 The 
extent of the medical, surgical and otherwise therapeutic interventions deemed 
necessary or advisable varied, depending on the programme in the respective 
hospital.
Medical measures in male-to-female transsexual individuals (mtf) involved 
treating the individual with estrogenes. Eicher and Richter suggested adminis-
tering estrogenes in order to induce the development of the breast glands, the 
redistribution of fat according to a female pattern and the softening of the skin 
(Eicher 1976: 43; Richter 1977: 914). However, Sigusch, Meyenburg and Re-
iche proposed possibly supplementing the estrogene regimen with gestagenes, 
since they believed the latter to have an additional positive effect on breast de-
velopment and the reduction of body hair (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 
295).
The endocrinological treatment of ftm transsexual individuals varied, too. 
In general, all sexologists proposed treating ftm transsexual individuals with 
testosterone. However, while Eicher and Richter considered this hormone treat-
ment permanent (Eicher 1976: 43; Richter 1977: 914), Sigusch, Meyenburg and 
Reiche suggested initially administering testosterone until the desired effects 
such as the lowering of the voice, increased facial hair and clitoral enlargement 
materialise. They furthermore proposed to use progestins in order to suppress 
menstruation (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 295).11
10 | The contraindications were (and in part continue to be) subdivided into internal, psy-
chiatric, neurological, social, personal and legal aspects. Physical contraindications are 
those that threaten the physical well-being or even the life of a transsexual person, such 
as e. g. an estrogene therapy in individuals who suffer from liver diseases or damages 
or who experienced thromboses, embolism or hypotonia (Richter 1978: 56). Psychiatric 
contraindications are e. g. psychoses and borderline pathologies »other« than transsexu-
ality (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 289). Temporal lobe diseases are a neurological 
contraindication in the case of transsexuality. Lack of intelligence and reason and the 
inability or unwillingness to collaborate are personal contraindications. Social contrain-
dications are according to Richter e. g. a marriage and the lack of a partner’s consent 
to get divorced, adolescent age and the risk of triggering a socio-economic and cultural 
crisis. Legal aspects are a criminal record that is not related to transsexualism and the 
refusal to sign a declaration stating that the physician is not responsible for the effects of 
the intervention, if it has been conducted properly (Richter 1977: 914; 1978: 58 f.).
11 | Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche only suggested a bilateral oophorectomy in cases of 
insufficient virilisation (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 298). They argued that if the 
ovaries were retained, the virilisation through initial doses of testosterone alone would 
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All authors mentioned here agreed on an orchidectomy, a penectomy and 
the construction of a neovagina as appropriate surgical interventions for mtf 
transsexual individuals (Eicher 1976: 43; Richter 1977: 914; 1978: 57; Sigusch/
Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 297). Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche rejected re-
quests for any other sex reassignment surgery, such as oto-rhinoplasties or the 
injection of liquid silicon as a means to augment breasts, arguing that they 
wanted to avoid complications that may result from any of these types of inter-
ventions (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 298).
Unlike Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche, Eicher and Richter proposed addi-
tional, albeit optional surgical interventions. These included the construction 
of labia out of scrotal skin, breast augmentation surgery, if estrogene-induced 
breast gland growth was considered insufficient, oto-rhinoplasty, the smooth-
ing out of male facial wrinkles (Eicher 1976: 43; Richter 1978: 57; 1977: 914) 
and »whatever else is felt to be disturbing and in need of correction« (Richter 
1978: 57).
As with male-to-female transsexual individuals, Sigusch, Meyenburg and 
Reiche opted for as few surgical interventions as possible in female-to-male 
individuals. They proposed a bilateral mastectomy. In their opinion a hyster-
ectomy and bilateral oophorectomy were only indicated, if the ovaries inter-
fered with the process of virilisation. They did not propose a phalloplasty due 
to dissatisfactory results (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 298). In contrast to 
Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche, a hysterectomy and adnectomy were part of 
the standardised programme with Eicher and Richter (Eicher 1976: 43; Richter 
1977: 914; 1978: 57). In addition, Richter suggested a colpectomy (Richter 1977: 
914). While both authors mentioned the possibility of a phalloplasty,12 they, too, 
did not consider this means mandatory due to poor surgical results (Eicher 
1976: 43; Richter 1977: 914; 1978: 58).13
Otherwise therapeutic measures for male-to-female transsexual individuals 
potentially consisted of electrolysis and speech therapy. While Sigusch, Meyen-
suffice, and when the hormone therapy with testosterone ends, the body would continue 
to be supplied with growth hormones.
12 | Surgeons did not offer a standardised procedure in the 1970s, and phalloplasties 
were considered experimental surgery. The phalloplasty Eicher had in mind had a neoure-
thra. The penoid was non-erectable (Eicher 1976: 43). Richter suggested a phalloplasty 
that may or may not have a urethra and a penis prosthesis. He also proposed the 
construction of a scrotum, possibly with an implantation of testicles (Richter 1977: 914; 
1978: 58).
13 | Frequent complications were strictures and fistulae. Occasionally thromboses and 
necroses occurred, resulting in a loss of the neo-phallus. These complications continue 
to occur to the present.
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burg and Reiche did not mention any of these options in their programme of 
treatment, Eicher suggested offering all measures (Eicher 1976: 43).
The medical management of transsexualit y
The US organisation of treatment inspired the medical management of trans-
sexual individuals in the Federal Republic of Germany. While West German 
medical professionals did not succeed in establishing gender identity commit-
tees and gender identity clinics, the surgeries of the Institut für Sexualwissen-
schaft (Institute for Sexology) in Frankfurt and the Institut für Sexualforschung 
und Forensische Psychiatrie (Institute for Sex Research and Forensic Psychiatry) 
in Hamburg e. g. became centres that, among other areas of sexological investi-
gation, specialised in the treatment of transsexual individuals.
Like their fellow colleagues at Johns Hopkins Hospital who organised the 
treatment of transsexual people in committees consisting of an endocrinolo-
gist, a gynaecologist, a urologist, two plastic surgeons, two psychologists and 
three psychiatrists of which one was a specialist for neuro-endocrinological 
cases (Money/Ehrhardt 1970: 70), West German physicians and psychologists 
decided to collaborate in multidisciplinary teams (Schorsch 1974: 198; Richter 
1977: 913; Kockott 1978: 49). As Eicher and Herms pointed out, »[t]he therapeu-
tic procedure requires at least the collaboration of a psychiatrist, a gynaecologist 
or surgeon, respectively, and a social worker in order to do justice to the social, 
medical and legal problems« (Eicher/Herms 1978: 50). Schorsch explicitly re-
ferred to the US model of gender identity committees and suggested that a 
team consist of a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a gynaecologist, a plastic surgeon, 
an endocrinologist and a urologist (Schorsch 1974: 198).
As the line-up of the psychological and medical team suggests, a thorough 
diagnostic programme preceded the treatment of transsexual individuals. Si-
gusch, Meyenburg and Reiche divided the diagnostic process into psychosocial 
examinations and psychotherapy, physical examinations and an examination 
by a second expert.
The psychosocial examination involved a psychiatric examination of a du-
ration of at least six months that was supposed to indicate whether the indi-
vidual was suitable for treatment and to exclude homosexuality, transvestism, 
borderline pathologies and psychoses (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 289). 
Moreover, a case history was compiled and the parents or other persons who 
were closely related to the patient in early childhood were interrogated. Based 
on the results of these examinations, the individual was either referred to an 
analytical therapy or a therapy that was meant to support the person during the 
programme of treatment (ibid: 289 f.).
The physical examinations included a comprehensive internal examination 
with a special emphasis on sex-specific characteristics, a blood picture in or-
der to exclude contraindications, an ECG and x-rays of the thorax. The latter 
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mainly served documentation purposes. Female men were required to undergo 
a gynaecological examination in order to exclude pregnancy. All transsexual 
individuals were examined endocrinologically for scientific purposes and to ex-
clude intersexuality, hypogonadism and thyroid diseases. These examinations 
were followed by a genetic test to exclude intersexuality and a neurological test 
to exclude diseases of the temporal lobe (ibid: 290-294).
Finally, a second expert was consulted. The expert was required to have 
gained experience in the field of so-called sexual perversions and transsexual-
ity (ibid: 294).
More than a decade later Sigusch explained the extent and rigorousness of 
the treatment scheme as follows:
In retrospect, I must say that there was no group of patients with which we dealt with 
in such a conventional, or thodoxly medical way in the course of the decades than with 
those with a gender identity disorder. I was particularly scared of so-called desires for 
retransformation and suicides after having undergone a sex reassignment operation. It 
is especially for this reason that we formulated our concept of examination and treat-
ment so painstakingly and so comprehensively. We pulled out all the stops, we wanted 
to make sure that the most improbable contraindication was excluded and attached 
great importance to a competent dif ferential diagnostics for an indefinite period of 
time, which is only possible within a therapeutic relationship. (Sigusch 2007: 352 f.)
At the time though, Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche also published their treat-
ment scheme in order to counter the unregulated and dissatisfactory treat-
ment of transsexual individuals (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 249). Their 
programme was to become influential in medical practice and institutions 
throughout Western and Eastern Europe (Sigusch 1991: 227).
While programmes of treatment initially varied throughout the Federal 
Republic of Germany, several other sexologists set up similarly rigorous and 
time-consuming schemes. Eicher’s somatic and psychological diagnostics, 
for instance, was as extensive as Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche’s. Eicher re-
quired of transsexual individuals to undergo internal, gynaecological, urologi-
cal and endocrinological examinations and psychological tests. Eicher insisted 
on a biographical case history, including an evaluation of extensive aspects of 
the patient’s personality with a particular emphasis on the sexual case history, 
attitudes towards masculine and feminine role behaviour in the respective 
person’s history and interviews with parents, siblings, friends and partners, 
among others (Eicher 1976: 43).
The series of examinations, tests and interviews were meant to enable the 
physician to decide on four issues. First, he or she was supposed to be able to 
answer the question whether the patient was either a candidate for psycho-
therapy or for surgery. Second, the physician was supposed be able to judge 
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whether the patient was really motivated. For Eicher »real motivation« meant 
that the patient revealed no signs of ambivalence or a fleeting, situational iden-
tification with the gender the individual longed to be recognised as. Third, the 
physician was supposed to be able to decide whether the patient was psychotic 
and predict whether the patient was going to encounter a postoperative socio-
cultural crisis (ibid).
Criteria for an indication for sex reassignment surger y
Analogously to the selection criteria at Johns Hopkins Hospital (Money/
Ehrhardt 1970: 71), a committee of the DGfS developed strict guidelines for an 
indication for surgery. Several sexologists adhered to these guidelines, albeit 
with minor deviations (Kockott 1978: 49; Eicher 1979: 476; Spengler 1980: 102; 
Richter 1977: 914; Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 296 f.).
The committee suggested eight criteria for an indication for surgery. First, 
it recommended a minimum age of 20 years (Kockott 1978: 51). Unlike the cri-
teria at the Johns Hopkins Hospital that proposed an age of at least 21 in order 
to avoid legal complications (Money/Ehrhardt 1970: 71), the committee argued 
that candidates for surgery were supposed to have completed their psychosexu-
al development (Kockott 1978: 51).14
The next three criteria consisted of a thorough somatic and psychiatric di-
agnostics, one to two years of preoperative medical observation of the patient 
and ›a real life test‹, which was facilitated by hormone therapy (ibid: 51).15 Ko-
ckott summarised the reasons for the abovementioned preconditions:
Prior to an operation, the transsexual should be carefully observed and looked after 
medically for one to two years in order to check the stability of the desire to change 
gender roles, to prepare for the change and to decide whether the transsexual can cope 
with this change psychologically. The transsexual should have lived for at least a year in 
the desired role (the so-called real life test) in order to experience whether he can live in 
the desired role before proceeding to the final surgical step. In this time, the additional 
hormone treatment can facilitate the development in the desired direction. (Ibid: 50)
Spengler (1980: 102) accorded particular significance to the ›real life test‹ and 
the preoperative hormone treatment.
14 | Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche suggested a minimum age of 21 years. However, in 
exceptional cases surgery was considered in individuals that had reached the age of 18, 
provided the candidate had passed his or her adolescence (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 
1979: 296).
15 | The fourth criterion corresponded with the seventh criterion Money and Ehrhardt list-
ed as a precondition for sex reassignment treatment at Johns Hopkins Hospital (Money/
Ehrhardt 1970: 71).
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The committee’s fifth criterion stated that two independent specialists were 
meant to give the indication for an operation. This criterion also resonated in 
Eicher’s scheme of treatment. According to Eicher, two specialists on trans-
sexuality, preferably psychiatrists and sexologists were responsible for the diag-
nosis (Eicher 1979: 476).
The sixth and seventh criteria dealt with issues pertaining to the pre- and 
postoperative care of patients. According to the sixth prerequisite, the candidate 
for surgery needed to be informed about the risks of surgery and the uncertain 
legal situation. Both the surgery and the legal situation required postoperative 
and social aftercare (Kockott 1978: 51).
Analogously to Money and Ehrhardt’s eighth criterion (Money/Ehrhardt 
1970: 71), the committee’s last criterion stated that psychoses and cerebral dis-
eases were a contraindication for sex reassignment surgery (ibid).
2.1.3 Establishing sexolog y as the authoritative voice 
 on transsexualit y
In the pre-legislative period, sexology firmly established itself as the authorita-
tive voice on trans issues in the Federal Republic of Germany. Three measures 
contributed to this status. First, sexologists managed to achieve the impression 
of internal cohesion within and outside the discipline. Second, sexologists pre-
sented medical knowledge as expert knowledge to the legal and political realm, 
regardless of how speculative it was. Third, sexologists gained control of trans 
individuals seeking treatment.
Creating a sense of cohesion
As pointed out earlier on, in the 1970s the medical disciplines involved in the 
therapy of transsexual individuals had begun to organise sex reassignment 
treatment in multidisciplinary teams. Tasks were clearly distributed in the 
team with psychiatrists as the gatekeepers and plastic surgery, gynaecology, 
urology and endocrinology as executing disciplines. This division of labour, in-
cluding its implicit hierarchy, was undisputed. As the plastic surgeon Lichten-
feld stated,
[i]t is not the patient’s desire or even the fees that constitute the indication for surgery 
but the knowledge on the patient. In my opinion, the complete exploration of the trans-
sexual patients’ psyche should be up to competent psychiatrists, psychotherapists and 
sexologists. They make a diagnosis and give the indication. Of course, the surgeon who 
performs the sex-transforming operations not only requires excellent surgical [skills] in 
this specialised area in plastic surgery but urological and gynaecological knowledge 
and skills at the same time, too. Nevertheless, he can only be an executing force with 
this particular clientèle. Undoubtedly, we surgeons are responsible for the surgical suc-
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cess. The overall success of such an operation cannot be measured with our criteria. 
It can only be judged by the colleagues who hand over the patient to us. (Lichtenfeld 
1980: 181)
The consensus on the organisation of a somatic transition produced a sense of 
cohesion within sexology.
Sexologists also demonstrated this cohesion to the outside through joint 
submissions at crucial points during the legislative process. On 18 June 1974 
e. g., a commission of the DGfS submitted suggestions for legal provisions ad-
dressing the needs of transsexual individuals and in an effort to secure their 
basic rights to the then Minister of Justice (Krause et al. 1974).16 On 28 Feb. 
1979, German sexological associations collectively appealed to the Bundesrat 
and the minister presidents of the Länder to support trans legislation and to 
consider medical and psychological findings (Sigusch/Gindorf/Kentler 1979: 
36). The latter is all the more remarkable, since the Gesellschaft zur Förderung 
sozialwissenschaftlicher Sexualforschung (Association for the Advancement of 
Social Scientific Sexuality Research [GFSS])17 and the DGfS were at odds with 
each other prior to collaborating on the joint submission (ibid).
Sexological inter ventions into the political and legal realm
The abovementioned submissions marked clear interventions into the political 
realm. In the letter accompanying the 1974 medico-legal statement on trans-
sexuality mentioned above, the authors urged the Federal Minister of Justice to 
16 | The DGfS has a history of interventions into law and politics through public 
statements, reports and expert witnesses. Issues were e. g. the decriminalisation of male 
homosexuality (see, e. g., Giese 1958: 134-139; Sigusch et al.: 1980: 36; Sigusch et al.: 
1981: 9; Pro Familia et al. 1989: 4), the decriminalisation of abortion (see, e. g., Dannecker 
et al. 1987: 28 f.; Hauch et al. 1993: 335-338) and issues pertaining to transsexuality 
and the law (see, e. g., Sigusch/Gindorf/Kentler 1979: 36; Becker et al. 2001: 258-268). 
For more public declarations and submissions, see DGfS undated a.
17 | The GFSS was founded in 1971 by Rolf Gindorf. It is the oldest non-medical sexologi-
cal association in Germany. Its aim is to supplement traditional medical, biological and 
psychoanalytical approaches to human sexualities with social science perspectives, tak-
ing into account sociological, psychological, ethnological, pedagogical, legal and histori-
cal aspects. While acknowledging a biological substratum of sexuality, the GFSS argues 
that the variability of human sexualities cannot be explained without taking into consid-
eration social norms that shape them (DGSS 2014). Unlike the DGfS, the GFSS mainly 
focused on issues pertaining to homosexualities and bisexualities in the decade prior to 
trans legislation (DGSS 2014a). In 1982, the GFSS became part of the German Society for 
Social Scientific Sexuality Research (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Sexualforschung; DGSS) (ibid 2014a).
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draft legislation appropriately, quickly and comprehensively. They furthermore 
suggested treating the statement as a proposal and impetus (Sigusch 1991: 228).
Sigusch stated later on that framing transsexual individuals as »a minority 
disadvantaged by fate whose basic rights are withheld by the legal order« played
an essential role in the politico-legal struggle that led to the Transsexual Act 
(ibid). The DGfS finally presented itself as spokesperson for the »transsexual 
minority consisting of one to three thousand individuals« (ibid).
As early as in the 1960s, sexologists had begun to publish their findings 
in law journals and to claim an expert position on transsexualism.18 In 1967, 
e. g., the gynaecologist Nevinny-Stickel and the legal scholar Hammerstein col-
laboratively published the article »Medizinisch-rechtliche Aspekte der menschli-
chen Transsexualität« (Medico-legal aspects of human transsexuality) in the law 
journal NJW.
In the article, the authors commented on the latest jurisdiction of their time 
in higher court cases dealing with the legal recognition of post-operative trans-
women. They contrasted the courts’ rulings with state of the art medical knowl-
edge on transsexuality, in particular male-to-female transsexuality. Moreover, 
the authors demanded of courts to take into consideration medical expertise in 
their decisions.
In both court cases, a post-operative transwoman pleaded to have the en-
try specifying an infant’s sex/gender in the birth register altered from ›boy‹ 
to ›girl‹.19 In the mid-sixties, the Chamber Court (Kammergericht [KG]) Ber-
lin20 and the High Regional Court Frankfurt ruled that surgical and hormonal 
measures removing male genitalia, forming a neovagina and inducing chest 
growth in a person who was at the time of birth unambiguously male did not 
render a person a female. Hence, the revision of the entry in the birth register 
does not apply as it would in the case of »ambiguous« genitalia at the time of 
birth (KG 1965: 1084; OLG Frankfurt 1966: 407).
The courts reasoned that an individual is assigned to a gender based on 
a person’s morphology at the time of birth. The external sex characteristics 
are of particular relevance to the determination of gender (ibid). Moreover, the 
18 | However, this was not a unilateral process. As we will see in the following subchapter, 
legal scholars and courts turned to medicine for reliable information on trans issues. The 
same applies to policy-makers as will become evident in the course of the legislative 
process.
19 | In the Federal Republic of Germany, s. 47[1] PStG provides for a revision of the entry 
in the birth register in cases in which a person was assigned to a gender that based on 
morphological facts proves to be wrong later on. Judges applied this particular section 
to intersex individuals. Since there was otherwise no legal provision to revise a person’s 
gender status, some trans people attempted to be recognised as intersex individuals.
20 | The Chamber Court is the (translated) name of the high regional court in Berlin.
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judges argued that a person’s psychic gender affiliation was legally irrelevant 
compared to an individual’s morphology (KG 1965: 1084; OLG Frankfurt 1966: 
408). Finally, they reasoned that a transition from male to female was not pos-
sible, since a neovagina was not a »real« and »permanent« structure. Rather, it 
was »artificial« and simply resembled female genitalia (ibid). Furthermore, the 
court in Frankfurt blamed the transwoman for the adverse social consequences 
following sex reassignment surgery: 
The applicant’s lack of recognition as a woman and the possibly resulting psychologi-
cal distress as well as dif ficulties in his [sic!] social and professional life cannot be 
accounted for, since considerations of equity have no influence on this decision. He 
[sic!] should have been aware of the far-reaching consequences of his [sic!] voluntary 
decision before undergoing the operation. (OLG Frankfur t 1966: 409)
Nevinny-Stickel and Hammerstein criticised the courts’ reasoning. They 
claimed that the courts did not sufficiently take into consideration fundamental 
medical principles and that they failed to interpret medical facts appropriately 
(Nevinny-Stickel/Hammerstein 1967: 664). The authors argued that based on 
the premise that bisexuality is a ubiquitous principle in humans and that a per-
son’s gender depends on a multitude of determinants, the psyche in humans 
is at least as significant with regard to a person’s gender as are morphologi-
cal facts. Therefore, the human psyche cannot be derived from morphological 
facts alone (ibid).
Nevinny-Stickel and Hammerstein extended their concept of intersexual-
ity to encompass the ›incongruence‹ of the psyche and bodily facts (ibid: 665). 
Moreover, they believed to have observed a genetically induced feminisation in 
mtf transsexual individuals from puberty onward. This observation prompted 
them to classify male-to-female transsexuality as a form of intersexuality (ibid).
With regard to male-to-female transsexuality, which they called ›male 
transsexuality‹, they argued that sex reassignment surgery was the only justifi-
able medical response, since psychotherapeutic and androgenising hormonal 
treatment had failed so far. The authors also refuted the notion that a neovagina 
differs substantially from a vagina with regard to its appearance, functionality 
and permanence (ibid).
In the light of these medical facts, they insisted that medical experts were 
responsible for determining a person’s gender and that the courts should there-
fore base their decisions on medical expertise:
In this not so small circle of people with a discrepancy between the various determi-
nants of gender, the assignment to a gender should occur according to the prevailing 
male or female predisposition while acknowledging all physical and psychic features. It 
is up to the medical expert to state this based on medical results and biological princi-
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ples, and the courts should base their decisions on the expert recommendations. (Ibid: 
666)
Gaining control of transsexual individuals
Apart from presenting themselves as experts vis-à-vis the legal realm and in-
stitutionalised politics, sexologists also claimed an authoritative role in relation 
to transsexual individuals seeking sex reassignment surgery. The conditions 
for an indication for surgery required of transsexual individuals to comply with 
profound interventions into their personal lives.
Although the programmes of treatment provided support during the ›real 
life test‹, such as e. g. issuing doctor’s notes explaining the discrepancy be-
tween the outer appearance and the information on the ID (Sigusch/Meyen-
burg/Reiche 1979: 295), transsexual individuals seeking surgery were required 
to take on the role of the gender they wished to be recognised as in all wakes of 
life for at least a year prior to surgery (ibid: 297). This also meant to earn one’s 
living while observing the conventions commonly associated with the gender 
the person identified with, despite having physical features that were in every-
day life conventionally attributed to another sex/gender.
Another prerequisite for surgery was that transsexual individuals were ex-
pected to be willing to engage in frequent and extensive observations as well 
as in post-operative check-ups and follow-up examinations for years. Sexolo-
gists stopped short of requiring of trans people to pitch their tents on hospi-
tal grounds when stating that, »[t]he patient should be prepared for check-ups 
and follow-up examinations for years and should therefore have his permanent 
place of residence in a reasonable distance from the therapist« (ibid).
Moreover, the diagnostic process bereft transsexual individuals of privacy. 
As mentioned earlier on, Eicher’s programme e. g. demanded an investigation 
into the patient’s biography, including the sexual case history, and the enquir-
ies extended to any number of persons the transsexual individual related to at 
any particular time of his or her life.
Sexologists also sought control over the transsexual subject by claiming 
the monopoly of knowledge on transsexuality and by monopolising treatment. 
Spengler e. g. attested an unfavourable prognosis to socially poorly integrated 
mtf transsexual individuals. He listed ties to the transvestite subculture among 
the signifiers of poor social integration (Spengler 1980: 102). The author par-
ticularly criticised hormonal self-treatment in the subculture (ibid: 103).
Finally, sexologists determined who was considered transsexual and eligi-
ble for treatment. Spengler e. g. differentiated between primary and secondary 
transsexuals and was inclined to give individuals who lived as effeminate ho-
mosexuals or as transvestites earlier on an indication for surgery in exceptional 
cases only and only after a long period of observation (ibid: 102 f.). Hence, the 
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self-understanding of a transsexual individual was accrued less credibility and 
authority than a medical expert’s opinion.
2.1.4 Reorganising marginalised genders
The medicalisation of transsexuality required defining and isolating it from 
similar phenomena. This process of specification had two effects on the mar-
gins of the gender regime. First, transsexuality was created as a distinct cat-
egory of subjects with specific properties. Second, transvestism, which was 
formerly a gender category, was subsumed under sexual perversions.21
Creating transsexualit y as a distinct categor y22
All approaches to transsexuality defined the phenomenon as a completely 
transposed gender identity that occurs in men and women. I.e. the male-bod-
ied transsexual considers herself a woman and the female-bodied transsexual 
considers himself a man (Eicher 1976: 42; Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 
250; Haynal 1974: 111; Schorsch 1974: 195; Eicher et al., 1980: 12).
However, clinical pictures of transsexualism mirrored less unanimous de-
scriptions of transsexual individuals, and contradictory clinical observations 
even occurred within one approach itself. This applied in particular to issues 
pertaining to personal traits attributed to transsexual individuals and sexuality.
Despite these variations among clinical pictures, sexologists more or less 
constructed the transsexual subject as a phenotypically inconspicuous person 
who usually from early childhood onward identifies with, and stereotypically 
performs the gender other than the one he or she was assigned to. Moreover, 
the transsexual individual was said to manifest a profound hatred of his or 
her genitalia. Finally, sexologists generally constructed transsexual persons as 
heterosexual.
21 | The differential diagnosis offers a more clear-cut separation of sexed and gendered 
subjects, including a homogeneous transsexual subject. Basing the construction of 
transsexuality on the differential diagnosis however at the same time means unduly 
homogenising sexological understandings of the transsexual subject, since clinical 
pictures of transsexual subjects varied. Therefore, I will initially deduce the construction 
of the transsexual subject from the clinical pictures and thereafter use the differential 
diagnosis to elaborate on the effects the delimitation of transsexuality had on gendered 
subjects formerly considered closely related.
22 | For a brief summary in German of the creation of transsexuality as a distinct cat-
egor y, using clinical pictures of transsexuality and the isolation of transsexuality from 
transvestism and male homosexuality based on the differential diagnosis, see de Silva 
2013: 82-88.
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On the whole sexologists either overtly (Schorsch 1974: 195) or by implica-
tion (König/Grünberger 1974: 734; Eicher 1976: 42; Eicher/Herms 1978: 36) 
suggested that transsexuals are biologically unambiguous. Sigusch, Meyen-
burg and Reiche described transsexual individuals’ phenotypes more cautious-
ly. They stated that genetic, chromosomal, gonadal and primary and secondary 
sex characteristics occur as often in transsexual individuals as in »other men-
tally ill« persons (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 251).
All sexologists agreed that in most cases the identification with the ›other‹ 
gender and gender role can be traced from an early age onward (König/Grün-
berger 1974: 734; Eicher/Herms 1978: 36). Eicher and Herms e. g. observed that 
childhood games usually correspond with the stereotypical behaviour demon-
strated by the ›other‹ gender (Eicher/Herms 1978: 44). Sigusch, Meyenburg 
and Reiche noted that cross-dressing occurs as early as in childhood (1979: 251).
Sexologists observed that adult transsexuals have a sense of belonging to 
the ›other‹ gender, an identity König and Grünberger qualify as »nearly de-
lusionary« (König/Grünberger 1974: 735). According to Schorsch, transsexual 
individuals live up to this sense of belonging as far as possible. Female-bodied 
men wear clothing culturally allocated to male-bodied men and vice versa. 
Male-bodied women live their social lives as women as do female-bodied men 
as men. Their gender performance includes the gender-specific language and 
gestures of the gender they identify with (Schorsch 1974: 195).
Like König and Grünberger, Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche added further 
impetus to their observations when they stated in their sixth cardinal symp-
tom23 that all transsexual individuals imitate and exaggerate the reactions, 
modes of expression and behaviour of the gender they perceive themselves to 
be:
Nobody advocates gender-specific attributes more passionately and uncompromis-
ingly than they do. At an adult age, transsexuals carry out a change of gender role in 
the private and professional realm up to the point of marrying in the new gender role 
and not infrequently without any medical measures. This transformation is often times 
expressed through rigidly and stereotypically taking on, and hyperbolising culturally 
dominant or dated ideals of masculinity or femininity. (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 
1979: 251)
All sexologists concurred explicitly (e. g. Schorsch 1974: 195; Eicher/Herms 
1978: 43) or by implication (e. g. Eicher 1976: 42; Kockott 1978: 50) that trans-
sexual individuals present in the surgery as people who believe they are living 
in the wrong body. Schorsch observed that transsexuals with great persistence 
23 | Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche (1979) organised their clinical picture of transsexual 
individuals according to twelve cardinal symptoms.
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strive to get rid of the body with its hated attributes (Schorsch 1974: 195). In 
their fourth cardinal symptom, Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche specified that 
transsexual individuals react to their gender-specific features, in particular the 
culturally most prominent ones, with »hatred and revulsion« (Sigusch/Mey-
enburg/Reiche 1979: 251). The sexologists observed that transsexual individu-
als reject psychotherapy, which aims at »reconciling« the psychological gender 
with the physical one (Kockott 1978: 49; Eicher 1976: 42).
While Eicher (1976: 42) and Kockott (1978: 49) described transsexual indi-
viduals’ requests neutrally, Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche’s account severely 
pathologised transsexual individuals wanting (or needing) to change their 
assigned sex/gender status medically, socially and legally. In their third car-
dinal symptom, they qualified this urge as »obsessive« and »addiction-like« 
(Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 251). While Kockott noted that transsexual 
individuals approach the doctor asking for help to adapt the body to the identity 
(Kockott 1978: 49), he observed that, »it is however not uncommon that trans-
sexuals find their equilibrium without surgical intervention or with few surgi-
cal modifications only as long as they can socially live according to their desired 
gender role as far as possible« (ibid: 50).
Several sexologists observed psychological concomitants of transsexualism, 
such as addictions (König/Grünberger 1974: 735) or depressions (ibid; Kockott 
1978: 49; Spengler 1980: 102). However, they assessed the results differently. 
While Kockott, and König and Grünberger considered transsexual individuals 
as such inconspicuous, they attributed depressions to conflicts with the envi-
ronment (Kockott 1978: 49) or disturbed social integration (König/Grünberger 
1974: 735). According to Spengler, the legal and social situation of post-operative 
transsexual individuals in the Federal Republic of Germany and the resulting 
stigmatisation unnecessarily endanger transsexual individuals’ mental health 
(Spengler 1980: 102).
In contrast, Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche believed transsexual individu-
als to be per se profoundly disturbed. In their eleventh cardinal symptom, they 
noted that transsexual individuals’ interpersonal relationships are troubled due 
to their lacking capacity for empathy and their inability to create ties with other 
people. The authors characterised transsexual individuals as »cold and distant, 
without affects, rigid, intangible and uncompromising, egocentric, demon-
strative and coercive, urgently obsessed and constricted, strangely uniform, 
completely typified« (1979: 252). They concluded that, »once the inexperienced 
examiner has seen the second transsexual patient, he believes he knows all of 
them« (ibid). Furthermore, the authors observed a tendency toward psychotic 
breakdowns during crises (ibid). Considering that Sigusch, Meyenburg and Re-
iche’s approach to transsexuality was to become highly influential in Germany 
(Sigusch 1991: 227), these psycho-medical assumptions finally homogenised 
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transsexual individuals and rendered them »decidedly barmy« (Whittle 1996: 
207).
Sexuality constituted another area in which clinical pictures of transsexu-
alism diverged among sexologists. Occasionally sexologists even presented a 
clinical picture, which contradicted their own observations. While König and 
Grünberger e. g. were not always able to observe a reduced libido in their pa-
tients (König/Grünberger 1974: 735), they nevertheless listed the latter in their 
clinical picture. According to Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche’s seventh cardi-
nal symptom, sexuality takes on a subordinate role compared to the »gender 
problem« (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 252).
With few exceptions, sexologists described transsexual individuals’ sexu-
alities as heterosexual. While Eicher and Herms reported rare cases in which 
psychologically female transsexuals consider themselves lesbians (ibid: 40), 
they observed that transsexual individuals usually engage in stereotypical 
heterosexual sex (Eicher/Herms 1978: 44). These exceptions did not appear 
in Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche’s clinical picture. In their eighth cardinal 
symptom, they claimed that all transsexuals consider themselves heterosexual 
(Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 252).
Separating transvestism and male homosexualit y 
from transsexualit y
The medical construction of a distinct transsexual subject went along with a 
reorganisation of the margins of the gender regime. In order to avoid treat-
ing individuals with similar ›symptoms‹ albeit different ›disorders‹ with an 
unsuitable therapy, sexologists drew clear borders between phenomena that 
were formerly understood to overlap or to display different degrees of the same 
characteristics. Transsexuality in male-bodied individuals was clearly set off 
against transvestism and feminine expressions of homosexuality.
In the 1950s to the mid-1960s, sexologists frequently conceptualised trans-
sexuality on a continuum with transvestism. Nevinny-Stickel and Hammer-
stein, for instance, noted that transvestism and transsexuality are closely relat-
ed phenomena (Nevinny-Stickel/Hammerstein 1967: 665). On this continuum 
of unusual expressions of gender, transsexuality featured as an extreme form 
of transvestism.24
However, in the process of delimiting transsexuality from transvestism, the 
latter was reframed as a disguising fetishism. Sexologists described transves-
tites as (male) individuals who wear clothing culturally associated with female-
bodied women for sexual arousal and gratification. After the orgasm subsides, 
24 | See also Bürger-Prinz/Albrecht/Giese 1966: 51. As Hirschauer notes, Benjamin, 
too, initially considered transsexuality as the most extreme form of transvestism and 
transvestism as the mildest form of transsexuality (Hirschauer 1999: 97).
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transvestites were said to lose all interest in female clothing (Schorsch 1974: 
196; Eicher 1976: 43; Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 279). Unlike with mtf 
transsexual individuals, then, cross-dressing in transvestites was considered a 
temporary phenomenon (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 279 f.).
Nor was cross-dressing considered an expression of gender identity as 
with transsexual individuals. According to Schorsch, Sigusch, Meyenburg and 
Reiche, transvestism occurs in usually heterosexual men with a male identity, 
which is never questioned except for in moments of sexual arousal (Schorsch 
1974: 196; Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 279), while Eicher stated that 
transvestites may be homosexual or not (Eicher 1976: 43).
Sexologists also differentiated between transsexuality and transvestism 
based on the age they believed cross-gendered behaviour to emerge. As pointed 
out to in the analysis of the clinical picture of transsexual individuals, cross-
gendered behaviour and a female identity in male-bodied women was said 
to usually manifest in early childhood, whereas cross-gendered behaviour in 
transvestites was most often observed to occur from puberty onward (Schorsch 
1974: 196; Eicher 1976: 43).
The most important criterion sexologists used to distinguish between 
transsexualism and transvestism was their respective attitude towards their 
bodies, in particular their genitalia. According to Schorsch, Eicher, Sigusch, 
Meyenburg and Reiche, male-bodied transsexuals abhor every male attribute of 
their bodies and turn to physicians to have them removed (Schorsch 1974: 196; 
Eicher 1976: 43; Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 279), while transvestites do 
not. Medical and surgical interventions then became the defining feature of 
transsexualism.
Sexologists also delimited transsexuality in males from homosexuality, 
in particular feminine expressions of male homosexuality, or in their terms, 
›effeminate homosexuals‹. Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche distinguished be-
tween two categories of homosexual individuals who desire sex reassignment 
surgery. The first group desires sex reassignment surgery as part of a defence 
mechanism against problems resulting from homosexuality. Persons in the 
second group contemplate sex reassignment surgery as a means to attract a 
masculine, heterosexual man as a partner (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 
279; Schorsch 1974: 196). Again, the main distinguishing feature between 
transsexual and homosexual individuals was that feminine homosexual per-
sons do not reject their genitalia as transsexual individuals do (Sigusch/Mey-
enburg/Reiche 1979: 279).
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2.1.5 Summar y: Sexological constructions of gender and 
 transsexualit y in the pre-legislative decade
Despite variations in approaches to transsexuality, the notion that genitalia do 
not necessarily determine a person’s gender was firmly established in West 
German sexology of the 1970s. This notion was based on the assumption that 
gender is comprised of different constitutive parts, such as chromosomes, go-
nads, hormones, internal and external genitalia and the psyche, and that these 
elements do not necessarily presuppose each other or relate to one another. As 
Nevinny-Stickel and Hammerstein point out, gender is so complex that there is 
no secure criterion for a person’s ›true‹ gender (Nevinny-Stickel/Hammerstein 
1967: 664). As a result, a gendered entity such as transsexualism became con-
ceptualisable (de Silva 2013: 99).
However, sexologists marked transsexuality as an aberrant form of gendered 
self-understanding vis-à-vis female-bodied persons who identify as women and 
male-bodied persons who identify as men. The marginalisation of transsexual-
ity and the normalisation of cis manifested themselves in the search for a cause 
of transsexualism while, by contrast, conventionally gendered individuals were 
not problematised. Moreover, the notion of transsexualism as abnormal was 
reinforced by attributing pathologising characteristics to transsexual individu-
als, such as e. g. classifying transsexual individuals as borderliners in psycho-
analytically inspired approaches or by assuming that hormonal and genetic 
disorders trigger a transsexual development as somatic approaches suggested. 
Hence, despite the fact that sexology could not detect a secure criterion for a 
person’s gender, it most certainly embarked upon, and reinforced the notion of 
›normal‹ genders (cf. ibid: 100).
While sexology took on a constitutive and enabling role on behalf of trans-
sexual individuals in the process of establishing itself as an authoritative power 
apparatus in regard to transsexualism vis-à-vis the legal and political realms, 
the medicalisation of transsexualism came at the cost of leaving little or no 
space for trans subjectivity and self-determination. On the one hand, sexology 
homogenised transsexual individuals by heterosexualising them, generalising 
the notion of having the ›wrong body‹ and by featuring transsexualism as a per-
manent disposition, which reaches back to early childhood (ibid: 100). On the 
other hand, contradictions in clinical pictures combined with sexological and 
psychiatric gatekeeping roles contributed to transsexual individuals’ strong de-
pendency on individual expert notions of gender-appropriate behaviour and, by 
implication, ›proper‹ signs of transsexuality. As TransMann e. V., a German po-
litical organisation of transmen and ftm transsexual individuals, states, expert 
assessments of whether a person is a ›real‹ man or woman led and continue 
to lead to arbitrary decisions in psycho-medical practice on the life of another 
person (TransMann undated).
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The creation of clear boundaries between transsexuality, transvestism and 
homosexuality rendered individuals unintelligible from a hegemonic perspec-
tive that fell into the cracks of the newly framed categories of individuals with 
unusual gender expressions. Subjects, such as homosexual transsexual indi-
viduals, transsexual individuals who wished to be recognised as the experi-
enced gender without surgical interventions, transvestites who wished to cross-
dress other than for sexual purposes or who wished to temporarily modify their 
bodies with hormones were no longer conceptualisable (de Silva 2013: 100).
2.2 legal de velopments and debates on tr ansse xualIt y
 In the 1960s and 1970s
The shift from the notion of the immutability of sex and gender to the recogni-
tion of their mutability in legal terms marked the most striking development 
in pre-legislation jurisdiction and legal scholarship on trans. This chapter ad-
dresses the processes that contributed to this development.
A legal regulation of a transition from one gender to another only makes 
sense in a context, which renders gender legally significant. Drawing upon 
Walter (1975) and using examples from various fields of law that at some point 
made gender and sexuality relevant, the principles upon which law on sex/gen-
der was premised prior to trans legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
will be briefly outlined.
The next section deals with formal aspects provided for a change of first 
names and a revision of gender status in the register of births before the Trans-
sexual Act came into force. The respective legal rules outlined in the Civil Sta-
tus Act are subject to interpretation. Therefore, jurisdiction on first names and 
legal options for a revision of gender status offered by courts and debated in 
legal scholarship will be discussed.
Thereafter this chapter elaborates on the relationship between law and 
medicine. Using examples from court decisions and the legal debate, this sec-
tion investigates into legal interpretations of knowledge on transsexuality and 
transvestism generated in sexology. Furthermore, this section addresses the 
knowledge the legal scholar Eberle (1974) imparted with sexologists in the jour-
nal Sexualmedizin.
Based on an overview of reported court decisions on gender recognition in 
cases of trans, this chapter finally traces the development of jurisdiction prior 
to the Transsexual Act. Emphasis will be placed on procedures and arguments 
that either contributed to, or prevented a legal transition. Moreover, legal con-
structions of trans will be deduced from court opinions.
The findings in this chapter rely on the rules of the Civil Status Act that 
were applied in cases of trans(sexuality) before the Transsexual Act came into 
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force, legal commentaries, legal articles on transsexuality published in the law 
journals NJW, Das Standesamt (The Register Office [StAZ]), Zeitschrift für das 
gesamte Familienrecht (Journal for the entire Family Law [FamRZ]) and the Ju-
ristenZeitung (The Jurists’ Journal [JZ]) as well as reported cases on trans.
The shift from the notion of the immutability of sex/gender to the accept-
ance of the sexological insight that a person’s morphology does not alone deter-
mine a person’s gender proved to be uneven in jurisdiction and legal scholar-
ship. It largely depended on higher courts’ willingness to engage in judge-made 
law and to subscribe to the notion that the psyche constitutes a determinant of a 
person’s gender in combination with a constitutional reading of the Civil Status 
Act.
2.2.1 Principles in law on gender
The law in the Federal Republic of Germany rendered (and, at the time of writ-
ing, to a lesser extent continues to render) gender legally relevant. Depending 
on the matter of regulation, acts that deal with gender oscillate between two 
principles. One of them is the rule of differentiation, the other the rule of equal 
treatment (Walter 1975: 118). While Walter considered gender a »natural fact 
with fundamental social significance« (ibid: 117), the development of the acts 
mentioned in the non-exhaustive list of examples he uses to explain these two 
principles with, uncovers the social construction of this seemingly natural fact.
The rule of differentiation and the rule of equal treatment
According to the rule of differentiation, the law provides for different legal con-
sequences for men and women. Until 01 Jan. 1975, marriage law e. g. provided 
for different marriageable ages for men and women. Labour law provided for 
the protection of expectant and nursing mothers (Mutterschutzgesetz; Mut-
terschutzG) as does in a more general way the Basic Law (Grundgesetz [GG]) 
in Art. 6(4) GG. The latter rules that, »[e]very mother shall be entitled to the 
protection and care of the community« (BMJV 2017). The Conscription Act
(Wehrpflichtgesetz; WehrpflichtG) ruled that men are required to perform com-
pulsory military service (Deutscher Bundestag 2011).25
The rule of differentiation also applied in some acts in the criminal code 
(Strafgesetzbuch [StGB]). Sexual assault and rape (s. 177 StGB) was e. g. formu-
lated in a gender-specific way. The perpetrator was defined as a man who rapes 
a woman. The victim was defined as a woman who was forced to engage in un-
wanted sexual and/or penetrative sexual acts (lexetius.com undated). The rule 
25 | If a person refused to serve in the armed forces for reasons of conscience, the 
Civilian Service Act (Zivildienstgesetz; ZivildienstG) provided for an alternative service 
(BMJV undated).
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of differentiation also applied to homosexuality. Section 175 StGB criminalised 
male homosexuality only.
The rule of equal treatment applies in instances in which the law rather 
wishes to see an equal treatment of men and women in areas of life in which 
the two legitimised genders are treated differently (Walter 1975: 118). Art. 3(2) 
GG e. g. rules that, »[m]en and women shall have equal rights. The state shall 
promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and 
take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.« (BMJV 2017)
The dynamics of the principles
Several acts mentioned earlier on have been modified or abolished to the effect 
that the rule of equal treatment applies more often than the rule of differentia-
tion. Hence, the laws have been reformed or supplemented to provide for indi-
vidual situations, independent of a person’s gender.
Since 01 Jan. 1975 marriage law and since the abolition of the latter on 01 
July 1998, s. 1303 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB]) e. g. rules 
that the marriageable age is in principle 18 years,26 regardless of an individual’s 
gender and with that identical with the age of majority. While the protection 
of expectant and nursing mothers remains in place, the Parental Support and 
Parental Leave Act (Gesetz zum Elterngeld und zur Elternzeit – Bundeselterngeld- 
und Elternzeitgesetz [BEEG]) which passed parliament on 05 Dec. 2006 allows 
for parental support and parental leave on application, regardless of the parent’s 
gender.27
The rule of differentiation no longer applies to the two acts in criminal law 
mentioned above. On 05 July 1997, s. 177 StGB was reformed to encompass 
sexual assault. Moreover, rape and sexual coercion were no longer limited to ex-
tra-marital sexualised violence (lexetius.com undated). Most important for this 
argument is that the current act is formulated gender-neutrally (Laue 2008: 
999). Hence, sexualised violence among persons of the same sex and sexual-
26 | Since 01 July 1998, exceptions are permitted, if at least one of the partners is 18 
years old and the other partner is no younger than 16 years of age. In cases in which one of 
the partners has not reached the age of majority, the minor is required to apply to a local 
court to be exempted from the age limit (s. 1303[2] BGB). The minor can be either a man 
or a woman (Strätz 2007: 253). For a history of the development of the age of consent for 
men and women, see Strätz 2007: 250-252.
27 | The BEEG regulates the pay (s. 2[1] BEEG) or allowance (s. 2[2] BEEG) the parent 
taking care of the child is eligible to, the period parental support covers (s. 4[1] BEEG) and 
the modalities that apply when parental leave is shared (s. 4[3] BEEG). Moreover, the Act 
determines that working hours may be reduced or organised flexibly (s. 15[5] BEEG). For 
more details on the BEEG, see BMJV undated b).
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ised violence perpetrated by women against men can be penalised. Section 175 
StGB was abolished on 11 June 1994 (lexetius.com undated a).
In other areas, the law continued to distinguish between men and wom-
en for more than two decades to follow. While male homosexuality was de-
criminalised in 1994 and same-sex partnerships gained recognition on 01 Aug. 
2001 when the Registered Life Partnership Act (Gesetz über die Eingetragene 
Lebenspartnerschaft – Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz; LPartG [cf. BMJV undated a]) 
was passed, this does not mean that same-sex desire was considered equal to 
heterosexuality. The registered life partnership was designed as an institution 
ranking lower than marriage.28
Shifts in the application of the rules of differentiation and equal treatment 
that have occurred since pre-trans legislation times suggest that gender and 
gender relations are socially and legally modifiable. At the same time, notions 
of a binary gender system with polarised genders and heterosexuality as a privi-
leged way of relating to one another continued to inform jurisdiction during 
the investigation period, albeit in a different guise than prior to the Transsexual 
Act.
2.2.2 Legal provisions for a revision of first names and the entr y 
 of gender in the register of births prior to the Transsexual 
 Act
Since gender matters to law, it offers legal provisions that lay down the pro-
cedure to determine a person’s gender and to state the outcome as binding 
28 | While the Registered Life Partnership Act (2001) recognises same-sex partnerships, 
it initially provided significantly fewer rights than a marriage. This applied particularly to 
the areas of tax law, adoption law, survivor’s social security, collective bargaining law 
and salary law (Adamietz 2008: 117). Since then, several Federal Constitutional Court 
decisions have contributed to an approximation of rights. On 21 July 2010, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to discriminate against registered 
life partners in inheritance tax (BVerfG 2010). On 19 Feb. 2013, the Court decided that 
the ban on successive adoption for registered life partners was unconstitutional (ibid 
2013). A few months later, the Court declared the unequal treatment of registered life 
partnerships and marriages in tax law, especially the method of calculating income jointly 
for married couples only, unconstitutional (ibid 2013a). 
While the section on marriage does not def ine marriageable genders, jurisdiction with few 
exceptions as of 27 May 2008 (see chapter 3.3.3) continued to interpret marriage as a 
state-santioned union of a woman and a man and, as such, as an exclusively heterosexual 
institution. On 30 June 2017, the Bundestag passed the Bill to introduce the right to 
marriage for same-sex individuals (Gesetz zur Einführung des Rechts auf Eheschließung 
für Personen gleichen Geschlechts) (Deutscher Bundestag undated).
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(Walter 1975: 118). Prior to the Transsexual Act, the Civil Status Act was the 
only instrument that served this particular function in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.29 I will initially outline relevant rules of the Civil Status Act30 before 
turning to legal controversies over the interpretation in cases in which trans 
was at issue. While the Civil Status Act lays down the procedure to determine 
a person’s gender and provides for a revision of gender status in certain cas-
es, neither the 1957 (Gaaz/Bornhofen 2008), nor the revised version of 2007 
(BMJV undated c) define the criteria for an individual’s gender, the number of 
gendered subjects or the rules that apply to naming.
Relevant regulations of the Civil Status Act
Former s. 2 PStG of the Civil Status Act described the purpose of the regis-
ters of births, marriages, families and deaths. Section 2(2) PStG specified that 
the registers of births, marriages,31 families and deaths serve to document the 
aforementioned events. The registrar was responsible for the documentation 
of a person’s civil status (s. 1[1] PStG). Section 1(2) PStG ruled that the registrar 
conducts the abovementioned registers, which altogether constitute the regis-
tries on a person’s civil status.32
29 | Until the first German Civil Status Act was established in 1875, Protestant and 
Catholic churches had conducted christening, marriage and death registers. It is part of 
the endeavour of the Prussian state to separate the state from religion that Prussia and 
later on, the whole empire introduced the obligatory civil marriage and the certification 
of a person’s civil status that was to be executed by state-implemented registrars. The 
second German Civil Status Act came into force in 1937. It has so far undergone two major 
reforms in 1957 and 2007 (Gaaz/Bornhofen 2008: 17).
30 | Unless stated otherwise, descriptions of the Civil Status Act refer to the version that 
was valid prior to the Transsexual Act. Otherwise, the legal debate on gender recognition 
based on provisions in ss. 30(1), 30(2), 46(1)3, 46(2), 47(1) and 47(2) PStG prior to the 
Transsexual Act would not make sense. Wherever relevant to the argument, major revisions 
to the Civil Status Act (2007) will be pointed out to.
31 | The registered life partnership (2001) is nowadays legally integrated into the registry 
system. It appears in the legal text as an event equal to marriage, birth and death (see e. g. 
s. 1[1] PStG 2007). Moreover, ss. 1, 3 and 9 LPartG rule that the registrar’s office is in 
charge of accepting explanations to found a life partnership and of determining the name. 
These regulations are subject to provisions that allow the Länder to maintain regulations 
that differ from the model of the register office or else to provide for such regulations 
(Gaaz/Bornhofen 2008: 118).
32 | As of 19 Feb. 2007, the Civil Status Act defines the term ›civil status‹ (Personen­
stand) in s. 1(1) PStG (Gaaz Bornhofen 2008: 19). Moreover, the term ›registrar‹ (Stan­
desbeamte) has been replaced by the name of the administrative body, i. e. the ›regis-
ter office‹ (Standesamt) (ibid: 21). Section 1(2) PStG now states that, »[t]he authorities 
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Section 16 PStG ruled that a child’s birth be reported to the registrar of 
the district within a week’s time. Among other facts, the registrar entered the 
child’s gender (s. 21[1]3 PStG), first names and surname (s. 21[1]4 PStG) into the 
birth register.33 If the person announcing the child’s birth was unable to name 
the child’s first names, they had to be announced within a month’s time. The 
names were then recorded on the margin of the birth entry.34
However, delaying the announcement of a birth for a period exceeding three 
months without an investigation into the matter was prohibited (s. 28[1] PStG). 
According to s. 28(2) PStG, the person who failed to announce the child’s birth 
responsible for civil registration according to the law of the Länder document the civil 
status in accordance with this Act; they assist in contracting marriage and founding life 
partnerships«.
33 | The fact that the law asks for the specification of an individual’s gender is based on 
19th-century medical knowledge, which assumes that every person has a gender (Plett 
2007: 164).
34 | The provisions for a delayed announcement e. g. applied to children born with 
genitalia that do not fit medical norms established for either male or female indi vi-
duals. The grounds for the provision were that the diagnostic process and doctor-parent 
consultations taking place before a child is assigned to either the female or the male sex 
might exceed the time limit stated in s. 16 PStG. 
In the af termath of extensive consultations (cf. Deutscher Ethikrat 2011; 2012) and rec-
ommendations published by the German Ethics Council (cf. Deutscher Ethikrat 2012a) on 
23 Feb. 2012, s. 22(3) PStG came into force on 01 Nov. 2013. This section rules that if a 
child cannot be assigned to the female or male sex, a child’s sex may not be entered into 
the birth register. While the introduction of s. 22(3) PStG was meant to improve the situ-
ation of intersex individuals, intersex organisations criticised the amendment on several 
grounds. The German branch of the Organisation Intersex International (OII-Germany/
Internationale Vereinigung intergeschlechtlicher Menschen e. V. [IVIM]) e. g. argued that 
the provision is prescriptive, rather than optional. Moreover, the new regulation continues 
to leave it up to physicians to define an individual’s sex/gender. In addition, OII-Germany 
fears that the amendment will increase the pressure on parents and physicians to prevent 
intersexuality, using abortion, prenatal and postnatal interventions as means. Finally, 
OII-Germany suggests that instead of providing for an option for all individuals to leave 
vacant the sex/gender entry, the new regulation produces exclusions and risks the stig-
matisation of intersex individuals (OII-Germany 2013). 
On 10 Oct. 2017, the Federal Constitutional Cour t decided that civil status law must pro-
vide for a further »positive« gender entry. The Court ruled that s. 22(3) PStG violates gen-
eral rights of privacy and the ban on discrimination as laid down in the Basic Law when 
civil status law demands a gender entry but does not provide individuals, who cannot be 
assigned to the male or female sex any other positive entry than ›male‹ or ›female‹ (BVerfG 
undated).
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was obliged to bear the costs of the investigation. Moreover, s. 68 PStG defined 
the delay or absence of an announcement of any event covered by ss. 16-19, 25, 
32 and 3435 as an infringement of law subject to a fine (Plett 2007: 168).
Neither the 1957 nor the revised version of the Civil Status Act (nor any oth-
er German statute for that matter) define the criteria for determining a child’s 
gender. Instead, courts ruled that a child’s gender is in general established on 
the basis of an inspection of the physical constitution at the time of birth, in 
particular the external genitalia (cf. KG 1965: 1084 and KG 1971: 80). 
The Civil Status Act does not state that the gender category ›boy‹ or the 
adult version ›man‹ follows from a male constitution and the category ›girl‹ 
or ›woman‹ from a female anatomy. In a court decision on 01 Nov. 1957, the 
Chamber Court ruled that the physical constitution determines the gender of 
a married partner, regardless of the individual’s psyche (KG 1958: 61).36 This is 
all the more remarkable, since an adult is, unlike a newborn child, usually able 
to express his or her understanding of self.
The Civil Status Act does not lay down the number of possible genders, 
either. It is only in a legal commentary on s. 21(1)3 PStG that the number of gen-
ders is limited to the entry of ›boy‹ and ›girl‹ (Hepting/Gaaz 2000: PStG s. 21, 
note 17; quoted in Plett 2003: 26). The commentator’s opinion was based on a 
decontextualised and truncated Chamber Court ruling37 of 09 Nov. 1928 stat-
ing that »[t]he entry ›Zwitter‹38 is inadmissible, because the term is unknown 
35 | These sections dealt with the announcement of various circumstances of births and 
deaths.
36 | In this particular case, the Court declared a marriage between two female individuals 
of which one identified as a man a ›non-marriage‹. The Court reasoned that marriage in 
a legal sense is a union of a man and a woman that is oriented towards building a full life 
partnership. Therefore, a same-sex marriage was conceptually impossible and considered 
a »non-marriage« (KG 1958: 61). For a more detailed account of this case, including 
medical opinions on the individual who identified as a man, see Klöppel 2010: 565 f.
37 | The full passage states that »[t]he German Civil Code assumes that every person may 
belong to one gender only. It is only acquainted with man and woman and does not, unlike 
the General State Law for the Prussian States include any regulations on Zwitter. Zwitter 
are, depending on the findings, assigned to the male or female sex. The prevailing sex is 
decisive. If no sex prevails, the rules that require a certain gender cannot be applied.« (KG 
1931: 1495)
38 | Several terms currently circulate in German language to signify individuals with 
uncommon genitalia. These are the older terms ›Zwitter‹ and ›Hermaphroditen‹ and the 
newer terms ›intersexuelle Menschen‹ (intersex individuals), and – since the publication of 
new guidelines on the clinical treatment of intersex infants and children in the aftermath of 
the Intersex Consensus Conference in Chicago in 2005 (Hughes et al. 2006) – [Menschen 
mit] ›Störungen der Geschlechtsentwicklung‹ (AWMF 2011). Variations on the latter are 
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to German law« (ibid).39 This understanding is repeated in a later version of the 
legal commentary. However, the commentary also states that in instances in 
which an unambiguous identification is not possible, the gender is undetermi-
nable (Gaaz/Bornhofen 2008: 143).
Finally, the Civil Status Act does not specify a link between a child’s sex 
and the first names. This particular link was established in a Federal Court of 
Justice decision on 15 Apr. 1959. The Court ruled that with exception of the ad-
ditional first name ›Maria‹,40 boys may not obtain a female name (BGH 1959: 
1582).41 The Court reasoned that it contravenes the »right order« established by 
customs and conventions when naming does not observe the »natural order« 
of the sexes/genders and when boys are given names that are in general known 
›Besonderheiten und Störungen der Geschlechtsentwicklungen‹ (UniversitätsKlinikum 
Heidelberg undated) or ›Besonderheiten der Geschlechtsentwicklung‹ (Netzwerk DSD 
2008) as translations of the current medical terminology and classification ›Disorders of 
Sex Development‹ (DSD). 
Legal texts at the time of the General State Law for the Prussian States referred to the 
phenomenon as ›Zwitter‹. Zwitter implies ›zwei‹ (two). There is no equivalent in English. 
I will use the German term ›Zwitter‹ when referring to legal texts in German prior to the 
introduction of the term ›intersexuelle Menschen‹. When discussing current issues related 
to intersexuality, I will not refer to intersex individuals as ›individuals with DSD‹ because 
of the normative, pathologising and stigmatising implications of the term ›disorders of sex 
development‹.
39 | Plett refutes the notion that the term ›Zwitter‹ is unknown to German law. She points 
out that the General State Law for the Prussian States of 1794 [Allgemeines Landrecht für 
die Preußischen Staaten; PrALR] was very well acquainted with the term. According to s. 19 
PrALR, it was up to the parents to decide on the gender according to which they wished to 
educate their intersex child. Section 20 PrALR ruled that at age 18 the intersex individual 
(Zwitter) was permitted to choose the gender s_he wished to live according to. Hence, the 
law only tolerated intersexuality for a certain duration. The choice was relevant, because 
different rules were in force for men and women as s. 22 PrALR suggests. However, if third-
party rights depended on the Zwitter ’s gender, the former was allowed to apply for an 
expert investigation. Section 23 PrALR ruled that in the latter case, the expert’s findings 
decided on the Zwitter ’s gender, regardless of whether it supported or contravened the 
Zwitter ’s or the parent’s choice (Plett 2002: 31; 2003: 27).
40 | In some Catholic regions in Germany, it is a custom to add Maria to a boy’s other first 
name(s) (cf. Sieß 1996: 53).
41 | In this particular case, a father wanted to give his male child two names conventionally 
given to male children and one name usually given to a female child (however, not Maria). 
While the High Regional Court Saarbrücken supported the parent’s position, adverse 
rulings in Bavaria and Hesse prompted the OLG Saarbrücken to forward the case to the 
Federal Court of Justice.
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to be girl’s names and vice versa. The purpose of the first name is, among other 
things, to mark a person’s sex/gender (ibid).42
However, the Civil Status Act provides for changes to, and revisions of 
initial announcements. In its 1957 version, ss. 30(1) and 30(2), 46a(1)3, 46(2) 
and 47(1) and 47(2) PStG were particularly relevant to the academic debate on 
acknowledging a person’s gender prior to the enactment of the Transsexual 
Act. The provisions can be distinguished according to the institution entitled 
to change completed entries. 
Section 30 PStG dealt with the establishment and change of descent and 
name. Section 30(1) PStG ruled, among other things, that a note needed to 
be entered in the margin with exception of facts regulated in ss. 29 and 29b 
PStG43 when the child’s descent or name had been established with generally 
binding effects or when the civil status or the child’s name had changed.44 In 
these cases, a certified copy, which explained the course of events, had to be 
sent to the registrar who had documented the child’s birth (s. 30[2] PStG).
Similar to the revised version of s. 46 PStG, the former s. 46a PStG regulat-
ed the revision of a completed entry by a registrar. According to s. 46a(1) PStG, a 
registrar was allowed to correct obvious spelling mistakes. Based on public doc-
uments or investigations of his or her own, the registrar was furthermore en-
titled to correct statements on the parent’s profession and place of residence in 
the register of births and the announcing person’s statements on the first and 
family names, the profession and place of residence (s. 46a[1]3 PStG). Accord-
ing to s. 46a(2) PStG, the registrar had the authority to revise other completed 
entries in the registers of marriage, birth and death, if the correct or complete 
facts had been established by domestic certificates on a person’s civil status.
Section 47 PStG45 regulated the revision of an entry by a court. In any other 
case than the aforementioned, a completed entry could only be revised by an 
42 | The Federal Court of Justice claimed that the fact that the name signifies a person’s 
sex/gender is generally considered self-evident. Therefore, the Civil Status Act limited the 
entry of an individual’s sex/gender in the civil status registers to the entry in the register 
of births. In entries in registers of marriage, family and death, a person’s sex/gender can 
only be derived from an individual’s first name (BGH 1959: 1583). 
43 | Section 29 PStG regulated cases in which the recognition or establishment of 
fatherhood were entered in the margin, while s. 29b PStG dealt with the recognition of 
motherhood.
44 | As a result of the enactment of the Transsexual Act (TSG), the statement on gender 
was added to the list.
45 | The current version of s. 47 PStG substantially extends the powers of the register 
office. Section 47(2)1 PStG for instance permits the register office to revise a child’s sex/
gender entry upon notification. However, areas subject to revisions listed in s. 47 PStG 
may also involve courts (s. 48 PStG). One of the reasons for increasing the powers of the 
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order of court. The same applied when the registrar was in doubt whether he 
or she was permitted to revise an entry (s. 47[1] PStG). In such an instance, 
all parties involved and the supervisory authority were given the option to file 
a claim for revision. They had the right to be heard before the decision was 
made (s. 47[2] PStG). Legal procedures had to follow the regulations on matters 
of non-contentious jurisdiction (Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit; s. 48[1] PStG). Local 
courts located at a regional court were exclusively responsible for decisions on 
matters provided in ss. 45 and 47 PStG (s. 50[1] PStG).46
Section 45 PStG dealt with court orders in instances in which the registrar 
refused to execute an official duty. Section 45(1) PStG ruled that if a registrar 
refuses to carry out an official duty, the party involved or the supervisory au-
thority may file a claim to the local court. The latter was entitled to order him 
or her to perform the duty.47 However, the registrar, too, was in cases of doubt 
permitted to bring about a decision of the local court on whether he or she had 
to carry out an official duty. The procedure in these cases followed the rules of 
handling a refusal to perform an official duty (s. 45[2] PStG).
register offices was to relieve the burden on the courts (Gaaz/Bornhofen 2008: 294). 
Since the reform of the Civil Status Act in 2007, regulations on revisions based on an order 
by a court have been moved to s. 48 PStG.
46 | The High Administrative Court of Northrhine Westphalia (Oberverwaltungsgericht 
NRW; OVG) in Münster dealt with the case of an intersex individual (Zwitter) whose 
gender was entered as ›girl‹ in the birth register. The 45-year-old plaintiff wished to have 
his birth entry changed to ›boy‹, since he felt he was a man and disposed of functioning 
male gonads, whereas his female gonads had ceased to function. While several medical 
expert reports supported his claim, the High Administrative Court argued that it could 
not decide on the matter for procedural reasons. The Court reasoned that administrative 
courts do not revise the entry of gender, and even if they did, civil courts were not bound 
by administrative court rulings. The Court cited s. 50 PStG to substantialise its decision 
(OVG NRW 1954: 254).
47 | The legal case history of the Chamber Court decision on 08 Sept. 1970 provides 
an example of this variant of s. 45 PStG. In this particular case, the registrar had sent 
a transwoman’s application for a revision of gender status in the birth entry to the local 
court. The latter granted the application and ordered a revision of the gender status via a 
note in the margin of the birth entry. Following an immediate complaint by the authorities, 
the regional court reversed the local court decision. The transwoman filed a complaint 
with the Chamber Court against the decision. The Chamber Court in turn argued in favour 
of reversing the regional court decision (KG 1971: 80). However it referred the case to 
the Federal Constitutional Court, since the High Regional Court Frankfurt had interpreted 
s. 47 PStG differently in its decision on 14 Feb. 1969 (ibid: 82) (cf. Sieß 1996: 66).
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The legal academic debate on reading transsexualit y into the 
Civil Status Act
When devising the Civil Status Act the legislator did not anticipate that a per-
son’s sex might change in the course of an individual’s life, nor that a person’s 
gender identity might not follow from the external genitalia at the time of birth. 
Faced with law suits initiated by trans individuals who wished to have their 
respective genders formally recognised, legal controversy arose over whether 
and how to interpret the regulations established in the Civil Status Act to ac-
commodate this request. Legal scholars focused on analogous applications of 
ss. 30(1), 46a and 47(1) PStG as possible solutions.
Eberle suggested reading transsexuality into s. 46a PStG by resorting to 
a legal fiction. A legal fiction means to create a legal regulation according to 
which an unreal fact is treated as though it existed. Eberle cautioned that such 
a fiction needs to be limited to specific legal relations only. Applied to trans-
sexuality, Eberle suggested that such a legal fiction regulates that a person be 
counted as a member of the ›other‹ sex, if he or she has due to a »psychosexual 
abnormality« developed a psychic attitude and demeanour known of the ›other‹ 
gender, even though he or she is on the basis of physical characteristics »not 
really« a member of the ›other‹ sex (Eberle 1971: 223).
Walter however doubted that Eberle’s suggestion constituted a viable ap-
proach to recognise a legal transition from one gender to another. First, the 
procedure implies ›revising‹ an entry in the register of births, although the 
initial entry continues to be correct. This applies particularly since Eberle 
based his criteria for gender assignment on physical features (Walter 1975: 
120). Second, Walter argued that an application of s. 46a PStG was unsuit-
able, since a judge is responsible for deciding on core areas of a person’s civil 
status (ibid: 119).
While Walter suggested that ss. 47(1) and 30(1) PStG lend themselves to an 
analogous application, he opted for the latter. He argued that s. 47(1) PStG re-
fers to entries that are incorrect from the outset, while s. 30(1) PStG covers in-
stances that occur later on. Transsexuality only manifests itself at a later point 
in life, and a transsexual predisposition cannot be proved at the time of birth 
(Walter 1972: 267). Moreover, he argued that s. 47(1) PStG may lead to backdat-
ing the recognition of the ›acquired‹ gender to the time of birth. Such a linear 
concept contributes to a regulation of legal consequences that rules out differ-
entiated solutions (Walter 1975: 119).
By contrast, Fuglsang-Petersen argued in favour of an analogous applica-
tion of s. 47(1) PStG as opposed to s. 30(1) PStG. He assumed courts would pre-
sumably reject an analogous application of s. 30(1) PStG to a revision of gender 
status. He argued that this rule presupposes a change of first names. Moreover, 
it would not assign to the registrar the task of deciding upon a revision of gen-
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der status and of stating this event in a public certificate (Fuglsang-Petersen 
1971: 128).48
Fuglsang-Petersen argued that the revision of an entry in the register of 
births according to s. 47(1) PStG does not linguistically assume the initial incor-
rectness. The section also covers instances in which an entry becomes wrong 
due to actual facts. He claimed that a transsexual individual has significantly 
and forever changed his or her actual appearance since he or she was born. 
Since the differentiation of people into males and females determines social 
life and the legal order in many ways, it is the purpose of s. 47(1) PStG to guar-
antee that the entry into the register of births conforms with the person’s actual 
civil status (ibid: 130).
As the legal academic debate shows, none of the aforementioned sections 
of the Civil Status Act could be directly applied to cases of transsexuality. The 
debate also suggests that s. 47(1) PStG proved most suitable for an analogous 
application.
Jurisdiction on the application of s. 47(1) PStG 
to cases of transsexualit y
Indeed, s. 47(1) PStG was the regulation judges considered most frequently in 
cases that dealt with gendered manifestations the law had not accounted for. 
However, and in contrast to cases that involved intersex individuals (Sieß 1996: 
60; Klöppel 2010: 563),49 court decisions in cases of transsexuality ranged from 
downright rejection of an analogous application of this section to an analogous 
application, and the latter was linked to various requirements.
The decision of the High Regional Court Frankfurt on 08 Dec. 1965 is an 
example of a rejection of an analogous application of s. 47(1) PStG. As with all 
courts that refused to apply this section analogously,50 the Court interpreted 
s. 47(1) PStG narrowly as opposed to the broad reading Fuglsang-Petersen sug-
gested. I.e. the courts reasoned that they could not grant a revision of gender 
status in the register of births for lack of a legal basis.
48 | Indeed, in its decision on 08 Sept. 1970, the Chamber Court ruled out an analogous 
application of s. 30(1) PStG). The Court reasoned that the regulation was clearly 
designed for legal facts that could be proved by certificates. The Court argued that a 
case of a subsequent revision of a person’s gender status is a procedure that relies on 
an appreciation of evidence, most notably an appreciation of medical expert reports. The 
latter are however not recognised as certificates in the sense of s. 30(2) PStG (KG 1971: 
81).
49 | For a comparison of the different treatment of intersex and trans individuals dealing 
with a revision of gender status in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic from 1945-1980, see Klöppel 2010: 551-584.
50 | See e. g. the decision of the Chamber Court on 11 Jan. 1965 (KG 1965: 1084).
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The abovementioned court ruled in the case of a post-operative transwom-
an that from a legal point of view a transition from male to female was not pos-
sible, since the »natural« physical findings as opposed to psychological factors 
are decisive for assigning a person to a gender. The loss of the external male 
genitalia due to a surgical intervention is legally analogous to the loss of genita-
lia resulting from an accident, war or emasculation (OLG Frankfurt 1966: 406; 
cf. Sieß 1996: 64).
Several courts decided to apply s. 47(1) PStG analogously. However, this did 
not necessarily coincide with a legal recognition of an applicant’s gender. De-
pending on the conditions added to the analogous applications, the respective 
court ruling led to a rejection or recognition of the demand for a revision of 
gender status in the birth entry.
The decision of the High Regional Court Frankfurt on 14 Feb. 1969 is an 
example of a very limited application of the regulation that necessarily led to the 
rejection of a post-operative transwoman’s request to have her gender legally 
recognised. As in the earlier decision, the Court interpreted s. 47(1) PStG nar-
rowly when stating that only a birth entry that was incorrect from the begin-
ning may be corrected. However, the Court implied that if there was a provable 
biological basis for transvestism,51 (s. 47[1] PStG) could be applied.
The Court ruled that as long as medical science cannot state the cause of, 
and the conditions for the development of transvestism, a person who belongs 
to this group of people cannot be legally assigned to the ›other‹ gender, even 
though the individual’s genitalia have been surgically reorganised. The Court 
held that jurisdiction and legal scholarship were not authorised to fill out a lack 
of knowledge in the field of medical science (OLG Frankfurt 1969: 1575).52
The decision of the Regional Court in Münster on 31 Jan. 1963 serves as an 
example of an analogous application of s. 47(1) PStG, which resulted in recog-
51 | As Eberle pointed out, the Court subsumed transsexuality under transvestism, which 
was incorrect from a medical perspective of the time (Eberle 1971: 221). Sieß suggested 
that the Court made a »classical legal mistake« by examining a matter that was not even 
submitted for a decision (Sieß 1996: 64).
52 | Legal scholars severely criticised this decision. Walter e. g. considered the decision 
inhumane (Walter 1975: 266). According to Sieß, the decision only contributed to 
confusion and dissatisfaction among transsexual individuals (Sieß 1996: 65). Similarly, 
the Chamber Court deviated from the High Regional Court’s decision when it stated that 
s. 47(1) PStG applied, if this change was not based on the person’s arbitrary behaviour. 
According to the Chamber Court, it was irrelevant whether the cause and the formation of 
this change were scientifically provable or whether there was a biological predisposition 
at the time of the entry (KG 1971: 79).
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nising the applicant’s gender.53 In this case, the Court stated that the legisla-
tor did not provide for a case in which an originally male individual claimed 
to have always conceived of herself as a girl or woman, respectively, and who 
had obtained the physical characteristics of a female individual. Cases of this 
kind have only become possible and known due to progress in medicine (LG 
Münster 1963: 250).
The Court decided to fill the legal gap via an analogous application of 
s. 47(1) in accordance with the purpose of the Civil Status Act to provide correct 
records on a person’s civil status in public registers. The Court ruled that such 
a procedure is justified in a case in which an individual no longer disposes of 
the features that reveal the original sex, manifests »all« the characteristics of 
the ›other‹ sex, identifies with this gender and is considered as such in his or 
her social environment (ibid).
2.2.3 Medical knowledge in jurisdiction and legal scholarship 
 on transsexualit y
German law does not have an inherent and static concept of gender. Rather, it 
relies on medical knowledge of sex and gender, and the law is expected to take 
into account medical advances in this field (Walter 1975: 120; KG 1971: 81).54 
However, in instances in which medical knowledge is at issue in court cases 
and legal scholarship, it is at the same time subject to legal interpretation. 
Legal interpretations of gender, and trans in particular, ranged from di-
rect quotations of medical literature to ›creative readings‹. Judges’ and legal 
scholars’ subjective perspectives on gender and trans as well as in part medical 
experts’ and scholars’ imprecise use of terminology contributed to a wide array 
of concepts in jurisdiction and legal scholarship.
Legal interpretations of medical concepts of gender in jurisdiction 
and legal scholarship 55
Legal concepts of gender alternated between those common in everyday knowl-
edge and the latest medical concepts. While e. g. the Chamber Court rulings 
on marriage and trans in the 1950s and 1960s were informed by social conven-
tions of the time, the Chamber Court revised its opinion in a court ruling on 
53 | Further examples are the decision of the Regional Court Hamburg on 20 Feb. 1956 
on a case of ›true hermaphroditism‹ (LG Hamburg 1958: 128 f.) and the Chamber Court 
opinion in a case of transsexuality on 08 Sept. 1970 (KG 1971: 79-82).
54 | This dependence on medical knowledge also explains why judges consult medical 
experts when deciding on a person’s gender.
55 | For a German version on the findings presented in this and the following section, see 
de Silva 2013: 89-93.
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trans at the beginning of the 1970s to accommodate latest developments in 
medicine on gender.
In its decision on 07 Nov. 1957 on the status of a marriage of two (presum-
ably) female-bodied partners of whom one identified as a man, the Chamber 
Court ruled that according to general and undisputed understandings a per-
son’s gender depends on his or her physical constitution (KG 1958: 61). The 
Chamber Court specified determinants of gender and the hierarchy of its con-
stituent components in its decision on 11 Jan. 1965 when it held that »a person’s 
gender assignment is generally determined by the external physical constitu-
tion, in particular by the external genitalia. By contrast, the psychic attitude is 
not decisive.« (KG 1965: 1084)
The Chamber Court revised its former opinion on gender in its landmark 
decision on the recognition of a trans person’s gender on 08 Sept. 1970. Based 
on an excerpt from Nevinny-Stickel and Hammerstein’s influential article 
(Nevinny-Stickel/Hammerstein 1967: 663 f.), the Court stated that, »[n]owa-
days it needs to be considered secured medical knowledge that a person’s gen-
der is not determined by the constitution of the genitalia and sex characteristics 
alone but by the psyche, too« (KG 1971: 81; cf. Sieß 1996: 65).
Legal interpretations of medical concepts of trans in jurisdiction
and legal scholarship
Just as concepts of gender varied in jurisdiction and legal scholarship, so did 
legal understandings of trans. Here again, legal interpretations of trans ranged 
from precise accounts of the latest medical findings to obvious misunderstand-
ings of medical notions.
The legal scholar Walter, e. g., precisely summarised state of the art medi-
cal understandings of transsexuality as they appeared in publications by e. g. 
Schorsch (1974). Walter described transsexual individuals as male or female 
individuals who dispose of a contrasting gender identity and therefore consider 
their bodies as an »error of nature«. Transsexual individuals try with all means 
to adapt their physical appearance to the gender they experience psychologi-
cally (Walter 1975: 117). 
According to Walter, this endeavour is not only restricted to medical aspects 
but extends to the social environment, too, in particular to the adaptation of 
appropriate first names. In accordance with the widespread sexological opinion 
of the time, Walter pointed out that the only cure consists of supporting the 
request for sex reassignment surgery after a period of careful observation, since 
psychotherapy and hormone treatment that conform to the body have failed. As 
in sexological publications discussed earlier on, Walter distinguished between 
transsexuality and transvestism (ibid).
Both court opinions in decisions on trans by the High Regional Court 
Frankfurt in the 1960s provide examples of legal misinterpretations of medi-
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cal knowledge. In its decision on 08 Dec. 1965, the Court e. g. held that the 
applicant’s, i. e. the transwoman’s, vagina and female breasts and the hormone-
induced psychological development only produced an »artificial« as opposed to 
a »natural« condition that does not functionally correspond with the internal 
gender predisposition (OLG Frankfurt 1966: 408). Walter critically commented 
on this particular statement that, »[s]uch jurists’ psychology constitutes an (un-
scientific) transgression« (Walter 1975: 120).
In a later ruling on a transwoman’s gender, the same court suggested that, 
»initially he [sic!] identified psychologically and later on physically with the fe-
male sex due to hormone treatment and surgery« (OLG Frankfurt 1969: 339). 
The lawyer Eberle countered this notion. He correctly noted that sex reassign-
ment surgery does not create a break in the sense that it is only possible to 
consider a person transsexual after surgery. Rather, it is the psycho-sexual at-
titude that renders a person a transsexual individual, regardless of medical and 
surgical interventions (Eberle 1971: 222).
However, misreadings, if not arbitrary readings of medical concepts were 
not limited to jurisdiction. They also occurred in scholarly legal articles. The 
leading senior government official Becker e. g. gave the following reasons for 
the development of transvestism in his journal article called Mann oder Frau? 
Rechtsprobleme der Intersexualität (Man or woman: Legal problems of intersexu-
ality):
Causes of transvestism are very complex. However, it is not possible to ascertain a 
unanimous opinion. Probably a hyperfunction of the pituitary gland, a specific predis-
position in combination with particular environmental influences, a tendency towards 
perversion, in particular towards fetishist interests, an identification complex, a narcis-
sism, but also neuroses and the so-called Freudian castration complex have a deter-
mining influence. One can distinguish between permanent and partial transvestites, 
whereas the groups with which especially police authorities deal with are mostly homo-
sexual transvestites. (Becker 1965: 191)
As Eberle stated, transsexualism and transvestism were frequently and errone-
ously subsumed under intersexuality in jurisdiction and in medical publica-
tions (Eberle 1971: 222). Apart from confusing categories and based on medical 
categorisation of the 1950s, Becker fabricated further causes of transvestism 
than did medicine.
Indeed, an inconsistent use of terminology runs through several medical 
and legal texts, contributing to a confusion of terms in jurisdiction and legal 
scholarly publications. Carsten, e. g., subsumed transsexuality under intersex-
uality (Carsten 1970: 107) as did e. g. Nevinny-Stickel and Hammerstein, who 
classified male-bodied transsexuality as a psychic form of intersexuality: »Male 
transsexuality is an extremely rare, apparently genetically produced variant of 
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human nature which is to be included in the circle of intersexuality.« (Nevinny-
Stickel/Hammerstein 1967: 666)
In another instance, a medical expert report in the case the High Regional 
Court Frankfurt decided upon on 14 Feb. 1969 described the applicant as a 
»true transvestite« (OLG Frankfurt 1969: 338). Despite the fact that the appli-
cant manifested characteristics that medical scholarship at the time associated 
with transsexuality, the Court decided not to consider the application analo-
gous to that of a transsexual individual (ibid: 339 f.).
Medical and legal concepts diverged most significantly on trans subjects 
that were associated with sexuality. This particularly pertained to transvestism, 
which was sexualised in medicine and law. However, while sexologists simply 
framed transvestism as a sexual category, legal scholars frequently stigmatised 
transvestism. Eberle for instance devalued transvestism when he suggested 
that, »[t]he nasty taint of perversion will stick to transsexuality as long as it is 
mentioned in the same breath as transvestism« (Eberle 1974: 139).
The devaluation of transvestism was even more pronounced when trans-
vestism was associated with homosexuality. Becker e. g. assumed that, »one 
can find heterosexual transvestites among members of all strata, whereas the 
morons and imbeciles prevail among homosexual transvestites who regularly 
lack the ability to respond positively to criticism and lack a sense of shame and 
who come together in known transvestite bars« (Becker 1965: 191).
While sexologists explained the delinquency rate with transvestites’ and 
trans individuals’ precarious situation in society (see, e. g., Kockott 1978: 49), 
Becker constructed homosexual transvestites as criminals per se: 
Transvestites’ susceptibility to crime is considerably larger than the corresponding fig-
ures in the average of the population. Apart from criminal offences according to s.175 
StGB, one can especially find criminal acts of theft, robbery and extor tion among them. 
Transvestism needs to be characterised as a phenomenon of pathological significance 
and degeneration. […] As experience has shown, social rehabilitation is barely possible, 
because transvestites usually do not regularly hold down a job, and they live an erratic 
life. The danger of transvestism should not be exaggerated. However, it is dangerous 
when a young person gets into the circles of these perver ts and possibly gets involved 
in their practices. For that reason, an appropriate preventive protection of the youth is 
an essential task of the authorities. (Becker 1965: 191 f.)
Translating current medical concepts of trans to the legal realm
In the light of legal misinterpretations of medical concepts and the inconsistent 
use of terminology in medicine and law, Eberle took on the role of translating 
legal problems to sexology. In his article published in Sexualmedizin, he identi-
fied four major problems for which he suggested medicine might contribute to 
a solution.
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First, he deplored that medicine had so far failed to provide secured knowl-
edge on the causes of transsexuality and had in general not come up with a 
unified opinion (Eberle 1974: 139). Second, he stated that there was no generally 
accepted definition of transsexuality in law and medicine, and he pointed out 
to the necessity of formulating a definition medicine and law could subscribe 
to for strategic reasons (ibid).56 Third, he advised sexologists to clearly distin-
guish between transsexuality and transvestism, especially since transvestism 
was strongly associated with perversion (ibid). Based on Money and Ehrhardt’s 
as well as Schorsch’s concept of transsexuality and transvestism, he suggested 
a definition for both phenomena (ibid: 140). Finally, he criticised health policy 
that forced transsexual individuals to undergo surgery outside the Federal Re-
public of Germany (ibid: 142 f.). In addition, Eberle informed medicine on cur-
rent developments in West German jurisdiction on trans (ibid: 143-145).
2.2.4 Pre-legislative jurisdiction on transsexualit y
Pre-legislation jurisdiction on transsexuality was marked by a gradual shift 
from legal non-recognition to a legal accommodation of a transition from one 
gender to the ›other‹. This process however was uneven in terms of time and 
region. I will elaborate on the discrepancy between higher and lower court deci-
sions and between reported and unreported cases before providing a systematic 
account of the legal reasoning in reported cases. I will argue that the willing-
ness of courts to recognise a change of sex and/or gender depended on complex 
interrelations of individual judges’ worldviews, including notions of the public 
order and gender, and their willingness to employ existing legal provisions and 
to engage in judge-made law. 
Lower and higher court jurisdiction on trans
Lower and higher court jurisdiction of which usually the latter was reported57 
differed from each other. The discrepancies were particularly pronounced with 
regard to the number of recognised revisions of gender status, the gender ratio 
and the physical requirements expected from individuals who had applied to 
be recognised as another gender than the one they had been assigned to at the 
time of birth.
First, lower courts tended to recognise a trans person’s gender more fre-
quently than higher courts, and this applied to reported and unreported lower 
court decisions alike. In 1963, the Regional Court Münster e. g. granted a re-
56 | Eberle took on this task vis-à-vis jurisdiction, too, in his article in the NJW (Eberle 
1971: 221 f.).
57 | Exceptions are the LG Münster (1963: 249-250) and the AG Flensburg (1980: 
246-248).
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vision of first names and gender status in the birth register in the case of a 
transwoman who had undergone sex reassignment surgery (LG Münster 1963: 
249 f.) as did the Local Court Flensburg in 1979 (AG Flensburg 1980: 246-248). 
In a comprehensive study of local court decisions until 31 Dec. 1980, Augstein 
stated that of overall 90 cases 87 trans individuals were granted a revision of 
their gender status (Augstein 1982: 240).58
By contrast, until the Federal Constitutional Court decision in 1978 (BVer-
fG 1979: 9-13) higher courts felt impeded by other equally high ranking court 
decisions to grant a revision of first names and gender in the register of births, 
as was the case with the Chamber Court in 1970 (KG 1971: 79-82). More fre-
quently, they simply rejected requests for a revision of gender status and/or 
change of first names or demanded conditions, which resulted in a factual de-
nial of recognition.59
Second, the gender ratio differed between (reported) higher court cases and 
(usually) unreported lower court cases. The overwhelming majority of reported 
court cases dealt with transwomen.60 By contrast, of 93 applications for a change 
of first names and a revision of gender status before the Transsexual Act came 
into force, transwomen submitted 56 applications as opposed to 37 applications 
by transmen (Augstein 1982: 240).
Third, lower court jurisdiction was more uneven than that of higher courts 
with regard to the physical conditions that they required for a revision of first 
names and gender status in the birth register. Lower courts granted a revision 
in cases ranging from no surgery at all to several medical and surgical means 
of sex reassignment. In the case of a non-operative transwoman, a court e. g. 
ruled that the applicant could not be forced to undergo surgery for legal reasons 
(ibid). In the case of a transman, a court decided that chest surgery sufficed 
in order to have his birth entry revised (ibid). The Regional Court Münster 
ruled in the reported case that, among other things, an analogous application 
of s. 47  PStG was justified, if the individual no longer revealed the original 
58 | Three applications were unsuccessful. In one case, the court denied a revision of 
gender and first names because the applicant did not undergo sex reassignment surgery 
(Augstein 1982: 240). In another case, the court turned down a transman’s request for a 
revision of the gender entry and first names in the register of births after having undergone 
a bilateral mastectomy, because he did not have abdominal surgery. The court reasoned 
that it could only order a change of first names and gender, if the applicant could provide 
a statement to the effect that he was no longer able to reproduce (LG Hamburg 1980: 
155). In another case, the local court felt inhibited to decide in favour of a revision of the 
birth entry, because the parliament hat passed the Transsexual Act, and the applicant was 
younger than the minimum age of 25 laid down by the Act (Augstein 1982: 240).
59 | See OLG Frankfurt 1969: 338-340 as an example of the latter.
60 | The 1980 lower court decision in Hamburg is an exception (LG Hamburg 1980: 155).
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sex characteristics and manifested »all« aspects of the »other« sex instead (LG 
Münster 1963: 249).
Unlike lower court cases, reported higher court cases from the outset only 
dealt with trans women who had undergone sex reassignment surgery, in-
cluding a penectomy, an orchiectomy and the construction of a neo-vagina. 
However, extensive sex reassignment surgery did not necessarily mean that 
an application would be successful. As mentioned earlier on, in most reported 
higher court cases prior to trans legislation judges turned down transwomen’s 
requests to have the gender status and first names altered to match their outer 
appearance and identity.
An account of pre-legislation jurisdiction on trans in reported 
cases:61  Controversies over constitutional and legal instruments
and judge-made law
The legal recognition of a transition was closely linked to individual judges’ 
willingness to employ existing legal provisions or to read a change of gender 
status and first names into existing provisions, respectively, in the absence of 
an act that explicitly regulated such a procedure. Courts particularly disagreed 
on the interpretation of s. 47(1) PStG, the relevance of constitutional rights and 
issues concerning legal security.
Reported cases on trans offered three different readings of the Civil Status 
Act. In its decision on 08 Dec. 1965, the High Regional Court Frankfurt inter-
preted s. 47(1) PStG narrowly. According to this interpretation, an entry in the 
registry of births could only be revised, if it was incorrect from the beginning 
(OLG Frankfurt 1966: 407). By contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court of-
fered a reading of the term ›revision‹ to the effect that it did not necessarily 
suggest the incorrectness of the initial statement. Instead, it could also mean to 
correct a statement that proved to be wrong later on (BVerfG 1979: 12) (cf. Sieß 
1996: 72 f.). While the Chamber Court agreed that s. 47(1) PStG could not be ap-
plied directly, it suggested that there was, on the other hand, no legal rule that 
excluded the change of gender or from which one could conclude that a change 
of gender that took place after birth could per se not be legally recognised (KG 
1971: 81).
The status of constitutional rights, in particular Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law 
which states that, [h]uman dignity shall be inviolable« (BMJV 2017) and Art. 2(1) 
GG which declares that »[e]very person shall have the right to free development 
of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend 
against the constitutional order or the moral law« (ibid) featured differently in 
jurisdiction on trans prior to the Transsexual Act. The Chamber Court was 
61 | For a systematic account of pre-legislative jurisdiction on trans in reported cases in 
German, see de Silva 2013: 94-99.
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the first court to resort to Articles 1(1) and 2(1) GG in the case of transsexuality 
(cf. Sieß 1996: 67). In its decision on 08 Sept. 1970, the Chamber Court ar-
gued that human dignity and the basic right to develop one’s personality freely 
forbid forcing a person to live as a member of a sex/gender to which he or she 
no longer belongs physically or psychologically because of a birth entry (KG 
1971: 81; cf. Sieß 1996: 66). The Federal Constitutional Court and several other 
courts followed this reading.62
Courts also took different stances on the issue of judge-made law. As early 
as in 1963, the Regional Court Münster felt that there was a real need to regu-
late a person’s civil status in cases in which an individual no longer disposed 
of the characteristics of the original sex, revealed »all« characteristics of the 
»other« sex,63 had a gender identity corresponding with the person’s sex and 
was socially recognised as such. Consequently, the Court argued in favour of 
filling the legal gap via analogy (LG Münster 1963: 250).
However, several courts refused to follow this route for various reasons. The 
Chamber Court and the High Regional Court Frankfurt saw no need for such 
a legal regulation in 1965, since they denied a sex change had taken place in 
the first place (KG 1965: 1084; OLG Frankfurt 1966: 408; cf. Sieß 1996: 62). 
The Federal Court of Justice acknowledged the applicant’s desire for legal rec-
ognition according to her experienced gender (BGH 1972: 85). Nevertheless, 
it refused to embark on judge-made law. The Court reasoned that the legal 
order was entirely determined by the principle of human sexual immutability. 
It anticipated a host of regulatory difficulties for which the given legal order 
offered no measures and guidelines. In the opinion of the Court, judge-made 
law would inevitably lead to legal uncertainty (ibid: 84) and that the legislator 
was much more suitable to generate a comprehensive solution (ibid: 85; cf. Sieß 
1996: 80).64
62 | Se e. g. AG Flensburg 1980: 246-248 and Hanseatisches OLG Hamburg 1980: 
244-246.
63 | Walter suggested that it cannot be deduced from the decision that the Court neces-
sarily insisted on all the criteria mentioned for a change of first names and gender status 
in the birth entry. He argued that the court obviously saw that the applicant fulfilled the 
requirements and possibly mentioned these facts in order to limit the effects of its ruling 
and to emphasise the distinctive nature of the case (Walter 1975: 119).
64 | The Federal Court of Justice was particularly concerned about fixing the point of 
time for a change of gender status and tentatively suggested to use sex reassignment 
surgery as the right time to do so (BGH 1972: 84). Furthermore, it opined that under 
no circumstances may a change of gender status be assumed as long as the applicant 
disposed of functioning genitalia he or she was born with. First, it needed to be ruled out 
that a male transsexual was able to commit criminal offences according to s. 175 StGB. 
Second, the Court argued that it should be avoided that a person with male genitalia 
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The Federal Constitutional Court to which the applicant appealed to, and 
legal scholars severely criticised the Federal Court of Justice decision. While 
Walter sympathised with the Court’s argument that judge-made law would 
most probably not solve all problems that required regulation, he argued that 
this procedure was not expected to do so in one sweep. In his opinion, the Fed-
eral Court of Justice decision amounted to a denial of justice (Walter 1972: 267). 
The Federal Constitutional Court repealed the decision of the Federal Court of 
Justice,65 arguing that it was the Court’s duty to interpret the law in accordance 
with the Constitution, and it returned the case to the Federal Court of Justice to 
find a legal solution66 (cf. Sieß 1996: 73):
The Federal Court of Justice’s opinion that problems of regulation linked to a sex change 
cannot be solved by means of judge-made law misjudges that whereas a legal gap might 
exist, one cannot however speak of a gap in legal regulation in the light of the pre-
sented situation under constitutional law, which according to the basic right in Ar t. 2(1) 
in combination with Ar t. 1(1) of the Basic Law immediately leads to an obligation of 
courts. Of course, on behalf of legal security it appears necessary that the legislator 
regulate questions regarding a person’s civil status in the case of a sex change and its 
ef fects. As long as this has not happened, the task for courts is no dif ferent than in the 
case of the equality of men and women before the Equal Rights Act came into force. 
(BVerfG 1979: 13)
Controversies over the public order, marriage and the status 
of gender, and the social order
Whether a court decided to order a revision of gender status and first names or 
not was closely related to the judges’ respective assessments of potential disrup-
tions to the public order, customs and institutionalised heterosexuality. Here, 
too, legal reasoning differed substantially.
marries a person of the male sex as long as the applicant is able to »perform sexually as 
a man« (ibid: 84 f.).
65 | It is hard to say whether the Federal Constitutional Court felt encouraged by 
political developments. However, the Court was aware of the provisions in the Bill on the 
establishment of gender status in specific cases in its version of 31 Aug. 1978 (cf. Federal 
Constitutional Court 1979: 11) and the agreement between the Federal State and the 
Länder allowing transsexual individuals to use a gender-neutral name in addition to their 
respective birth names (cf. ibid). 
66 | On 14 Mar. 1979, the Federal Court of Justice finally ruled that s. 47 PStG was to be 
applied by entering a note in the margin of the registry of births stating the gender status 
(BGH 1979: 1287).
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Different assessments of the effects on the public order are mirrored in the 
debate on the purpose of the Civil Status Act. In the case of a post-operative 
transwoman, the Regional Court Münster started out from the premise that 
human communities and the public order required clear statements on a per-
son’s civil status, which the Court understood as conclusive statements on fam-
ily law relationships to other living persons. The Court argued that this was not 
the case, if an individual’s outer appearance, the shape of her external genitalia 
and the position in society that derives from the former contradicted the gender 
stated in civil status certificates (LG Münster 1964: 250; cf. Sieß 1996: 61).
However, the Federal Administrative Court disagreed with such an in-
terpretation. In the case of a transvestite who wished to supplement his first 
names by the name ›Maria‹, the Court cited the Federal Court of Justice deci-
sion on 15 Apr. 1959. The latter reasoned that it contradicted the right order fixed 
by morality and tradition, if naming did not observe generally accepted »natu-
ral« limitations (cf. BVerwG 1969: 858). The Court argued that it was only due 
to the individual’s first names that a person’s gender could be inferred from in 
the registries of marriage, family and death, since the Civil Status Act provided 
for an entry of a child’s gender in the registry of births only (ibid).67
Courts were also divided over the implications of the revision of a married 
individual’s first name and gender status. Defenders of marriage as an exclu-
sively heterosexual living arrangement assumed a same-sex marriage would 
pose a threat to the traditional and constitutionally protected concept of mar-
riage as a union of a man and a woman.
In its decision on a marriage between two (presumably) female individuals 
of which one identified as a man and the other as a woman, the Chamber Court 
defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. However, the Court 
determined a person’s gender status based on the physical constitution, regard-
less of the individual’s identity. Hence, the Court declared the union between 
the (presumably) female man and female woman that the registrar had initially 
entered as a marriage a »non-marriage« (KG 1958: 61).
By contrast, in the case of two married partners of which one had post-
operatively been legally recognised as a woman, the Hanseatic High Regional 
Court Hamburg decided that there was no valid reason for the State not to 
protect a life partnership of individuals, who had once entered marriage as a 
man and a woman and whose partnership had become a same-sex partnership 
as an effect of one partner’s transition. The Court argued that such exceptional 
67 | The Federal Administrative Court ruled out that the applicant add ›Maria‹ to his first 
names. It reasoned that while the additional name ›Maria‹ may be added to male chil-
dren’s first names for religious purposes, the conditions for such an exception were not 
given in the applicant’s case. The applicant was a Protestant and simply desired the first 
name ›Maria‹ in order to live as a woman (BVerwG 1969: 858).
Concepts until the enactment of the Transsexual Act 103
cases did not threaten the image of marriage as a union between a woman and 
a man. Moreover, constitutional rights guaranteed in Art. 2(1) in conjunction 
with Art. 1(1) GG were paramount to potential disruptions of the public order, 
and irritations and complications that might arise for authorities (Hanseati-
sches OLG Hamburg 1980: 245; cf. Sieß 1996: 77).68
Whether courts decided to change a person’s first name and gender status 
in the birth entry also depended on the emphasis the respective court placed 
on individual rights in relation to the social order of the time. In its decision 
on 08 Dec. 1965, the High Regional Court Frankfurt e. g. opposed the notion 
that a post-operative transwoman’s sex had changed. It argued that social and 
economic developments take into consideration biological dispositions. There-
fore, the determination of a person’s gender needs to observe »natural« facts, 
which outweigh a person’s attitude (OLG Frankfurt 1966: 408). According to 
the Court’s opinion, individualised concepts of gender posed a threat to the 
legal and social order:
If one wanted to render the personal attitude decisive, an individual would be able to 
influence our moral and legal order as long as the dif ferentiation of human beings into 
those of a female and a male sex dominates our existence in many ways and cannot 
at all be thought of as missing in people’s imagination and behaviour towards each 
other. One only needs to e. g. think of the family as the cell of our social order and social 
system and of the criminal law provisions, which presuppose the qualification of an of-
fender as a man or woman. (Ibid)
As Klöppel suggests, according to the High Regional Court Frankfurt, the free-
dom of the individual was subject to conditions: 
It is only under the condition that the individual subordinates itself under the existing 
social order with its premises that it may develop itself freely, i. e., it has to accept the 
social demand for an unambiguous gender classifiability of all individuals as either male 
or female as well as the assumption of a natural-fateful gender. (Klöppel 2010: 579)
The Federal Constitutional Court, however, took a different stance on the is-
sue of the social and legal order. Unlike the High Regional Court Frankfurt, 
the Federal Constitutional Court defined a person’s gender identity and the 
ability to live up to the conventions of the experienced gender as one of »the 
most intimate areas of the personality to which the state has is in principle no 
access. It is a sphere which may only be intervened into in the case of particular 
68 | The Transsexual Act that was to come into force on 01. Jan. 1981 however ruled in 
s. 8(1)2 TSG that a marriage had to be dissolved before the trans person’s gender would 
be recognised. 
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public interests.« (BVerfG 1979: 12)69 To the Federal Constitutional Court, then, 
it was constitutive of the social and legal order that an individual’s dignity be 
protected and that a person has the right to develop him- or herself freely.
Controversies over concepts of gender
Concepts of gender also played a role in reported court decisions on the is-
sue of whether to order a revision of transsexual individual’s first names and 
gender status in the birth entry. Judges who based their understandings of 
gender on physical properties only declined to recognise a trans person’s gen-
der. Higher courts in the 1960s devalued trans bodies and delegitimised trans 
identities. The Chamber Court and the High Regional Court Frankfurt e. g. 
considered trans genitalia to be either deficient (OLG Frankfurt 1966: 408), 
»artificial« (ibid) or »unreal« (KG 1965: 1084) and their transition from one sex/
gender to another either impossible or an effect of arbitrary behaviour:
The non-recognition of the applicant as a woman and the psychological distress and 
the dif ficulties in his [sic!] social and professional life that might possibly result [from 
surgery] cannot be taken into consideration; he [sic!] should have thought about the 
effects of his [sic!] voluntary decision before undergoing surgery. (OLG Frankfur t 1966: 
409; cf. Sieß 1996: 63; cf. Klöppel 2010: 579)
By contrast, courts that engaged in judge-made law and adapted to law the con-
temporary medical concept of gender as comprised of multiple factors recog-
nised a change of sex and a trans person’s gender.70 However, the status of the 
psyche vis-à-vis physical determinants of gender varied. The Chamber Court 
which in line with Nevinny-Stickel and Hammerstein (1967) classified trans-
sexuality as a form of psychic intersexuality ruled that psychological factors 
69 | The Court argued that according to medical evidence the complainant was a woman 
whose outer appearance had been hormonally and surgically reassigned to match her 
experienced gender. However, in legal terms she is treated as a man against her volition. 
In doing so, she is bereft of the possibility to live an inconspicuous, socially adapted life 
as a woman. Since the Civil Status Act assumes that the first name signifies the bearer’s 
gender, the complainant can only achieve a change of first names after the gender status 
has been changed in the register of births. However, the fact that this had been denied her 
produces conflictual situations for the complainant despite her gender-neutral first name 
(BVerfG 1979: 11 f.). The Federal Constitutional Court decided that the transwoman’s 
complaint was permissible, because the Federal Court of Justice decision she had 
appealed against infringed upon the complainant’s basic right to develop her abilities 
and strengths freely as provided in Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with her right to dispose of 
herself and to shape her fate, as implied by Art. 1(1) GG (ibid).
70 | See e. g. LG Münster 1963: 250; KG 1971: 81; BVerfG 1979: 12.
Concepts until the enactment of the Transsexual Act 105
should be considered, if the »natural« physical development gives reason to in-
vestigate into the question of the »true« gender (KG 1971: 79; cf. Klöppel 2010: 
575 f.).71 The Regional Court Münster and the Federal Constitutional Court, 
however, considered intersexuality and transsexuality as separate phenomena 
and physical and psychological aspects of a person’s gender as equally signifi-
cant (LG Münster 1963: 249; BVerfG 1979: 12).
Judges in reported higher court cases in the 1970s who were convinced of 
the respective trans person’s claim to have his or her first names and gender 
entry revised in the register of births discussed the rules that should apply 
in these cases. All courts were, albeit to a different degree, concerned about 
the issues of irreversibility, surgery and the motivation for a revision of gender 
status.
The Chamber Court explicitly ruled that, among other things, s. 47 (1) PStG 
applies, if the change was not based on the respective trans person’s arbitrary 
behaviour (KG 1971: 79; cf. Klöppel 2010: 575). The Chamber Court and the 
Federal Constitutional Court ruled out that the respective applicant’s desire to 
live according to another gender than the one he or she had been assigned to 
at the time of birth was arbitrary. Expert reports had convinced the courts that 
the applicant’s urge to change gender status was beyond her volition (KG 1971: 
82; BVerfG 1979: 12).
Both Courts assumed that the fact that the applicant had undergone sex 
reassignment surgery served as a clue to the irreversibility of the applicant’s 
decision to live as a woman (KG 1971: 82): 
Art. 2(1) GG in combination with Ar t. 1(1) GG demands the revision of the transsexual’s 
male gender in the register of bir ths, at any rate in a case that according to medical 
knowledge deals with irreversible transsexualism and when a sex-reassigning operation 
has been performed. (BVerfG 1979: 9)
2.2.5 Summar y: Legal constructions of gender and transsexualit y 
 in the pre-legislative phase
Granting trans individual’s requests for a change of first names and a revision 
of gender status in the birth entry prior to the Transsexual Act proved to be an 
uneven process and depended on several factors. These factors were interpreta-
tions of legal and constitutional provisions, the willingness to engage in judge-
made law, interpretations of medical literature and expert reports, assessments 
71 | In this particular case, medical experts stated that the applicant’s psychological and 
physical development deviated from a boy’s one, since she featured a slight swelling on 
the chest in puberty and later on proved to be impotent (KG 1971: 82).
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of the public order, morality and society, including marriage and concepts of 
gender.
The abovementioned factors interrelated in various ways, although not all 
factors were necessarily discussed and even less so to the same extent in every 
individual court case. In reported court cases in the 1960s, e. g., interpretations 
of s. 47(1) PStG featured particularly strongly without any reference to the Con-
stitution. However, ever since the Chamber Court introduced Art. 2(1) and 1(1) 
GG into the debate in 1970, no court in a reported court case failed to refer to 
the Constitution, although courts differed on the significance of the abovemen-
tioned articles in relation to judge-made law and legal consistency.
Moreover, the period from the 1960s to the late 1970s was marked by a 
gradual shift from a legal concept of sex/gender as innate and immutable to 
an understanding of sex/gender as mutable. This shift largely depended on 
whether a court decided to interpret gender according to contemporary medi-
cal knowledge, according to which gender was a complex conglomeration of 
several factors, including the psyche, or not. Whereas reported higher court 
decisions in the 1960s were based on an understanding of gender as based on 
a person’s morphology, in particular the genitalia at the time of birth, in the 
1970s higher courts increasingly accrued more importance to the psyche (de 
Silva 2013: 100 f.).
Concepts of gender in jurisdiction not only had tangible effects on trans 
individuals’ applications to have their respective birth entries revised. The as-
sumption that female-bodied individuals were girls and male-bodied persons 
boys at the time of birth who grow up to be women and men, respectively, e. g. 
rendered trans individuals unconceptualisable and did not allow for claims to 
dignity and the right to the free development of one’s personality.
Discussions in jurisdiction in the 1960s on possible causes of transsexual-
ity also gave way to clearly defined conditions for a revision of the entry of gen-
der and first names in the birth register. In accordance with the Draft Bill, the 
Federal Constitutional Court held that the birth entry was to be revised at least 
in cases where medical experts stated that the applicant irreversibly identified 
with the ›other‹ gender and had undergone a sex-reassigning operation.
Roughly a year before the Transsexual Act passed the West German par-
liament, courts recognised a person as a member of the ›other‹ legitimised 
gender in cases when the following conceptual and procedural factors coin-
cided: courts read s. 47(1) PStG constitutionally, engaged in judge-made law, 
interpreted gender in accordance with the latest insights in medicine and when 
a trans person according to medical evidence fulfilled the criteria mentioned 
above (ibid: 101).
At the same time, the case the High Regional Court Frankfurt decided 
upon in 1969 reveals that trans categories were less tidy than sexology or legal 
rules in the late 1970s claimed them to be. In this particular case, a person 
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identified as a transvestite, although the individual had undergone sex reas-
signment surgery (ibid).
While legal scholarship overall tended to be more sympathetic to trans-
sexual individuals’ claims to recognition than jurisdiction, this did not apply 
to transvestites and, unlike in sexology, legal scholars’ reactions to transves-
tites were markedly deprecative. Reactions ranged from unease to patholo-
gisation with features that exceeded pathologising constructions in sexology 
and amounted to downright criminalisation. The latter was more pronounced 
when a transvestite engaged in homosexual acts, which underscores that with 
few exceptions the law, legal scholarship and jurisdiction of the time contrib-
uted to producing and reproducing a heteronormative society (ibid).
While the mutability of sex and gender became entrenched in jurisdiction 
by the end of the 1970s, the gender binary remained untouched in principle. 
Intersexuality and trans continued to be pathologised as physically or psycho-
logically defective sex and gender developments, respectively, and a transition 
from one gender to the ›other‹ was recognised only under the condition that a 
physical adaptation to normative and conventional understandings of men and 
women had taken place (ibid: 101 f.).
Jurisdiction is deeply embroiled in historically-specific relations of power, 
including its productions of gender and transsexuality. Courts read the number 
of genders into the Civil Status Act and defined the relation of the two in het-
eronormative terms. Jurisdiction produced different interpretations of, and as-
sessed differently, the same legal and constitutional provisions in similar facts 
of a case. Courts subscribed to different concepts of gender and transsexuality.
2.3 de vIsIng the tr ansse xual act
Faced with the Federal Constitutional Court decision in the 1978 that considered 
transsexual individuals’ demand for gender recognition legitimate, and con-
fronted with pressure from sexological associations and Members of the Bun-
des tag, the West German social-liberal government drafted the Bill to change 
first names and establish gender status in specific cases (Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit 
in besonderen Fällen).72 This chapter deals with the legislative process that led to 
the Transsexual Act.
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the legislative pro-
ceedings. It focuses on the dynamics between jurisdiction, government policy 
72 | The Bill to change first names and establish gender status in specific cases 
will be referred to as the Bill, the Government Bill or the Transsexual Bill (Entwurf des 
Transsexuellengesetzes).
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and parliamentary activities with regard to trans in the pre-legislative phase 
and addresses the effects major controversies between the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat had on the development of the Draft Bill during the legislative pro-
ceedings. The findings of this section are based on higher court decisions, gov-
ernment documents, stenographic records of the parliamentary debates in the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat (Stenographische Berichte), committee minutes of 
both chambers and printed matters of the Bundestag (Bundestagsdrucksachen) 
and the Bundesrat (Drucksachen des Bundesrates),
The abovementioned chapter will be followed by an analysis of sexologi-
cal and trans movement interventions and concepts of transsexuality as they 
featured during the legislative process. This section draws upon several sourc-
es. Among these are summaries of sexological submissions in appendages to 
minutes of plenary and committee meetings, the sexologist Pfäfflin’s (1980) 
comment on the legislative debate on the Draft Bill in the influential news 
magazine der spiegel and petitions and letters by trans individuals, including 
responses by government officials. Further sources are the answers to a ques-
tionnaire on medical issues the Christian democratic opposition submitted to 
the Federal Home Office and a medico-legal article in the medical journal Der 
Gynäkologe, co-authored by the MP Müller-Emmert (Müller-Emmert/Hiersche 
1976), which was submitted to the Bundestag Committee on Domestic Affairs.
After a brief summary of general characteristics of the parliamentary de-
bate, the next chapter analyses the constructions of transsexuality and outlines 
the negotiations on trans rights as they emerged during the debates in the ple-
nary sessions of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and committee meetings. The 
analysis takes into consideration both explicit statements on transsexuality as 
well as the issues around which the parliamentary debate on transsexuality 
unfolded.
The final section of this chapter deals with the outcome of the legislative 
process, i. e. the Act to change first names and establish gender status in spe-
cific cases. An outline of the Act will be followed by an analysis of gender, trans 
and gender regime as laid down by the Act.
Despite occasional challenges to heteronormativity, the parliamentary de-
bate in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat at no point questioned the hegemonic 
gender order, and while the Transsexual Act provided for a revision of first 
names and gender status, it nonetheless restored the heteronormative gender 
binary.
2.3.1 Outline of the legislative process
While pre-legislative parliamentary activities began as early as in March 1972, 
the legislative process only began three years later and ended with the sign-
ing of the Transsexual Act on 10 Sept. 1980. Pre-legislative developments were 
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marked by the dynamics between jurisdiction, government policy and parlia-
mentary activities. The legislative phase was, by contrast, characterised by fun-
damental disagreements between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.
Pre-legislative dynamics between jurisdiction, the government 
and the Bundestag on trans legislation
The fact that the governing social-liberal coalition introduced a draft bill to 
provide for a revision of first names and gender status into the Bundesrat on 
05 Jan. 1979 (Bundesrat 1979) was attributable to a complex set of relations 
between jurisdiction, the government and the parliament. Federal jurisdiction 
and federal government policy on trans initially consisted of shifting to and fro 
the responsibility for regulating the revision of first names and gender status 
in the birth registry in cases of transsexuality. 
On 21 Sept. 1971, the Federal Court of Justice acknowledged that transsexu-
al individuals’ claim to be legally recognised as the gender »they irresistibly feel 
compelled to align themselves to and have more or less succeeded in doing so« 
(BGH 1972: 85) was legitimate. Nevertheless, the Court shied away from filling 
a legal gap arguing that judge-made law could not take into consideration all the 
effects recognising a transsexual person’s gender would have on other areas of 
the law and spheres of life. Instead, the Federal Court of Justice suggested the 
legislator was more suitable to accomplish such a task (ibid; cf. Sieß 1996: 80).
However, the West German government, too, was reluctant to introduce a 
draft bill into parliament in the aftermath of the abovementioned court deci-
sion. As the Secretary of State of the Federal Ministry of Justice (Staatssekretär 
im Bundesministerium der Justiz), Dr. Erkel, explained in his answer to the 
parliamentary enquiry by the social democratic MP for Hamburg, Dr. Arndt, 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1972: 10270 A) on 15 Mar. 1972, the federal government 
felt inclined to wait for the Federal Constitutional Court decision on the trans-
sexual litigant’s complaint against the Federal Court of Justice ruling on 21 
Sept. 1971 (ibid: 10270 C; cf. Sieß 1996: 81).
With its decision on 11 Oct. 1978, the Federal Constitutional Court put an 
end to the practice of deferring responsibility. While it suggested that legisla-
tive provisions would contribute to legal certainty, it ruled that to deny a trans-
sexual individual the revision of the entry of sex in the birth registry was in-
compatible with the Constitution. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court 
decided that in the light of a legal gap, courts were required to interpret s. 47(1) 
PStG constitutionally (BVerfG 1979: 13).
The written decision of the Federal Constitutional Court sheds a light on 
the relationship between the Bundestag and the federal government prior to the 
legislative process. In its presentation to the Federal Constitutional Court, the 
Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz [BMJ]) held that the 
complainant could not be considered a member of the female sex despite hav-
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ing undergone genital surgery, since the individual’s chromosomes were male 
(Federal Ministry of Justice, quoted in ibid: 11).
However, the Federal Constitutional Court was aware of the unanimous 
resolution of the Bundestag on 10 June 1976 (Deutscher Bundestag 1976c: 17818 
B), which demanded the government to submit a proposal to design a proce-
dure to legally recognise a transsexual individual’s gender after medical reas-
signment interventions had taken place (BVerfG 1979: 11). As a result, the gov-
ernment had devised a Draft Bill to establish the gender status in specific cases 
on 31 Aug. 1978 (BMI 1978).
Indeed, the relationship between the government and the parliament sug-
gest that the federal government was reluctant to address questions regarding 
the regulation of trans (cf. Sieß 1996: 84). It was largely due to constant pres-
sure by a group of social democratic MPs, foremost Dr. Arndt and Dr. Meinecke 
that the government put the issue on the agenda.
The government faced a sequence of parliamentary enquiries from 15 Mar. 
1972 onwards. In response to the initial question by Dr. Arndt (Hamburg, SPD) 
whether the government intended to introduce legislative measures to regulate 
sex reassignment surgery in cases of transsexuality and transvestism in the 
aftermath of the Federal Court of Justice decision on 21 Sept. 1971 (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1972: 10270 A), the Secretary of State of the Federal Ministry of Jus-
tice, Dr. Erkel, pointed out that the government lacked conclusive knowledge 
on transsexuality and that it did not know when it could address the matter 
(ibid: 10270 D; cf. Sieß 1996: 81). The Secretary of State of the Federal Ministry 
of Justice’s answer needs to be appreciated considering that with exception of 
Sweden no other country had any comparable experience with regulating mat-
ters pertaining to a change of gender status in the event of transsexuality.
However, the responses by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of the Home 
Office (Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär beim Bundesministerium des Innern), Dr. 
Schmude, to Dr. Arndt’s (Deutscher Bundestag 1975: 10943 A, B, C) and Dr. 
Meinecke’s (ibid: 10943 D) parliamentary questions on 18 Mar. 1975 suggest 
that the government was not particularly inclined to introduce trans legislation 
in the first place. When asked about legislation to revise the Civil Status Act and 
to issue administrative regulations that provide for an entry of a transsexual 
person’s new first name and gender in the birth registry, Dr. Schmude simply 
referred to the answer Dr. Erkel had given three years ago (ibid: 10943 A).
Government reluctance also becomes evident in the answer to the question 
whether the state’s entitlement to a particular order, which in Dr. Arndt’s opin-
ion generates significant psychological strain on trans individuals (ibid: 10944 
C), was not secondary to the right to develop one’s personality freely according 
to Art. 2 GG. In this instance, Dr. Schmude responded that the government 
did not consider such an extensive entitlement to follow from Art. 2 GG (ibid; 
cf. Sieß 1996: 83).
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However, the small group of social democratic MPs did not cease to exert 
pressure on the federal government. On 18 Mar. 1975, Dr. Arndt (Hamburg, 
SPD) e. g. enquired into the reasons for the three-year government delay to sub-
mit its representation to the Federal Constitutional Court in the abovemen-
tioned case (ibid: 10948 A). In response, the Parliamentary Secretary of State 
of the Federal Ministry of Justice, Dr. de With, gave three reasons for the delay. 
First, complex legal and medical problems required of the Federal Home Of-
fice, the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal Office for Youth, Family 
and Health (Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit) to discuss 
the respective effects on legislation. Second, the Foreign Office (Auswärtige 
Amt) conducted time-consuming investigations into the regulation of similar 
matters in other countries. Finally, due to possible effects of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court decision on the administration of the Bundesländer, the Federal 
Home Office had to consult the Home Offices of the Bundesländer (ibid: 10948 
A/B; cf. Sieß 1996: 84).
On 30 Mar. 1976 a motion by Dr. Arndt, Dr. Meinecke, Kleinert and 26 
other members of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands [SPD]) finally sparked the legislative process. The MPs demanded 
of the government to present a draft bill as soon as possible to the effect of 
legally recognising the gender of individuals according to the proceedings of 
non-contentious jurisdiction after genital surgery or other medical procedures 
had taken place (Deutscher Bundestag 1976; cf. Sieß 1996: 85). The motion was 
referred to the Bundestag Committee on Home Affairs and the Bundestag Com-
mittee on Legal Affairs (Rechtsausschuss), discussed in the latter on 05 May 1976 
and on 21 May 1976 in the former (Deutscher Bundestag 1976b: 2). The Com-
mittee on Home Affairs suggested the Bundestag pass the motion (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1976a; cf. Sieß 1996: 86), and indeed the MPs unanimously voted in 
its favour on 10 June 1976 (Deutscher Bundestag 1976c: 17818 B; cf. Sieß 1996: 
87).
Legislative proceedings
With the onset of the legislative process, the line of conflict shifted from the 
social-liberal government and the parliament to the Bundestag with a solid 
social-liberal majority and the Bundesrat, dominated by Christian democratic 
Bundesländer. Conflicts particularly arose over the structure of the Bill and the 
issue of marriage in the event of an establishment of gender status.73
73 | The reasons for particular perspectives on the ›small solution‹ and the issue of the 
dissolution of marriage prior to, or upon legal recognition of a trans person’s gender will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.3.3.
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Both the Draft Bill (TSG-R)74 that was circulated among all federal offices 
from 31 Aug. 1978 onward (BMI 1978, Anlage) and the revised Government Bill 
(TSG-E), which was submitted to the Secretary of the Bundesrat on 20 Dec. 1978 
(BMI 1978a) and to the President of the Bundesrat on 05. Jan. 1979 (Bundesrat 
1979) were subdivided into four parts (cf. Sieß 1996: 90).75 The first part of the 
revised Government Bill dealt with the change of first names (ss. 1-7 TSG-E) and 
the second laid down the requirements for, and the effects of the establishment of 
gender status (ss. 8-12 TSG-E). The third and fourth parts of the Bill determined 
revisions to other acts (ss. 13-15 TSG-E) and contained interim and final regula-
tions (ss. 16 and 17 TSG-E).
Since the application for a change of first names in the Government Bill 
was less ridden with prerequisites than the establishment of gender status, the 
former came to be known as the ›small solution‹ (›Kleine Lösung‹) and the latter 
as the ›big solution‹ (›Große Lösung‹). Section 1(1)2 TSG-E of the so-called small 
solution disallowed the applicant to engage in generational reproduction, and 
s. 7(1)1 TSG-E considered the decision that changed the first names void, if the 
applicant had either given birth to a child 302 days after the decision entered 
into effect or if the applicant had procreated a child within this period of time. 
Like s. 1(1) TSG-R, s. 1(1) TSG-E required of the applicant to be at least 18 years 
old at the time of application.
By contrast, the so-called big solution required, among other things, that the 
applicant had to be sterile (s. 8[1]3 TSG-E) and had to have undergone a surgical 
procedure to approximate the appearance of the ›other‹ sex/gender (s. 8[1]4 TSG-
E). Unlike s. 8(1) TSG-R which required the applicant to be 18 years of age for an 
application for the establishment of gender status, and as opposed to s. 1(1) TSG-
E, s. 8(1) TSG-E determined that an applicant had to be at least 25 years old at the 
time of applying for an establishment of gender status (cf. Sieß 1996: 90).
Except for the Committee on Youth, the Family and Health of the Bundesrat 
(Bundesrat Ausschuss für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit) which suggested to 
the House on 01 Feb. 1979 to pass the Bill without any modifications (Bun-
desrat – Ausschuss für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit 1979: 8; cf. Sieß 1996: 
103, footnote 52), the Bundesrat committees involved in discussing the Govern-
ment Bill resisted the ›small solution‹. Based on a motion by the representative 
of Bavaria, the majority of the representatives of the Bundesländer voted against 
the ›small solution‹ during the Bundesrat Subcommittee on Legal Affairs (Bun-
desrat Unterausschuss des Rechtsausschusses; Bundesrat – RA-U) meeting on 24 
Jan. 1979 (Bundesrat – RA-U 1979: 36). The Bundesrat Committee on Legal Af-
74 | The TSG-R stands for TSG-Referentenentwurf and refers to the initial draft, while 
TSG-E is an abbreviation for Entwurf (draft) and denotes the Government Bill.
75 | The analysis covers the first two parts of the Bill, since the third and fourth parts are 
irrelevant to an analysis of trans, gender and gender regime.
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fairs (Bundesrat Rechtsausschuss; Bundesrat – RA) supported this decision in its 
466th session on 31 Jan. 1979 (Bundesrat – RA 1979: 36).
On 02 Feb. 1979, the Bundesrat Committees on Home Affairs (Bundesrat 
Innenausschuss) and Legal Affairs unanimously recommended to the Bundesrat 
to dismiss the ›small solution‹ and to change the title and structure of the Bill 
accordingly. They suggested to change the provisions under s. 1(1) TSG-E to re-
quire of an applicant to be at least 25 years old, unmarried, permanently sterile 
and to have undergone a surgical intervention to the effect of approximating the 
outer appearance of the ›other‹ gender (Bundesrat 1979a).
The issue of marriage in the event of an establishment of an applicant’s 
gender status became the second major area of contention during the legisla-
tive process. The respective majorities in both legislative bodies were divided 
over the issue whether a marriage was supposed to be divorced prior to the ap-
plication for the establishment of gender status or after the court decision had 
come into force.76 According to s. 10(2) of the Government Bill, an applicant’s 
marriage was to be dissolved once the court decision on the gender status was 
to take effect. The effects of the dissolution of the marriage were to be deter-
mined according to the regulations pertaining to a divorce (BMI 1978a, Anlage: 
9). However, the Bundesrat Committee on Home Affairs and the Bundesrat 
Committee on Legal Affairs opposed s. 10(2) TSG-E and suggested a marriage 
be terminated prior to an application (Bundesrat 1979a: 10 f.).
On 16 Feb. 1979, the Bundesrat followed the committee recommendations 
without any further plenary debate (Bundesrat 1979b: 27 A-D). By contrast, the 
majority of MPs in the Bundestag supported the Government Bill after a short 
debate on 28 June 1979 (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13169 B-13176 A).
The resistance to the so-called small solution and to s. 10(2) TSG-E was 
significant to the legislative process. According to Art. 84(1) GG, the matter of 
the Government Bill required the approval of the Bundesrat.77 Hence, the Bill to 
change first names and establish gender status in specific cases was doomed to 
fail without the consent of the Bundesrat.
76 | The Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei [FDP]) which was the minor 
of the two governing coalition parties opted for a solution that did not require a divorce in 
the first place (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13175 C). However, the liberal party did not 
have the political weight to influence the course of the Bill.
77 | Bills are divided into approval bills (Zustimmungsgesetze) and objection bills 
(Einspruchsgesetze). With regard to the former, the Bundesrat may consent to a bill, 
demand that the Mediation Committee be convened or reject a bill. Objection bills do 
not require Bundesrat approval. However, if two-thirds of the members of the Bundesrat 
object to a bill, the Bundestag needs a two third majority to reject the appeal and render 
the bill effective. Since the reform of the federal system (Föderalismusreform) took effect 
in Sept. 2006, the proportion of approval bills has dropped (bpb undated).
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The government decided to follow up upon some of the minor issues the 
Bundesrat raised against the Bill, such as for instance the amount and kind 
of medical knowledge that informed the Government Bill and court proceed-
ings. While the government refuted the accusation that it had not sufficiently 
implemented state-of-the-art medical knowledge in the design of the Bill (Bun-
desregierung 1979, Anlage 3: 25), it accepted the opposition’s demand to seek 
additional medical expertise by forwarding a questionnaire designed by Dr. 
Jentsch (Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) to renowned sexologists (Deutscher Bunde-
stag – In 1979: 18).
However, the perspectives of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on the so-
called small solution and the requirement to terminate a marriage either prior 
to, or upon the establishment of gender status remained irreconcilable, despite 
tedious negotiations in several committee meetings and repeated attempts to 
come up with a viable solution for the respective majorities in both legislative 
bodies.78 Members of the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Un-
ion (Christlich Demokratische Union [CDU] / Christlich Soziale Union [CSU]) 
and the SPD simply reiterated their respective perspectives on these issues 
(Bundesregierung 1979, Anlage 3: 25; Deutscher Bundestag – R 1980a: 117; 
Deutscher Bundestag – In 1980: 24).
The Bundestag passed the Government Bill after second and third reading 
on 12 June 1980 (Deutscher Bundestag 1980a: 17738 B-D). Since the CDU domi-
nated the Bundesrat Committees on Home Affairs and on Legal Affairs, the 
latter recommended to the Bundesrat to call upon the Mediation Committee 
(Vermittlungsausschuss)79 (Bundesrat – In-R 1980: 1; cf. Sieß 1996: 106).80 Once 
78 | See for instance the negotiations during the 91st meeting of the Bundestag 
Committee on Legal Affairs on 05 Mar. 1980 (Deutscher Bundestag – R 1980), the 
94th meeting of the Bundestag Committee on Legal Affairs on 16 Apr. 1980 (Deutscher 
Bundestag – R 1980a), the minutes of the 86 th meeting of the Bundestag Committee on 
Home Affairs on 29 Nov. 1979 (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1979) and the debate during the 
94th meeting of the Bundestag Committee on Home Affairs on 27 Feb. 1980 (Deutscher 
Bundestag – In 1980).
79 | The Mediation Committee is composed of Members of the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat for joint consideration of bills in instances when the consent of the Bundesrat 
is required, the latter however objects to the bill becoming law (Art. 77[2] GG). Art. 77(2) 
and 77(2a) GG determine the institutions eligible to demand the convention of a Media-
tion Committee, deadlines for submission of bills to the Bundesrat, response times and 
voting procedures in cases of amendments or upon completion of the mediation proce-
dure. For further details and the exact wording of Art. 77(2) and 77(2a) in English, see 
BMJV 2017.
80 | The Bundesrat Legal Committee’s decision was preceded by a recommendation by the 
Bundesrat Subcommittee of the Legal Committee to this effect (Bundesrat – RA-U 1980).
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more, the majority of votes in the Bundesrat followed the Committee’s recom-
mendations without any debate in its 489th session (Bundesrat 1980: 301 D; 
Deutscher Bundestag 1980b).
The Mediation Committee came up with a compromise on 03 July 1980 
(cf. Sieß 1996: 107). The Committee suggested that the Bill remain divided 
into a ›small solution‹ and a ›big solution‹ as the majority in the Bundestag had 
opted for (cf. ibid). However, it also proposed to raise the age requirement for 
an application for a change of first names to 25 years and to require of a per-
son to be unmarried prior to applying for the establishment of gender status 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1980d, Anlage 2; cf. Sieß 1996: 107). The two latter sug-
gestions were in line with the demands of the majority in the Bundesrat. The 
compromise was communicated to both legislative bodies, and the Bill finally 
passed the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat on 04 July 1980 (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1980c: 18688 A; Bundesrat 1980b: 333 D; Bundesrat 1980c; cf. Sieß 
1996: 108 f.).
The Act to change first names and establish gender status in specific cases 
(Transsexual Act – TSG) was finally signed on 10 Sept. 1980 by the then Presi-
dent Carstens, Chancellor Schmidt and the federal ministers of the offices that 
were involved in drafting the Bill. It was announced in the Federal Law Gazette 
(Bundesgesetzblatt) as BGBl 1980, Teil I, 1654. The Bill was enacted on 01 Jan. 
1981 to give the administration and courts of the Bundesländer time to become 
acquainted with the Act.
2.3.2 Sexological and trans concepts and inter ventions
Sexologists and transsexual individuals alike intervened into the legislative 
process. However, the types of intervention and the authority accorded to the 
respective contributions differed. While sexological interventions were granted 
privileged access and significant space during the legislative debate,81 trans in-
terventions were limited to lobbying in local constituencies and petitions, and 
the contents of the latter were barely discussed during plenary debates and 
committee meetings.
Sources and inter ventions
Sexological knowledge appeared on the terrain of the state in various guises 
and via different channels. The latter can be divided into unrequested interven-
81 | As the analysis in chapter 3.3.3 will show, privileged access and extensive 
discussion on sexological information did not necessarily mean that medical knowledge 
was implemented in the Bill. Nor does this mean that medical knowledge was at all times 
the real issue whenever MPs and committee members referred to it.
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tions from civil society agents, information upon request and medical knowl-
edge by governmental sources.
Interventions that took the first route were necessarily proactive and decid-
edly strategic. Depending on the stage of the legislative process, these contri-
butions either generally pressed for trans legislation, such as the medico-legal 
submission by the DGfS to the Federal Minister of Justice in 1974 (Krause et al. 
1974), or exerted pressure on particular state actors in critical moments of the 
legislative process. One of the two most prominent interventions that took this 
route was the public appeal to the Bundesrat and the Prime Ministers (Minister-
präsidenten) of the Bundesländer by the three West German sexological associa-
tions on 28 Feb. 1979. In these documents, sexologists urged the addressees to 
support trans legislation and to take into consideration medical and psychologi-
cal knowledge on the subject matter (Sigusch/Gindorf/Kentler 1979: 36). The 
other was the sexologist Pfäfflin’s article called Skalpell oder Couch? Probleme 
der Transsexualität, which appeared in the weekly news magazine der spiegel 
on 11 Feb. 1980 and explicitly took a stance in favour of the ›small solution‹ as 
proposed by the West German social-liberal government (Pfäfflin 1980: 211; 
Deutscher Bundestag – In 1980, Beigabe).
Medical knowledge upon request appeared on the level of the state via oral 
consultations and written statements. Among these were an updated version of 
the sexological submission to the Federal Constitutional Court which served 
as background knowledge for the Bill (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13170 D) 
and answers to an extensive questionnaire the Christian democratic MP, Dr. 
Jentsch presented to the Federal Home Office during the Bundestag Committee 
on Home Affair’s meeting on 29 Nov. 1979 (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1979, 
Anlage 4: 2-4).
Medical knowledge also entered the parliamentary debate from sources on 
the terrain of the state. The minutes of the 86th session of the Bundestag Com-
mittee on Home Affairs for instance state that the physician, Dr. Meinecke 
(Hamburg, SPD), presented to the committee sexological assumptions on the 
aetiology of transsexuality (ibid).82 In another instance, the legal expert and MP 
Dr. Müller-Emmert submitted a medico-legal article he co-authored with the 
physician Dr. Hiersche (1976) and which appeared in the medical journal Der 
Gynäkologe to the Bundestag Committee on Home Affairs on 02 July 1979. In a 
letter, he asked the chairperson of the committee, Dr. Wernitz, to distribute the 
article among the members of the committee (Müller-Emmert 1979).
82 | Dr. Meinecke stated that he was a physician during the plenary debate of the 
Bundestag at third reading of the Bill (Deutscher Bundestag 1980a: 17735 C).
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Since trans individuals were not invited to any consultations at the gov-
ernment level, every intervention may be considered proactive.83 Trans indi-
viduals used lobbying and petitions as channels to voice their demands and 
opinions. Trans individuals did not yet organise politically on a national scale 
in Germany during the 1970s. Rather, lobbying took place in local constituen-
cies. Little written information is available on lobbying activities and the issues 
trans individuals raised. However, a transman’s petition clearly indicates that 
trans people lobbied politicians in Hamburg prior to, and during the legislative 
proceedings (Petitioner 5 1979: 1).
While it is quite likely that lobbying was an effective means of influencing 
the legislative process, it is premature to arrive at such a conclusion in this 
particular case, given the scarce evidence. Interestingly, however, particularly 
social democratic Members of the Bundestag representing constituencies in 
Hamburg pressed for legislation, most notably Dr. Arndt in the pre-legislative 
era84 and Dr. Meinecke during the legislative process.85
While the petitions suggest that most of the individuals acutely monitored 
the legislative process,86 knowledge on legal and political conventions and pro-
ceedings varied. Contributions ranged from a highly unrealistic demand for a 
revision of the Act roughly 2.5 years after it had come into force (Petitioner 3 
1982), a misplaced complaint (Petitioner 6 1979),87 to a renowned activist and 
lawyer’s far-sighted critique of constitutional pitfalls in several provisions of the 
Bill and future Act (Petitioner 4 1979; 1980).88
83 | One petitioner only mildly criticised the legislator for not involving trans persons 
during the consultation process (Petitioner 7 undated).
84 | As mentioned earlier on, Dr. Arndt initiated all parliamentary enquiries throughout 
the 1970s and was, together with Dr. Meinecke, Kleinert and 26 other members of the SPD 
responsible for the motion on 30 Mar. 1976.
85 | Dr. Meinecke is one of the few MPs who is recorded to have mentioned the petitioners 
in his speech during the first plenary consultation in the Bundestag on 28 June 1979 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13173 D) and who consistently accompanied the legislative 
process of the Bill for the SPD in the Bundestag and during committee meetings.
86 | An obviously political and legal layperson for instance quoted from the Bundestag 
stenographic reports to support her argument (Petitioner 7 undated: 1).
87 | The petitioner complained to the Bundestag Committee on Petitions that the Home 
Office of the Bundesland Schleswig-Holstein had addressed a letter to her using her 
former male first name (Petitioner 6 1979).
88 | Her critique particularly focused on the provisions in ss. 8(1)1 and 7(2) TSG-E. 
Section 8(1)1 TSG-E rules that two experts are required to state that the applicant’s sense 
of belonging to the ›other‹ gender will with a high degree of probability not change. Her 
opinion will be outlined in more detail later on. Section 7(2) of the Bill (and the Act) rules 
that the decision to change the first names is void, if a person marries.
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Moreover, the focus of the petitions proved to be heterogeneous. The peti-
tions ranged from brief pledges for legislation to allow a change of first names 
(Petitioner 1 1979; 1979a; Petitioner 2 1979) to the design of a bill (Petitioner 3 
1982) at the end of a lengthy exchange between a transman and government 
officials (Petitioner 3 1979; BMI 1979; Petitioner 3 1979a; 1979b; BMI 1979a; 
Deutscher Bundestag – R 1979; Petitioner 3 1982). Some petitioners addressed 
their respective social and legal situation (Petitioner 1 1979; Petitioner 5 1979).89 
More frequently, though, transsexual individuals commented on various pro-
visions of the Bill (Petitioner 4 1979; 1980; Petitioner 7 undated; Petitioner 3 
1979; 1979b; Petitioner 5 1979).
Perspectives on the Bill
Not only did the channels of access to the arena of institutionalised politics 
vary between sexologists and transsexual individuals, so did the respective so-
cial agents’ perspectives on the Bill. While sexological interventions with few 
exceptions focused on broad aspects of the Bill, transsexual individuals largely 
concentrated on individual provisions.
Sexologists unanimously and strongly supported the ›small solution‹ in 
their interventions during the legislative process. They favoured this particular 
structure of the Bill for three reasons. In the written response to the questions 
prepared by the opposition, sexologists suggested that the option to change 
first names contributes to a transsexual individual’s social integration. They 
reasoned that the ›small solution‹ would enable the respective person to take 
on the social role he or she deemed more in accordance with his or her gen-
der identity (Deutscher Bundestag – 1979, Beigabe 1: 2). Moreover, the ›small 
solution‹ was considered to facilitate the diagnostic decision-making process, 
since the transsexual individual had time to explore life in the desired gender 
role independently of endocrinological and surgical treatment (ibid; Pfäfflin 
1980: 211). Finally, sexologists argued that it was a personal decision whether 
an individual wished to undergo sex reassignment surgery. Hence, those who 
did not opt for surgery could apply for a change of first names only (Deutscher 
Bundestag – In 1979, Beigabe 1: 3). Pfäfflin quite dramatically summarises sex-
ologists’ sentiment towards the opposition’s plans to scrap the ›small solution’: 
»Without the ›small solution‹ the Act would remain a torso, a monstrosity one 
can only caution against.« (Pfäfflin 1980: 211; cf. Sieß 1996: 103)
89 | While one post-operative petitioner did not mention any social problems without 
legal recognition, she anticipated them in the workplace and with the bureaucracy 
(Petitioner 1 1979). Two other petitioners recounted problems in some areas of life, such 
as with the state bureaucracy (Petitioner 6 1979: 1; Petitioner 7 undated: 2) and none 
at all in everyday life (ibid) and when dealing with the health insurance and the bank 
(Petitioner 6 1979: 1).
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However, unlike the Government Draft Bill, which initially allowed a change 
of first names as soon as the applicant reaches the age of majority, Sigusch and 
Schorsch recommended increasing the minimum age to 21 years. The sexolo-
gists admitted that the proposed age limit was somewhat arbitrary. However, 
they reasoned that even though some transsexual individuals were physiologi-
cally and psychosexually mature at the age of majority, such a measure was jus-
tified in order to avoid a premature and questionable indication in other cases 
(Deutscher Bundestag – In 1979, Beigabe 1: 4).
The petitioners’ perspectives on the Bill were more heterogeneous than 
those sexologists presented. They ranged from hopes for a speedy passage of 
the Bill (Petitioner 1 1979; Petitioner 2 1979; Petitioner 5 1979: 2), objections 
to individual provisions of the Government Bill (Petitioner 4 1979; 1980; Peti-
tioner 7 undated; Petitioner 5 1979) to a critique of the basic structure of the Bill 
and the Act, respectively (Petitioner 3 1979; 1979b; 1982).
The petitioners did not necessarily share a common critique or perspec-
tive on trans. While most petitioners e. g. either did not focus on, or as much 
as mention90 the division of the Bill into provisions that regulate a change of 
first names and those that establish the gender status, those who did debated 
this issue controversially. One petitioner vehemently opposed the ›small solu-
tion‹ for two reasons. First, a change of first names without a revision of the 
entry in the birth registry would in his opinion transmit the split between the 
person’s mind and body to official documents, too. Second, he feared that the 
›small solution‹ might entice transvestites and homosexual cis individuals to 
seek solutions under a bill designed specifically for transsexual individuals. He 
suggested instead to sever the ›small solution‹ from the Transsexual Bill and 
to create a separate bill for transvestites (Petitioner 3 1979b: 3). By contrast, an-
other petitioner defended the option to apply for a change of first names only. 
She presented two reasons to support her stance. First, the ›small solution‹ 
would enable married individuals to continue their marriage. Second, the Act 
should in her opinion not be more restrictive than the Federal Constitutional 
Court decision (Petitioner 4 1979: 5). Three other petitioners were foremost 
concerned about the option to have their first names changed in official docu-
ments (Petitioner 1 1979; Petitioner 6 1979; Petitioner 5 1979) and therefore can, 
by implication, be considered supporters of the so-called small solution.
In another instance, a petitioner objected to s. 8(1)2 TSG-E, which requires 
of a married individual to get divorced in order to be recognised as a member 
of the ›other‹ gender. She argued that it should be left up to the partners to de-
cide whether they wished to continue or terminate their marriage (Petitioner 7 
undated: 1). By contrast, another petitioner considered the abovementioned rule 
appropriate. Like many sexologists in the 1970s and 1980s, he was convinced 
90 | See e. g. Petitioner 5 1979.
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that unambiguously transsexual individuals were heterosexual (Petitioner 3 
1979b: 5). Therefore, he believed that a marriage between a transsexual and a 
non-transsexual person was no longer possible.
Similarly, some petitioners disagreed over ss. 6 and 9 TSG-E. The latter pro-
vide for a reversal of the revision of first names or gender status, respectively. One 
petitioner who suggested that the desire for a reversal of any of these decisions 
would not occur frequently did not object to ss. 6 and 9 TSG-E (Petitioner 4 1979: 
2). Another petitioner however insisted that transsexuality was caused by an or-
ganic predisposition and was therefore necessarily irreversible. He suggested 
that an initial decision be rendered permanent (Petitioner 3 1979: 3).
The petitioners were also divided over the status the Bill accrued to ex-
perts. Two petitioners vehemently opposed the regulation that provides that 
a successful post-operative trans person’s application for the establishment of 
gender status relies on supportive expert reports. One of the petitioners cau-
tioned that experts were fallible. Moreover, society could be expected to stom-
ach rare incidents in which individuals desire a reversal of a decision. In her 
opinion, the possibility that an establishment of a person’s gender status may 
be denied a post-operative applicant constituted a breach of Art. 1 GG (Peti-
tioner 4 1979: 2). The other petitioner argued that expert reports were unneces-
sary, since a person’s gender status was established forever due to surgery. In 
her opinion, the requirement to consult expert reports for an establishment of 
gender status would simply delay the procedure unnecessarily and render the 
procedure more expensive (Petitioner 7 undated: 1). Other petitioners did not 
object to this requirement at all.91
Nevertheless, petitioners who were quite at odds e. g. about the provisions 
laid down in s. 8(1)3 TSG-E agreed on other issues at the same time. Opposition 
was most prominent to the minimum age requirement of 25 years provided in 
s. 8(1) TSG-E to gain the legal recognition of the experienced gender.92 The pe-
titioners argued that based on Art. 3 GG,93 it was unconstitutional to grant dif-
ferent rights to post-operative trans individuals based on age (Petitioner 4 1979: 
3)94 and that such a regulation placed undue hardship on individuals younger 
than 25 years of age who had undergone sex reassignment surgery (Petitioner 
4 1979: 3; Petitioner 3 1979b: 4).
91 | See e. g. the letter to the Federal Home Office on 15 Oct. 1979 (Petitioner 3 1979b).
92 | Unlike s. 8(1)1 TSG-R, which provided that an application for the establishment 
of gender status may only be granted, if the applicant is at least 21 years of age, the 
minimum age was increased to 25 years of age in the TSG-E during the legislative process.
93 | According to Art. 3(1) GG, »[a]ll persons shall be equal before the law« (BMJV 2017).
94 | Indeed, in 1982 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that s. 8(1)1 TSG amounted 
to a breach of Art. 3(1) GG (BVerfG 1983: 170). For more details on this decision, see 
chapter 3.3.2.
Concepts until the enactment of the Transsexual Act 121
The government’s intention to regulate a person’s change of first names 
and establish of gender status according to the proceedings of contentious ju-
risdiction (s. 14 TSG-E) also met upon resistance. The petitioners who raised 
this issue argued that it was inappropriate to expect of individuals to be bur-
dened with costs in order to correct an error caused by what they considered to 
be a prenatal defect (Petitioner 3 1982: 3; Petitioner 7 undated: 1).
Three petitioners raised concerns about the wording used in some provi-
sions of the Draft Bill, arguing that it was either misleading or discriminatory. 
One petitioner objected to the phrase »a person […] is to be considered a mem-
ber of the other gender« that introduces the prerequisites for gender recogni-
tion in s. 8(1) TSG-E. She argued that this particular formulation is discrimi-
natory, since it implies that the respective person does not really belong to the 
›other‹ gender (Petitioner 4 1979: 4). In another instance, a petitioner rejected 
the phrase »no longer feels he belongs to the gender, which is entered in the 
birth registry«, which precedes the conditions for a change of first names in 
s. 1(1) TSG-E. He suggested that the wording contradicted the notion that there 
was an organic cause of transsexuality (Petitioner 3 1979b: 2). The author also 
criticised the formulation »has felt compelled to live according to his ideas« 
in the same section, because it invokes the notion of a mental disorder. In his 
view, the abovementioned phrase violates an applicant’s personality (ibid). An-
other petitioner held that the term ›transsexuality‹ itself was awkward, arguing 
that it is frequently associated with sexuality. In his opinion, however, trans-
sexuality demarcates an identity problem (Petitioner 5 1979: 1).
Another transman suggested that the Bill was based upon flawed prem-
ises. Referring to s. 8(1)4 TSG-E, which rules that an establishment of gender 
status may only be granted, if the applicant has undergone surgery to change 
his external sex characteristics to the effect of having clearly approximated the 
appearance of the so-called other gender, he argued that the government had in 
mind transwomen only when it drafted the Bill. Quoting a surgeon, he argued 
that feminising surgery appeared to be quite advanced. By contrast, the results 
of masculinising surgical interventions were, with exception of sterilisation, 
unacceptable at the time of writing. He suggested that the Bill ought to take 
into consideration the different situations transwomen and transmen face and 
limit sex reassignment surgery to sterilisation for the latter until surgical meth-
ods have improved (Petitioner 3 1979b: 5).
Finally, one petitioner held that s. 7(2) TSG-E was unconstitutional. She ar-
gued that it is unjustifiable to declare a decision to change first names void, if a 
person marries, since the Bill allows a married person to change his or her first 
name without such a consequence. Moreover, a transwoman’s desire to marry 
a ciswoman does not imply that the applicant no longer identifies as a woman. 
Instead, she might simply want to live with a woman as a woman (Petitioner 4 
1979: 5).
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Concepts of transsexualit y
Sexologists and trans individuals raised similar issues when addressing trans-
sexuality on the terrain of the state. The most prominent issues were trans-
sexual individuals’ understandings of self and mental health, the aetiology of 
transsexuality, the probability of reversals of the decision to transition from 
one gender to the ›other‹, surgery, sexual orientation and arguments to justify 
trans legislation. Altogether, the issues shed a light on their respective concepts 
of trans(sexuality).
Sexologists’ and trans individuals’ concepts concurred with regard to trans 
individuals’ understandings of self, their respective mental state, statements 
on reversals and surgery. The sexologist Pfäfflin e. g. noted that transsexual in-
dividuals integrate transsexuality into their lives in different ways. While some 
transsexual individuals consider transsexuality a transitory condition, others 
suggest that this gender identity constitutes a permanent state (Pfäfflin 1980: 
209 f.). These understandings of one’s gender history are mirrored in the peti-
tions. One author e. g. refers to herself as a »former transsexual«. She argues 
that since sex reassignment surgery has eradicated the discrepancy between 
her body and her mind, she no longer considers herself a transsexual individual 
(Petitioner 6 1979: 1). Another petitioner however continues to view him- or her-
self a transsexual individual despite having undergone surgical interventions 
(Petitioner 1 1979).
Neither sexologists nor transsexual individuals suggested that trans indi-
viduals were mentally disturbed. The sexologist Schorsch e. g. stated that trans-
sexual individuals are not usually mentally ill. According to Schorsch, psycho-
logical disorders may however occur as a secondary effect due to strong social 
pressure and conflicts (Schorsch 1974: 195). With exception of one petitioner, 
trans individuals did not raise the issue of mental health. However, the person 
who did repeatedly criticised formulations in the Bill that in his opinion asso-
ciated transsexuality with a psychological disorder (Petitioner 3 1979b: 2; ibid 
1982: 2).
Sexologists and trans individuals shared the assessment of the frequency of 
reversals on decisions to transition after having undergone sex reassignment 
procedures. Sexologists and trans individuals alike held that instances of re-
versals were either unknown in the Federal Republic of Germany (Deutscher 
Bundestag – In 1979, Beigabe 1: 7) or rare occurrences (Pfäfflin 1980: 209; 
Petitioner 4 1980).
Sexologist and trans perspectives were more or less identical with regard to 
surgery as the defining feature of transsexuality. However, this did not neces-
sarily mean that they believed all transsexual individuals opt for surgical in-
terventions. While the sexologists who responded to the questionnaire agreed 
with Schorsch (1974: 198) that the desire for surgery was the most significant 
feature in transsexual individuals and a successful mode of treatment in most 
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cases, they emphasised that it was a personal decision, whether a person want-
ed to undergo surgery or not (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1979, Beigabe 1: 3). 
They also stressed that surgery was the final step during a prolonged course of 
treatment (ibid; Pfäfflin 1980: 206). These statements on the one hand mirror 
sexologists’ unease with sex reassignment surgery and on the other hand in-
dicate less rigid understandings of transsexuality than in the mid-1970s. Most 
trans individuals did not claim that all transsexual individuals wished to un-
dergo surgery. However, several petitioners had undergone sex reassignment 
surgery at the time of writing.95 One transman suggested that surgical meas-
ures were appropriate, provided surgical techniques were sufficiently advanced 
(Petitioner 3 1979b: 5) and did not threaten the individual’s life (ibid 1982: 5).
Sexologists and trans individuals couched their respective demands for 
trans legislation in liberal rhetoric by referring to transsexual individuals as a 
»minority disadvantaged by fate« (Krause et al. 1974, quoted in Sigusch 1991: 
228) or as victims of nature (Petitioner 7 undated: 1; Petitioner 5 1979: 1).96 Sex-
ologists emphasised that the lack of legal recognition impinged on transsexual 
individuals’ mental health and social integration (Schorsch 1974: 195). Some 
trans individuals argued that their gender identity was caused through no fault 
of their own. Others suggested either implicitly (Petitioner 4 1979: 2) or explic-
itly (Petitioner 5 1979: 2), and with or without reference to essentialist concepts 
that the recognition of a transsexual individual’s first name and gender status 
was a human right (Petitioner 4 1979; Petitioner 5 1979: 2).
The social agents were however divided over the aetiology of transsexuality 
and used different arguments to justify legislation. Sexologists who intervened 
into the legislative process offered a multi-causal explanation for transsexual-
ity. Schorsch e. g. suggested that interlocking environmental and somatic con-
ditions caused transsexuality (Schorsch 1974: 198). Pfäfflin assumed somatic 
and psychological causes (Pfäfflin 1980: 205 f.), and Müller-Emmert and Hier-
sche suggested that somatic, psychosocial and environmental factors triggered 
a transsexual development (Müller-Emmert/Hiersche  1976: 96). According to 
Dr. Meinecke (Hamburg, SPD), this conglomeration of potential causes indi-
cated that the aetiology of transsexuality was unknown (Deutscher Bundes-
tag – In 1979: 15). By contrast, some petitioners insisted that a prenatal organic 
defect caused a transsexual development (Petitioner 7 undated: 1; Petitioner 3 
1979b: 2). One transman quoted a renowned medical expert and referred to 
Neumann’s and Dörner’s studies to support his assumption that prenatal endo-
crinological effects on the development of the brain were responsible for trans-
95 | See e. g. Petitioner 1 1979; Petitioner 6 1979; Petitioner 3 1979.
96 | For major characteristics of liberal rhetoric, see the following chapter.
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sexuality (Petitioner 3 1979: 5). However, other petitioners did not refer to the 
aetiology of transsexuality at all.97
Sexual orientation was another issue where sexologists’ and trans individu-
als’ concepts did not concur. Nor were trans individuals’ understandings of 
transsexual persons’ sexual orientations congruent. While sexologists claimed 
that transsexual individuals were heterosexual (Schorsch 1974: 195; Müller-
Emmert/Hiersche 1976: 95), trans individuals themselves were divided over 
the issue of whether transsexual individuals were per se heterosexual or not. 
While one of the petitioners e. g. insisted that trans individuals were usually 
heterosexual (Petitioner 3 1979b: 5), another suggested that more than half of 
all transwomen were lesbians (Petitioner 4 1979: 5).
2.3.3 Negotiating transsexualit y and trans rights during 
 the parliamentar y debate
The parliamentary discourse on transsexuality and trans rights was shaped 
by liberal rhetoric and different perspectives on concrete provisions of the Bill. 
While all parties represented in the Bundestag and Bundesrat agreed on the 
essentialist nature of transsexuality and the legitimacy of trans rights, contro-
versies over the Bill generated different concepts of transsexuality and notions 
on the scope of trans rights. In the course of the debate transsexuality was 
constructed, and medical knowledge on transsexuality deployed strategically 
to match the respective values the major political parties wanted to implement 
in the Bill.
General characteristics of the debate
The social-liberal government as well as the official Christian democratic op-
position agreed that it was the legislator’s task to create provisions that allow a 
legal recognition of a person’s gender according to the proceedings of conten-
tious jurisdiction after the applicant had undergone surgery or any other medi-
cal intervention to change his or her genitalia.98 The all-party consensus can 
be explained by three factors. First, regardless of how unsettling this thought 
was to some MPs,99 the MPs who engaged in the debate formally adopted two 
97 | See e. g. Petitioner 4 1979; 1980.
98 | See e. g. Dr. Jentsch’s (Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) statement during second and third 
reading of the Bill on 12 June 1980 (Deutscher Bundestag 1980a: 17734 A).
99 | During a meeting of the Bundestag Committee on Home Affairs on 29 Nov. 1979, Dr. 
Jentsch (Wiesbaden, CSU/CSU) stated that a person’s gender status was so far based on 
external biological findings. He feared that the determination of a person’s gender status 
would become fraught with uncertainty, since the Bill took into consideration subjective 
criteria, too (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1979: 15).
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basic premises medical science and jurisdiction had generated. One of them 
was that the external sex characteristics of a person at the time of birth do not 
necessarily determine a person’s gender identity and the other was that gender 
is mutable. Second, the MPs were aware of the Federal Constitutional Court 
decision on 11 Oct. 1978. Third, the Bundestag had unanimously resolved to de-
mand of the government to present a corresponding draft bill on 10 June 1976.
All MPs who spoke up on the issue of trans legislation engaged in liberal 
rhetoric to express their general support for legislation. One of the features of 
liberal ideology is that societies consist of unchangeable majorities and minori-
ties. MPs of all political parties emphasised that transsexual individuals con-
stitute a tiny minority that through no fault of its own suffers from a condition 
marked by a discrepancy between their respective bodies and minds. This split 
forces them to live in the gender accorded to the ›other‹ sex.100
However, in the opinion of all MPs involved in the debate on the Bill, trans-
sexual individuals not only faced problems caused by »a special imprinting« 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13169 C). Rather, they suggested that the law, 
widespread ignorance and social prejudice denied them citizenship and prohib-
ited their social integration (Deutscher Bundestag 1979; 1979a: 13169 D; 13173 
D; 1980a: 17733 D/17734 A).
A second characteristic of liberal rhetoric is that it is the duty of the lib-
eral-democratic state to protect minorities. Regardless of the respective party 
membership, the MPs repeatedly emphasised that a bill to the abovementioned 
effect was a means of a credible and effective modern democracy whose task it 
is to socially include and take into consideration the needs of a small and vul-
nerable minority, which faced laws that increased their problems.101 The appeal 
to the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic state is maybe best summarised in 
100 | See, for instance, the motion by Dr. Arndt, Dr. Meinecke, Kleinert and 26 other 
members of the SPD on 30 Mar. 1979 (Deutscher Bundestag 1976), the plenary 
speeches by von Schoeler, Parliamentary Secretary of State, on 28 June 1979 (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1979a: 13169 C and Wolfgramm, representative of Göttingen and member 
of the FDP (ibid: 13174 D) and Dr. Jentsch’s speech (Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) on 12 June 
1980 (Deutscher Bundestag 1980a: 17733 D).
101 | See e. g. von Schoeler’s statement on 28 June 1979 (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 
13169 D, Dr. Meinecke’s (Hamburg, SPD) speech (ibid: 13173 D), Dr. Jentsch’s (Wies-
baden, CDU/CSU) statement on 12 June 1980 (ibid: 1980a: 17734 A) and Wolfgramm’s 
(Göttingen, FDP) statement (ibid: 17736 C). Only one MP (Dr. Mende (CDU/CSU) ques-
tioned whether trans legislation was of any public interest in the pre-legislative period, 
considering that transsexual individuals only constituted a small minority in a country 
with a population of approximately 61 million people (ibid 1975: 10943 D). Dr. Schmitt-
Vockenhausen, the then Vice President of the Bundestag, responded to Dr. Mende’s ques-
tion as follows: »Ladies and gentlemen, if the Chair was to examine submitted questions 
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von Schoeler’s statement during his introduction of the Bill to the Bundestag on 
first reading: »But I believe that the liberalness of a state can be measured by, 
and especially in the way it deals with minorities, whether it takes their prob-
lems seriously and is prepared to solve them.« (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 
13171 A; cf. Sieß 1996: 99)
The parliamentary debate in the Bundestag and Bundesrat followed party 
lines. In addition, most of the negotiations on the Bill to change first names 
and establish gender status in specific cases did not take place during the ple-
nary sessions of either the Bundestag or the Bundesrat but in the respective 
Committees on Home Affairs and Legal Affairs.
In fact, with exception of the MPs who negotiated on the Bill during com-
mittee meetings, no other MP got involved in the plenary debates. Frequently, 
MPs simply followed the recommendations of the respective party policy in 
the committees without any plenary debate at all.102 Moreover, as Wolfgramm 
(Göttingen, FDP) noted in his speech during the first plenary consultation in 
the Bundestag on 28 June 1979, only few MPs were present in the first place 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13174 A/B).
However, those who got involved on behalf of the Bill discussed controver-
sial issues matter-of-factly as von Schoeler remarked in his contribution to the 
plenary debate in the Bundestag during second and third reading of the Bill 
(ibid 1980a: 17737 C). None of the MPs considered the recognition of a person’s 
gender and the implications for marriage a moral issue. Moreover, while the 
conservative MP Dr. Jentsch had hoped for support from Christian congrega-
tions, neither the Protestant nor the Catholic Church published statements on 
the Bill (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1980, Beigabe 1: 10 f.). Finally, the West Ger-
man parliamentary debate focused on possible effects of individual provisions 
of the Bill, rather than on the aetiology of transsexuality.
Controversial issues
Transsexuality and trans rights were debated in the context of the ›small solu-
tion‹, the point in time a marriage was to be dissolved under the provisions of 
the ›big solution‹, the relationship between trans and third-party rights, and 
medical knowledge. With exception of the minor governing coalition party, 
which questioned heteronormativity, neither the SPD nor the CDU/CSU chal-
lenged the privileged status of heterosexuality or the gender binary. However, 
according to the criteria of how many people were affected by a question, some questions 
could not be introduced« (ibid: 10944 A; cf. Sieß 1996: 83).
102 | There was e. g. no further debate on the recommendations of the Bundesrat 
Committee on Home Affairs of 11 June 1980 (Bundesrat – Ausschuss für Innere Angele-
gen heiten 1980) during the plenary session of the Bundesrat on 27 June 1980 (Bundesrat 
1980: 301 C).
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the CSU/CSU stood for more conservative notions on the gender order, mar-
riage and the family and more restrictive and homogeneous understandings of 
transsexuality than the SPD.
Controversial issues: Struggling over the ›small solution‹
The so-called small solution creates an option for a change of first names with-
out surgery and allows an individual to revert to the former first names upon 
application (s. 6[1] TSG-E). Consequently, it challenges the legally produced 
link between first names and morphology and the notion that a person’s gender 
identity might only change once in life.
Proponents of the ›small solution‹ presented several arguments to defend 
the non-surgical option. Dr. Baumann and the Parliamentary Secretary of 
State, von Schoeler, e. g. supported the ›small solution‹, arguing that nobody 
should be forced to undergo surgery (Bundesrat – RA 1979: 35; Deutscher 
Bundestag – In 1980: 25). Moreover, the Parliamentary Secretary of State, von 
Schoeler, and Dr. Meinecke (Hamburg, SPD) argued that the ›small solution‹ 
reduces the pressure on individuals under the age of 25 years, since the option 
of changing first names helps them circumvent several problems in everyday 
life until they are sufficiently mature to assess the consequences of surgery 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13170 D; ibid 1980a: 17735 D; cf. Sieß 1996: 90 f.). 
Furthermore, the government coalition designed the ›small solution‹ in order 
to give inoperable transsexual individuals a chance to adapt themselves to the 
›other‹ gender (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13170 B; cf. Sieß 1996: 89 f.). Dr. 
Meinecke (Hamburg, SPD) also suggested that the ›small solution‹ provides a 
solution for individuals who fear surgery (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13174 
B). He added that the desire to undergo surgery does not alone indicate a trans-
sexual person’s gender identity (ibid; cf. Sieß 1996: 100).
As mentioned earlier on, the ›small solution‹ provides the option for a re-
versal to the initial first names. The governing coalition designed s. 6(1) TSG-E 
to avoid placing undue hardship on those individuals who, after changing first 
names, developed an understanding of self that was more compatible with the 
gender assignment at the time of birth (BMI 1978a, Anlage: 20; cf. Sieß 1996: 
91). In summary, then, the governing coalition allowed for dynamic transsexu-
al developments within the confines of the gender binary.
By contrast, the CDU/CSU staunchly resisted the ›small solution‹. The op-
position argued in favour of maintaining a strict link between a person’s first 
names, morphology and gender identity and against the possibility to revert to 
the former first names. The opponents of the ›small solution‹ held that a provi-
sion requiring less than the ›big solution‹ suggests that there are two groups 
of transsexuals, i. e. those who strive to adapt to the ›other‹ sex/gender as far as 
possible and those who are content with a change of first names. However, in 
their opinion it was characteristic of all transsexual individuals that they wish 
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to approximate the ›other‹ gender, using surgical means. Hence, individuals 
who reject surgery could not in their view be considered transsexual (Bundesrat 
1979a: 9). To members of the opposition, it was appropriate, then, to require of 
transsexual individuals to undergo surgery (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13172 
B). Moreover, conservative MPs argued that it was not the task of the legislator 
to legally enshrine therapeutic measures for individuals who cannot or do not 
want to undergo surgery (Deutscher Bundestag 1980: 15; cf. Sieß 1996: 105). 
The opponents of the ›small solution‹ also argued that its particular provisions 
exceeded the motion of the Bundestag on 10 June 1976 and the Federal Consti-
tutional Court decision on 11 Oct. 1978 (ibid: 14 f.; cf. Sieß 1996: 104). Finally, 
the CDU/CSU rejected the provision that allows a person to apply for his or her 
initial first names after a successful application to change first names, since 
transsexual developments were irreversible and such instances would only oc-
cur, if an applicant had abused the provisions of the ›small solution‹ (Bundesrat 
1979a: 19; cf. Sieß 1996: 97). Overall, the CDU/CSU promoted a homogeneous 
and rigid concept of transsexuality.
Several arguments presented by the CDU/CSU reveal that the latter feared 
that the ›small solution‹ would threaten the gender order. This becomes par-
ticularly evident in the set of arguments aimed at limiting access to the legal 
provisions of the future Transsexual Act. Opponents of the ›small solution‹ for 
instance argued that this particular option enables non-transsexual individu-
als to make use of the regulations provided in ss. 1 to 7 TSG-E. Members of 
the CDU/CSU suggested that the comparatively easy access to provisions to 
change first names might lead persons with »transsexual leanings« to change 
sex prematurely, even though there were other solutions (Bundesrat 1979: 9; 
Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13172 C). Similarly, they argued that individuals 
should be safeguarded from presenting themselves in the role of the ›other‹ 
gender at an early stage in order to avoid promoting a premature transsexual 
fixation of an immature person (Bundesrat 1979: 10). Members of the CDU/
CSU also countered the argument presented by the governing coalition that the 
provisions of the ›small solution‹ were meant to enable inoperable individuals 
to bear a first name reflecting their respective gender identity, arguing that 
there were no figures on inoperable transsexual individuals. Moreover, even if 
this were the case, the legislator could not prevent self-mutilation and suicides 
(Bundesrat – RA-U 1980: 15). According to the CDU/CSU, provisions to revise 
first names without surgery were unacceptable, considering, as Dr. Jentsch 
(Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) suggested, that the ›small solution‹ tempted a large 
number of individuals to succumb to their »transsexual leanings« (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1979a: 13172 C). Moreover, conservative MPs suggested that the so-
called small solution deviated from the legal principle that the first name cor-
responds with a person’s gender (Deutscher Bundestag 1980: 15).
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Members of the governing political parties emphasised enabling aspects 
of the ›small solution‹. According to the government coalition, the ›small solu-
tion‹ rendered possible the early involvement of experts (BMI 1978, Anlage 3). 
Moreover, members of the SPD and FDP argued that the provisions in ss. 1 to 
7 TSG-E enabled individuals to live as members of the ›other‹ gender in their 
private lives and vis-à-vis the bureaucracy (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13175 B) 
and would help reduce discrimination transsexual individuals face in everyday 
life (ibid: D). Von Schoeler reinforced his argument by mentioning that trans-
sexual individuals had originally asked for the ›small solution‹ only (Deutscher 
Bundestag – In 1980: 26).
The CDU/CSU assessed the effects of the ›small solution‹ quite differently. 
Members of the opposition suggested that the provisions made to revise first 
names without surgery would disrupt transsexual individuals’ everyday life 
and pose problems for others in specific situations. They cautioned that indi-
viduals who did not undergo any somatic steps towards the ›other‹ sex would, 
due to the discrepancy between the first name and the individuals’ respective 
first names, encounter embarrassment and problems when presenting them-
selves as members of the ›other‹ gender (Deutscher Bundestag – R 1980a: 117; 
Deutscher Bundestag 1980a: 17734 C). Moreover, while Dr. Jentsch (Wies-
baden, CDU/CSU) conceded that provisions for a change of first names without 
the requirement to undergo surgery might help transsexual individuals deal 
with the bureaucracy, such a solution would however not be useful in the event 
of hospitalisation and imprisonment or when using washrooms (ibid).
Members of the CDU/CSU also rejected the ›small solution‹, arguing that 
it posed a threat to marriage. According to the CDU/CSU, the ›small solution‹ 
impinged on the notion of marriage as a constitutionally protected union be-
tween a man and a woman and provided a potential gateway for homosexual 
marriages (Deutscher Bundestag 1980: 15). This stance is vividly expressed in 
Dr. Jentsch’s speech in the Bundestag on second and third reading of the Bill:
The small solution bears a potential risk to the institution of marriage, which we do not 
want to unleash. If we allow a person to belie her sex by using a first name of the other 
sex, it can be expected for the future that ever more rights will be derived from this. […] 
When will the time come for the demand that the transsexual whose outer appearance 
has remained that of a man, but who appears as a woman should also be allowed to 
marry another man? We do not want to open this floodgate. (Deutscher Bundestag 
1980a: 17734 C/D)103
103 | Although the facts of the case were different, in principle, the floodgate opened 
on 06 Dec. 2005. For details on the Federal Constitutional Court decision that rendered 
a marriage possible between a male transwoman who had been granted a revision of first 
names and a ciswoman, see chapter 3.3.3.
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The governing coalition countered the notion that marriage as a heterosexual institution 
was doomed to perish. While the SPD designed s. 7 TSG-E to allow a married transsex-
ual individual to continue his or her marriage (Deutscher Bundestag 1980: 14), social 
democrats pointed out that s. 7(1)2 TSG-E provided that the decision on an applicant’s 
first name would be considered void in the event of a marriage and that s. 7(1)1 TSG-E 
ruled that the court decision to change first names was equally void in the event of the 
bir th of child […]. (Ibid.)
Controversial issues: Negotiating marriage under the provisions 
of the ›big solution‹
The struggle over marriage as a heterosexual institution became even more 
prominent in the debate on s. 10(2) TSG-E. The political parties represented in 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat developed three different perspectives on this 
issue. Despite conflictive perspectives on this particular provision, with excep-
tion of the FDP, none of the major political parties challenged heteronormativity.
Section 10(2) TSG-E suggested that if the applicant is married, the marriage 
needs to be dissolved as soon as the decision to change the applicant’s gender 
status has come into force. The effects of the dissolution were to follow the 
regulations concerning divorce (BMI 1978a, Anlage: 24; Deutscher Bundestag 
1980: 14). The SPD considered this provision appropriate for three major rea-
sons. First, social democrats reasoned that it would be unfair to expect of an ap-
plicant to get divorced without having granted him or her the security of gender 
recognition (BMI 1978a: 24). Second, the SPD argued that the dissolution of a 
marriage prior to recognising a person’s gender status produces unnecessary 
costs (ibid). Third, members of the SPD argued that a marriage needs to have 
broken down in order to be divorced. Transsexualism however does not con-
stitute a legally acceptable reason for divorce. As a result, a court could deny a 
transsexual person a revision of gender status simply because the marriage did 
not break down (Bundesregierung 1979: 25; cf. Sieß 1996: 94).104
At the same time, the SPD did not endorse a concept of homosexual mar-
riage. The SPD insisted that a marriage be divorced in the event of a court deci-
sion that grants an applicant a revision of gender status under the provisions 
of the ›big solution‹, suggesting that it did more justice to the ›nature‹ of mar-
riage, if it was dissolved as soon as two individuals of the same sex were mar-
ried (BMI 1978a: 24; cf. Sieß 1996: 94). Moreover, the government designed 
s. 8(4) TSG-E, which specified that a revision of gender status would be ac-
corded only on the condition that he or she had undergone sex reassignment 
surgery to the effect of approximating the outer appearance of the ›other‹ sex, 
104 | The Bundesrat Committee for Youth, Family and Health presented the same 
perspective (Bundesrat – Ausschuss für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit 1979: 9).
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particularly in order to avoid that a male person marries another person »as 
long as he can engage in sex as a man« (BMI 1978a: 15).
The CDU/CSU held that a person who applies for a revision of gender status 
should no longer be married at the point of application (Bundesrat – Ausschuss 
für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit 1979, Anlage: 8 f.; Bundesrat 1979: 11 f.). 
Members of the CDU/CSU presented a number of reasons, ranging from con-
stitutional concerns to third-party rights. One set of arguments defended the 
privileged status of marriage per se and the gender and sexual system it stands 
for. During the 154th meeting of the Bundesrat Committee on Youth, the Fam-
ily and Health, the CDU/CSU suggested that an automatic termination of an 
existing marriage in the event of legally establishing a person’s gender status 
was incompatible with the significance of marriage (Bundesrat – Ausschuss 
für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit 1979, Anlage: 48 f.). In response to the so-
lution proposed by the FDP, which will be presented later on, Dr. Jentsch (Wies-
baden, CDU/CSU) argued that the union of a transsexual person after a legally 
sanctioned revision of gender status had taken place with his or her partner 
contravened the traditional image of a marriage. According to Dr. Jentsch, the 
social order that informed the traditional understanding of marriage needed to 
be defended (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1979: 16).
Another set of arguments dealt with constitutional concerns. Members of 
the CDU/CSU argued that the dissolution of an intact marriage contravenes 
Art. 6 GG105 (Bundesrat – Ausschuss für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit 
1979, Anlage: 49; cf. Sieß 1996: 96 f.). Moreover, the fact that the transsexual 
person’s partner was involved in the legal proceedings under the provisions of 
the ›big solution‹ could impinge on the former’s rights to the extent that he or 
she is prevented from adapting him- or herself to the ›other‹ gender (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1980: 15).
The opposition presented further arguments to support its perspective. The 
CDU/CSU suggested that it was in the interest of the applicant’s partner to 
get divorced prior to the application for an establishment of gender status, be-
cause this was the only way of regulating the effects of a divorce in conjunction 
with the dissolution of a marriage (Bundesrat – Ausschuss für Jugend, Familie 
und Gesundheit 1979, Anlage: 49; cf. Sieß 1996: 97). Moreover, the CDU/CSU 
opted for a solution that avoided having to involve the applicant’s partner in the 
legal proceedings (ibid). Furthermore, the opposition emphasised that courts 
were not supposed to decide upon a marriage under the Act but on an indi-
vidual’s gender status only (Bundesrat 1979a: 10 f.).
105 | Art. 6(1) GG declares that, »[m]arriage and the family shall enjoy the special 
protection of the state« (BMJV 2017).
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The FDP proposed to leave it up to the partners to decide for themselves 
whether they wanted to terminate their respective marriage or not. In his 
speeches during the plenary sessions in the Bundestag on 28 June 1979 and 
12 June 1980, Wolfgramm (Göttingen, FDP) presented two arguments to sup-
port his stance. First, he reasoned that marriage was based on a number of 
other, additional ties than sexuality. Second, he tentatively questioned whether 
intensive ways of living together necessarily needed to be heterosexual. He con-
cluded that there was also an option to open up marriage to same-sex partners 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13175 C; ibid 1980a: 17737 A; cf. Sieß 1996: 101).
The FDP was the only party that challenged the notion of marriage as a 
heterosexual institution, heterosexual relations as a superior form of human 
bonding and the significance assigned to sexuality in general. However, when 
faced with a lack of understanding on the part of the more powerful coalition 
partner and threats by the CDU/CSU majority in the Bundesrat not even to pass 
the more conservative solution favoured by the SPD, the FDP decided not to 
trigger a fundamental debate on this issue (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1980: 
25).
Controversial issues: Balancing rights
The debate on the Bill also focused on the rights and interests of those who 
were considered to be affected by a court decision to change an applicant’s first 
names and gender status. While no party doubted that third-party rights need-
ed to be addressed, the political parties represented in the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat assessed the government’s attempt to balance transsexual individu-
als’ rights vis-à-vis third-party rights differently.
The FDP emphasised two aspects of the Bill of which one was securing 
transsexual individuals’ right to privacy. In his plenary speech in the Bundestag 
on 12 June 1980, Wolfgramm (Göttingen, FDP) particularly welcomed the pro-
vision in s. 5(1) TSG-E that prohibited passing on, or investigating into the ap-
plicant’s previous first names after the decision to change first names had come 
into force, unless the public interest required such an investigation (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1979a: 13175 C).
The second aspect dealt with the issue of extending or creating provisions to 
include additional trans individuals. Wolfgramm suggested that transvestites, 
too, belonged to a group of individuals, which required support and provisions 
to create a less prejudiced environment (ibid: D).
As the debate on the ›small solution‹ reveals, the CDU/CSU was by contrast 
rather adamant about reducing the number of individuals eligible to apply for 
a change of first names and the establishment of gender status. Moreover, the 
CDU/CSU was concerned that transsexual individuals’ rights provided in the 
Government Bill impinged on the rights of transsexual individuals’ spouses
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and children (cf. Sieß 1996: 99)106 and demanded provisions to include further 
individuals in the provisions of the Bill that might possibly be affected by a 
change of first names or gender status. Section 5(2) TSG-E e. g. was designed 
to exempt the former spouse, the spouse and the offspring from being obliged 
to state the trans person’s first names, unless this information was relevant to 
administrating public registries. The CDU/CSU demanded of the government 
to include the applicant’s parents and grandparents, too (Bundesrat 1979a: 17; 
Bundesrat 1979: 17), a demand the governing SPD/FDP coalition decided to 
give in to (s. 5[2] TSG). In another instance, the representative of the then CDU/
CSU-governed Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland Palatinate) demanded that the 
government examine how to make sure that a fiancé or fiancée, respectively, is 
informed that his or her partner is »a member of the other sex in a legal sense 
only« (Bundesrat – RA-U 1979: 49). The government did not follow up on this 
issue.
In fact, the CDU/CSU reproached the governing coalition for having crea-
ted lopsided provisions to the benefit of transsexual individuals and to the detri-
ment of third-party rights, in particular transsexual individuals’ spouses and 
children. While the government laid down in s. 10 TSG-E that the decision to 
revise the applicant’s gender status would not affect the parent/child-relation-
ship, members of the CDU/CSU considered this provision insufficient and in-
complete, as Dr. Jentsch’s (Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) statement attests:
If the government have nothing more to say in its explanations than that the assignment 
to the other gender leaves the legal position towards the child unaffected, we think that 
that is insufficient. We believe that the transsexual’s well-being is a legitimate concern, 
however, that the child’s well-being is at least as important and must be regulated just 
as reliably and reasonably […]. Here we have to expect that the federal government will 
improve its Draft significantly during the consultations. (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 
13172 A)
In general, the CDU/CSU sought to tighten provisions in the Bill for the sake of 
securing third-party rights vis-à-vis those of transsexual individuals. In s. 8(1)3 
TSG-E, the government for instance required of a transsexual applicant that he 
or she is no longer able to procreate or bear a child. The majority in the Bun-
desrat however suggested rephrasing the provision to ensure that the applicant 
106 | See e. g. Dr. Jentsch’s (Wiebaden, CDU/CSU) statement during the first plenary 
consultation in the Bundestag: »During the consultations on the Bill in the Committees, 
my faction is going to attach great importance to a very close examination of the effects 
the assignment of a person to the other gender has on third parties. Among these third 
parties are particularly the person’s spouse and children.« (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 
13171 D)
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was permanently sterile (Bundesregierung 1979, Anlage 2: 18). The Bundesrat 
reasoned in its statement on s. 1 TSG-E that a child should have a chance to 
establish its parentage. The government decided to reformulate this particular 
requirement to meet the demands of the conservative majority in the Bundesrat 
(ibid: Anlage 3: 26).
In another instance, the Bundesrat was dissatisfied with the wording in 
s. 1(1)2 TSG-E that determined that an applicant’s gender identity will with a 
high degree of probability not change anymore. The representative of Bavaria 
(Bayern) asked the federal government to check whether there was a way of 
rephrasing the term »with a high degree of probability« in the abovementioned 
section to ensure that the prognosis did not leave any reasonable doubt about 
the applicant’s transsexuality (Bundesrat – RA 1979: 42; Bundesrat 1979a: 13). 
The government however responded that the formulation was appropriate 
(Bundesregierung 1979, Anlage 3: 26).
In many ways, the interventions of the Bundesrat not only suggest that the 
CDU/CSU wished to defend alleged third-party interests. Rather, the CDU/
CSU was quite inclined to defend conservative notions of marriage, the family, 
sexuality and the gender regime. While the CDU/CSU emphasised its concern 
for the transsexual individual’s spouse and children, it only deemed a particu-
lar type of marriage and family worthy of protection. The CDU/CSU was quite 
willing to expect partners to consent to a divorce and families with children to 
split up prior to a court decision to revise an applicant’s gender status, regard-
less of the partners’ and children’s desires and perspectives on these issues.107
Controversial issues: Deploying medical knowledge
Medical knowledge constituted another area of political struggle during the 
parliament debates. No party contested the structurally privileged status of 
medical expertise, and the governing coalition and the opposition backed up 
their respective stances on specific provisions of the Bill, most notably with re-
gard to the ›small solution‹, by referring to medical findings on transsexuality. 
However, as the course and outcome of the political debate suggest, it is fair to 
say that medical knowledge was at the hands of political dynamics.
107 | Similarly, Dr. Jentsch’s (Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) plenary speech on first reading of 
the Bill in the Bundestag suggested that a transsexual person’s gender was despite a 
court ruling to revise a transwoman’s gender status less ›real‹ than that of a cisperson’s, 
or put in another way, a cisperson’s gender was regarded less of a fiction than that of 
a transperson. In his speech, he repeatedly associated a revision of sex and/or gender 
with a fiction: »A legal fiction of a sex change is supposed to be introduced.« (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1979a: 13171 B) »Surely all of us agree that such a change of gender in one 
parent in form of a fiction is naturally bound to have a very incisive significance for a 
child.« (Ibid: 13171 D/13172 A)
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In its ruling on 11 Oct. 1978, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the 
structurally privileged status of medical knowledge when it held that, 
human dignity and the fundamental right to develop one’s personality demand that the 
declaration of a transsexual individual’s male gender be changed at any rate in a case 
that according to medical knowledge deals with irreversible transsexualism and when a 
sex-reassigning operation has taken place. Such a revision does not violate moral law, 
especially since the operation was medically indicated. (BVerfG 1979: 12)
The legislator was to implement the pivotal role of medical expertise in s. 4(3) 
TSG without any controversy among the political parties represented in either 
the Bundestag or the Bundesrat. Section 4(3) TSG states that, 
[t]he court may only grant an application according to s. 1 after it has obtained re-
ports of two experts, who are based on their training and their occupational experience 
sufficiently familiar with the special problems of transsexualism. The experts need to 
act independently of each other; in their expert reports they are required to comment 
on whether the applicant’s gender identity will not, according to medical knowledge, 
change anymore with a high degree of probability. 
While the provision does not mention that experts necessarily need to be physi-
cians, it has become a convention that psychiatrists, psychologists or sexolo-
gists are assigned the task of writing expert reports (cf. de Silva 2005: 259).
However, political strife arose over the contents of medical knowledge on 
transsexuality. As outlined in the debate on the ›small solution‹, the governing 
coalition and the opposition interpreted medical knowledge differently. Here 
again, the opposition deployed medical knowledge on transsexuality strategi-
cally as a means to press for legal provisions that render a change of first names 
and gender as little disruptive as possible to conservative notions on gender and 
the gender regime.
Setting out from a rigid and homogeneous concept of transsexuality and 
fierce opposition to the ›small solution‹, the CDU/CSU insinuated that the Gov-
ernment Bill was based on insufficient knowledge (cf. Sieß 1996: 95). Accord-
ing to the opposition, this lack of knowledge featured most prominently in the 
area of medical and natural science studies,108 the effects of a legal assignment 
to the ›other‹ gender,109 a legally applicable distinction between transsexuality, 
108 | See Bundesrat 1979: 1 f. and ibid a: 1.
109 | This aspect was reiterated by the senior officer (Regierungsdirektor) Mischke and 
Dr. Weissauer (Bavaria) during the 466 th meeting of the Bundesrat Legal Committee on 
31 Jan. 1979 (Bundesrat – RA 1979: 34 and 35) and in the Bundesrat document BR-
Drs. 6/79 (Bundesrat 1979: 1 f.).
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homosexuality and transvestism, and on results of studies on transsexual in-
dividuals who decide to reverse their decision110 (Bundesrat – RA-U 1979: 33 f.).
The government repudiated this allegation. When introducing the Bill to 
the plenary of the Bundestag on 28 June 1979, von Schoeler pointed out that 
the Government Bill was informed by an updated medical documentation 
compiled by the DGfS and hearings with renowned experts, such as sexolo-
gists of the Institut für Sexualforschung (Institute for Sex Research) in Ham-
burg (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13170 D). It was, as Dr. Meinecke (Hamburg, 
SPD) suggested, particularly the insight that transsexual developments were 
dynamic that prompted the government to create the options of a ›big solution‹ 
and a ›small solution‹ (Deutscher Bundestag 1980a: 17735 D).
However, the CDU/CSU was not content with the answers the govern-
ment and members of the SPD in parliament provided. Therefore, Dr. Jentsch 
(Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) prepared a questionnaire, which he submitted to rep-
resentatives of the Federal Home Office on 29 Nov. 1979. The first part of the 
questionnaire covered detailed questions on transsexuality from a medical 
point of view, especially with regard to what he termed »highly intensive« and 
»controllable« transsexuals, surgery, age limits, reversals and the number, type 
and organisation of recommended experts. The second part dealt with ques-
tions on legal effects of the assignment to the ›other‹ gender, e. g., on marriage, 
inheritance, social insurance, and the establishment of fatherhood (Deutscher 
Bundestag – In 1979, Anlage 4).
The experts’ answers to the questionnaire in many ways supported the 
Government Bill and the governments’ understanding of transsexuality. This 
applied particularly to the division of the Bill into a surgical and a non-surgi-
cal route, the assessment of surgery in relationship to a legal recognition of a 
transsexual person’s gender identity (ibid: Beigabe 1: 2) and the occurrence of 
reversals in the Federal Republic of Germany (ibid: 6). Moreover, sexologists 
supported s. 4(3) TSG-E, suggesting that at least two experts be involved in the 
court proceedings (ibid).
Despite having received the medical information the CDU/CSU had asked 
for, it clung to its opinion that the ›small solution‹ be discarded. This clearly 
indicates that the issue of medical knowledge was only a pretext for the CDU/
CSU not to accept the ›small solution‹. From then onward, the opposition de-
cided to change its strategy. While it initially criticised that the Bill was based 
on insufficient medical and natural scientific knowledge on transsexuality, the 
opposition turned the argument around. The CDU/CSU reproached the gov-
ernment for its »total legislative perfectionism« (Deutscher Bundestag 1980a: 
17734 B). During the 94th meeting of the Bundestag Committee on Home Af-
110 | Dr. Jentsch (Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) repeated this reproach during first reading of 
the Government Bill in the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag 1979a: 13172 C).
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fairs Dr. Jentsch (Wiesbaden, CDU/CSU) held that »therapeutic wishes cannot 
be implemented into the law in every case. It would be difficult to expect of the 
legal order to do justice to every situation« (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1980: 
24).
Unsurprisingly, then, the CDU/CSU-dominated Bundesrat called upon the 
Mediation Committee to resolve the conflict between the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat, when the latter learned of the former that it had passed the Bill after 
third reading on 12 June 1980 (Bundesrat 1980: 301 D). Anticipating that the 
CDU/CSU was not willing to budge, Dr. Meinecke (Hamburg, SPD) indicated 
that the governing coalition was willing to meet the demands of the opposition 
on some issues as early as on 27 Feb. 1980. However, the SPD was not willing 
to make any concessions on the division of the Bill into a ›small‹ and a ›big solu-
tion‹ (Deutscher Bundestag – In 1980: 23).
The compromise the Mediation Committee suggested to the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat and to which both institutions consented to on 04 July 1980 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1980c: 18688 A; Bundesrat 1980b: 333 D) illustrate that 
the results of the political negotiations were not congruent with medical knowl-
edge. While the ›small solution‹ was maintained alongside the ›big solution‹, 
the age limit for the ›small solution‹ was raised to 25 years of age (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1980c: 18687 D).111 The latter thwarted sexological intentions to gain 
time to diagnose transsexuality and to give transsexual individuals the oppor-
tunity to live according to their respective gender identities with the security of 
legally sanctioned matching first names.
2.3.4 The Transsexual Act
The Transsexual Act marked the outcome of a matter-of-fact and persevering 
struggle over transsexuality and the significance of trans rights in relation to 
third-party rights and, on a deeper level, the result of a controversy over the sex-
ual and gender regime. While the legal recognition of a change of first names 
and gender status had enabling effects, the options were organised within the 
boundaries of the heteronormative gender binary. Hence, the Act stands for 
a shift within the gender regime without, however, seriously challenging the 
heteronormative gender binary.
111 | Moreover, the compromise entailed the demand of the CDU/CSU to require that 
a marriage be divorced prior to an application for the revision of gender status, as Jahn 
(SPD) and Senator Apel (Hamburg) reported in the Bundestag and in the Bundesrat, 
respectively (Deutscher Bundestag 1980c: 18687 D/18688 A; Bundesrat 1980b: 333 A).
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A systematic outline of parts one and two of the Transsexual Act
Parts one (ss. 1-7) and two (ss. 8-12) of the Transsexual Act regulate four as-
pects. These are general procedural aspects, prerequisites for a change of first 
names and an establishment of gender status, the rights granted upon a court 
decision to change first names (ss. 4[4], 5, 6 TSG) and establish an applicant’s 
gender status (ss. 5, 9[1] and 10 TSG), and the protection of third-party rights 
and/or the limitation of trans rights (ss. 3[2]2, 3[3], 7 and 8[1]2, 8[1]3 and 8[1]4 
TSG.
Sections 1 and 8 TSG rule that the individual needs to initiate the procedure 
to change first names and/or to revise the gender status via application. The 
Transsexual Act allows the applicant to proceed in three different ways. Sec-
tions 1-7 TSG allow an individual to apply for a change of first names only under 
the provisions of the so-called small solution. Sections 8-12 TSG regulate the 
so-called big solution and offer two routes to achieve a revision of gender sta-
tus. The applicant may either apply for gender recognition after having fulfilled 
the requirements outlined in ss. 1(1)1-3 and 8 TSG or via preliminary ruling 
(s. 9 TSG). Moreover, an individual who wishes to have his or her gender status 
changed under the legislation may do so in consecutive steps by applying for a 
change of first names first and for a revision of gender status in a second step, 
or may do so in one go.
Sections 2-4 TSG cover general procedural aspects that apply to a revision of 
first names and gender status alike. Section 2 TSG regulates the competence. 
According to s. 2(1) TSG, jurisdiction lies exclusively with county courts that 
are located in a regional court. Moreover, s. 2(2) TSG determines that the court, 
which is located in the applicant’s municipality, is responsible for processing 
the application. If the applicant is a German citizen living outside the validity 
area, the responsibility for the application lies with the Local Court Schöneberg. 
However, the latter may for valid reasons transfer the responsibility to another 
court.
Section 3 TSG specifies the individuals who may engage in legal action and 
the interested parties. If a person is e. g. incapable of contracting, a legal repre-
sentative will conduct the judicial proceedings on his or her behalf, provided 
the representative has been authorised by the guardianship court (s. 3[1] TSG). 
Section 3(2) TSG rules that the applicant (s. 3[2]1 TSG) and the representative 
of the public interest (s. 3[2]2 TSG) are the only individuals involved in the pro-
ceedings.112 The government of a Land determines the representative of the 
public interest via statutory instrument (s. 3[3] TSG).
112 | The fact that the (former) spouse is not among the persons involved in the judicial 
proceedings is a concession to the CDU/CSU. Since the applicant is according to s. 8(1)2 
TSG required to be unmarried, there is no spouse to speak up before a court.
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Section 4 TSG determines the court proceedings. Section 4(1) TSG speci-
fies that unless regulated otherwise in this statute, the rules of contentious 
jurisdiction apply. The court hears the applicant in person (s. 4[2] TSG). Accord-
ing to s. 4(3) TSG, the court may only grant an application according to s. 1 TSG 
after having obtained reports by two experts, 
who are based on their training and their occupational experience sufficiently familiar 
with the special problems of transsexualism. The experts need to act independently of 
each other; in their expert reports they are required to comment on whether the appli-
cant’s gender identity will not, according to medical knowledge, change anymore with a 
high degree of probability […]. 
The persons involved may immediately appeal against the decision to grant the 
application (s. 4[4] TSG).
Sections 1, 8 and 9 TSG determine the prerequisites for either a change of 
first names or a revision of gender status. The requirements set forth in s. 1 
TSG apply individuals applying for a change of first names. According to s. 1(1) 
TSG, a court is upon application required to change a person’s first names, 
if he or she, based on her »transsexual imprinting« no longer feels he or she 
identifies with the gender specified in his or her birth entry and if the applicant 
has felt compelled to live according to his or her ideas since three years. Un-
til 18 July 2006 this rule was limited to German citizens, stateless persons, 
foreigners without a home country, persons eligible for asylum and foreign 
refugees whose regular place of residence was in the validity area of the Act 
(s. 1[1]1 TSG).113
Moreover, and as mentioned earlier on, s. 1(1) TSG only applies, if the iden-
tification with the ›other‹ gender will with a high degree of probability not 
change anymore (s. 1[1]2 TSG) and provided the applicant is at least 25 years old 
(s.1 [1]3TSG).114 Section 1(2) TSG provides that the application indicate the first 
names the applicant wishes to use in future.
The rules for a recognition of gender status include115 and exceed the prereq-
uisites called for under s. 1 (1)1-1(1)3 TSG. According to s. 8(1)2 TSG, an applicant 
113 | The government had initially excluded this foreign citizens permanently living in 
the Federal Republic of Germany in order to avoid conflicts with laws in other countries 
(BVerfG 2007: 15). The Federal Constitutional Court decision on this particular rule will be 
discussed in chapter 3.3.2.
114 | See chapter 3.3.2 for the Federal Constitutional Court decision on s. 1(1)3 TSG on 
26 Jan. 1993 (BVerfG 1993: 109). 
115 | Section 8(1)1 TSG provides that an applicant needs to have fulfilled the 
prerequisites outlined in s. 1(1)1-1(1)3 TSG.
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may not be married.116 In addition, the applicant is required to be permanently 
sterile (s. 8[1]3 TSG) and to have undergone surgery on his or her external sex 
characteristics to the effect of having clearly approximated the outer appear-
ance of the ›other‹ sex/gender (s. 8[1]4 TSG).117 Like in s. 1(2) TSG, s. 8(2) TSG 
determines that the application lists the first names the applicant wishes to use, 
unless his or her first names have already been changed according to s. 1 TSG.
Section 9 TSG regulates the change of gender status under the provisions 
of preliminary ruling. Section 9(1) TSG rules that in case an application may 
not be granted, because the applicant has not yet undergone surgery as speci-
fied in s. 8(1)3 TSG, is not yet permanently sterile or is still married, the court 
states this in advance. The involved persons may immediately file a complaint 
against the decision. However, if the decision according to s. 9(1)1 TSG is incon-
testable and the prerequisites outlined in s. 8(1)2-8(1)4 TSG have been fulfilled, 
the court makes a final decision (s. 9[2] TSG). Expert reports are required to 
attest to the prerequisites according to ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG.
Individuals who have been granted either a change of first names or a revi-
sion of gender status are accorded additional rights. Some of these rights apply 
to the ›small‹ and the ›big solution‹ alike, whereas some apply to either the 
›big‹ or the ›small solution‹ only. The prohibition to disclose the applicant’s for-
mer first names and gender status applies to both decisions (s. 5[1] TSG; s. 10[2] 
TSG). More precisely, s. 5(1) TSG rules that if the decision that changed the 
first names has come into force, the first names the applicant had at the time 
of the decision may not be disclosed or investigated into without the applicant’s 
consent, unless reasons pertaining to the public or a legal interest require this 
type of information. However, the former spouse, the parents, grandparents 
and the applicant’s offspring are only obliged to mention the new first names, 
if this information is required in order to administrate public registries. How-
ever, this rule does not apply to children who were adopted after the decision 
under the provisions of s. 1 TSG (s. 5[2] TSG). Moreover, if a child was born to 
the applicant or if the applicant adopted a child prior to the decision to change 
first names, the child’s birth entry remains unchanged (s. 5[3] TSG).
Section 6 TSG allows for an annulment of the decision to change the first 
names. Section 6(1) TSG rules that a court may upon application, annul the de-
cision that changed the applicant’s first names, if the applicant identifies with 
the gender entered in the birth registry ›again‹. In such an event, the procedure 
outlined in ss. 2-4 TSG applies (s. 6[2] TSG).
116 | See chapter 3.3.3 for the Federal Constitutional Court decision on s. 8(1)2 TSG on 
27 May 2008 (BVerfG 2008: 312).
117 | Sections 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG no longer apply since a Federal Constitutional Court 
decision on 11 Jan. 2011 (BVerfG 2011). See chapter 4.1.1 on this particular decision.
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The rights and duties provided in ss. 10(1), 11 and 12 TSG apply to the ›big 
solution‹ only. According to s. 10(1) TSG, from the moment the decision that the 
applicant is to be considered a member of the ›other‹ gender comes into force, 
his or her rights and duties will be those of the ›new‹ gender, unless the law 
specifies the contrary.
Section 11 TSG regulates the parent/child-relationship. This section e. g. 
rules that the decision that the applicant is considered a member of the ›other‹ 
gender leaves the legal relationship between the applicant and his or her par-
ents and between the applicant and his or her children unchanged. This rule 
only applies to adopted children as long as they were adopted before the deci-
sion came into force.
Finally, s. 12 regulates the issue of pensions and recurring payments. Among 
other things, s. 12(1) TSG rules that the decision that the applicant is considered 
a member of the ›other‹ gender leaves untouched the entitlement under a pen-
sion scheme and other comparable recurring payments.
At the same time, the Act provides several rules that limit trans 
rights. Among these are the already mentioned provisions in s. 8(1) of the ›big 
solution‹. However, trans rights are also curtailed in provisions of the ›small 
solution‹, such as in 7(1) TSG.118 According to s. 7(1) TSG the decision that 
changed the applicant’s first names becomes void, if the applicant gives birth to 
a child or fathers progeny 302 days after the decision has come into force (s. 7[1]1 
TSG), if there is evidence of an applicant’s parentage after the abovementioned 
period of time (s. 7[1]2 TSG) or if the applicant marries (s. 7[1]3 TSG).119
Gender regime, gender and transsexualit y in the Transsexual Act
The Transsexual Act diverges from the previous principle of the immutability 
of gender in the law. At the same time, its rules are based upon, and restore 
the heteronormative gender binary. The (re-)establishment of heteronormativ-
ity and the gender binary occurs through three means. First, the Act limits 
the numbers and modes of legitimised gendered possibilities. Second, it con-
ceals and reiterates the construction process of the gendered options ›man‹ 
and ›woman‹ as exclusive and polarised genders. Third, the Act minoritises 
subjects that deviate from conventional modes of gendering.
The Transsexual Act is based upon, and repeats several features constitu-
tive of the gender regime of its time. First, the piece of legislation limits gen-
dered options to two possibilities. Without any further specification, s. 1(1) TSG 
118 | S. 7(2) TSG rules that a decision to change first names is void, if the applicant uses 
the first names he or she had prior to the decision.
119 | In its decision on 06 Dec. 2005, the Federal Constitutional Court declared that 
s. 7(1)3 TSG may no longer be applied (BVerfG 2006a: 102) See chapter 3.3.3 for an 
outline and discussion of this decision.
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e. g. determines as a requisite for an application for a change of first names and 
a revision of gender status that the applicant identifies with the gender other 
than the one he or she was registered as in the birth entry. Hence, the Trans-
sexual Act does not provide for subjects that refuse to categorise themselves 
as either of the legitimised genders or as both or anything else than one of the 
officially sanctioned genders (cf. de Silva 2005: 260).
Moreover, the Transsexual Act conveys the notion that a gender identity 
constitutes a permanent disposition. Despite the fact that the Act provides for a 
reversal of a court decision in s. 6(1) TSG, the Act also includes provisions that 
suggest that an individual’s gender ought not to change more than once in life. 
Section 1(1) TSG e. g. rules that the applicant must have been compelled to live 
according to his or her ideas for at least three years. Section 4 (3) TSG reinforces 
this notion when determining that the application may only be granted, if two 
experts comment independently of each other on »whether the applicant’s gen-
der identity will according to medical knowledge not change anymore with a 
high degree of probability«.
Furthermore, a person’s gender status is not based on an individual choice. 
A gender status is assigned to a person at the time of birth, or in the event of 
transsexualism medically assessed at a later point in time. As mentioned in 
the previous section, according to the Transsexual Act a court may only grant 
an application according to s. 1 TSG after having obtained reports by two ex-
perts, »who are based on their training and their occupational experience suf-
ficiently familiar with the special problems of transsexualism« (s. 4[2] TSG). 
While s. 4(2) TSG does not explicitly define physicians and/or psychotherapists 
as potential experts, courts and physicians alike have interpreted the above-
mentioned phrase to justify expertise from within the realm of medical com-
petency only.
Finally, the Transsexual Act reinforces the heteronormative character of the 
gender regime. The Transsexual Act for instance rules that the change of first 
names becomes ineffective, if the applicant marries (s. 7[1]3 TSG). Moreover, 
s. 8(1)2 TSG determines that a person who applies for the revision of gender 
status is required to be unmarried. As outlined earlier on, the legislator imple-
mented both rules after a lengthy struggle with the opposition over the signifi-
cance of marriage and in order to avoid homosexual marriages.
The Transsexual Act draws upon the premise that the two legitimised gen-
ders are polarised. This notion is implicitly entailed in the rules that regulate 
the ineffectiveness of the revision of first names and the prerequisites for a 
revision of gender status. As mentioned earlier on, s. 7(1)1 TSG e. g. determines 
that the decision that changed the applicant’s first names becomes void, if the 
applicant gives birth or procreates a child 302 days after the decision has come 
into force. I. e. the Act lays down the rule that only a man may father progeny 
and only a woman may bear a child (cf. de Silva 2005: 260).
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Moreover, the Transsexual Act is based on the premise that the two legally 
sanctioned genders can be derived from a person’s morphology. This notion be-
comes evident in the demand for somatic measures as a prerequisite for recog-
nising an applicant’s gender identity. Section 8(1)3 TSG rules that an applicant 
needs to be permanently sterile, and s. 8(1)4 TSG requires that an applicant 
needs to have undergone surgery to modify his or her external sex character-
istics to the effect of having clearly approximated the outer appearance of the 
›other‹ sex.
Furthermore, the Transsexual Act reinforces the gender binary by minor-
itising transsexual individuals vis-à-vis the officially sanctioned gender catego-
ries ›man‹ and ›woman‹. The Transsexual Act clearly acts on the assumption 
that female infants identify as girls and male infants as boys, short »biological 
essentialism« (Cromwell 1999: 107). This assumption becomes evident in the 
following wording in s. 1(1) TSG: »The first names of a person, who due to his 
transsexual imprinting no longer identifies with the gender registered in the 
birth entry, but to the other gender […].«. The formulation implicitly normal-
ises a cis development and constructs trans as a deviation from this normative 
social construction.
Moreover, transsexuality is pathologised. In the same section, the Transsex-
ual Act rules that an applicant needs to »have felt compelled to live according to 
his ideas for at least three years« (s. 1[1] TSG). While the term ›compulsion‹ sug-
gests the proximity to a psychological disorder, using the term in this context 
also masks the fact that every person is forced to perform a gender (Hirschauer 
1994: 679).
2.3.5 Summar y: Legislative constructions of gender,
 transsexualit y and gender regime
While the social-liberal government was initially reluctant to introduce legisla-
tion to regulate a revision of gender status, a favourable jurisdictional climate 
towards the end of the 1970s and constant pressure from within the Bundestag 
throughout the 1970s prompted the then government to design and introduce 
a Draft Bill to change first names and establish gender status in specific cases.
Social forces were granted unequal access to the consultations on the Bill. 
Moreover, legislators gave more attention and accrued more authority to sexo-
logical than to trans knowledge. While the voices of the former were marked 
by homogeneity with regard to concepts of transsexuality and mainly focused 
on the general structure of the Bill in order to extend freedoms for diagnostic 
purposes and trans individuals, trans individuals’ demands concentrated on 
several sections of the Bill and ranged from more restrictive suggestions to 
rights that exceeded those demanded by sexologists.
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Having privileged access to legislative consultations, however, did not 
necessarily mean that sexological knowledge was mirrored in the Act, and if 
so, for the reasons sexologists had put forward. Instead, a dynamic of its own 
developed during the legislative debate. The Christian democratic opposition 
used assumed sexological knowledge on transsexuality strategically to fend off 
anticipated challenges to the conventional mode of gendering, disruptions to 
cis individuals’ everyday-life and perceived encroachments on their rights and, 
above all, potential threats to marriage as a privileged and exclusively hetero-
sexual institution in a, with few exceptions, heteronormative and homophobic 
political climate.
The Transsexual Act marks the culmination and political consolidation of a 
gradual shift within the gender regime from the immutability to the mutability 
of sex/gender without, however, endangering either the gender binary or the 
heteronormative character of the gender regime. Recognising transsexual in-
dividuals' experienced gender while leaving intact the heteronormative gender 
binary, including its polarised notions of cismen and ciswomen, came at a cost. 
The restoration of the gender regime went hand in hand with the marginalisa-
tion of transsexuality, the continuing naturalisation of conventionally gendered 
individuals, the marking of transsexuality as an aberrant development and the 
legally sanctioned coercion to trade fundamental human rights, such as the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to human dignity, physical integrity, mar-
riage and family for gender recognition within a limited scope of options. Thus, 
while the Transsexual Act had enabling effects, it also provoked resistance.
2.4 a note on the tr ans movement from the 
 1970s to the mId-1990s
While a comprehensive study of the early trans movement remains to be done, I 
will in the following address basic features of the trans movement. The deliber-
ations in this chapter draw upon different perspectives on the trans movement 
from the 1970s to the mid-1990s as they emerged in the debate following Si-
gusch’s (1991a) publication of his concept of depathologisation in the Zeitschrift 
für Sexualforschung. Further sources are the to date very few articles on the 
West German trans movement, selected court cases and findings from the pre-
vious chapters on medical, legal and political concepts of transsexuality.
The first section of this chapter outlines basic structural features and con-
cepts of transsexuality in the trans movement from the time transsexuality 
appeared as a clearly defined psychiatric category until the mid-1990s. The sec-
ond section identifies major factors that in addition to sexological ascriptions 
contributed to an overall homogeneous image and the isolation of transsexual 
individuals, despite heterogeneous individual concepts with regard to sexual 
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orientation, concepts of self and perspectives on sex reassignment treatment. 
The last two parts of this chapter engage with the controversy on the contribu-
tion of the early transsexual movement to legal recognition and responds to 
sceptical assessments of the future of the trans movement that arose in the 
aftermath of the Transsexual Act.
I will argue that the period from the 1970s until the mid-1990s marks an 
early stage of the trans(sexual) movement in (West) Germany rather than a 
transitory phase as Sigusch (1991a: 328) suggests and that external and internal 
factors contributed to the isolation and homogeneous representations of trans-
sexual individuals. Moreover, any assessment of trans movement concepts and 
policies, achievements and anticipated developments needs to be contextual-
ised within the historically-specific discourse on transsexuality and practices 
vis-à-vis transsexual individuals and requires complex understandings of social 
movements and social and political change.
2.4.1 Basic structural and conceptual features 
 of the trans movement
Trans(sexual) individuals began to organise soon after transsexuality emerged 
as an isolated medical category. Their initial organisational structures and 
routes for social change involved local support groups that developed as early as 
in the 1970s (Regh 2002: 186), individual litigation for a change of first names 
and gender status in the birth register since at least the early 1960s, local lobby-
ing for trans legislation since the early 1970s (Augstein 1992: 258) and petition-
ing during the legislative proceedings that led to the Transsexual Act. While 
the trans movement set out with rather informal, local and dispersed forms 
of organisation and actions from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, it proceeded to 
develop larger structures from the mid-1980s onward, of which Transidentitas 
e. V., as a trans support group that was to operate on a national scale, is an ex-
ample. The early trans movement was host to a number of individuals with dif-
ferent gender expressions and a plurality of transsexual subjects. With regard 
to the former, Sigusch and Augstein described individuals who identified as 
either one of the two legitimised genders, who temporarily changed genders or 
who did not identify with any particular gender (Augstein 1992: 260; Sigusch 
1991a: 324).
Transsexual individuals, too, appear to have been rather heterogeneous 
with regard to sexual orientation, understandings of transsexuality and per-
spectives on sex reassignment treatment. Augstein and Sigusch (1991a: 322) 
e. g. suggested that despite the psychiatric heterosexualisation of transsexual-
ity sexual orientations varied among transsexual individuals. In her critical re-
sponse to Meyenburg and Ihlenfeld’s report on successful psychotherapeutic 
treatment of transsexuality in the USA (Meyenburg/Ihlenfeld 1982), Augstein 
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e. g. claimed that most trans women were lesbians, a significant number lived 
as bisexual women and that some transmen were gay (Augstein 1982a: 599).
Similarly, transsexual individuals’ perceptions of transsexuality differed, 
ranging from transsexuality as a disorder to transsexuality as a gender variant. 
At the time, Augstein was a proponent of the former concept. In her opinion, 
transsexuality was a disorder, because transsexual individuals suffer from the 
discrepancy between their bodies and minds (Augstein 1992: 259). She held 
that transsexuality was a state of »lack« (ibid: 257) that is overcome once trans-
sexual individuals transition to women and men with a transsexual past (ibid: 
255), hence mirroring the at the time hegemonic medical concept of transsex-
uality in this regard. However, Transidentitas e. V.’s response to the German 
Standards suggests that some trans individuals opposed a pathologising model 
of transsexuality. Rather than consider transsexuality a disorder, Transiden-
titas e. V. perceived transsexuality to be a »special form of gender identity« 
(Trans identitas 1997: 342).
The same heterogeneity can be observed with regard to sex reassignment 
surgery. While Augstein echoed the dominant medical treatment paradigm of 
the time when she insisted that the desire for sex reassignment surgery was 
the defining feature of transsexuality (Augstein 1992: 257), several transsexual 
individuals went to court in the course of the 1980s and early 1990s in order 
to achieve a revision of gender status with limited or without any medical and 
surgical treatment at all. In the early 1980s, the High Regional Court Hamm 
e. g. dealt with an application for a revision of gender status in the case of a 
transman who had undergone a mastectomy but for health reasons refused to 
take hormones or undergo a hysterectomy and an oophorectomy (OLG Hamm 
1983: 167). In the mid-1990s, a transwoman who desired a revision of gender 
status without wanting to undergo any sex reassignment treatment whatso-
ever in vain challenged the constitutionality of s. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG, (OLG 
Düsseldorf 1996: 43).120 Moreover, Transidentitas e. V.’s comment on the Ger-
man Standards suggests that sex reassignment surgery was either a necessary 
or dispensable therapeutic measure, depending on the respective individual 
(Transidentitas 1997: 342).
2.4.2 Factors leading to a homogeneous image and 
 the isolation of transsexual individuals
Despite this heterogeneity of unusually gendered subjects and of transsexual 
individuals, support groups which constituted the bulk of collective organising 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Regh 2002: 186) are frequently associ-
120 | For more details on court interpretations of somatic requirements under the 
Transsexual Act, see chapters 3.3.4 and 4.1.
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ated with a homogeneous and narrow definition of transsexuality and subse-
quent internal policing. The significance, features and policies of early trans-
sexual support groups cannot be detached from the historical context in which 
these groups operated.
Sigusch described transsexual support groups as a »paramedical subcul tu-
re«.121 According to him, transsexual support groups were foremost concerned 
about issues relating to epilation, hormones, surgery, authorities, courts and 
health insurances (Sigusch 1991a: 328). Considering the maze of legal and 
medical rules and procedures and social stigmatisation, and in the light of little 
information available, medical or otherwise, support groups and their respec-
tive artefacts and events provided opportunities for trans individuals to gain 
and exchange information and experiences required to achieve formal gender 
recognition, it does not come as a surprise that trans individuals who sought 
medical services and/or legal recognition organised in support groups.
Moreover, observers of early transsexual support groups notice that sup-
port groups functioned as rather exclusive organisations. Sigusch for instance 
suggested that these support groups welcomed transsexual individuals only 
(Sigusch 1991a: 328). At the same time, transsexuality was defined narrowly. 
While Sigusch seemed oblivious of the factors that induced this policy, Regh 
explained that support groups for transsexual individuals uncritically adopted 
the medical differential diagnosis, which was premised on the distinction be-
tween various trans phenomena (Regh 2002: 188). This meant that the desire 
for sex reassignment surgery was the defining feature and entrance ticket to 
support groups who on their part pursued a policy of producing »real women 
and men (with a transsexual past)« (ibid). Or, as Regh put it, support groups 
served to solve the problems the medical and psychiatric establishment gener-
ated and determined the solutions for (ibid: 186).
Several authors also agree upon the publicly perceivable conformity trans-
sexual individuals represented with regard to gender norms prevailing at the 
time (Sigusch 1991a: 328 f.; Hirschauer 1992: 250; Augstein 1992: 256; Regh 
2002: 186 f.). As Hirschauer, Augstein and Regh point out, adopting conserva-
tive gender roles was inextricably linked to hostile social conditions (Regh 
2002: 187) and medical expectations, which had to be met in order to be eligible 
for medical and surgical treatment (ibid; Augstein 1992: 257). They functioned 
as a strategy to appease their social environment, which, in conjunction with 
concentrated medical and legal efforts mirrors how radically transsexual indi-
viduals pursued a claim to self-determination (Hirschauer 1992: 250). Hence, 
121 | In the same vein, Becker calls Transidentitas e. V. a »professional association« 
(Becker 1998: 159) in her reply to the critique of the German Standards in the Zeitschrift 
für Sexualforschung.
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it was only after surgery that transsexual individuals were free to deal critically 
with gender roles and heteronormative expectations (Augstein 1992: 257).
Developments in the women’s and the lesbian and gay movements exac-
erbated the isolation of trans individuals. As Regh contended, from the end 
of the 1970s to the mid-1980s and very much like in the UK, Raymond’s book 
The Transsexual Empire (1979)122 greatly influenced the women’s movement in 
West Germany to the effect of expelling trans individuals from its midst (Regh 
2002: 189). Dominant forces in the gay movement contributed to the isolation 
of trans individuals in a different way, albeit no less effectively. Intent on as-
suring a homophobic society that gay men were no less masculine than other 
men, transsexual women, drag queens and transvestites were, if not entirely 
excluded, at least shoved to the fringes of the movement. Moreover, transmen 
were not even known to exist (ibid: 189 f.).
2.4.3 Discussing the contribution of the trans movement 
 to formal gender recognition
The question of the achievements of the initial stage of the trans movement, 
in particular whom to credit for the Transsexual Act is debated controversially. 
Some scholars do not acknowledge trans movement contributions to this de-
velopment at all. Sigusch for instance held that transsexual individuals and 
transvestites were, among other things, offered legal provisions and health in-
surance coverage (Sigusch 1991a: 328). The sociologist Hirschauer echoed Si-
gusch’s assumption when suggesting that the state »offered« trans individuals 
an opportunity to legally »change gender« (Hirschauer 1992: 249).
By contrast, trans scholars and activists claimed that any legal or political 
success was attributable to battles fought by trans people. In his critical ap-
praisal of the development of the trans movement in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the activist Regh suggested that without the work of support groups, 
neither health insurance coverage of sex reassignment treatment, nor the 
Transsexual Act would have materialised (Regh 2002: 193). More precisely, and 
in critical response to Hirschauer, the trans activist and lawyer Augstein held 
that any rights and the Act were an effect of local lobbying efforts in Hamburg 
since 1972 and persistent individual litigation (Augstein 1992: 258).
122 | In her book, Raymond among other things held that »transsexuals« were part of a 
patriarchal conspiracy meant to colonise feminism and rape women’s bodies (Raymond 
1994: 104). For a critique of Raymond’s concept, see Riddell 2006 and for the effects 
of the publication on the relationship between feminism and trans in the UK, see Whittle 
2006).
Concepts until the enactment of the Transsexual Act 149
Any answer to this question is necessarily flawed, unless it takes into con-
sideration both individual and collective trans movement endeavours and e. g. 
the opportunity structures123 in which these legal and political undertakings 
took place. Indeed, in the light of local lobbying in Hamburg it is most prob-
ably no coincidence that it was particularly social democratic MPs representing 
Hamburg who pressed for trans legislation. Moreover, the history of litigation 
suggests that however dispersed individual members that shaped the early days 
of the trans movement in the Federal Republic of Germany may have been, 
their activities initiated and fuelled attempts at gender recognition.
At the same time, trans struggles for legislation to regulate a change of 
first names and gender status occurred within an increasingly favourable con-
text. As pointed out in previous chapters, since the early 1970s various societal 
forces and actors on the level of the state pressured the then West German 
government to introduce trans legislation. Sexological submissions, recurring 
parliamentary enquiries posed to the West German government by a small 
group of social democratic MPs headed by Dr. Arndt and later on Dr. Meinecke 
as well as the Federal Constitutional Court decision on 11 Oct. 1978 produced a 
favourable political climate to this effect.
2.4.4 Assessing the future of the trans movement
Another question that is debated controversially deals with the development 
of the trans movement throughout the 1980s and its future. Both Sigusch and 
Hirschauer (1992: 249) were sceptical about the »take-off« of the trans move-
ment at the beginning of the 1990s. Sigusch observed an increase of e. g. jour-
nals, brochures and documentations produced by trans individuals, support 
groups, self-organised conferences, exhibitions, collaboration with health in-
surance companies, struggles for membership and the right to speak before 
legal experts and physicians. At the same time, he considered these activities 
politically and intellectually unsophisticated, narrow-minded and redundant 
123 | According to Rayside, »[s]ocial movements operate within an ›opportunity struc tu-
re‹ – one shaped by factors, such as the openness or permeability of the political system, 
the extent of centralization or decentralization of the regime, the relationship between 
executive and legislative, the capacity of the courts to challenge governmental action, 
the support for rights claims in the existing legal environment, and the array of media 
voices. These are not simply fixed elements, for there can be important shifts in party 
composition and leadership, and changes in judicial interpretation, some of which are of 
course subject to influence from the activity of social movements themselves.« (Rayside 
1998: 9 f.)
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(Sigusch 1991a: 326), hence shifting the totalisation of transsexual individuals 
from the medical to the politico-cultural sphere (Lindemann 1992: 261).124
However, it seems more likely that the time until the mid-1990s marked 
the period of the foundation of the social movement in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. While Sigusch predicted that the trans movement would at 
best be a transitory movement (Sigusch 1991a: 328), the period from the early 
1970s to the mid-1990s was only the beginning of a political movement, which 
was partly due to resistance to internal policing, developments in theories of 
gender, new means of communication and as a reaction to ongoing external 
discriminatory regulations and practices going to grow and diversify from the 
mid-1990s onward.
2.4.5 Summar y: Concepts of transsexualit y 
 in the trans movement
It would be premature to deduce conclusions on trans movement concepts 
of transsexuality, gender and gender regime in the period from the 1970s to 
the mid-1990s without an in-depth study of the social movement. However, 
findings so far indicate that there was a discrepancy between representations 
and psycho-medical descriptions of transsexual individuals on the one hand, 
and transsexual individuals’ subjectivities on the other. Internal forces, most 
prominently transsexual support groups, as well as external factors, such as the 
pressure to appease a hostile social environment and the isolation from other 
social movements dealing with issues related to gender and sexuality contrib-
uted to predominantly homogeneous and gender-conformist representations 
of transsexual individuals. At the same time, there are indicators that trans-
sexual individuals were far less homogeneous with regard to sexual orienta-
tions, understandings of self and perspectives on sex reassignment treatment 
than dominant factions in sexology suggested.
124 | In her response to Sigusch’s concept of detotalisation and depathologisation of 
transsexuality, the sociologist Lindemann criticised Sigusch for consistently ignoring 
trans individuals’ scholarly and political statements (Lindemann 1992: 268).
3 CONCEPTS OF GENDER AND 
 TRANS(SEXUALIT Y) PRIOR TO, AND DURING
 THE L AW REFORM DEBATE
3.1 de velopments and debates on tr ans(se xualIt y) 
 In se xology from the 1990s to 2010
The sexological debate in Germany from the 1990s to 2010 was marked by four 
major developments. First, while enquiries into the aetiology of transsexual-
ity, like in other Western countries, overall shifted towards somatic research, 
perspectives that questioned the search for a cause of transsexuality and called 
for a depathologisation of transsexuality entered the debate. Second, alongside 
homogenising concepts of transsexuality, perspectives emerged that acknowl-
edged the publicly discernible proliferation of trans subjectivities, including 
the heterogeneity of transsexual subjects. Third, while the vast majority of sex-
ologists continued to endorse a course of treatment based on authoritative psy-
cho-medical control of trans subjects, one sexologist argued in favour of taking 
into account trans expertise and self-determination. Fourth, despite disagree-
ment over concepts of transsexuality and the organisation of the treatment of 
transsexual individuals, sexologists developed authoritative national guidelines 
for the treatment and diagnostic assessment of transsexual individuals.
This chapter analyses clinical categories and underlying concepts of trans 
according to the perspectives and resulting tensions that emerged in the course 
of the developments mentioned above. Drawing upon articles from the sexo-
logical journals Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung, Sexuologie and relevant articles 
in Psychoendocrinology, Zeitschrift für Humanontogenetik (Journal for Human 
Ontogenetics) and a sexological handbook, the chapter starts out with a system-
atic account of aetiological approaches to transsexuality. 
The next section deals with the reconceptualisation of transsexualism as 
it features in terminology and definitions, clinical pictures and differential 
diagnoses. Thereafter this chapter will address the debate on the diagnostics 
of transsexualism with a particular focus on the patient history, the physical 
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examination, the psychopathological examination and psychotherapy and the 
›real life test‹. 
Finally, this chapter deals with the medical management of transsexuality 
since the introduction of the German Standards. This section contextualises 
the legal and medical transition from the one to the other of the two officially 
recognised genders within the complex relationships between law and medi-
cine, health insurance company administration and advisory body practices 
and psycho-medical professionals as well as county courts and psycho-medical 
practitioners in the field of transsexuality. Sources for this section are in ad-
dition to Langer’s (1995), Langer and Hartmann’s (1997) and Becker et al.’s 
(2001) articles in Sexuologie and the Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung, respectively, 
relevant articles in Clement and Senf’s anthology.
The sections on the reconceptualisation, diagnostics, assessment and man-
agement of transsexuality draw upon articles in the journals Zeitschrift für Sex-
ualforschung, including the interdisciplinary debate on the German Standards,1 
Sexuologie and relevant sexological articles in Andrologia, Psychiatrische Praxis 
(Psychiatric Practice), Der Urologe (The Urologist) and Nervenarzt (The Neurol-
ogist). Further sources are two influential sexological handbooks, relevant con-
tributions to Clement and Senf’s (1996) anthology, a monography by the Swiss 
psychologist Rauchfleisch (2006) and the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialge-
richt; BSG) decisions on 06 Aug. 1988 (BSG 1988) and 10 Feb. 1993 (BSG 1993).
Throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century and despite 
tensions between the recognition of individual subjectivities and homogenisa-
tion, depathologisation and ongoing pathologisation and the issue of surveilling 
transitions as opposed to granting trans individuals self-determination, neither 
depathologising approaches nor an overall higher degree of self-reflexivity in 
recommendations for clinical practice led to loosening the psycho-medical grip 
on transsexual individuals. Instead, dominant sexologists frequently manoeu-
vered within the restrictive regulatory regime it had fed into at an earlier point 
in time, such as the Transsexual Act (1980), a development that accounts for the 
specific national route that sexology took on trans in Germany.
3.1.1 Approaches to transsexualit y in the sexological debate
The concern for finding a cause of transsexuality among sexologists in Germa-
ny was overall less prominent in the period between 1990 and 2010 than in the
1 | The debate on the German Standards includes perspectives of trans and cis sociolo-
gists, a lawyer and the national trans organisation Transidentitas e. V.
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time preceding the Transsexual Act.2 Nevertheless, the search for a cause did 
not cease. Like in other Western countries,3 the focus of the research on the 
aetiology shifted in favour of somatic approaches (cf. Becker 2013: 153), and atti-
tudes towards research on the aetiology of transsexuality became more diverse. 
Perspectives and research on the aetiology of transsexuality debated in German 
sexology journals can be divided into three categories. The first questioned the 
search for a cause of transsexuality. The second pursued ongoing somatic re-
search. The third engaged in research on multi-causal factors.
Critical approach
Sigusch was the first sexologist in Germany who questioned research on poten-
tial causes of transsexuality. While he did not reject research per se, he took a 
vehement stance in his concept of the detotalisation of transsexuality4 against 
2 | The reasons for this development are twofold. First, the majority of sexologists agreed 
that there was no conclusive single factor or known set of factors that causes transsexual-
ity, regardless of whether sexologists questioned or reproduced pathologising concepts 
of transsexuality (Becker et al. 1997: 147; Sigusch 2007: 351). Most of the sexologists did 
not refer to aetiology at all (e. g. Clement/Senf 1996; Langer/Hartmann 1997; Gauruder-
Burmester/Popken/Beier 2006; Seikowski 2007), since hypotheses on biological causes 
have so far been either falsified or proven unverifiable, and psychosocial causes have 
turned out not to be generalisable (Bosinski 2000: 72; Rauchfleisch 2006: 20). Second, 
the debate in sexology from the 1990s to 2010 placed more emphasis on pragmatic is-
sues, such as aspects related to the overall concept of treatment (e. g. Clement/Senf 
1996; Kockott 1996; Becker et al. 1997; Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005; Gauruder-Burm-
ester/Popken/Beier 2006; Sigusch 1996; 2007), specific aspects in psychotherapy (e. g. 
Meyenburg 1992; Bosinski 1994; Laszig/Knauss/Clement 1995; Clement/Senf 1996a; 
Pfäfflin 1996; Eicher 1996; Rauchfleisch 2006; Seikowski 2007; Seikowski et al. 2008) 
and on conceptual aspects, such as the issue of depathologisation (Sigusch 1991; 1991a; 
1992; 1995; 1995a; Hirschauer 1992; Lindemann 1992; Augstein 1992; Langer 1995).
3 | For a comprehensive discussion of somatic approaches to transsexuality in Western 
countries, see Nieder/Jordan/Richter-Appelt 2011).
4 | Sigusch developed his concept of detotalisation in the first part of his article »Die 
Transsexuellen und unser nosomorpher Blick« (Transsexuals and our nosomorphic per-
spective). He discussed three issues. First, he critically reflected upon the dynamics be-
tween sexology and psychotherapy in the preliminary stages of the establishment of the 
programme of treatment in Frankfurt (Sigusch 1991: 225-230). Second, he discussed the 
resurging debate on psychotherapy vs. surgery in the 1980s (ibid: 230-240), which was 
sparked by Meyenburg and Ihlenfeld’s report on successful psychotherapeutical treat-
ment of trans individuals in the United States (Meyenburg/Ihlenfeld 1982). Third, Sigusch 
compared the current pathologisation of transsexuality with the pathologisation of indi-
viduals engaging in same-sex erotic activities in the 19th century (Sigusch 1991: 247).
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attempts in medicine to find a single ›cause‹ to explain a complex and unusual 
social phenomenon. His criticised this kind of research for two reasons.
First, Sigusch objected to the unidimensionality of such an undertaking. 
He argued that there was no »pure« natural scientific model of sexual or gen-
der identity that could unambiguously prove a direct effect of genes or hor-
mones. In his view, sexual desire, sexual preferences, gender roles or gender 
identities could not be stripped from the cultural contexts that shape them. He 
held that just as human beings would not even exist biologically without soci-
ety, nor would social human beings exist without genes, hormones and a brain. 
Sigusch suggested approaching complex phenomena by taking into considera-
tion interrelations and interdependencies (Sigusch 2007: 352).
Second, Sigusch criticised the pathologising impetus of aetiological re-
search on transsexuality. Alarmed by the similarity between the pathologisa-
tion of individuals featuring same-sex desires in the 19th century and the cur-
rent medical understanding of trans individuals (Sigusch 1991: 247),5 Sigusch 
uncovered the logic that rendered possible the representation of homosexuality 
as a disease earlier on and the current pathologisation of transsexuality. Ac-
cording to Sigusch, this logic operates to the effect that medical science pathol-
ogises phenomena when properties assumed to be linked by nature fall apart 
(ibid: 248). Hence, he cautioned against a scientific attitude that,
subjects all manifestations in life to its criteria and its theories, against the bad habit 
of psychological medicine to psycho-pathologise everything that appears offensive and 
incomprehensible, against the bad habit of somatic medicine to reduce highly complex 
phenomena to possibly one tangible cause, in short, against the nosomorphic perspec-
tive […]. (Ibid: 249 f.)
However, he anticipated that an aetiopathogenetic approach would continue to 
produce theories of transsexuality »regardless of the waste of time, nerves or 
money, the strain on the patients. As soon as a new product of a gene emerges, 
it will not be shied away from« (Sigusch 1991a: 311), especially since »[n]othing 
appears to be more reassuring to the reified medical awareness than a noxa of 
which one believes that one can assume that it is concrete and immediately ef-
fective« (ibid: 311).
5 | Sigusch observed that v. Krafft-Ebing perceived of the ›urning‹ in Psychopathia 
sexualis (1886) in the same way contemporary professionals understand transsexuality 
(Sigusch 1991: 247).
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Somatic approaches
Indeed, various disciplines in medical science continued to search for a ›noxa‹ 
that might cause transsexuality. In the 1990s, e. g. the endocrinologist Dörner 
continued to refine his thesis that prenatal hormone imbalances cause trans-
sexuality during a particular phase in the differentiation of the human brain. 
Based on results of experiments on rats and clinical examinations of human be-
ings, Dörner identified disorders in the adrenal steroid biosynthesis, in particu-
lar 21-hydroxylasis and 3ß-hydroxysteroid-dehydrogenasis deficiencies during 
the second trimenon of pregnancy as factors that organise the »sex centres«6 in 
the brain to induce homo- and transsexuality (Dörner 1995: 22-25).
According to Dörner, the combination of a genetically, gonadally and geni-
tally male foetus with a neuronally feminised brain develops when the testicu-
lar androgen secretion in a male foetus is inhibited due to stress and/or a ma-
ternal 21-hydroxylasis deficiency or a fetal 3ß-hydroxysteroid-dehydrogenasis 
deficiency during the organisation of the brain. Either endocrinological situ-
ation triggers the overproduction of adrenal androgens. The latter are aroma-
tised to estrogen and conjugated to estrogen sulfate in the placenta. Estrogen 
sulfate inhibits the testicular production of androgens. Dörner suggested that 
the person’s brain would be more or less feminised, resulting in a »female sexual 
orientation« and/or »female gender role behaviour« in these males (ibid: 29).
According to Dörner, the determination of the gender identity constitutes 
the fifth and last phase7 of the sex differentiation in human beings. The con-
sciously experienced understanding of oneself as a man or woman is primarily 
6 | According to Dörner’s observations, sexual orientation and gender role behaviour 
are immediate effects of endocrinological processes at a specific time of prenatal brain 
development. The sex centres control typically female or male patterns of gonadotropin 
secretion. The sex centres are organised by estrogens only (Dörner 1995: 27). The mating 
centres control the person’s sexual orientation. These centres are organised by estrogens 
and androgens alike. The gender role centres control typically female and male gender 
role behaviour and are exclusively organised by androgens (ibid: 28). 
The critical phases for the sex dif ferentiation of the brain are not identical. However, they 
overlap (ibid: 27). Dörner’s findings suggest that both the absolute sex hormone level as 
well as the ratio of androgens to estrogens affect the sexual differentiation of the brain in 
these critical phases, allowing for »various combinations of, or dissociations between the 
sex hormone-dependent development of the gonadotropin secretion, sexual orientation 
and gender role behaviour« (ibid: 28).
7 | This phase is preceded by four others. The first is genetic and is determined by 
the presence of an x or y chromosome in the semen. The gonadal sex is determined by 
the sex-determining gene. The genital sex is determined by the Müllerian-Inhibitory-
Substance (MIS) and in particular by androgens during the second to the fourth month of 
pregnancy. Neuronal sex, i. e. the typically female or male gonadotropin secretion pattern, 
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determined by the prenatal, sex-hormone induced differentiation of the somat-
ic and neuronal sex and depends on pre- and postnatal psychosocial influences 
(ibid: 28).
Dörner’s search for an aetiology of homosexuality8 and transsexuality was 
not value-free. Homosexuality and transsexuality featured as results of biologi-
cal processes largely deemed deficient as opposed to seemingly unremarkable 
hetero and cis developments. Heteronormativity and the naturalised gender 
binary with stereotypical, universal and ahistorical understandings of the ex-
clusive categories ›man‹ and ›woman‹ formed the unquestioned background of 
his research as well as the assumption that biological, or to be precise, neuroen-
docrinological processes immediately affect the social.
Moreover, his research on the aetiology of homosexuality and transsexu-
ality was not non-directional either. While he believed that the value of such 
findings to sexology would continue to decriminalise, dediscriminate and de-
pathologise homo- and bisexuality, he placed his findings on the alleged aetiol-
ogy of transsexuality in a ›reparative‹ and preventative context:
In case fur ther neuroendocrinological and genetic examinations confirm our results, 
it is possible to assume that the 3ß-HSD and the 21-hydroxylasis deficiency not only 
represent a predisposition for the development of transsexualism, but for hyperandrog-
enous anovulation and idiopathic oligospermia, too. This should in future be in part rec-
ognisable via neonatal or prenatal diagnostics. Hence, severe gender identity disorders 
or the most frequent forms of infer tility in both sexes would in principle be at least in 
part accessible for treatment at an early stage or for prevention. (Ibid: 29)
The assumption that either particular prenatal, and to a lesser degree postna-
tal hormonal constellations condition transsexuality informed several somatic 
approaches. As a result, various parts of trans bodies were scrutinised for an 
either unusual hormonal status or traces of potential prenatal endocrinological 
peculiarities. Among these were studies by Bosinski, Schröder, Arndt, Heiden-
reich and Wille (1995), and Schneider, Pickel and Stalla (2006).
Based on anthropomorphic measurements considered sex dimorphic in 
fifteen hormonally untreated ftm trans subjects, nineteen ›healthy‹ female, 
i. e. ciswomen, and twenty-one ›healthy‹ male controls, i. e. cismen, Bosinski, 
Schröder, Arndt, Heidenreich and Wille investigated into the relationship 
between physical constitution and trans identity (Bosinski et al. 1995: 326 f.). 
While the researchers could not detect any differences between ciswomen and
sexual orientation and gender role behaviour are organised by sex hormones and in part 
neurotransmitters as mediators of the hormonal effects (Dörner 1995: 28).
8 | For a critique of Dörner’s concept of homosexuality, see Bock von Wülfingen 2007: 65.
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transmen in terms of absolute body measurements,9 a comparison of physical 
proportions suggested contradictory results, which Bosinski and his colleagues 
interpreted to be overall leaning towards an »intermediate« or »masculine« 
side (ibid: 333).10
Bosinski, Schröder, Arndt, Heidenreich and Wille tentatively concluded 
that ftm transsexual subjects and ciswomen differed with regard to a few body 
measurements and proportions that allegedly establish sex dimorphism. They 
equally tentatively suggested that the differences reveal that ftm trans individu-
als tend to match the parameters of the gender they identify with (ibid: 333 f.).
As the researchers readily admitted, the research design was flawed. First, 
the sample was too small to produce representative data. Second, the groups 
were too heterogeneous. While there were e. g. two blue collar workers each 
in the control groups, the trans group hosted six blue collar workers. As the 
research team conceded, different types of labour, diets and exercising shape 
bodies in different ways (ibid: 334).
Bosinski, Schröder, Arndt, Heidenreich and Wille’s study also constitutes 
an episode in the cultural production of sex dimorphism and the naturalisa-
tion of an apparent link between a person’s genitalia and gender identity. The 
researchers e. g. maintained an understanding of two polarised sexes, despite 
the fact that seven ciswomen’s bodies were reported to have transgressed the 
values for females on the Thanner scale (ibid: 329). By contrast, variations in 
ftm body measurements were emphasised, hence accentuating the ›abnormal-
ity‹ of transsexuality and implying the ›health‹ of gender identities that appear 
to follow from a particular genital status at birth.
Based on an anthropomorphic study, the neuroendocrinologist Stalla and 
his research team believed to have found a biological explanation for the devel-
opment of transsexuality in mtf trans individuals. The research team meas-
ured the 2D:4D finger length ratios of more than 100 trans individuals.11 The 
researchers found out that in mtf transsexual subjects the ratio was higher than 
in cismen. The ratio corresponded with that of heterosexual women. Schnei-
9 | On average ftm trans subjects and ciswomen in this non-representative study were 
smaller, had less weight, more narrow shoulders and waists, shorter and thinner upper 
and lower arms and radioulnar diameters than cismen (Bosinski et al. 1995: 329).
10 | Indices such as the androgyny score by Thanner and the body mass index indicated 
that in five of sixteen cases ftm trans individuals disposed of more male than female 
proportions, whereas some proportions such as the shoulder pelvis index suggested more 
female proportions in ftm trans subjects than in ciswomen (ibid: 330-333). The Thanner 
scale is used to distinguish between males and females (ibid: 329).
11 | Some researchers assume that the value between the finger length ratio indicates 
the prenatal androgen situation in the phase when fingers develop. High levels of testos-
terone are deemed to result in longer ring fingers in relation to index fingers.
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der, Pickel and Stalla concluded that mtf transsexuals are more likely to have 
experienced lower intrauterine androgen levels than average cismen (Schnei-
der/Pickel/Stalla 2006: 268).
Apart from the intriguing simplicity of the sociobiologistic line of argu-
ment, the usefulness of data on finger length ratios becomes questionable 
when compared with research in this field elsewhere. E.g., in a study of 60 in-
dividuals each per group, Rahman and Wilson in the UK related finger length 
ratio to sexual orientation. Their findings suggest that homosexual males and 
females show significantly lower 2D:4D ratios than heterosexual males and 
females (Rahman/Wilson 2003: 288).
Taking for granted for the sake of the argument an immediate link between 
sex steroids and social behaviour or identity, respectively, the comparison of the 
aforementioned finger-length-ratio studies raises a few questions. When does 
a particular finger-length ratio indicate a case of transsexuality and when does 
it indicate homosexuality? How do finger length ratios feature in lesbian as op-
posed to heterosexual ftm subjects? How does a change in sexual orientation 
fit together with rather stable finger lengths?
Moreover, when taking further studies on finger length ratios into consid-
eration, findings are contradictory. While Rahman and Wilson held that homo-
sexual males and females show significantly lower 2D:4D ratios in comparison 
to heterosexual controls, Lippa’s findings suggested that 2D:4D finger length 
ratios in cismen are related to sexual orientation, whereas they are not related to 
ciswomen’s sexual orientation (Lippa 2003: 179).12 Findings in studies on finger 
length ratios seem to vary from study to study.
Multi-causal approach
In the light of the deficiencies of biological13 and psychological14 approaches and 
based on a discussion of various studies on the gender identity of intersex indi-
viduals (Bosinski 2000a), Bosinski suggested that gender identity development 
12 | In Lippa’s study homosexual men were said to feature ›female‹ finger length ratios.
13 | Bosinski detected four major flaws in biological approaches to transsexualism. First, 
being a human feature, gender identity cannot be derived from animal experiments. Sec-
ond, species vary. Therefore, results from experiments on rats cannot be applied to other 
species. Moreover, biosocial aspects influence sexual and social behaviour. Third, biolog-
ical approaches cannot explain why the overwhelming majority of persons with congenital 
adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) do not develop a ›gender identity disorder‹ or homosexuality. 
Finally, endocrinological findings in transsexual individuals are contradictory (Bosinski 
2000: 72).
14 | According to Bosinski, psychological approaches have two drawbacks. First, 
psychological assumptions are based on subjective interpretations of individual cases, 
which cannot be empirically verified. Second, while specific factors might apply to 
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is determined by a »highly complex, time-dependent biopsychosocial complex 
of conditions« (ibid: 96). He argued that further research into transsexuality 
was required to analyse biological and psychological factors in the same sample 
of individuals, pay more attention to physical aspects in untreated transsexual 
individuals, create sufficiently large ›healthy‹ control groups in studies and sup-
plement group differences with case studies (Bosinski 2000: 73).
With these ideas in mind, Bosinski conducted research on the aetiology 
of female-to-male transsexualism based on a sample of sixteen untreated fe-
male-to-male transsexual individuals and a control group group of nineteen 
ciswomen and twenty-one cismen. He applied several methods, including 
standardised personality tests and depth interviews covering issues such as the 
family situation, childhood and adolescent gender behaviour, school history, 
psycho- and somatosexual development and the development of gender identity 
(ibid: 73). Moreover, he conducted anthropometric, endocrinological and trans-
vaginal ultrasound examinations (ibid: 74).
With regard to gender-specific socialisation in childhood and adolescence, 
Bosinski’s findings suggest that ftm transsexual individuals experience signifi-
cantly more asymmetrical family structures, either identify with their fathers 
like the cismen in the control group do or experience the loss of their fathers 
as traumatic (ibid: 74). Furthermore, he observed that ftm transsexual persons 
engage in masculine playing activities like the male cis controls and profoundly 
dislike ›girls’ clothing‹ (ibid: 75).
Bosinski’s findings on the psychosomatic and psychosexual development 
suggest that the vast majority of ftm transsexual individuals experience men-
strual problems (ibid) and perceive chest development as traumatic (ibid: 76). 
They masturbate as early and frequently as do cismen in the control group (ibid: 
76 f.). All participants of the study lived as heterosexuals. Incidences of sexual 
abuse did not feature significantly higher in any group (ibid: 77).
The endocrinological findings in this study revealed significantly higher 
levels of T and A4 levels in female-to-male transsexual individuals than in 
female cis control subjects. However, there was no difference between these 
groups with regard to DHEAS, SHBG, LH and FSH. After stimulation with 
ACTH, the cortisol precursors 17 OHP and OHPREG happened to be higher in 
ftm transsexual individuals than in ciswomen in the control group (ibid). More-
over, Bosinski diagnosed more non-classical CAH and higher rates of PCOS in 
ftm transsexual individuals than in female cis controls (ibid: 78).
Based on the results of his psychological explorations, physical examina-
tions and on the hypothetical assumption that hyperandrogeny in adults mir-
rors pre- and perinatal hormonal imbalances (ibid: 79), Bosinski developed a 
transsexual individuals more frequently, psychological approaches cannot explain why 
children who experience similar influences do not develop transsexualism (ibid).
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›hypothetical developmental model for ftm transsexualism‹, which he divided 
into a childhood and a pubertal phase. According to this model, the transposi-
tion of an ftm transsexual person’s gender identity is established in childhood 
due to misidentification. As early as in childhood, hyperandrogeny stimulates 
behaviour stereotypically associated with boys. Masculine behaviour leads the 
child to consider itself more a boy than a girl (ibid: 80). The boyish behaviour 
causes the child’s environment to reinforce the child’s masculine understand-
ing of self (ibid: 81).
According to Bosinski, puberty marks the completion of this development. 
He argued that the ftm transsexual individual develops an aversion to specifi-
cally female aspects of his body, since a female puberty does not match the 
adolescent’s self-categorisation (ibid: 81). Moreover, the in part masculinised 
physical appearance during and after puberty contributes to the »illusionary« 
self-understanding of being similar to boys, and the masculine habitus causes 
the social environment to refrain from encouraging femininity. Furthermore, 
hormonal imbalances produce physical discomfort in the female body. Finally, 
the developing homosexual orientation matches the individual’s feeling of be-
ing a man, but does not fit the expectations associated with the role as a woman 
(ibid).
As several of the somatic approaches mentioned earlier on, Bosinski’s mul-
ti-causal concept is premised upon normative understandings of gender and 
sexuality, which render transsexuality an anomaly. Seen from such a perspec-
tive, factors assumed to play into the development of transsexuality are neces-
sarily deemed deficient compared to cis developments. Hence, when the social 
environment reinforces behaviour culturally associated with masculinity in 
a female-bodied child, Bosinski evaluates such a reaction as »inappropriate« 
(ibid: 82). Similarly, Bosinski frames the fact that trans children do not accept 
that a person’s gender cannot be changed as a deficiency (ibid: 80), rather than 
e. g. the product of a creative and/or questioning mind.
Moreover, Bosinski’s model contains a decidedly heterosexual bias. This 
applies to the sample as well as to the explanatory range of his concept. Gay 
transmen are not conceptualisable in his model for a biopsychosocial approach 
to ftm transsexuality.
Bosinski’s multi-causal concept shares with somatic approaches the as-
sumption that pre and/or perinatal hormonal imbalances form the biological 
basis of transsexuality. Since this hypothesis has so far not been verified, the 
entire concept necessarily remains speculative.
Concepts prior to, and during the law reform process 161
3.1.2 Reconceptualising transsexualit y
While the diversification of trans subjects resounded in the terminology used 
for unusual gender identities in the DSM-IV,15 sexologists in Germany with few 
exceptions continued to use the term ›transsexuality‹ or variations of the term 
throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. At the same time, 
clinical pictures of transsexuality reveal that sexologists more or less agreed 
that transsexual individuals were a heterogeneous group. However, sexologists 
were deeply divided over the issue of whether transsexuality constitutes a psy-
chopathological state or a variant of gender expression.
Terminolog y, definitions and concepts from the 1990s to 2010
While pathologising concepts generally classified transsexuality as a ›gender 
identity disorder‹, sexologists in Germany, unlike their U.S. colleagues, clung 
to the term ›transsexuality‹ or variations of the term. Moreover, despite the 
fact that the majority of sexologists employed the terms ›transsexuality‹ (e. g. 
Sigusch 1991a; 2007; Clement/Senf 1996; Becker et al. 1997; Seikowski 2007; 
Seikowski et al. 2008) or ›transsexualism‹ (e. g. Langer 1995), the meanings 
were not necessarily identical.
Sigusch for instance did not define the term. His concept of ›transsexual-
ity‹ is marked by two characteristics. First, as the title of the chapter »Trans-
sexuelle Entwicklungen« (Transsexual developments) in the 2007 edition of his 
sexological handbook suggests, he stressed the diversity of transsexual people’s 
lives. Second, he used the terms imprecisely. While he e. g. occasionally dis-
15 | In the DSM-IV which was published in 1994 and revised in 2000 (DSM-IV-TR), the APA 
abandoned the term ›transsexuality‹ in favour of ›gender identity disorders‹ (GID). The APA 
decided to drop the diagnosis of transsexualism in the DSM-IV in order to sever the clinical 
diagnosis of gender identity disorder from the criteria for sex reassignment. Moreover, 
the committee acknowledged different developments of transsexual individuals’ gender 
identities and sexual orientations. Another reason for replacing ›transsexualism‹ with 
›gender identity disorder‹ was because of the lack of clear boundaries between persons 
considered gender dysphoric with and without the desire to transition physically (Langer 
1995: 266).
The DSM-IV distinguished between symptoms in childhood on the one hand and adolescent 
and adult manifestations on the other (APA 1994: 533 f.). Among the diagnostic criteria 
for a GID in the latter was a »strong and persistent cross-gender identification« (ibid: 
532) and »evidence of persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of 
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex« (ibid: 533). Furthermore, intersexuality 
was excluded from a diagnosis of gender identity disorder. Finally, the person needed 
to display clinically significant discomfort or impairment at work, in social situations, or 
other important areas of life (ibid).
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tinguished between transsexuality and transvestism (e. g. Sigusch 1991a: 328), 
he used the terms ›transsexuality‹ and ›transgender‹ interchangeably in other 
instances (Sigusch 2007: 347 f.).
Unlike Sigusch, Clement and Senf, and the authors of the German Stand-
ards defined transsexuality narrowly. According to Clement and Senf, 
[t]ranssexuals are conscious of belonging to the other gender. The core of the trans-
sexual experience is the suffering due to the discrepancy between the sexed body and 
the subjective sense of gender belonging. They perceive the sex realistically, however, 
they feel it is subjectively wrong. This discrepancy is absolute in the sense that the 
subjective sense of belonging to the other gender is without any doubt experienced as 
an unchangeable identity. Accordingly, transsexual persons try to align their physical 
features with their subjective experience. They do so by adopting the outer appearance 
(clothing, haircut) and the typical behaviour of the other gender and by undergoing hor-
monal and surgical treatment. (Clement/Senf 1996: 1) 
However, they added that transsexual subjects shape their gendered selves in-
dividually (ibid 1996a: 19).
By contrast, the authors of the German Standards entail a more rigid, ho-
mogenising and pathologising concept of transsexuality than the aforemen-
tioned sexologists. The Standards hold that transsexual individuals strive to ap-
proximate the physical appearance according to their respective gender identity 
as much as possible: 
Transsexuality is marked by the permanent inner cer tainty of belonging to the other 
gender. This includes the rejection of the physical features of the innate sex and the 
role expectations that are linked to the biological sex as well as the desire to adapt the 
physical appearance to the gender identity as much as possible, using hormonal and 
surgical measures, and to live socially and legally recognised in the desired gender. 
(Becker et al. 1997: 147)
The definition proposed by the German Standards does not leave space for in-
dividual modes of shaping gender.16 In addition, they classify transsexuality as 
a gender identity disorder: »According to currently valid diagnostic classifica-
tion schemes, transsexuality is considered a special form of gender identity 
disorder.« (Ibid)
16 | By contrast, Becker suggested that the German Standards allow for individual 
solutions (Becker 1998: 157). Nevertheless, the German Standards consider their 
outline of a transition normative as the following quotation suggests: »The following 
Standards of Treatment and Diagnostic Assessment of Transsexuals are minimum 
requirements. Deviations from these Standards need to be justified in the patient’s health 
record in writing.« (Becker et al. 1997: 148)
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Langer decided to continue using the term ›transsexuality‹ after discuss-
ing the shortcomings of the term ›gender identity disorder‹. He argued that 
abandoning the terms ›transsexualism‹ and ›transvestism‹ would not solve the 
problems they denote. Moreover, he claimed that transsexuality would no long-
er be visible as an extreme form of gender dysphoria. He feared that the indica-
tion for sex reassignment surgery could become arbitrary (Langer 1995: 267).
However, the term ›transsexuality‹ was also contested. Seikowski and 
Rauchfleisch e. g. suggested exchanging the term ›transsexuality‹ for ›trans-
identity‹ (›Transidentität‹). In his critique of the German Standards, Seikowski 
mentioned two reasons for dropping the conventional psycho-medical term. 
First, he believed ›transsexuality‹ implies a sexual disorder (Seikowski 1997: 
352).17 Second, he claimed that trans individuals were more likely to identify 
with the term ›transidentity‹ (ibid: 352 f.).18 Despite suggesting a change of ter-
minology, Seikowski rarely used the term ›transidentity‹ in his studies. With 
few exceptions,19 he used the term ›transsexuality‹ (Seikowski 2007; idem et 
al. 2008).
Unlike Seikowski, Rauchfleisch used the term ›transidentity‹ consistently 
in his handbook on psychotherapy with trans individuals. Rauchfleisch devel-
oped his preference for ›transidentity‹ in a discussion of the terms ›transsexu-
ality‹ and ›transgender‹. Like Seikowski, he considered the term ›transsexual-
ity‹ confusing. Rauchfleisch argued that identity is the issue and not sexuality 
when dealing with the phenomenon (Rauchfleisch 2006: 21). However, he also 
favoured the term ›transidentity‹ over ›transsexuality‹, because the former sig-
nifies a departure from the pathologising connotation of the latter (ibid: 22 f.).
Rauchfleisch favoured ›transidentity‹ over ›transgender‹ when discussing 
issues that are associated with the medical term ›transsexuality‹. He consid-
ered the term ›transidentity‹ to be more specific than the term ›transgender‹. 
›Transgender‹ constitutes an umbrella term for all individuals who are not 
sufficiently, or not at all described by the gender they were assigned to. Con-
17 | However, ›sex‹ in ›transsexuality‹ does not refer to sexuality but to sexus, the body.
18 | Seikowski referred to the umbrella organisation Transidentitas e. V., which operated 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. However, it is for two reasons hard to quantify 
trans individuals’ preferred self-designations. First, there are no studies to this effect. 
Second, self-definitions and preferred terminology vary historically. The trans movement 
in Germany has changed rapidly over the past decades. The term ›transidentity‹ seems to 
have been rather popular among trans individuals in the mid- to the end of the 1990s as 
e. g. the name of the national lobby organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Transidentität 
und Intersexualität (German Association for Transidentity and Intersexuality; dgti e. V.) 
suggests. See chapter 3.2.2 for the use of terminology in contemporary trans lobby 
organisations.
19 | See e. g. Seikowski et al. 2008: 137.
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sequently, the category ›transgender‹ includes transsexual individuals, trans-
vestites, cross-dressers of all kinds, drag kings and queens, transwomen and 
transmen, whereas the latter are not necessarily identical with transsexual in-
dividuals (ibid: 21 f.).
Unlike Rauchfleisch, Becker, Berner, Dannecker and Richter-Appelt sug-
gested using the term ›transgender‹ in their statement on the reform of the 
Transsexual Act on behalf of the DGfS. Like Seikowski and Rauchfleisch, they 
argued that transsexuality is foremost a gender identity and gender role prob-
lem rather than an issue concerning sexuality (Becker et al 2001: 259). Howev-
er, by arguing that the Transsexual Act should apply to transsexual individuals 
only (ibid), they implicitly suggested that ›transsexuality‹ can be distinguished 
from other trans manifestations.
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit developed further terminological variants with-
out however abandoning the term ›transsexual‹. They defined persons with a 
›transsexual gender identity disorder‹ as individuals who more or less reject 
their birth gender, its physical characteristics and the gender role expectations 
that society links to their sex. They permanently consider themselves as mem-
bers of the other sex and strive to achieve its physical features by resorting to 
medical measures and use legal declarations in order to live and be socially 
accepted in this role (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 365).
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit did not consider every deviation from socially 
sanctioned understandings of gender pathological.20 They considered gendered 
conditions pathological that require massive and irreversible medical and sur-
gical interventions. The latter necessitate the diagnosis of an illness and a sci-
entifically founded indication (ibid: 368). They subsumed transsexuality which 
they understood to be the most severe form of gender identity disorder under 
those gender manifestations they deemed pathological (ibid: 365).
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit distinguished between ›biological men with a 
transsexual gender identity disorder‹ (formerly ›male-to-female transsexuals‹) 
and ›biological women with a transsexual gender identity disorder‹ (formerly 
›female-to-male transsexuals‹) (ibid: 368).21 While any term for a gender start-
20 | Beier, Bosinski and Loewit did not classify individuals as sick who transgress 
conventional gender norms without medical and surgical means. They considered 
transgender, queers and drag kings and queens among the latter (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 
2005: 367). However, these categories cannot at all times be neatly distinguished from 
one another.
21 | Beier, Bosinski and Loewit’s terminology and typology of transsexual individuals is 
based on earlier work by Bosinski. His 1994 study on the classification of gender identity 
disorders in men, i. e. males who identify as women, constituted an initial attempt to 
systematise transsexual individuals according to sexual orientation (Bosinski 1994). 
By 2003, Bosinski had developed a comprehensive model in which he added ›biological 
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ing with the prefix ›trans‹ while leaving cisgenders unmarked suggests an orig-
inal link between a person’s morphology and gender identity, no terminology 
introduced before so vehemently reveals the naturalising effects of the gender 
binary and the express will to police the borders of the hegemonic gender re-
gime than that of Beier, Bosinski and Loewit.22
As the terminology and definitions suggest, sexological perspectives on 
transsexuality varied from understandings as unusual but non-pathological 
to notions of transsexuality as a pathological state of mind. Concepts that de-
pathologised transsexuality were rare throughout the 1990s and the first dec-
ade of the 21st century, and pathologising understandings prevailed.
With his concept of depathologisation, Sigusch wrested transsexuality away 
from the realm of illness. First, he self-critically highlighted the process of ›oth-
ering‹ individuals who deviate from normative understandings of gender and 
sexuality in sexology by revising the cardinal symptoms he and his colleagues 
Meyenburg and Reiche had put forward in 1979 (Sigusch 1991a: 317-327). In-
spired by the characteristics v. Krafft-Ebing attributed to individuals with a 
›contrary sexual feeling‹ in Psychopathia sexualis (1886), Sigusch conceded 
that the cardinal symptoms he and his colleagues had formulated were char-
acterised by medical totalisation and clinical pathologisation (Sigusch 1991a: 
318). In his view, the eleventh cardinal symptom for instance mirrored at least 
as much his situation and defence as the patients’ situation and defence at the 
time (ibid: 319).
Second, he problematised cissexuality and related cissexualism and trans-
sexualism to each other (ibid: 329-335). He argued that masculinity and femi-
ninity required of every person to limit him- or herself either to the one or to 
the other side. He questioned the seemingly self-evident link between a male 
person’s gender identity as a man and a female person’s identity as a woman 
(ibid: 333). Since it is impossible to escape compulsory gendering, transsexual-
ism and cissexualism necessarily are relational categories: 
women with a transsexual gender identity disorder‹, i. e. females who identify as men, to 
his systematic and detailed account of transsexual developments (Bosinski 2003).
22 | From a perspective that considers every gender expression equally valid, Beier, 
Bosinski and Loewit’s terminology is ethically and logically questionable. Calling trans 
individuals ›men‹ or ›women‹ based on their assigned gender is disrespectful, if it is known 
that they do not identify as such. Moreover, while ›woman‹ or ›man‹ signify a gender role 
or gender identity, ›female‹, ›male‹ and ›intersex‹ signify socially generated classifications 
of the human body. The terms ›biological man‹ or ›biological woman‹ do not make sense, 
unless one subscribes to a perpective that a body produces a gender role or identity. 
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The obsessiveness of transsexuals, their ›gender delusion‹ is an individual reflex to 
compulsory social gendering and the collective gender delusion of the normal, which 
continues to be perfectly concealed in most people. The stronger the one, the more rigid 
the other. (Ibid: 334 f.)
While Sigusch’s concept of depathologisation met with resistance in German 
sexology of the 1990s,23 the Swiss psychotherapist Rauchfleisch took up his 
concept again in 2006. Rauchfleisch suggested transidentity ought to be con-
sidered a variant of the (cis) norm (Rauchfleisch 2006: 8). He held that trans-
identity was not linked to any psychiatric disorders. Rather, depressions, ad-
justment disorders, addictions and suicidal crises often occur as reactions to 
the difficult social situations transidentified individuals experience (ibid: 48).
Sigusch and Rauchfleisch’s concepts differ with regard to the motivation, the 
significance that is accrued social discrimination and the social vision. While 
Sigusch admitted that the prospect of no longer having to decide on irreversible 
surgical measures motivated him to develop his concept of depathologisation 
(Sigusch 1991a, 329),24 Rauchfleisch mentioned several reasons for favouring 
a depathologising concept over a pathologising one. One of his reasons was 
pragmatic. Rauchfleisch suggested that it was easier to differentiate between 
primary and reactive disorders in transidentified individuals, if transidentity 
was no longer pathologised (Rauchfleisch 2006: 49). Moreover, transidentified 
individuals cannot be sufficiently considered partners in a therapeutic setting 
as long as they are considered sick (ibid: 50). Second, abandoning a pathologis-
ing concept would also strengthen transidentified individuals’ self-confidence 
23 | Langer e. g. insisted on the »clinical perspective«, in particular since he believed that 
sex reassignment surgery had increasingly become a solution for various »gender identity 
problems« (Langer 1995: 265).
24 | Sigusch argued that sex reassignment surgery was only justified, if transsexual 
individuals were not considered sick and if they were as »free« as possible to decide on 
these interventions (Sigusch 1991a: 329). Augstein commented on Sigusch’s motivation 
that anybody who feels uncomfortable about deciding on sex reassignment surgery should 
leave it (Augstein 1992: 259). 
Lindemann criticised Sigusch’s assessment of a reversal of sex reassignment surger y 
as a »catastrophe«. She suggested that Sigusch feared »gender disorder« (Lindemann 
1992: 267). In her response to the critique of the German Standards, Becker countered 
Lindemann’s undramatic perspective on a »double transsexuality«. Becker argued that 
repeated changes of gender were only possible without surgical measures (Becker 1998: 
162). I suggest that whether a reversal of a physical transition amounts to a catastrophe 
or not depends upon several factors, such as, e. g. a realistic assessment of surgical 
possibilities and/or a person’s ability to integrate the episode in the reassigned sex and 
gender into their own life.
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and self-esteem (ibid: 8). In addition, he argued that the depathologisation of 
transidentity would open up perspectives on gender discourse in the wider so-
ciety (ibid).
While the significance Sigusch accrued to social discrimination in trans 
individuals’ lives is uneven throughout his concept of depathologisation,25 
Rauchfleisch consistently acknowledges forms of social discrimination that 
impinge on transidentified individuals’ lives. He noted that, »[t]he spectrum 
of discrimination and exclusion ranges from titillating comments in private and 
public to non-consideration of applications for flats and workplaces to manifest 
violence« (ibid: 87 f.). Like Sigusch (1991: 235), Rauchfleisch explained the so-
cial discrimination of transidentified individuals with the irritation they cause 
in cis subjects. Based on Lindemann’s elaborations, Rauchfleisch argued that 
transidentical individuals shatter the certainty that there are two (and only 
two) gender categories. Rauchfleisch built upon Hirschauer’s insights when 
he suggested that representatives of norming instances, such as psychologists, 
psychiatrists, endocrinologists, jurists, etc. mobilise normalising strategies. To 
define transidentity as a disorder is one such means of normativity in order to 
protect the normality of the gender binary and to fend off irritation (ibid: 141 f.).
While Sigusch’s social vision ideally allows for a pluralisation of genders 
and sexualities, if social arrangements allowed for more genders than men and 
women (1991a: 335) and provided transsexual individuals were not a »transitory 
minority« (ibid: 329), Rauchfleisch suggested that transidentity poses three 
challenges to society. First, the phenomenon invites radically questioning the 
gender dichotomy and the categorisation of genders. As a result it becomes pos-
sible to accept that there are not only two genders and that there is space for in-
dividual life schemes (Rauchfleisch 2006: 146) Second, transidentity suggests 
that the distinction between sex and gender is questionable. He concluded that 
equality could be achieved, if society was to return to a ›one-sex-model‹ (ibid: 
147 f.).26 Third, transidentity renders visible that sex is socially constructed in 
the sense that the meanings allocated to physical features are socially deter-
mined. Rauchfleisch suggested that transidentity could become a paradigm 
for the recognition of equality (ibid: 148). His insight that gender is socially 
25 | His attitude oddly shifted from a scathing critique of the medicocentric perspective, 
which debases transsexual individuals, to instances when he seemed unaware of effects 
of social discrimination, to discriminatory statements on trans individuals.
26 | Rauchfleisch idealises the one-sex-model. This type of gender regime did not polar-
ise genders to the extent the binary gender system does. Therefore, it tolerated feminine 
men, masculine women, and within limits, hermaphrodites. However, the gender model 
was nonetheless androcentric. The male became the norm of the human, whereas females 
featured as lesser (Laqueur 1992: 10). Hence, the one-gender-model cannot serve as a 
model for gender equality.
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constructed raises the question why he did not enquire into the construction of 
cis instead of using transidentity as a paradigm for the recognition of equality.
Pathologising concepts of transsexuality can be subdivided into two catego-
ries. Representatives of one group considered transsexuality a gender identity 
disorder without psychiatric cocommitants. Proponents of the other category 
insisted that transsexuality was a disorder accompanied by several other psy-
chiatric disorders.
Seikowski suggested that transsexuality was a gender identity disorder 
without cocommitants. Despite considering transsexuality a disorder, he disa-
greed with the classification of transsexuality as a psychiatric condition. While 
Sigusch claimed that, »[t]he crazy thing about transsexualism is that transsexu-
als are not crazy« (Sigusch 1991a: 331), Seikowski, Gollek, Harth and Reinhardt 
delivered evidence for this thesis in an extensive quantitative study. He and his 
colleagues examined 164 transsexual subjects, using the Borderline Personal-
ity Inventory (BPI), the Freiburg Personality Inventory (FPI) and the Question-
naire for the Assessment of One’s Own Body (Fragebogen zur Beurteilung des ei-
genen Körpers; FbeK). The objective of their study was to find out whether there 
was, as several sexologists suggested, an increased incidence of borderline per-
sonality disorders in transsexual individuals (Seikowski et al. 2008: 141).
Major findings of the study were that 88 % of the individuals examined did 
not feature any symptoms associated with a borderline disorder (ibid: 139 f.). 
Moreover, the researchers could not detect any further psychopathological 
symptoms, which sexologists commonly associated with transsexuality (ibid: 
140).
The group of sexologists that claimed that transsexuality was a gender 
identity disorder with additional psychiatric abnormalities was not homoge-
nous. While Pfäfflin, and Clement and Senf agreed with Seikowski that the 
diagnosis of transsexuality did not justify the general assignment to a border-
line disorder,27 they observed several psychiatric cocommitants, such as depres-
sions, suicidality, and a history of drug abuse (Clement/Senf 1996: 5 f.; Pfäfflin 
1996: 29). However, Clement and Senf suggested that in principle the exami-
nation of transsexual individuals did not require any other diagnostic proce-
dure than with other patients (Clement/Senf 1996: 5).
Other sexologists however pathologised transsexuality to an extent that is 
reminiscent of the pathologisation in the 1970s. Langer and Beier, Bosinski 
and Loewit assumed that transsexual individuals were frequently ›abnormal‹ 
in psychopathological terms. In a study consisting of eleven ftm and twenty 
mtf transsexual individuals, Langer classified one third of the probands as 
27 | Pfäfflin suggested that the diagnostic allocation of transsexuality to borderline 
personality disorders impedes therapeutic work (Pfäfflin 1996: 29).
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disturbed (Langer 1995: 271). Similarly, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit described 
transsexual individuals as 
internally torn, subdepressive, emotionally unstable and suicidal. Data on auto-aggres-
sive actions that range from excessive alcohol abuse over self-mutilation (e. g. con-
striction of the breasts or the penis) to suicide, can regularly be found […] in the older 
literature. The social marginalisation these patients experience (also due to their not 
always harmonious appearance in the role of the desired gender) amplifies the dis-
tress. (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 365)
According to Beier, Bosinski and Loewit, cocommitant disorders are unevenly 
distributed among trans individuals. They distinguished between biological 
women with a transsexual gender identity disorder and androphilic and gyno-
philic biological men with a transsexual gender identity disorder. According to 
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit, biological women with a transsexual gender iden-
tity disorder present a whole array of variations, ranging from inconspicuous to 
borderline personalities (ibid: 371). They considered androphilic biological men 
with a gender identity disorder psychopathologically inconspicuous except for 
the odd depression and dependent personality disorder (ibid: 374). By contrast, 
they claimed that gynophilic biological men with a gender identity disorder 
were more apt to display disorders, such as histrionic or antisocial personalities 
and borderline disorders, depressions and suicidal tendencies (ibid: 377).
The vast differences in the understanding on the same group of individuals 
suggest that the classification of transsexuality as a gender variant or a disorder 
with or without cocommitants depended on the sexologists’ subjective concepts 
of masculinity and femininity and the number of genders they considered le-
gitimate.
Clinical pictures from the 1990s to the end of the first decade 
of the 21 st  centur y
While most of the sexologists stated that transsexual subjects express their gen-
der identity very differently, they disagreed over the extent to which transsexual 
subjects wish to undergo surgery and perceivably live according to the gender 
they identify with. Three different clinical observations emerged on the issue of 
surgical interventions. According to some sexologists, transsexual individuals’ 
surgery requirements range from no interventions to extensive measures. Oth-
ers tentatively suggested that the type and extent of surgery correlates with a 
person’s sexual orientation and assigned gender. To other sexologists, surgery 
remained the defining feature of transsexualism.
Clement and Senf e. g. observed that some transsexual individuals do not 
reveal their gender identity publicly. Others wish to be accepted in public and 
private life as the gender they identify with without wanting to undergo hor-
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mone treatment and surgery, whereas some transsexual subjects require one 
particular surgical measure only of a set of several possible surgical interven-
tions (Clement/Senf 1996: 1).28 Similarly, Kockott observed that while several 
transsexual individuals require extensive sex reassignment surgery, there is a 
significant number of individuals that opts for other solutions (Kockott 1996: 
15).29
Becker, Berner, Dannecker and Richter-Appelt suggested that the consist-
ent experience of living and enjoying recognition as a member of the gender 
the respective individual identifies with is crucial to a transsexual person’s psy-
chological stability. Hence, a successful transition does not necessarily include 
surgical measures (Becker et al. 2001: 261). A few years later, Becker summa-
rised this observation succinctly when noting that, while surgery continues to 
be indicated urgently in order to alleviate distress in some transsexual individu-
als, »[o]nly fundamentalists hang onto the ›real‹ (genuine, true) transsexual-
ity that is by definition always linked to the desire for sex-transforming opera-
tions« (Becker 2006: 157 f.).
Sigusch’s statements at the beginning of the 1990s were contradictory. 
While Sigusch observed that transsexualism had changed as a psychiatric and 
social phenomenon,30 he reported in his concept of depathologisation31 that 
in the 1970s, he encountered transsexual individuals living according to their 
concepts of gendered selves without resorting to medical means or frequently 
changed their gender affiliation (Sigusch 1991: 324), suggesting that several 
ways existed of leading a transsexual life.
In his discussion of the issue of whether transsexual individuals were in 
the process of becoming a minority (ibid: 325-329), however, his understand-
28 | Clement and Senf’s observations are congruent with those by Rauchfleisch (2006: 
17).
29 | As early as in 1987, Kockott and Fahrner noted in their follow-up study on transsexual 
individuals without surgery that a highly valued job or the development of a meaningful 
partnership that could only be maintained in the initial gender or with the initial physical 
characteristics were among the reasons for transsexuals not to undergo surgery (Kockott/
Fahrner 1987: 520).
30 | Sigusch observed that transsexualism had changed with regard to diagnostic 
findings (Sigusch 1991a: 322 f.), therapeutic concepts (ibid: 323) and the social and 
psychological situation of transsexual individuals (ibid). 
31 | Sigusch reiterated several of his arguments presented in his initial article on the 
depathologisation of transsexuality in an interview in 1992, a monography in 1995, 
journal articles (1992; 1995a; 1997) and in articles in the sexological reference books he 
published in 1996 and revised in 2001, 2006 and 2007. Sigusch’s concept constituted the 
most extensive and radical published sexological perspective on the depathologisation of 
transsexuality throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century.
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ing of transsexuality took on a totalising ring. Sigusch e. g. argued that unlike 
the gay movement, which he believed had developed beyond narrow issues, 
transsexual individuals were due to their characteristics tied to the law and in 
particular to medical science:
In some ways the dawn of transsexuals is reminiscent of the dawns of homosexuals 90 
to 150 years ago and once more after World War II: low intellectual and political stand-
ards, simple-minded smugness, narrow-mindedness, great redundancy and struggling 
for everything, public coming out, the founding of clubs, members, subscribers, a right 
to speak before jurists and physicians, etc. However while homosexuals soon looked 
beyond their noses, transsexuals are due to their characteristics tied to law and 
especially medicine. (Ibid: 326)32
According to Sigusch, other than with the »collective of homosexuals«, which 
is in his opinion based on mutual sexual attraction, »medical science is the 
bond that renders transsexuals a collective in a historical and an individual 
sense« (ibid: 330).33
Moreover, he argued that the transsexual community did not, unlike the 
protest cultures of the 1960s challenge the gender binary.34 He suggested that 
transvestites and transsexuals were corrupted by the system via the benefit 
32 | Sigusch’s understanding of the gay and trans movements is problematic. First, 
Sigusch’s concept of homosexuality is ahistorical. As Hirschauer points out, social 
phenomena Westphal termed contrary sexuals in 1869 are not the same as present-day 
homosexuals (Hirschauer 1992: 250 f.). Second, Sigusch romanticises the gay movement 
(ibid: 251). 
In the 2007 edition of his sexological reference book, Sigusch no longer maintained the 
ahistorical concept of homosexuality: »At any rate, in some ways the present situation of 
transsexuals reminds me of the people over a hundred years ago who are currently called 
homosexuals« (Sigusch 2007: 354).
33 | Sigusch’s evaluation of trans subcultures is flawed. First, he inappropriately 
distances homosexuality from transsexuality. As Hirschauer points out, the differentiation 
of homosexuality from sodomy did not occur without reliance on and resistance to, medical 
science (Hirschauer 1992: 251). Moreover, with a similarly distancing gesture Sigusch 
suggests that transsexuality is a historical construction, while he features homosexuality 
as a pre-social, essentialist phenomenon (Lindemann 1992: 262). Furthermore, Augstein 
and Hirschauer suggest that rather than the awkward juxtaposition of medical science 
and desire, social discrimination (Augstein 1992: 257; Hirschauer 1992: 251) as well 
as the creation of spaces for developing gay and trans lifestyles (Hirschauer 1992: 251) 
constitute unifying elements in both minoritised populations.
34 | According to Hirschauer, Sigusch overestimated the challenge protest movements of 
the 1960s posed to the gender binary (Hirschauer 1992: 250).
Negotiating the Borders of the Gender Regime 172
of a law and of health insurances, tv and treatment programmes (ibid: 328).35 
Hence, transvestites and transsexuals are unable to articulate the growing un-
ease with gender publicly in this culture. Instead, they succumb to the tyranny 
of the gender binary, »because they are addicted to normality and unable to 
ascend from gender dysphoria to gender relaxation« (ibid: 328 f.):36
If they owned up to their transgression as a transgression, i. e., to their femininity with 
a male body and their masculinity with a female body, they would transition from the 
›dignity of a psychiatric-surgical entity of disease‹ to the ›dignity of a social minority‹. 
This would be contranomic, the height of a provocation in a society that does not grant 
an institutional space for a change of gender and gender crossings beyond clinics and 
chambers, in a society that despite all weakening of gender roles ranging from the social 
division of labour to the legal system leaves no doubt about which gender is the sexus 
sequior. (Ibid)37
In his sexological reference book referred to earlier on, Sigusch did not repeat 
his depreciative and homogenising statements on trans individuals and the 
trans movement. Instead, he noted that transsexual individuals manifest a 
wide range of very different identities, roles and lifestyles (Sigusch 2007: 347). 
He also implicitly repealed his former equation of transsexuality with surgical 
measures in his critique of the German Standards (ibid).
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit tentatively suggested that the need for surgery 
correlates with the assigned sex/gender and sexual orientation. While they 
cautioned that their typology did not apply to every single case, their attempt 
to systematise transsexual individuals led to more homogenous clinical pic-
tures compared to those of the aforementioned sexologists. Beier, Bosinski and 
35 | As Augstein pointed out, Sigusch conflated transsexualism with transvestism. 
Especially in the context of the Transsexual Act and medicine, it is misleading not to 
differentiate between transvestites and transsexual individuals, since there are neither 
legal nor medical provisions that transvestites might benefit from (Augstein 1992: 256). 
36 | Sigusch’s assumptions on transsexual subjects who undergo surgery and on social 
change are problematic for several reasons. With regard to the former, Sigusch defamed 
all trans individuals who opt for surgical measures (Augstein 1992: 257; Lindemann 
1992: 265). This devaluation is also inappropriate considering that in particular sexology, 
the media and the law produced the image that genital surgery stands for the social 
treatment as a man or woman (Hirschauer 1992: 248). Sigusch’s concept of social change 
is debatable, since he adhered to an emancipatory policy model, which places the onus 
for social change on trans individuals (Lindemann 1992: 268).
37 | It remains unclear why Sigusch mentioned transvestites in this context, since 
they ›own up‹ to their femininity in a male body and their masculinity in a female body 
(Augstein 1992: 256).
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Loewit e. g. claimed that biological women with a gender identity disorder pro-
foundly reject their secondary sex characteristics (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 
369 f.). They prioritise mastectomies over the construction of phalloplasties 
(ibid: 370 f.). According to their observations, gynophilic biological men with 
a gender identity disorder most urgently wish to have large breasts and tend 
to be ambivalent with regard to their genitalia (ibid: 376), while androphilic 
biological men with a gender identity disorder preferably opt for a neovagina 
(ibid: 374).
The German Standards mirror the most homogenising clinical picture of 
transsexual individuals with regard to gendered self-concepts and attitudes 
towards surgery. According to the Standards, transsexual individuals wish to 
resemble the physical appearance of the gender they identify with as much 
as possible through hormonal and surgical measures and to live socially and 
legally recognised in the desired gender role (Becker et al. 1997: 147).
Most sexologists agreed that transsexual developments vary. While some 
sexologists pointed out to individual variations in general (e. g. Sigusch 2007; 
Clement/Senf 1996; Rauchfleisch 2006), others believed it was possible to sys-
tematise them (e. g. Bosinski 2003; Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005).
Clement, Senf and Rauchfleisch observed that while some transsexual de-
velopments begin at such an early age with the effect that the respective trans 
individuals feel they have always been transsexual, other developments mani-
fest as late as from the thirties onward (Clement/Senf 1996: 1; Rauchfleisch 
2006: 16). Clement and Senf suggested that transsexual individuals frequently 
experience uneasiness with their morphology in childhood. The difficulties in-
crease in puberty when physical features associated with a particular gender 
emerge or become more prominent (Clement/Senf 1996: 1 f.).
Clement, Senf and Rauchfleisch agreed that the terms ›primary‹ and ›sec-
ondary‹ transsexuality simply attest to the time of manifestation (ibid; Rauch-
fleisch 2006: 16). They do not require different treatment and cannot be dis-
tinguished aetiologically (Sigusch 2007: 354). Similarly, the authors of the 
German Standards suggested that a persistent transsexual desire »is the result 
of sequential factors that have an impact in various episodes of the psycho-
sexual development and possibly become effective cumulatively. Accordingly, 
»different developmental paths can lead to the development of a transsexual 
desire« (Becker et al. 1997: 147).
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit suggested that transsexual developments can be 
typified along the lines of gender and sexual orientation. Beier, Bosinski and 
Loewit e. g. claimed that biological women with a gender identity disorder usu-
ally present in the physician’s office in the twenties to the mid-thirties (Beier/
Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 369). They have a childhood history of tomboy behav-
iour, experienced their puberties as traumatic and profoundly reject their sec-
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ondary sex characteristics (ibid: 369 f.). They appear as masculine as possible 
with regard to clothing and hairstyle (ibid: 370).
According to their observations, androphilic biological men with a gender 
identity disorder are usually in the mid-twenties as opposed to gynophilic biologi-
cal men with a gender identity disorder who tend to be ten to fifteen years older 
when they first present in a physician’s office (ibid: 372). Unlike the latter, so-
called androphilic biological men with a gender identity disorder cross-dress and 
engage in activities conventionally associated with female children (ibid: 373 f.). 
While gynophilic biological men with a gender identity disorder develop trans-
vestic fetishism during their puberties (ibid: 374), androphilic biological men 
with a gender identity disorder envision themselves as heterosexual women who 
desire cismen and cross-dress as a means to express their femininity (ibid: 373).
Sexologists observed that unlike clinical and theoretical descriptions in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, transsexual developments appeared to be more di-
verse. Sigusch and Langer observed that transsexual individuals seeking sex 
reassignment surgery in the 1990s were on average clearly younger than a few 
decades ago. Moreover, the sex ratio of female-to-male transsexuals and male-
to-female transsexuals had become more even (Sigusch 1991a: 321; Langer 1995: 
265). Furthermore, the choice of sex partners was no longer consistently hetero-
sexual (Sigusch 1991a: 323; Langer 1995: 265) and female-to-male transsexuals 
appeared less aggressive and more driven by sexual desires (Sigusch 1991a: 322).
However, the abovementioned sexologists explained these changes differ-
ently. Sigusch did not rule out that so-called experts were maybe only now able 
to observe things that existed before or that transsexual individuals were only 
at this point able to disclose more information to medical professionals, be-
cause the latter no longer reacted as rigidly as they did earlier on. However, he 
attributed the changes foremost to changed gender relations (Sigusch 1991a: 
320). Langer however suggested that gender identity disorders were sympto-
matic variants of contemporary »frequent structural deficits of personality« for 
which a »sex change is a propagated solution« (Langer 1995: 263).
Since the beginning of the 1990s, most sexologists considered transsexual 
individuals sexual beings. Sigusch stated that unlike in earlier clinical descrip-
tions, sexologists no longer ruled out that transsexual individuals could be 
sexual (Sigusch 2007: 353 f.; Sigusch 1991a: 322).38 The German Standards e. g. 
38 | Sigusch argued that transsexual individuals’ gender identities are no longer as 
fragmentary as they used to be. He suggested that a structured sexuality is impossible 
without a gender identity. Morever, collective notions of genders changed to the effect 
that women are nowadays constructed as sexual beings (Sigusch 2007: 353 f.).
However, his argumentation is not convincing. His, Meyenburg and Reiche’s argumentation 
in the late 1970s was premised on psychoanalytic assumptions that suggest that 
transsexual individuals are not likely to develop much of a sexuality due to very early 
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implicitly affirmed that transsexual individuals could relate to sexuality, since 
the psychosexual development, including the sexual orientation constituted 
part of the diagnostics (Becker et al. 1997: 149).
This notion was reinforced by Bosinski (2003: 713 f.) and Beier, Bosinski and 
Loewit (2005: 372-375) who systematised transsexual individuals according to 
their respective sexual orientations. While Sigusch did not elaborate on trans-
sexual individuals’ sexual involvement, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit assumed 
that pre-operative transsexual individuals’ erotic lives were usually dissatisfy-
ing. With regard to biological women with a transsexual gender identity disor-
der, they e. g. suggested that, »[o]ccasional attempts to act out this gynophilic 
orientation in a lesbian setting remain dissatisfying, since the patients (unlike 
lesbian women) cannot pleasurably bring in their physicality in such relation-
ships« (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 371).
While sexologists more or less considered transsexual individuals to be het-
erosexual in the 1970s and 1980s, clinical pictures from the 1990s onward with 
few exceptions39 suggested that transsexual individuals’ sexual orientations are 
more diverse. Sigusch stated in his concept of depathologisation that gender 
roles and sexual preferences vary in transsexual individuals as they do in cis 
subjects (Sigusch 1991a: 322).
Bosinski distinguished between biological women with a transsexual 
gender identity disorder, which he believed were predominantly heterosexual 
(Bosinski 2003: 713) and biological men with a transsexual gender identity dis-
order who feature as either androphilic or gynophilic (ibid: 713 f.). While Beier, 
Bosinski and Loewit adopted Bosinski’s model, they added autogynophilic sub-
jects to the group mentioned last (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 376).
Differential diagnoses from the 1990s to the end 
of the first decade of the 21 st  centur y
The pluralisation of transsexual phenomena (or the recognition of the diversity) 
suggests that the borders of transsexuality had become fuzzy throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s. This situation complicated the differential diagnosis 
on a practical and theoretical level. Several sexologists problematised this issue, 
splitting mechanisms and a lack of psychic maturity that is assumed to be a precondition 
to the genital orgasmic function (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 270).  
I suggest that it was not that transsexual individuals were necessarily asexual. Rather, it 
was due to a limited approach that transsexual individuals engaging in sexual activities 
were rendered unthinkable.
39 | As late as in 1995 Soyka and Nedopil parroted Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche’s 
cardinal symptoms, including the eighth symptom, which describes transsexual individu-
als as heterosexual (Soyka/Nedopil 1995: 46), despite the fact that from 1991 onward 
Sigusch published revisions of the cardinal symptoms in several medical journals.
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and they nevertheless developed various systems to distinguish transsexuality 
from similar, if not partially overlapping, phenomena.
While Clement and Senf addressed the practical side of the problem, Si-
gusch pointed out to a theoretical dilemma that arises in the event of having to 
isolate transsexuality from other phenomena. Clement and Senf suggested that 
while e. g. fetishist transvestism40 was distinguishable from transsexuality, epi-
sodes of transvestism did not necessarily rule out a transsexual development: 
The categorically unambiguous distinction cannot […] always be met with in every sin-
gle diagnostic case. Transsexuals do not rarely report earlier transvestic phases in the 
course of their transsexual development. Also, there are occasional reports of transves-
tites who picture themselves as women with whom they are having sex in masturbation 
fantasies. (Clement/Senf 1996: 4)
While Sigusch insisted on a differential diagnosis when establishing a case of 
transsexuality, he cautioned that such a procedure necessarily ignored combi-
nations »which cannot be simply considered transitions from one big and clear 
form to another« (Sigusch 1991a: 317). According to Sigusch, the infinite multi-
plicity of sexual and gender identities is reduced in order to fit into general and 
clinical understandings (ibid).
Sexologists considered different gender manifestations that could be mis-
taken for transsexuality. With the exception of so-called gender identity disor-
ders, which arise as an effect of intersex or in the event that an intersex individ-
ual feels that s/he has been socially and surgically falsely assigned to another 
gender at an early age, Clement and Senf’s categories resembled those of the 
1970s and 1980s. Clement and Senf distinguished transsexuality from fetishist 
transvestism, effeminate behaviour in some homosexual men and gender iden-
tity disorders in the course of a psychosis. Unlike the differential diagnoses in 
the earlier period, however, neither transvestism, nor psychotic developments 
or intersex necessarily excluded a diagnosis of transsexuality (Clement/Senf 
1996: 4 f.).
Unlike the APA, the authors of the German Standards did not mention any 
somatic phenomena, such as intersex as diagnostic categories that needed to be 
distinguished from transsexuality. The German Standards suggest the follow-
ing differential diagnoses:
40 | Clement and Senf defined fetishist transvestism as an inclination to cross-dress for 
the purpose of sexual arousal. This behaviour is not linked to a consciousness of belonging 
to, or a desire to belong to the ›other‹ gender. The clothing is not a means to express the 
individual’s identity, as it would be in the case of transsexuality. Instead, it is a fetishistic 
object. In other words, clothing is an object to a transvestite, while it is a part of oneself to 
a transsexual (Clement/Senf 1996: 4).
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– discomfort, difficulties or non-conformity with established gender role expectations 
that do not coincide with a lasting and profound gender identity disorder;
– partial or fleeting gender identity disorders, such as adolescent crises;
– transvestism and fetishist transvestism in the course of which critical constitutions can 
arise;
– difficulties with the gender identity that result from a rejection of a homosexual orienta-
tion;
– a psychotic misjudgement of the gender identity;
– severe personality disorders with an effect on the gender identity (Becker et al. 1997: 
149).41
In his critique of the German Standards, Seikowski suggested cisidentity be 
added to the differential diagnosis. Seikowski defined cisidentified individuals 
as persons who wish to live as ›both‹ genders and who may want to undergo 
hormonal treatment but not sex reassignment surgery (Seikowski 1997: 352). 
In her response to the critique of the German Standards, Becker rejected Sei-
kowski’s suggestion. In her opinion, such a differential diagnosis was clinically 
not useful (Becker 1998: 159 f.).
Sigusch suggested a set of psychiatric, psychological and somatic condi-
tions as differential diagnoses. The former are identical with those listed in the 
German Standards. However, Sigusch added »psychopathologically rather in-
conspicuous ›cultural‹ confusions and transgressions of gender roles, e. g. with 
a transgender gender dysphoria« (Sigusch 2007: 354) to the developments that 
needed to be distinguished from transsexuality or that could possibly develop 
into transsexuality. Sigusch suggested organic ›conditions‹ such as intersex or 
temporal lobe diseases as somatic differential diagnoses (ibid).
Hence, the blurring of the boundaries of transsexuality revealed in the clin-
ical pictures resounded in the differential diagnosis. Not only did differential 
diagnostic concepts become more diverse. In the period between the 1990s and 
the end of the first decade of 21st century, the differential diagnosis increasingly 
allowed phenomena to overlap, such as e. g. transvestism and transsexuality.
41 | Bosinski’s (2003: 716) and Beier, Bosinski and Loewit’s (2005: 381-383) differential 
diagnoses are identical, except that they pull together psychotic misjudgement of the 
gender identity and severe personality disorders with an effect on the gender identity. 
Unlike the German Standards, which did not elaborate on the treatment of trans 
adolescents, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit rejected sex reassigning measures in adolescents 
and suggested using reversible puberty suppressants instead in the event of a severe 
gender identity disorder that does not cease despite psychiatric-psychopharmaceutic 
and psychotherapeutic interventions (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 382).
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3.1.3 Diagnosing transsexualit y and assessing 
 transsexual individuals
During the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, medical surveillance 
and (exclusive) medical expertise was not only challenged by trans individu-
als and/or social scientists and legal experts42 involved in the sexological de-
bate, but by individual sexologists themselves,43 albeit to a significantly lesser 
degree. Various aspects of the tension between trans self-determination and 
medical control and contestations over medical and extra-medical expertise in 
the sexological debate throughout the 1990s and early 2000s are mirrored in 
the diagnostic parameters patient history, psychopathological and physical ex-
amination, psychotherapy and ›real life test‹, which have formally remained 
unchanged since the introduction of the German Standards in 1997.
General perspectives on trans self-determination, 
medical sur veillance and psycho-medical expertise
Two major perspectives marked the sexological debate on diagnosing trans-
sexuality in the 1990s and early 2000s. One strand of the debate, usually rep-
resented by psycho-medical professionals, claimed that establishing a case of 
transsexuality necessarily required medical attendance, whereas the other, 
mostly cis and trans social scientists and legal experts, leaned towards trans 
self-determination.44
Defenders of the psychiatric or psychological surveillance of a transition 
presented several arguments to legitimate their claim. Langer (1995: 265) and 
Bosinski (2003: 715 f.) argued that the desire for a transition could function as a 
model solution for various problems with a person’s identity or gender identity. 
Therefore, the severity of the desire for sex reassignment and the self-diagnosis 
alone were not reliable indicators for diagnosing transsexuality.
Moreover, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit suggested that it was a contradiction 
to on the one hand expect of physicians not to intervene into aspects related 
to the identity and on the other hand to demand of them significant and irre-
versible medical and/or surgical interventions. They argued that such interven-
42 | With regard to the debate on the German Standards in the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 21st century, these are Augstein, Hirschauer, Lindemann, Kaltenmark, 
Kasimir, Rauner and de Silva.
43 | The most prominent voices from the medical and psychological communities on 
diagnosing and assessing trans individuals in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st 
century were Langer, Hartmann, Becker, Beier, Bosinski, Clement, Eicher, Hartmann, 
Kockott, Langer, Pfäfflin, Rauchfleisch, Senf, Seikowski and Sigusch.
44 | However, the contributions of the latter barely influenced the clinical perspective at 
the time.
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tions required a high degree of responsibility, the diagnosis of a disease and a 
scientifically based medical indication (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 378).
Sexologists that followed this line of argument also brought forward prag-
matic reasons. Bosinski advised physicians to adhere to the diagnostic route 
outlined in the German Standards in order to avoid adverse legal consequenc-
es. He argued that in the case a patient regretted surgery and sued the surgeon, 
the latter would be held responsible in the event of insufficiently indicated sex 
reassignment surgery.
Finally, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit proposed that if a ›transsexual gender 
identity disorder‹ was no longer considered a disease and a person’s freely cho-
sen and self-determined expression of self instead, there was no reason for the 
community of individuals covered by health insurances to pay for sex reassign-
ment surgery. As a result, trans individuals would be asked to pay for such 
interventions, an outcome Beier, Bosinski and Loewit considered undesirable 
(Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 368).
Proponents of the concept of self-determination argued that any decision 
on behalf of a person’s life contravenes a person’s right to self-determination 
and human dignity. Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner (1998: 266), Lindemann 
(1997: 329), and Hirschauer (1997: 337) suggested respecting a person’s deci-
sion to transition from one gender to another as a life decision.
In contrast to Beier, Bosinski and Loewit’s opinion and referring to abor-
tion, Hirschauer (1997: 337) and Lindemann (1997: 329) doubted that major 
and irreversible medical and surgical interventions necessarily required the 
status of a disease. They argued that individuals who seek abortions do not ask 
for a medical intervention based on a disease but due to a personal decision.45 
They suggested treating transsexual individuals analogously.
In addition, de Silva questioned whether it was in the light of human dig-
nity and the right to the free development of one’s personality appropriate for 
any person to assess another individuals’ gendered concept of self (de Silva 
2005: 269). He suggested placing the responsibility for the decision to live in 
another gender than the one assigned to the person at the time of birth on the 
trans individual.
Three distinct perspectives emerged among psycho-medical practitioners 
on the question of the subjects deemed appropriate to decide upon whether an 
individual may be considered transsexual or not. One perspective suggested 
psycho-medical expertise ought to be considered authoritative. Another pro-
45 | Becker countered Hirschauer’s and Lindemann’s analogy of sex reassignment 
surgery and abortion. She argued that an abortion did not preclude future pregnancies. If 
an abortion was possible as sterilisation only, she assumed that sexology would be more 
cautious (Becker 1998: 161).
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posed trans and psycho-medical expertise be deemed equal when diagnosing 
transsexuality. Other practitioners were ambivalent about this issue.
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit argued in favour of psycho-medical practition-
ers as the only agents entitled to decide on a case of transsexuality in the last in-
stance. As pointed out earlier on, they took it for granted that largely irreversible 
consequences of a medical and surgical sex reassignment treatment require a 
secured indication. Moreover, they held that only a psycho-medical expert was 
able to decide whether a person’s distress could be permanently alleviated with 
medical and surgical means (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 377). Hence, Beier, 
Bosinski and Loewit considered trans individual’s urge to transition physically 
secondary.
Seikowski however suggested that transsexual individuals are »unusual pa-
tients«. In his critique of the German Standards, he argued that transsexual 
individuals are specialists on issues regarding transsexuality (Seikowski 1997: 
351). According to his observations, trans individuals frequently turn to medical 
institutions after having gone through an adequate process of self-recognition 
or self-diagnosis. Hence, a transsexual individual’s self-diagnosis and catego-
ries of assessment ought to be accrued equal authority and credibility (ibid). To 
impose a lengthy process of consultation upon such individuals would simply 
mean to postpone life in the preferred gender (ibid: 352).
Sigusch’s perspective mirrors the conflicts that arise when wanting to ac-
knowledge a person’s right to self-determination while feeling the need to obey 
clinical rules at the same time. He noted,
I always ask myself how I would deal with such situations, if I were affected myself or 
persons who are closest to me. If I were transsexual, I would with or without consultation 
insist on the right to decide by myself whether I want to undergo surgery or not. I would 
not accept that so-called experts determine how I am supposed to live. As an expert 
however I got to insist vis-à-vis the transsexual on being able to follow my own profes-
sional and non-professional ideas, ideas that refer to all the world and his brother and 
the ar t of healing and to clinical experience and rules, too, that I imposed upon myself 
in order not to without fur ther reflection serve irrational patient desires with disastrous 
consequences of irreversible manifestation. (Sigusch 1991a: 330)
Hence, Sigusch’s perspective was biased towards clinical authority due to his 
position as a medical practitioner. In contrast to Beier, Bosinski and Loewit 
however, he problematised the contradictions and the ethical dilemma that go 
along with such a stance.46
46 | The different perspectives on the issue of expertise are revealed in the assessment 
of support groups, too. Pfäfflin and Eicher perceived of trans support groups as extra-
medical contestations of psycho-medical expertise. According to Pfäfflin, members of 
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Patient histor y
Among the key aspects that are at issue in the course of establishing the patient 
history are, as the German Standards propose, the person’s gender identity de-
velopment, psychosexual development, including the sexual orientation, and 
the current life situation (Becker et al. 1997: 149). Hence, the trans person’s 
past and present gender performance are at the heart of the negotiations be-
tween the medical professional and the so-called patient. However, medical 
examiners dealt, and continue to deal, very differently with the findings.
While Clement and Senf for instance stressed the importance of the exam-
iner’s impression of a trans person’s current gender performance, they cau-
tioned against evaluating it. According to Clement and Senf, neither a gen-
der-neutral appearance nor a patient’s overcompensated gender performance 
indicate whether a person is trans. Clement and Senf concluded that the exam-
iner’s impression is not a diagnostic criterion. It may however give an idea of 
whether the patient will encounter difficulties in his or her social and profes-
sional life or not (Clement/Senf 1996: 16 f.).
When investigating into a trans person’s gender development, Langer tried 
to detect the »subjective experience of the gender identity disorder as well as 
objective aspects of behaviour in the desired role« (Langer 1995: 272). Beier, 
Bosinski and Loewit were more explicit about the indicators they perceived to 
be gender-typical behaviour. Among these were e. g. favourite childhood games 
and toys, cross-dressing, and favourite subjects in school (Beier/Bosinski/Loe-
wit 2005: 379). Likewise, Langer and Hartmann sought indicators in order to 
assess a patient’s transsexual development. They e. g. suggested to enquire into 
the patient’s childhood preferred games and playmates and his or her social 
behaviour in school (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 866).
support groups were primarily concerned about the knowledge on psychiatric experts 
(Pfäfflin 1996: 26 f.) they shared among each other and instances of self-medication 
(Pfäfflin 1996a: 35; Eicher 1996: 49). By contrast, Seikowski highlighted the enabling 
effects support groups, subcultural networks and publications have in the process of self-
diagnosis (Seikowski 2007: 250 f.). While Rauchfleisch, like Sigusch, insisted on psycho-
medical diagnostics in the event of transsexualism, he acknowledged the significance 
support groups have for the acceptance of trans individuals and the exchange of 
knowledge and experience (Rauchfleisch 2006: 89). Unlike Seikowski, he also developed 
a critical perspective on support groups when pointing out to the pressure they exert on 
trans individuals to conform to mainstream notions of trans (ibid: 90). In his chapter, 
»What can transidentified people do themselves?« (Was können transidente Menschen 
selbst tun?) he presents as his recommendations tasks support groups have taken on 
since the 1970s at the very latest, such as, offering information and consultation for trans 
individuals and physicians (ibid: 122).
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Moreover, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit as well as Langer and Hartmann sug-
gested painstakingly investigating into a trans person’s intimate life. Their pro-
posed patient histories e. g. explore the individual’s masturbation scenarios and 
fantasies (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 379; Langer/Hartmann 1997: 866), fa-
vourite sexual positions and practices (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 379) and 
sexual orientation (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 866).
Finally, Langer and Hartmann suggested inquiring into the family history 
with a particular emphasis on psychiatric symptoms, delinquency, depres-
sions, attempts at suicide and self-mutilation. They argued that this informa-
tion was relevant in order to understand the effects these incidences had on the 
individual’s development (ibid).
Langer’s, Langer and Hartmann’s, and Beier, Bosinski and Loewit’s ap-
proach to the trans patient and his or her patient history are problematic from 
an ethical and analytical point of view. With regard to the latter, neither Beier, 
Bosinski and Loewit (2005) nor Langer and Hartmann (1997) questioned the 
gender norms and stereotypes that informed their perspective. Moreover, their 
exploration of a trans person’s sex life suggests that sexual practices, positions 
and fantasies indicate a particular gender identity. A trans person’s intimate 
life seen through the lense of normative and reductionist concepts of gender 
and sexuality become criteria for granting or denying trans individuals access 
to medical and/or surgical treatment and/or legal provisions.
Moreover, the sexologists’ gender concepts and ethics clash in a setting 
characterised by an unequal distribution of power. This particular diagnostic 
situation is prone to render psycho-medical experts’ subjective understandings 
of gender and sexuality authoritative.47 While Langer appeared to be aware of 
47 | Langer and Hartmann’s stance on the medical assessment for a revision of gender 
status serves as an example of the hierarchical relationship and with that the trans 
person’s dependence on what medical experts deem a healthy gender identity and an 
appropriate gender performance. Langer and Hartmann argued that a medical assessment 
for the purpose of a revision of gender status should not be taken lightly, despite the 
fact that sex reassignment surgery and the change of first names might have taken place 
(Langer/Hartmann 1997: 868). They stressed that the medical assessment should state 
whether a change of gender has taken place convincingly or at least satisfactorily in a 
psychosocial sense (ibid). Langer and Hartmann did not mention what was supposed to 
happen in the event that a person had undergone a physical transition and did not appear 
psychosocially convincing to a medical expert. 
The normative ef fect of the examiners’ subjective concepts of gender and sexuality also 
becomes evident in Langer and Hartmann’s example case studies. First, they called 
male-to-female trans individuals ›men‹ and female-to-male subjects ›women‹, which 
apart from being disrespectful, suggests that a person’s gender identity is necessarily 
linked to a particular morphology. Second, their examples also suggest that a person’s 
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this problem, his suggestion that the medical expert reflect upon his or her 
understanding of gender when assessing the psychic and physical chances of 
a trans person’s life in the desired gender (Langer 1995: 272) remains entirely 
voluntary. There is no mode of fostering or supervising the psycho-medical ex-
pert’s degree of self-reflexivity and gender knowledge. Nor do any of the sexolo-
gists mentioned above give a plausible reason why a medical examiner’s assess-
ment of a trans person’s gender performance or experience as a trans person is 
less prone to misjudgement and with that superior to that of a trans individual’s 
concept of self.
In a setting characterised by unequal power relations and possibly conflict-
ing concepts of gender, the examiner’s concept of gender becomes the trans 
person’s obstacle that needs to be overcome in order to gain access to medical 
and surgical treatment and to legal provisions during the assessment process 
prior to a change of first names and revision of gender status. Hence, Linde-
mann’s critique of the German Standards, which in her opinion deny trans 
individuals their respective subjectivities acutely applies in this particular step 
of the diagnostic process. With regard to the investigation into the trans per-
son’s intimate life, conducting the patient history according to Beier, Bosinski 
and Loewit’s, and Langer and Hartmann’s concept denies a trans person the 
right to privacy.
willingness to submit to the psycho-medical assessment regime is among the criteria 
that contribute to a favourable outcome. Their following descriptions in note form back up 
this assumption: »33-year-old man whose change of first names could not be approved 
despite extremely large doses of hormones (without any therapeutical monitoring) and 
despite benevolent statements by individuals the person is attached to. Information on 
the amnesis with unproblematic male professional life and without perceivable distress 
due to the identity considerably contradictory. Laboured short-run stereotyped ideas and 
travesty-like appearance. […] Diagnostic criteria for transsexuality not fulfilled« (Langer/
Hartmann 1997: 864) and »31-year-old natural scientist with a PhD and high achievement 
motivation. Ideal psychiatric supervision. In its setting simultaneous application and 
commencement of the hormone treatment. Complicated development from insecure 
boyishness. Postpuberal pure fetishism, experienced as deeply foreign to him, embedded 
in a strong sexual appetence and masochistically tinted autoeroticism. Later on diffusion 
of gynophilic orientation and cross-gender identification. Four relationships with women 
with a transvestic-penetration-ambivalent sexual style and gradual development of 
crossdressing. Finally self-critically completed stable change of gender. Overall a 
transformation of a paraphilic into a transsexual state with an apparently bisexual 
orientation.« (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 863)
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Physical examination
Sexologists were, and continue to be divided over the necessity and extent of 
physical examinations as a diagnostic means in the course of the assessment 
process. Three perspectives emerged in the period from the 1990s until the 
end of the first decade of the 21st century. Some sexologists demanded an ex-
tensive set of physical examinations. Others developed a differential perspec-
tive on the relevance of, and degree to which a physical examination should be 
undertaken. Others again questioned the diagnostic value of physical examina-
tions for diagnosing transsexuality.
The authors of the German Standards, Langer and Hartmann, and Beier, 
Bosinski and Loewit considered extensive physical examinations mandatory for 
a diagnosis of transsexuality. The German Standards and Beier, Bosinski and 
Loewit specify that the diagnostic and assessment processes require a gynaeco-
logical or urological examination, respectively, and data on the endocrinologi-
cal status (Becker et al. 1997: 149; Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 380).
While the German Standards do not offer a reason for these requirements, 
Langer and Hartmann as well as Beier, Bosinski and Loewit presented a num-
ber of arguments to justify somatic examinations. Langer and Hartmann for 
instance held that a physical examination is self-evident, because »[a] person 
has become transsexual with his body« (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 867). The fact 
that a person develops a gender identity that does not correspond with the so-
cially expected identity does not however explain the requirement for a physical 
examination.
Moreover, Langer and Hartmann claimed that requiring a trans individual 
to disrobe serves diagnostic purposes, since the individual’s attempt e. g. to 
conceal his or her genitalia indicates the extent of bodily aversion (ibid). Clem-
ent and Senf however indicated that the desire to cover up one’s genitalia is not 
necessarily a feature that characterises transsexual individuals alone (Clement/
Senf 1996: 6).48
Langer and Hartmann furthermore suggested that an inspection of the 
genitalia »protects« transsexual individuals »from lack of knowledge of his or 
her genital status« (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 867). It is questionable whether 
this information is required, since transsexual individuals are no less aware 
of their respective genitalia than cis persons are, of whom usually no physical 
examination is demanded to confirm their gender status.
48 | In the light of the reasons mentioned above, it appears that Langer and Hartmann lack 
ethics, and gender and cultural competency. Quoting the trans organisation TransMann 
e. V., Becker holds that physical examinations during the assessment process are abusive 
and »cannot be justified by any means« (Becker 2013: 19).
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Moreover, they argued that somatic parameters serve as a supplement to 
the patient history (ibid). This requirement however is merely bureaucratic and 
therefore neither contributes to the diagnosis nor to the trans individual’s health.
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit demanded an endocrinological examination in 
order to exclude CAH, one of many forms of intersex (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 
2005: 380). Unlike the DSM-IV, the German Standards to which Beier, Bosin-
ski and Loewit otherwise doggedly adhered to do not exclude intersex from a 
diagnosis of transsexuality.
In addition, Langer and Hartmann, and Beier, Bosinski and Loewit sug-
gested that a somatic examination reveals physical preconditions for sex reas-
signment and the effects of hormones (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 867; Beier/
Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 380). Clement and Senf argued that requiring trans-
sexual individuals to undress for this purpose was unnecessary (Clement/Senf 
1996: 6). Moreover, individual bodies respond to sex hormones at a different 
pace. Therefore, any finding would be inconclusive with regard to either a per-
son’s post-pubertal appearance or the person’s identity.
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit argued that a physical inspection helps establish 
signs of self-mutilation (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 380). Self-harm however 
does not apply to all transsexual individuals and is not restricted to transsexual 
persons either.
They also required of ›biological women‹ an ultrasound of the gonads to 
exclude polycystic ovaries (ibid). Like intersex, polycystic ovaries are not a coun-
ter indication to transsexuality. Moreover, Langer and Hartmann argued that a 
physical examination might give hints at the risks of sex reassignment surgery 
(Langer/Hartmann 1997: 867).
Proponents of a differentiated perspective on the necessity of physical ex-
aminations disagreed with the diagnostic value the aforementioned sexologists 
accrued to physical examinations. While Clement and Senf ascertained that 
somatic examinations may serve individuals’ general health, they held that 
they are irrelevant to the diagnosis of transsexuality (Clement/Senf 1996: 6). 
Unlike the German Standards, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit, and Langer and 
Hartmann, they proposed inspecting a trans person carefully, i. e. without de-
manding of the individual to undress (ibid).
Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner vehemently opposed mandatory physi-
cal examinations of any sort for the purpose of diagnosing transsexuality and 
assessing a trans individual. Like Clement and Senf (1996), they questioned 
the relevance of such measures. They held that a somatic examination is only 
justified in a surgical context. They argued in favour of banning an examina-
tion of the genital status from the assessment situation and suggested leaving 
it up to trans individuals to undergo physical examinations or not (Kaltenmark/
Kasimir/Rauner 1998: 148).
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When considering the criteria according to which the German Standards 
identify transsexuality, there is no causal relationship between the features 
associated with transsexuality and the requirement for physical examina-
tions. The German Standards hold that transsexuality is characterised by a pro-
found and permanent cross-gender identification, a long-standing unease with 
a person’s sex and a clinically relevant impairment in e. g. the areas of work and 
social life (Becker et al. 1997: 148). Hence, the criteria refer to a person’s self-
understanding and cannot be derived from physical parameters.
The same applies to formal criteria medical professionals are asked to as-
sess prior to the legal change of first names and gender status. According to 
s. 1(1)1 TSG, the court is required to change a person’s first names, if the ap-
plicant due to his or her »transsexual imprinting« no longer identifies with 
the gender specified in his or her birth entry but to the ›other‹ gender instead 
and has felt compelled to live according to his or her ideas since at least three 
years. Moreover, the application needs to be granted, if the identification with 
the gender will not change with a high degree of probability (s. 1[1]2 TSG). None 
of the answers to these requirements are written on the body.
Prior to the Federal Constitutional Court decision on 11 Jan. 2011 that ruled 
the surgery requirement mandatory for a revision of gender status unconstitu-
tional, medical experts were asked, in addition to the requirements specified in 
s. 1 (1) 1 and 1(1)2 TSG, to assess whether the individual was permanently unable 
to reproduce (s. 8[1]3 TSG) and had undergone a surgical intervention that had 
changed their external sex characteristics in a way that a clear approximation 
to the appearance of the ›other‹ sex/gender had been achieved (s. 8 [1]4 TSG). 
However, surgical reports suffice to prove that the physical conditions have 
materialised. Hence, the requirement of physical examinations raises the sus-
picion that mandatory physical examinations in this context primarily served 
disciplinary or other ulterior purposes.
Psychopathological examination
As mentioned earlier on, the sexological community in Germany was deeply 
divided over the issue of the psychiatric health of transsexual individuals in 
the 1990s and 2010s. However, approaches that claimed to be depathologis-
ing in this period did not necessarily coincide with the abandonment of a psy-
chopathological examination. Two major approaches to this diagnostic means 
emerged throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. One 
dealt flexibly with this diagnostic requirement. The vast majority of sexologists 
however maintained that a psychopathological examination ought to be consid-
ered mandatory in every incidence of diagnosing transsexuality.
Seikowski doubted that every diagnosis of transsexuality requires a psycho-
pathological examination. In his critique of the German Standards, he there-
fore suggested to supplement the extensive list of psychiatric conditions and 
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personality traits the German Standards enumerate with the diagnosis of men-
tal health. According to Seikowski, there is no reason to demand a long-term 
diagnostic process, if somebody is psychologically healthy and feels uncomfort-
able about his or her gender identity (Seikowski 1997: 351 f.).49
The German Standards however enumerate a set of psychiatric conditions 
and personality traits clinical-psychiatric and/or psychological diagnostics they 
recommend to take into consideration when assessing whether the criteria for 
a diagnosis of transsexuality apply or not. Among these are the structural level 
of personality and its deficits, neurotic dispositions and conflicts, substance 
abuse and addictions, suicidal tendencies and self-harming behaviour, para-
philias and perversions, psychotic diseases, cerebral disorders and poor apti-
tude (Becker et al. 1997: 149).
Like the requirement for physical examinations outlined in the Stand-
ards, Langer and Hartmann as well as Beier, Bosinski and Loewit used the 
enumeration of psychiatric conditions and personality traits for disciplinary 
purposes. Beier, Bosinski and Loewit e. g. attached the condition of one year 
of abstinence of drug abuse to the initial phase of treatment (Beier/Bosinski/
Loewit 2005: 381). Langer and Hartmann considered contact, including coun-
tertransference, the willingness to impart information, the ability to verbalise 
something and collaboration important parameters of the psychopathological 
examination.
Psychotherapy and the ›real life test‹
Considerable disagreement arose among those involved in the sexological de-
bate on the necessity of, and the right to enforce psychotherapy and a ›real life 
test‹ as part of the diagnostic process. Perspectives on the usefulness and legiti-
macy of these instruments as supportive50 and diagnostic means can be divided 
49 | It would be more precise to associate the feeling of discomfort with the initial gender 
assignment and/or particular gendered physical attributes.
50 | Until the German Standards recommended psychotherapy to be neutral with regard 
to sex reassignment measures (Becker et al. 1997: 150), the function of this means was 
contested, too. Based on the experience with one individual who underwent more than 
300 therapeutic sessions over a period of six years and finally decided not to undergo 
surgery, Meyenburg e. g. suggested that a psychotherapy should include questioning 
the desire for sex reassignment measures (Meyenburg 1992: 106 f.). In contrast, Laszig, 
Knauss, Clement and Senf argued in favour of psychotherapeutic neutrality in this respect 
(Clement/Senf 1996a: 19; Laszig/Knauss/Clement 1995: 25). Laszig and colleagues 
argued that psychotherapic collaboration between a psychotherapist and a ›patient‹ is 
hampered, if the former aims at reconciling the trans individual’s mind with his or her sexed 
bodily features. In such an instance, a transsexual individual necessarily experiences 
psychotherapy as a threat. Rather, the psychotherapeutic attitude should be focused on 
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into three distinct categories. The first endorsed a concept of compulsory psy-
chotherapy and mandatory ›real life test‹.51 The second perspective postulated 
that compulsory psychotherapy and the ›real life test‹ should apply to some 
individuals only. Proponents of the third perspective rejected mandatory psy-
chotherapy and the ›real life test‹ as means of generating a diagnosis. Each per-
spective had very different implications with regard to trans self-determination 
and psycho-medical surveillance.
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit, the authors of the German Standards, the au-
thors of the statement on the reform of the Transsexual Act on behalf of the 
DGfS, Bosinski and Sigusch considered both instruments as vital for all ›pa-
tients‹ with a ›gender identity disorder‹. Proponents of this approach reasoned 
that a diagnosis of an irreversible transposition of the gender identity can only 
be substantialised in a long-term diagnostic process (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 
2005: 385; Bosinski 2003: 715 f.; Becker et al. 1997: 149; Becker et al. 2001: 262; 
Sigusch 2007: 354). Based on non-representative single case studies on 20 ›bio-
logical men‹, i. e. transwomen, Bosinski e. g. concluded that the self-diagnosis 
was an unreliable means to establish a diagnosis of transsexuality (Bosinski 
1994: 210).
Beier, Bosinski and Loewit, the authors of the Germans Standards and the 
authors of the statement on the reform of the Transsexual Act on behalf of 
the DGfS held that psychotherapeutical support in combination with the ›real 
life test‹ must indiscriminately precede somatic measures (Becker et al. 1997: 
149; Becker et al. 2001: 262). With regard to the ›real life test‹, Beier, Bosinski 
and Loewit e. g. stated that, »[i]f the patient refuses to try out the role of the 
desired gender in everyday life prior to body-modifying reassignment measures 
(medical and/or surgical), the indication cannot be issued« (Beier/Bosinski/
Loewit 2005: 385). Moreover, they held that, »[i]n this case doubts about the 
diagnosis ›transsexual gender identity disorder‹ are justified« (ibid). Becker, 
Berner, Dannecker and Richter-Appelt argued in favour of an extensive diag-
nostic and psychotherapeutic procedure, including the ›real life test‹, in order 
supporting and understanding the transsexual individual’s development (Laszig/Knauss/
Clement 1995: 25 f.).
51 | Beier, Bosinski and Loewit, Kockott and Rauchfleisch define the ›real life test‹ 
as a period of at least one year in which a transsexual individual lives according to the 
conventions associated with the gender he or she wishes to be recognised as for 24 hours 
a day (Rauchfleisch 2006: 27; Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 385; Kockott 1996: 12). The 
purpose of the ›real life test‹ is in their opinion twofold. First, the transsexual individual 
has the opportunity to develop his or her sense of masculinity or femininity, respectively 
and to check whether the role suits him or her. Second, the transsexual person is advised 
to test the environment and to learn how to deal with the reactions.
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to prevent access to hormone treatment and surgery based solely on demand 
(Becker et al. 2001: 262).
Like Pfäfflin (1996: 33) and Rauchfleisch (2006: 27), Sigusch argued in the 
revision of his, Meyenburg’s and Reiche’s cardinal symptoms that an analytic 
psychotherapy and the ›real life test‹ are the most appropriate methods of exam-
ining a transsexual individual’s development (Sigusch 2007: 353). Sigusch sug-
gested that the transference and countertransference process that takes place 
during an analytical psychotherapy allows the examiner to gain the security 
that a particular individual is a man or a woman (ibid).
Finally, he argued that an analytical psychotherapy aims at increasing or 
rendering possible the patient’s self-reflection. He concluded that this type of 
psychotherapy is the most appropriate means to combine the patient’s self-de-
termination with the professional’s responsibility (ibid: 348).
He also emphasised the necessity of psychotherapy for differential-diagnostic 
purposes. Like Langer, he held that the desire for sex reassignment surgery alone 
does not justify the diagnosis of transsexuality, since several developments oc-
cur as attempts to solve very different conflicts and tensions. At the same time, 
organic findings and psychological illnesses do not necessarily exclude the di-
agnosis of transsexuality. However, such distinctions are only possible within a 
sufficiently long and intensive therapeutic relationship (Sigusch 2007: 354).
The first perspective is based upon five premises. First, transsexual indi-
viduals are either more prone to manifest psychopathological disorders than 
cis individuals (Becker et al. 1997: 149), or there are persons that desire a tran-
sition for ulterior reasons, respectively (Sigusch 2007: 354). Second, transsex-
ual individuals lack self-knowledge, a situation which requires a ›real life test‹ 
(Rauchfleisch 2006: 27; Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 385) and psychotherapy 
(Sigusch 1991: 867). Third, contrary to Langer and Hartmann’s claim that the 
›real life test‹ is not an examination the transsexual individual needs to pass 
vis-à-vis a medical professional or any other person for that matter (Langer/
Hartmann 1997: 867), a transsexual individual has to convince the examiner 
that he or she identifies with, and is capable of performing the gender the re-
spective individual claims to be, and be it simply for the sake of an examiner’s 
sense of security. Fourth, psychotherapy and the ›real life test‹ are considered 
superior to any other means of self-enquiry. Finally, examiners imply that it 
does not make a difference in everyday life, if a person e. g. with a male body 
presents him- or herself as a woman or a man.52
52 | However, the examiners underestimated social sanctions that individuals are ex-
erted to when a person’s gender performance diverges from (assumed) physical prop-
erties. Beier, Bosinski and Loewit e. g. hold that, »[h]ormones and an operation neither 
cause a change in one’s opinions and thoughts, nor in principle change the reaction of the 
environment« (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 385). They add that, »[i]t should be pointed 
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The second and third perspective on compulsory psychotherapy and man-
datory ›real life test‹ either entirely or in part questioned the validity of these 
assumptions. In its critique of the German Standards, Transidentitas e. V. held 
that neither psychotherapy nor the ›real life test‹ are necessary and appropri-
ate as a means to establish a person’s transsexuality in every case. Mandatory 
psychotherapy should be restricted to persons with significant psychological 
problems. In these particular instances, though, the duration, comprehensive-
ness and intensity of these measures should be agreed upon in advance and 
on equal terms between the psychotherapist and the ›patient‹ (Transidentitas 
1997: 344).
Transidentitas e. V. rejected the demand for the general imposition of a 
compulsory ›real life test‹. The organisation argued that to pose a ›real life test‹ 
as a condition for all transsexual individuals amounts to an incapacitation (ibid: 
343). Transidentitas e. V. held that most ›patients‹ either in part or completely 
live their lives according to their identities, while at the same time guarding or 
regaining their stability (ibid: 345). The organisation suggested that a »negative 
real life test«, i. e. the inability to live as the assigned gender ought to suffice 
for an indication for hormones (ibid). Moreover, the organisation rejected an 
approach that does not take into consideration individual situations (ibid: 346).
While Transidentitas e. V. agreed to compulsory ›real life tests‹ and psy-
chotherapy under certain conditions, Clement and Senf (1996a: 22), Seikowski 
(1997: 252; 2007: 250), Lindemann (1997: 324; 329) and Kaltenmark, Kasimir 
and Rauner (1998: 267) rejected mandatory psychotherapy for various rea-
sons.53
While Beier, Bosinski and Loewit emphasised that catamnestic studies 
have proven that successful post-operative adaptations depend on the patient’s 
pre-operative psychotherapeutic and psychiatric care,54 results of Seikowski’s 
out to patients that since a long time it is neither punishable by law in Germany to wear 
clothes of the other gender, nor to bear another name than the Christian name« (ibid). In-
terestingly, Beier, Bosinski and Loewit’s terminology ›biological woman with a transsexual 
gender identity disorder‹ or ›biological man with a transsexual gender identity disorder‹ 
and their reference to a »not always harmonious appearance in the role of the desired 
gender« as one of the reasons for social marginalisation (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 
365) mirror the discriminatory social reactions they wish to downplay.
53 | While the authors agreed that psychotherapy should be voluntary, their suggestions 
were not homogeneous. Clement and Senf e. g. recommended supportive psychotherapy 
to all transsexual individuals in order to help the latter secure his or her decision 
(Clement/Senf 1996a: 22). Seikowski however suggested psychotherapy be offered to all 
transsexual individuals and recommended to some only (Seikowski 2007: 249).
54 | Beier, Bosinski and Loewit based their argument on a survey of findings compiled by 
Pfäfflin/Junge 1992.
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extensive quantitative study suggest that with a high degree of probability about 
two thirds of transsexual individuals do not need deeper psychotherapy. They 
are emotionally strong enough to cope with gender reassignment without psy-
chotherapeutic support (Seikowski 2007: 249).
Unlike the proponents of the first approach, Seikowski questioned the as-
sumption that transsexual individuals necessarily lack self-knowledge. As 
mentioned earlier on, he observed that trans individuals frequently obtain an 
appropriate degree of self-knowledge before turning to medical profession-
als. Consequently, he argued that to impose psychotherapy on individuals who 
believe they do not need it obviously does not make sense to them (Seikowski 
1997: 351; 2007: 250 f.).55 Depending on the examiner’s attitude, the situation 
can become tense: »They [Transsexual individuals] react ›allergically‹, if the 
55 | In a study on the acceptance of therapeutical assessment prior to a change of first 
names, Luther, Osburg and Weitze examined whether the assessment of trans individuals 
matches the negative public image of these procedures (Luther/Osburg/Weitze 
1998: 31). For this purpose, the authors sent questionnaires to sixty patients who had 
undergone such an assessment with the authors from 1985 to 1994. Among other things, 
the patients were asked to give their opinion on this process, taking into consideration the 
duration of the assessment, the choice of experts, the relationship to them and the issue 
of double assessment (ibid: 32-36). 
For ty previous patients responded to the questionnaire. The f indings suggest that one 
third of the respondents considered the assessment procedure positively. An equal 
number of individuals answered to the contrary. Approximately 10 % were ambivalent and 
less than 5 % responded that the assessment did not have any effect on them (ibid: 36). 
Those who responded negatively did so for mainly two reasons. First, they had the 
impression that they had to justify their decision. Second, they considered the assessment 
an illegitimate intervention into their personal lives (ibid). The respondents who took an 
affirmative stance towards the assessment procedure emphasised that the process 
contributed to their self-confidence, social skills and knowledge. Moreover, the expert 
opinion contributed to their sense of security with regard to the decision they had made 
(ibid).  
Luther, Osburg and Weitze concluded that nearly half of the respondents considered a 
»thorough and objective assessment« (ibid: 30) worthwhile. In their opinion, the study 
affirmed Pfäfflin and Junge’s (1992) conclusion from their compilation of catamnestic 
studies. The latter suggested that the duration and thoroughness of the examination 
correlates with post-surgical satisfaction (Luther/Osburg/Weitze 1998: 37). Similarly, 
they held that Beck-Managetta and Böhle’s (1989) study supports their findings. The 
latter suggested that the significance of the relationship between the so-called expert 
and the assessed increases with the duration of the procedure (ibid). 
While the authors repeatedly classif ied individual trans person’s and trans organisation’s 
critique of the assessment procedure as polemical (ibid: 30; 37), their study reveals 
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therapist claims to be a specialist who knows better than the patient.« (Sei-
kowski 2007: 251)
Moreover, Seikowski suggested that simplistic psychopathological concepts 
are inappropriate when dealing with transsexual individuals. Since transsexu-
ality is not an emotional disorder, trans individuals do not want to be psychia-
trised (ibid).
Finally, Seikowski suggested deprivileging psychotherapy as the only ap-
propriate means of acquiring support. He held that support groups or other 
consulting facilities can equally well contribute to a favourable treatment out-
come (ibid).
Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner argued that compulsory therapy56 is only 
justified in legally clearly defined situations, such as in a forensic context. To 
require mandatory therapy that is not executed in a legitimate legal sense as it 
holds true for transsexuality contravenes the right to self-determination and 
human dignity (Kaltenmark/Kasimir/Rauner 1998: 267).
Furthermore, the authors profoundly rejected psychotherapy that aims to 
adapt the transsexual person to notions of gendered normality.57 They argued 
that the German Standards raise such expectations when demanding as an 
outcome of psychotherapy an »inner coherence and stability of the identity of 
the gender the person identifies with and its individual embodiment«. Kalten-
mark, Kasimir and Rauner demanded that psychotherapeutic treatment of 
transsexual individuals should take place on a voluntary basis only (ibid).
Unlike Transidentitas e. V., which held that a compulsory ›real life test‹ is 
justifiable in individual cases, Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner vehemently
substantial methodological flaws. First, Luther, Osburg and Weitze did not raise the 
crucial question, whether the respondents considered an assessment per se as good and 
justified. Second, the empirical study is not representative. Third, while the authors affirm 
Pfäfflin and Junge’s findings, there are to date no studies in Germany on post-surgical 
satisfaction in those trans individuals who decide to circumvent assessment for medical 
and surgical treatment, albeit with the effect of having to pay for sex reassignment surgery 
by themselves and to do without a legally recognised change of first names and revision 
of gender status.
56 | Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner define compulsory therapy as a directly or indirectly 
enforced therapy, in that a person who refuses to participate will be denied access to 
material goods and legal provisions, which the person subjectively considers important 
(Kaltenmark/Kasimir/Rauner 1998: 266).
57 | Similarly, Lindemann opposes mandatory psychotherapy, arguing that it is a means 
of social control to ensure the gender binary (Lindemann 1997: 324).
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opposed the ›real life test‹.58 They argued that this procedure violates human 
dignity, humiliates those individuals upon whom such a measure is imposed 
and gravely violates an individual’s privacy for two reasons. First, a test is an 
exceptional situation and is therefore necessarily not identical with everyday 
life (ibid: 269). Second, the ›real life test‹ forces transsexual individuals to adapt 
to the examiner’s ideas, in particular to fetishised notions of life in the ›new‹ 
gender. Hence, they demanded to ban the ›real life test‹ as a means of diagnos-
tics and suggested that the diagnosis be limited to the examination and evalua-
tion of voluntarily and spontaneously generated social relations and individual 
modes of demeanour (ibid).
3.1.4 The medical management of transsexualit y
A medical and legal transition in Germany takes place in a complex institution-
al and regulatory setting. This setting includes the German Standards, legal 
provisions, federal jurisdiction and the Medical Advisory Services of the Statu-
tory Health Insurance Companies (Medizinische Dienst der Krankenversicherung 
[MDK]).59 Despite being distinct regulatory systems with formal procedures 
of their own, they form complex interrelations in the event of a legal and/or 
medical transition. The German Standards, the relationship between law and 
medicine, medical practitioners and the MDKs or the Medical Advisory Service 
of the Central Federation of Statutory Health Insurance Companies (Medizinis-
cher Dienst des Spitzenverbandes Bund der Krankenkassen [MDS]),60 respectively, 
58 | Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner subsume the ›real life test‹ under »social-experi-
mental diagnostic procedures«. They define such a procedure as a scientifically unfound-
ed means used to generate social and psychosocial relations for diagnostic purposes via 
experiments (Kaltenmark/Kasimir/Rauner 1998: 269).
59 | The MDK is a public body. Most Länder usually have one MDK. Exceptions are 
Northrhine Westfalia, which has two (MDK Nordrhein and MDK Westfalen-Lippe), Berlin 
and Brandenburg that have created a joint MDK as well as Hamburg and Schleswig-
Holstein that have established the MDK Nord (MDK 2015). The health insurance companies 
finance the medical advisory services. The MDKs serve the health insurance companies 
and as of 01 Jan. 1995, the nursing care insurance companies by e. g. providing health 
insurances with expert statements in cases specified by law or the type, severity, duration 
and frequency of the disease (Banaski 1996: 64).
60 | The MDS has three major functions. First, the MDS advises the Central Association 
of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds (Spitzenverband der Gesetzlichen Krankenversi­
cherung; GKV­Spitzenverband) on issues related to medical care, services and organisa-
tion. Second, it advises the Central Association of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds 
on issues related to compulsory long-term care insurance (Pflegeversicherung) and 
contributes to the development of standards. Third, it coordinates the professional work 
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and the courts and medical professionals open up spaces for different interpre-
tations with effects on trans individuals in the process of undergoing a medical 
transition.
The German Standards for the Diagnostic Assessment 
and Treatment of Transsexuals
As outlined in the previous sections of this chapter, sexologists and medical 
practitioners widely disagreed on several clinically relevant issues pertaining 
to transsexuality. Despite these profound differences, three major German sex-
ologist associations61 agreed to compile a set of authoritative guidelines for the 
diagnostic assessment and treatment of transsexual individuals under the lead 
of Sophinette Becker. The German Standards were first published in 199762 
and they mark a compromise between different perspectives on transsexuality 
and its treatment at the time in several ways.63
Following a brief description of the main components of the German Stand-
ards, this section will initially address the issues of psycho-medical surveil-
lance and expertise. Thereafter, the question of pathologisation will be raised. 
Finally, the issue of the gender order as it features in the German Standards 
and in the ensuing debate will be discussed.64 I will argue that while the debate 
on the abovementioned issues and expertise did not cease, the German Stand-
of the MDKs with regard to advice and expert reports and promotes uniform procedures 
in organisational matters. The MDS is primarily funded by the Central Association of the 
Statutory Health Insurance Funds (MDS 2015).
61 | These are the DGfS, the Academy for Sexual Medicine (Akademie für Sexualmedizin) 
and the Association for Sexology (Gesellschaft für Sexualwissenschaft).
62 | Unlike the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH; formerly 
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association; HBIGDA) Standards of Care 
for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People that have 
been revised several times over the past decades, the German Standards have remained 
unchanged to the time of writing. The process of revising treatment standards for trans 
individuals in Germany has only begun recently. For more details on this development, 
see chapter 4.3.
63 | The deliberate omission of speculations on the aetiology of transsexuality (Becker 
1998: 161), the consensus on psychotherapeutic neutrality despite differing views on 
this issue (ibid: 156) and the provision that the patient and the therapist determine the 
frequency and duration of psychotherapy together (Becker et al. 1997: 150) indicate that 
the involved sexologists sought for compromises.
64 | The German Standards also lend themselves to a discussion of the intermingling 
of law and medicine, an issue that will be dealt with in more detail in the section »The 
relationship between law and medicine« in this chapter.
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ards enshrined notions of authoritative psycho-medical expertise and control, 
the pathological state of transsexual individuals and the gender binary.
The German Standards are composed of six distinct components. Starting 
with an introduction that is comprised of the definition of transsexuality, a note 
on transsexual developments and premises of the diagnostic and assessment 
procedure (Becker et al. 1997: 147 f.), the document outlines the standards for 
diagnostics and differential diagnosis (ibid: 148 f.). These sections are followed 
by standards for psychotherapy/psychotherapeutic support (ibid: 149 f.), stand-
ards for the indication for somatic treatment (ibid: 151 f.) and the standards for 
somatic treatment, i. e. hormone treatment and sex reassignment surgery (ibid: 
152-154). The latter lists recommended surgical measures for ftms (ibid: 153) 
and mtfs (ibid: 153 f.) separately. Finally, the Standards specify the rules for the 
assessment of transsexual individuals according to ss. 1 and 8 TSG (ibid: 154 f.).
While the German Standards did not put a halt to the sexological debate on 
psycho-medical control and trans self-determination, they however did resolve 
the tension between the two in favour of the former. This becomes evident e. g. 
in one of the purposes of the Standards, the diagnostic means of psychotherapy 
and the indication for somatic treatment.
Well before the German Standards were established as an authoritative 
guide to the diagnostic assessment and treatment of transsexual individuals, 
Langer, and Langer and Hartmann called for national standards to regulate 
psycho-medical aspects of a transition from one gender to another. One of their 
reasons was expressly to curb trans self-determination.65 As early as in 1995, 
Langer decried that the process of sex reassignment was gaining a life of its 
own (Langer 1995: 264). Langer and Hartmann in particular pointed out to 
transsexual individuals’ practice of contacting county courts prior to appearing 
at a physician’s office. Having obtained expert reports issued for changing first 
names according to s. 1 TSG, they would then produce these reports at health 
65 | These and other authors gave further reasons for specifically national stand-
ards. Langer and Hartmann e. g. claimed that the international Standards of Care is-
sued by the then HBIGDA did not apply to the German context for clinical and legal rea-
sons. Langer considered the Standards of Care deficient, since they did not take psy-
chiatric contraindications into consideration (Langer 1995: 271). In their critique of the 
German Standards, Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner however convincingly argued that 
clinical pictures of transsexual individuals do not stop at national borders. However, the 
institutional way of dealing with transsexual subjects very well does. They suggested that 
the German Standards were devised to function as a »transsexual- and psychiatry-politi-
cal regulation« (Kaltenmark/Kasimir/Rauner 1998: 262). 
In her defense of the German Standards Becker mentioned a fur ther reason for devising 
national guidelines. She stated that the German Standards were meant to express the 
common sense of the treatment centres (Becker 1998: 155).
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insurance company offices and subsequently use them as an indication for sur-
gery (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 868). Langer and Hartmann warned that, »[m]
edical experts could be in danger of testifying to a self-determined sex change, 
if the current inflation of the concept of self-determination was not recognised 
as such and questioned« (ibid: 869).
While the German Standards mirror the change of the modalities and the 
functions of psychotherapy since the 1970s,66 this diagnostic means at the same 
time operates as an instrument of psychiatric control. The German Standards 
support the widespread consensus among those sexologists who considered 
psychotherapy necessary as a supportive and diagnostic means (Becker et al. 
1997: 150).67 It is up to the psychotherapist to decide whether the following three 
criteria apply:
– the inner coherence and stability of the gender identity and its individual embodiment;
– the ability to live according to the desired gender role;
– the realistic assessment of the possibilities and limits of somatic treatment (Becker et 
al. 1997: 150).
By contrast, the severity of a transsexual individual’s urge for sex reassignment 
surgery and the self-diagnosis are not considered reliable indicators for estab-
lishing a diagnosis of transsexuality (ibid: 148).
The notions of psycho-medical surveillance and control reemerge in the 
section on the standards for the indication for somatic treatment. The German 
Standards e. g. outline an extensive set of requirements that needs to be ful-
filled prior to issuing an indication for sex reassignment surgery. Psychothera-
pists or other medical experts have to confirm the requirements. 
Among these requirements are that the patient has to be known to the ther-
apist since at least one-and-a-half years. The patient needs to have performed a 
66 | In his critique of the Frankfurt treatment scheme of the 1970s, Sigusch described the 
function of psychotherapy at the time. He stated that the two departments of sex research 
in Germany sent transsexual applicants for probatory psychotherapeutic sessions in order 
to prove that it was impossible to treat transsexual individuals psychotherapeutically 
(Sigusch 1991: 231). Moreover, psychotherapy was considered successful in the 1970s 
when a patient decided to give up his or her desire for sex reassignment surgery (Sigusch 
2007: 356). By contrast, psychotherapeutic treatment of transsexual individuals in the 
1990s and 2010s was guided by the principles of an open outcome (Kockott 1996: 15; 
Pfäfflin 1996: 26; Sigusch 2007: 356) and a psychotherapist’s neutrality towards sex 
reassignment surgery (Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 387; Clement/Senf 1996a: 19; 
Becker et al. 1997: 150; Rauchfleisch 2006: 55 f.).
67 | See e. g. Sigusch 1991a, Clement/Senf 1996a and Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005: 
387 f.
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›real life test‹ on a continuous basis for at least the same duration. Moreover, the 
patient is required to have undergone at least half a year of hormone treatment.
The therapist is required to describe whether the patient’s identity is stable 
and whether he or she has permanently taken on the role of the ›other‹ gender. 
Moreover, the therapist has to characterise the patient’s outer appearance, be-
haviour, experience and personality. In addition, the indication should include 
a patient history with a particular focus on the complete individual course of 
the transsexual development and the factors that influenced this development 
(ibid: 151).
Moreover, the Standards demand information on the ›real life test‹, such 
as when it started, whether and, if so, when the patient applied for a change of 
first names according to the Transsexual Act. In addition, the therapist is asked 
to describe the effects of the ›real life test‹ on the patient’s psychic equilibrium, 
the security in the role of the desired gender role, sexuality, relationships to 
partners, family and friends, ability to work and acceptance in the workplace 
(ibid: 152).
The Standards also require a detailed description of the physical conditions 
for a life in the ›other‹ gender role, such as physical and psychological effects 
of the hormone treatment, the patient’s evaluation of the physical changes and 
the way the he or she deals with possibly negative reactions to his or her outer 
appearance and behaviour (ibid).
Furthermore, the therapist is among other things asked to describe wheth-
er the patient has realistically thought about unwanted effects of surgery that 
might occur and his or her expectations with regard to the outer appearance, 
functionality and sexuality. The report must explain why the patient would 
experience more distress without surgery. Finally, the therapist is required to 
anticipate the effects of sex reassignment surgery with regard to the patient’s 
social integration, ability to form partnerships, ability to work, and his or her 
autonomy (ibid).
In the process of drafting the guidelines, the authors of the German Stand-
ards also resolved the question of expertise in favour of sole psycho-medical 
expertise. Despite demands by some members of the committee to involve so-
ciologists and transsexual individuals or trans organisations, respectively, the 
German Standards were exclusively authored by members of the three national 
sexological associations (Becker 1998: 155). In response to Seikowski’s (1997: 
351) and Transidentitas e. V.’s (1997: 350) critique of this omission, Becker rea-
soned that the opinions among the treatment centres on this and many other
issues the Standards address diverged to such an extent that the committee 
finally decided to leave out any further input (Becker 1998: 155).68
68 | Lindemann criticised the exclusion of trans individuals in the process of drafting the 
German Standards. She doubted that the procedure outlined by the Standards would lead 
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With regard to the tension between pathologising and depathologising 
transsexuality, the German Standards are clearly biased towards the former. 
The pathologisation of transsexuality features in the definition and the reason 
for a psychopathological examination. The authors of the German Standards 
define transsexuality among other ascriptions as »a special form of gender 
identity disorder« (Becker et al. 1997: 147).
The necessity of a psychopathological examination is premised upon the 
notion that individuals with so-called gender identity disorders frequently ex-
hibit significant psychopathological abnormalities. As mentioned earlier on, 
the German Standards suggest that transsexual individuals should be screened 
for the structural level of personality and its deficits, neurotic dispositions and 
conflicts, substance abuse and addictions, suicidal tendencies and self-harming 
behaviour, paraphilias and perversions, psychotic diseases, cerebral disorders 
and poor aptitude (Becker et al. 1997: 149).
However, the German Standards do not suggest what to do with these find-
ings.69 As a result, psycho-medical experts interpret the findings differently or, 
to put it bluntly, as they please. While Seikowski e. g. does not consider poor 
aptitude a contraindication (Seikowski 1997: 352), Rauchfleisch does. The lat-
ter insists that this particular finding should be treated as a contraindication, 
since the transidentified person would not be in a position to assess the effects 
of hormonal and surgical interventions (Rauchfleisch 2006: 25).
Finally, the German Standards reproduce several notions that character-
ise the gender binary of the time, including essentialist and polarised notions 
of gender to which the definition of transsexuality, several criteria mentioned 
for an indication for sex reassignment surgery and the recommendations for 
sex reassignment surgery attest. Lindemann suggests that the modern gender 
binary is based upon three assumptions. First, every person is gendered and 
belongs to one gender only. Second, a person belongs to a gender for life. Third, 
gender is based upon physical properties (Lindemann 1997: 324). In addition, 
the gendering process is not self-determined.
The definition suggests that, like any other individual, the transsexual in-
dividual was initially assigned to a gender. However, transsexual individuals 
subjectively perceive this assignment to be inappropriate and therefore require 
medical, surgical and legal measures in order to transition to the ›other‹ gender 
(Becker et al. 1997: 147). Hence, the definition implies that every subject is gen-
dered and that there is one option only to which an individual can transition. 
to more objectivity and security. Instead, transsexual individuals might simply consider 
the Standards as guidelines to achieve their goal (Lindemann 1997: 326).
69 | Kaltenmark, Kasimir and Rauner suggested that the German Standards do not offer 
an interpretation of the findings, because there was no consensus on this issue among the 
researchers (Kaltenmark/Kasimir/Rauner 1998: 364).
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The definition does not allow a person to take on the identity of two (or more) 
genders, an identity other than ›man‹ or ›woman‹, or none at all.
The definition and the criteria for an indication for somatic treatment sug-
gest that a person’s gender identity is a permanent disposition. The German 
Standards hold that, »[t]ranssexuality is marked by the permanent inner cer-
tainty of belonging to the other gender« (ibid). Likewise, the indication for so-
matic treatment requires that a patient’s identity be stable (ibid: 157) and coher-
ent (ibid: 150) before an indication may be issued.
Moreover, the definition, the criteria for an indication for somatic treatment 
and the recommendations for somatic treatment are based on the assumption 
that a person’s morphology, gender role and identity are linked. Transsexual 
individuals are by definition portrayed as persons who reject the physical char-
acteristics of the innate sex and the role expectations attached to the physical 
appearance (ibid: 149). In a similar vein, the indication for somatic treatment 
requires an assessment of the physical conditions for a life according to the 
›other‹ gender role (ibid: 152).
The recommendations for sex reassignment surgery reproduce »somatic 
fundamentalism« (Lindemann 1997: 327). According to this principle, a per-
son’s body may not be more similar to the body of a member of the ›other‹ 
gender (ibid: 324). The German Standards recommend a penectomy, an orchi-
ectomy, the creation of a vulva, clitoris and a neovagina, epilation and breast 
augmentation surgery for male-to-female trans individuals in the event of in-
sufficient gynaecomasty (Becker et al. 1997: 153 f.). Female-to-male trans indi-
viduals are recommended to undergo a bilateral mastectomy, a hysterectomy 
and an adnectomy (ibid: 153). The Standards suggest that genital surgery in 
female-to-male transsexual individuals requires individual solutions,70 since 
phalloplasties and the implantation of surrogate testes are still at an experi-
mental stage of surgical development (Becker et al. 1997: 153).
Neither transmen’s nor transwomen’s subjective attitudes towards their 
respective genitalia are considered at all. As early as in 1997, Lindemann for 
instance observed that many transmen approach their respective transitions 
pragmatically. A significant number of transmen are content with the effects of 
testosterone treatment and a bilateral mastectomy and consider a hysterectomy 
70 | Individual solutions range from no surgery to the creation of a metadoioplasty with or 
without an extension of the urethra and with or without the construction of a scrotal sack 
and testicular implants, to various forms of phalloplasties with or without an extended 
urethra and erection devices. Phalloplasties in Germany are currently created, using 
either a radial forearm flap or a flap harvested from the lower leg and erection devices, 
such as an erection pump, a semi-rigid rod or a bone. Some surgeons also offer to shape 
the tip of the penoid to resemble a glans. To ensure sensitivity, nerves in the phalloplasty 
are connected to nerves in the clitoris or the groin, respectively.
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and an adnectomy a destructive means imposed upon them by the Transsexual 
Act (Lindemann 1997: 327).71
Finally, the German Standards are informed by the assumption that a per-
son’s gender identity can be derived from the genitalia at the time of birth, i. e. 
at a time no individual can speak on behalf of him- or herself. The gendering of 
a person uncovers the seemingly natural link between a person’s morphology, 
gender role and gender identity as a heteronomous process based on social con-
ventions. The fact that the recognition of a gender identity that does not follow 
the originally assigned gender requires psycho-medical assessment even past 
the age of majority implies that a person’s gender or gender recognition is at no 
time self-determined.
The relationship between law and medicine
Law and medicine are interwoven in several moments of a legal and medical 
transition from one sex/gender to another, necessitating medicine to interpret 
legal rules. As an effect, two problems arise. First, 1970s medical knowledge on 
transsexuality informed the Transsexual Act in ways that conflict with current 
medical understandings of transsexuality. Second, medical procedures occa-
sionally contradict the legislator’s intentions.
While the Transsexual Act does not prescribe exact medical procedures, the 
legal revision of gender status was until the Federal Constitutional Court ruled 
ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG unconstitutional premised upon somatic measures. Sec-
tion 8(1)3 TSG demanded permanent sterility as a prerequisite for a revision of 
gender status. Since there is a (slight) possibility of reversing a person’s repro-
ductive capacity using less invasive measures, such as a vasectomy or a tubal 
ligation, respectively, the German Standards suggest that the legal requirement 
is best met with maximum surgery, i. e. an orchidectomy in male-to-female 
transsexual individuals and a hysterectomy and adnectomy in female-to-male 
transsexual individuals.
Moreover, s. 8(1)4 TSG required as a precondition for a revision of gender 
status a surgical intervention on the external sex characteristics to approximate 
the outer appearance of the ›other‹ sex/gender. As mentioned earlier on, the 
German Standards interpret this legal requirement to be a penectomy, an or-
chidectomy, the reconstruction of external genitalia that resemble female ones, 
epilation and, if necessary, breast augmentation surgery in male women and 
a bilateral mastectomy, a hysterectomy and an oophorectomy in female men.
71 | In her defence of the German Standards, Becker readily admitted that the Standards 
were based on normative understandings of gender. However, she defended the estab-
lishment of maximum psychotherapeutic and surgical measures as a means to secure 
health insurance coverage of psychotherapeutic support and sex reassignment surgery in 
the light of austerity politics in the health system (Becker 1998: 158).
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In her defence of the German Standards Becker claimed that the Stand-
ards did not invent sex reassignment surgery or the requirements laid down by 
the Transsexual Act, such as genital surgery and infertility as a precondition 
for a revision of gender status (Becker 1998: 155). However, she conceded that 
medicine contributed to the awkward link between gender reassignment and 
surgery at an earlier point in time (ibid: 156).
Apart from wanting to curb trans self-determination, sexologists tailored 
the German Standards to fit the legal environment. Langer and Hartmann e. g. 
explained the need for national standards of care with the specific legal context 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. They argued that such an environment 
required guidelines for surgical measures and the assessment according to the 
Transsexual Act (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 864). This notion is also expressed 
in the German Standards: 
[s]ince 1980 there is the Transsexual Act (TSG) in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
which regulates the legal preconditions for a change of first names and the gender 
status of a person. However, so far authoritative guidelines for the treatment and as-
sessment of transsexuals are non-existent. The ›Standards of Care‹ issued by the Harry 
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association which were initially presented in 
1979 and have since then been revised several times can only be applied in a limited 
way under German circumstances. (Becker et al. 1997: 147)
Hence, while the German Standards constitute a medical document, the last 
section of the guidelines takes into consideration the requirements the Trans-
sexual Act lays down in ss. 1 and 8 TSG.
Medical interpretations of legal provisions for a change of first names not 
only indicate ways of translating legal requirements into medically manage-
able steps. They also highlight how sexologists grapple with legally enshrined 
interpretations of medical concepts. Section 1(1) TSG e. g. rules among other 
things that the court is required to change a person’s first name following an 
application, if the person due to his or her transsexual imprinting no longer 
identifies with the gender entered in the birth entry but with the ›other‹ gender. 
Sexologists agree that the behavioural concept of imprinting does not apply. 
Rather, the currently widely held concept of transsexuality suggests that trans-
sexuality is the result of a multifactorial and cumulative development (Langer/
Hartmann 1997: 865; Pfäfflin 1996b: 82). Therefore, the section on the stand-
ards of diagnostic assessment determines that the psycho-medical assessment 
according to s. 1 TSG requires the expert to reconstruct and discuss the trans-
sexual individual’s gender identity development, including environmental in-
fluences on the development of the ›disorder‹ in specific phases in life. The 
standards of diagnostics and differential diagnostics serve as guidance (Becker 
et al. 1997: 154).
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Section 1(1) TSG rules that the applicant needs to have felt compelled to live 
according to his or her ideas for at least three years. The authors of the Ger-
man Standards understand the term ›compulsion‹ to mean that the individual 
is unable to ›reconcile‹ his or her concept of gender with the assigned gender 
and has the persistent inner certainty of being a member of the ›other‹ gender.
In another instance, the timing of medical diagnostic instruments clashes 
with the legislator’s intentions. The legislator expressly devised the provision 
for a change of first names to help transsexual individuals live according to 
their desired gender role in everyday life (Pfäfflin 1996a: 41; 1996b: 83; Augstein 
1996: 76). At the same time, the statute requires that the person’s gender iden-
tity will not change »with a high degree of probability« (s. 1[1]2 TSG). In order 
to assess the trans individual’s consistency of the desire (or urge) to live accord-
ing to the ›other‹ gender, psycho-medical experts employ the ›real life test‹ as a 
diagnostic means (Becker et al. 1997: 155). In doing so, the German Standards 
follow Langer and Hartmann’s opinion that, »one can with or without support 
expect a certain amount of testing according to the desired role by means of the 
real life test as a precondition for a change of first names« (Langer/Hartmann 
1997: 866 f.). However, by rendering a ›real life test‹ a medical precondition for 
meeting legal requirements for a change of first names, the German Standards 
turn the legislator’s intentions upside down: 
The indications for a change of first names on the one hand and surgical interventions 
on the other are basically dif ferent. The ›small solution‹ of the TSG, i. e. the possibility 
to change first names was legally fixed in order to facilitate the real life test for the pa-
tient in the new gender role, to protect them at the workplace, while contracting tenancy 
agreements, at the bank counter, during border crossings etc. from the critical gaze and 
inquisitory enquiries, since the outer appearance contrasts with the gender-specific 
first names entered in their documents. The indication for a change of first names is 
meant foremost to achieve social relief, and this indication can therefore be issued ear-
lier than the medical indication for irreversible somatic interventions. (Pfäfflin 1996a: 
41)
The relationship between the health insurance company
administration and their medical advisor y bodies and 
psycho-medical professionals
Disagreements between the health insurance company administration and 
advisory bodies on the one hand and medico-psychiatric professionals on the 
other complicate a medical transition from one sex/gender to another. In the 
period from 1987 until 2010, controversies arose over the interpretation of the 
Federal Social Court decision on 06 Aug. 1987 and the number of expert re-
ports and the experts’ qualifications.
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On 6 August 1987 the Federal Social Court decided in a legal dispute be-
tween a transwoman and her health insurance company that she may demand 
of the health insurance to pay for sex reassignment surgery, »if her former psy-
chophysical condition legally qualifies as an illness requiring treatment accord-
ing to ss. 182 11, 184 I RVO« (BSG 1988: 1550). In its discussion of the Regional 
Social Court (Landessozialgericht; LSG) decision, the Federal Social Court held 
that not all forms of transsexuality qualify as an illness. Therefore, the patho-
logical state needs to be established in every individual case (ibid: 1551).
In this particular case, the Court reasoned that the degree of the tension 
between the woman’s male body and her identity was such that it amounted to 
an illness. According to the High Regional Social Court and the Federal Social 
Court, it is not the identity but the psychological strain that produces the illness 
(ibid).
The Federal Social Court argued that the eligibility to health care coverage 
is based on the condition that the illness can be healed, alleviated or that a 
deterioration of a person’s health can be prevented. The Federal Social Court 
supported the High Regional Social Court’s argumentation that in this par-
ticular case an indication for sex reassignment surgery was the only measure 
to alleviate her situation after all psychiatric and psychotherapeutic means had 
been unsuccessful (ibid).
The Federal Social Court suggested that the High Regional Social Court 
might have misjudged the expedience of the treatment, had it not considered 
psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment prior to surgery. However, it es-
tablished that the High Regional Social Court had considered this issue, too, 
and resolved that all these means had been unsuccessful in this particular case 
(ibid).
Representatives of the medical advisory services of the health insurances 
companies and medical practitioners treating transsexual individuals as well as 
legal experts interpret this court decision differently. Banaski, a representative 
of the medical advisory services of the statutory insurance companies in North-
rhine Westfalia, for instance concludes from the decision that statutory health 
insurance companies only need to pay for sex reassignment surgery after all 
psychiatric and psychotherapeutic means have failed to alleviate or eliminate 
the tension between a person’s sex and his or her psychological identification 
with the ›other‹ gender (Banaski 1996: 65).
The lawyer Augstein disagrees with Banaski’s interpretation of the court 
decision. She argues that the conditions laid down by the court ruling are suf-
ficiently met with, if the specialist treating the individual states that psychiatric 
or psychotherapeutic treatment is unpromising right from the outset (Augstein 
1996: 75 f.).
Indeed, the Federal Social Court decision on 10 Feb. 1993 seems to support 
Augstein’s reading. In this particular decision, the Court argued that sex reas-
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signment surgery is the only option for those individuals whose distress ema-
nating from the tension between sex and gender identity constitutes an illness, 
regardless of whether the transsexual individual agrees to undergo psychiatric/
psychotherapeutic treatment or not (BSG 1993: 2400).
Controversies also arise between the MDKs and medical specialists who 
treat trans individuals over the number of expert reports required for an in-
dication for surgery and the experts’ qualifications. With regard to the latter, 
Eicher and Pfäfflin suggest that it is irrelevant, whether a psychotherapist or a 
psychiatrist issues an indication for sex reassignment surgery (Eicher 1996: 48; 
Pfäfflin 1996a: 37).72
However, MDKs have defined the rules of the game at will. For example, 
until 2004 the medical advisory service of the health insurance companies in 
Bremen accepted expert reports, including indications for surgery from physi-
cians experienced with trans individuals and with additional psychotherapeu-
tic qualifications. In the course of the year, the MDK changed the rules to the 
effect that it no longer accepted expert reports from medical professionals other 
than from psychiatrists.
With regard to the number of expert reports required for meeting the costs 
of sex reassignment surgery, MDKs frequently ask for two expert reports. This 
means that trans individuals need to produce two expert reports for the county 
court and two for the respective statutory health insurance company of which 
the latter includes an indication for sex reassignment surgery.
Eicher, and Becker, Berner, Dannecker and Richter-Appelt suggest that this 
and further arbitrary requirements and interpretations of the law complicate 
the whole procedure (Eicher 1996: 64), hamper the medical and psychothera-
peutic procedures and unduly prolong the proceedings under the Transsexual 
Act (Becker et al. 2001: 265). Similarly, Pfäfflin criticises the additional work, 
especially because the reports are presented to the MDKs, which will once more 
and finally decide upon the indication. Pfäfflin argues that this procedure pro-
duces a further controlling authority (Pfäfflin 1996a: 46).
The relationship between count y courts and 
psycho-medical professionals
Occasionally tensions arise between the courts and psycho-medical profession-
als over procedural issues. Langer and Hartmann e. g. deplore that courts do 
not commission all qualified experts to write expert reports and exclude some 
72 | However, Pfäfflin (1996a: 37) excludes endocrinologists, gynaecologists, urologists 
and general practitioners from the pool of potential experts for issuing an indication 
for sex reassignment surgery. He argues that the task of the latter is to exclude somatic 
contraindications, to determine individual hormone dosages and to control the effects 
and side effects of hormone treatment on a long-term basis.
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instead. Moreover, they criticise the practice of some courts to address the ap-
plicant with the desired first name at the beginning of the legal and diagnos-
tic procedures (Langer/Hartmann 1997: 868). Hence, Langer and Hartmann 
seem to be concerned about limitations of their power.
Pfäfflin is more concerned about the practice of some county courts to wait 
for one expert report before assigning an expertise to the second expert, and 
as such, with adverse effects of this practices on trans individuals. Like several 
trans organisations, he objects to such a practice, since this unnecessary delay 
prevents the applicants from sorting out their usually challenging lives (Pfäff-
lin 1996b: 87).
3.1.5 Summar y: Sexological constructions of gender 
 and transsexualit y in the reform period
While approaches that attempt to explain transsexuality have increased in 
Western countries and research on assumed somatic causes has become more 
diverse, the sexological debate during the reform period in Germany appears 
to have engaged less with questions related to aetiology than in the period prior 
to the enactment of the Transsexual Act. Furthermore and in contrast to the 
1970s and early 1980s, perspectives in sexology emerged in the early 1990s and 
the first decade of the 21st century calling for a critical enquiry into cis and the 
heteronormative gender binary. Like in the earlier period, though, somatic and 
multi-causal approaches were premised upon unquestioned gender and sexual 
norms, and an understanding of transsexuality as an anomaly prevailed.
Definitions, clinical pictures and differential diagnoses of transsexuality 
varied among sexologists. The sexological debate in the last decade of the 20th 
and the first decade of the 21st century mirrors a pluralisation of trans subjects 
and transsexual developments. As a result, the borders between transsexual-
ity and other phenomena inhabiting the fringes of the gender regime became 
blurred. In addition, while the majority of concepts continued to pathologise 
transsexuality to varying degrees, in the early 1990s, a depathologising concept 
of transsexuality entered the sexological debate.
While the sexological debate in the time of the enactment of the Trans-
sexual Act did not question psycho-medical authority and expertise on matters 
pertaining to transsexualism, the latter began to be challenged from within the 
discipline. Depathologising concepts however did not necessarily coincide with 
the acceptance of a transition from one gender to another as a self-determined 
decision.
The diagnostic process for an indication for medical and surgical measures 
and the assessment for a change of first names or gender status, respectively, 
reveals more or less disciplinary traits, in particular with regard to the contro-
versially debated physical examination. Moreover, the hierarchically organised 
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situation between the assessing or diagnosing person, respectively, and the as-
sessee renders the examiner’s concepts of gender and sexuality the benchmark 
according to which access to sex reassignment treatment and legal goods were, 
and continue to be granted or denied.
A legal and medical transition from one gender to another takes place 
within a complex regulatory regime. Specific laws, jurisdiction, the German 
Standards and guidelines of the MDKs are part of this regime. All areas of-
fer possibilities to those in a position to decide upon a trans person’s gender 
identity to do so according to their respective interpretations of rules and guide-
lines. Furthermore, despite being very different regulatory regimes, the nation-
al psycho-medical guidelines for the treatment and assessment of transsexual 
individuals were devised taking into account the legal situation of the time. The 
Transsexual Act, however, was largely based upon medical knowledge and even 
more so of political interpretations of medical knowledge generated at a very 
different moment in the history of gender.
3.2 de velopments and debates In the tr ans movement
 from the mId-1990s to 2010
Since the mid-1990s, the trans movement in Germany has changed structur-
ally, conceptually and politically. Drawing heavily upon documents produced 
by trans organisations with an decidedly political agenda that are published 
on their respective web pages, this chapter traces the abovementioned develop-
ments of the trans movement from the mid-1990s until 2010.
While structural and conceptual changes within the trans movement were 
inextricably linked with each other, they will for analytical purposes be ad-
dressed separately. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of ma-
jor structural changes within the trans movements that evolved in the above-
mentioned period. I will use as examples major local and national support and 
lobby groups, broad local networks and a multinational lobby group with Ger-
man participation and membership that have emerged since the mid-1990s 
and draw upon self-representations of the organisations and networks, their 
respective history, membership lists and by-laws as sources.
The second section of this chapter focuses on concepts of gender, trans 
and perspectives on the gender binary in order to capture conceptual change 
and differentiation as it features on a trans-organisational level.73 This section 
73 | This does not mean however that the concepts that emerged in trans organisations 
with a political agenda comprehensively cover concepts within the trans movement. The 
focus here is on a systematic account of basic concepts in an influential part of the trans 
movement which in part co-exist throughout the entire social movement.
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draws upon the history of the organisations, TransMann’s FAQs (TransMann 
2004a), talks and articles published on organisation websites, programmes, 
reports, flyers presenting the organisation or network and mission statements.
The initial sections are followed by an analysis of trans perspectives on legal 
rules of the Transsexual Act, procedures under the Act, sexological concepts 
of trans and the psycho-medical management of trans subjects in the above-
mentioned period. This section particularly deals with human rights issues 
raised by the Act, problems that arise with legal proceedings and practices 
trans individuals face and with trans perspectives on the classification of trans 
as a psychiatric and / or medical condition as well as the diagnostic and treat-
ment process and health insurance practices. The analysis is foremost based 
on speeches, reports, programmes and a flyer addressed to doctors, by-laws, 
the abovementioned FAQs and an open letter to psycho-medical professionals 
engaged in assessment procedures (Alter 2008a).
While the new organisations that have emerged since the mid-1990s, like 
their predecessor organisation Transidentitas e. V., provide support and out-
reach, and information and education, they also operate in the areas of lobbying 
and networking. The fourth section of this chapter addresses means and con-
cepts of social change to redress discrimination and major attempts to achieve 
trans law reform from the late 1990s to the Act to amend the Transsexual Act 
in 2009. By-laws, mission statements, flyers, announcements of events, sug-
gested draft legislation for trans law reform, a submission and a key issues 
paper constitute major sources for this section.
I will argue that the mid- and late 1990s witnessed a substantial growth 
and diversification of the trans movement, most notably the rise of national 
lobbying groups and an increased visibility of until then barely noticed hetero-
geneous (trans)gender subjects in the political arena. These subjects largely 
challenge the heteronormative gender binary and decidedly object to legal reg-
ulations and psycho-medical concepts and practices that are perceived to curtail 
trans self-determination and infringe upon human rights.
3.2.1 Structural change74
Trans activism and organising has undergone significant structural change 
since the mid-1990s. These changes are mirrored in the development, growth 
and differentiation of national lobby and educational trans associations with lo-
cal helpdesks; the increased consolidation of local activism and the local organi-
sation of individuals and groups with marginalised genders and sexualities in 
broad networks; the creation of a supranational organisation and network; the 
74 | For a brief summary of the major structural and conceptual changes of the trans 
movement in Germany since the mid-1990s, see de Silva 2014.
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rise and proliferation of web-based trans organisations and networks, and the 
increased visibility of (trans)gender subjects that were previously barely or not 
at all represented in transsexual organisations and largely left unnoticed and 
unaccounted for in the political arena (de Silva 2014: 153).
Institutional differentiation and proliferation marks one of the most strik-
ing features of the German trans movement since the mid-1990s. While the 
foundation of Transidentitas e. V. in 1985 already indicated a tendency towards 
creating a nationwide infrastructure for trans individuals and whereas tradi-
tional local support groups continue to exist to this day,75 three national or-
ganisations with regional chapters have emerged since Transidentitas e. V. 
gradually folded in the period from 1995 to 1997. These are the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Transidentität und Intersexualität e. V. (German Associa-
tion for Transidentity and Intersexuality [dgti e. V.]), founded in Cologne in 
1998 (Ottmer 2011),76 TransMann e. V. (TransMan e. V.), which emerged in 
the same city a year later (TransMann undated)77 and Aktion Transsexualität 
und Menschenrecht e. V. (Campaign for Transsexuality and Human Rights; 
ATME e. V.), founded in April 2008 in Ludwigsburg (ATME 2011; 2011a).78
75 | See e. g. VIVA TS in Munich (VivaTS München undated), Trans­Ident Nürnberg 
(www.nuernberg.trans-ident.de) and TransidentX in Stuttgart (TransidentX 2015), to 
name a few. While VivaTS was open to transsexual individuals and transvestites in the 
period discussed here, it has meanwhile shifted its focus to transsexual women and 
their families, friends and partners (VivaTS München undated). TransidentX serves ftm 
and mtf transsexual individuals. In 2010 and 2011, support groups in Bavaria (Freistaat 
Bayern), including Trans-Ident Nürnberg, organised under the umbrella support group 
Selbsthilfeorganisation Trans-Ident e. V. (Selbsthilfeorganisation Trans-Ident undated).
76 | The national headquarters of the dgti e. V. has changed over time, depending on 
the respective first chairperson’s place of residence. The dgti e. V. maintains several 
helpdesks. At the time of writing, they are located in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg in 
the south, Hesse (Hessen) in the centre, Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) and Schleswig-
Holstein in the north, Northrhine Westphalia (Nordrhein­Westfalen; NRW) and Rhineland 
Palatinate (Rheinland­Pfalz) in the west and Brandenburg in the east of Germany (dgti 
undated a).
77 | TransMann e. V. is registered in Munich (2004). Except for the branch in Cologne 
(Köln), the activities of TransMann e. V. were mainly located in the south of Germany from 
the late 1990s to 2010 (TransMan 2007).
78 | The bulk of ATME e. V.’s activities are centred in Baden-Württemberg. While ATME 
e. V. has so far only established one workgroup, the heading »Landes­AKs« (Länder­
Arbeitskreise; Länder workgroups) (ATME 2015a) suggests that ATME e. V. does not rule 
out establishing local chapters in other German Länder.
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The consolidation of local activism and organising in broad local networks 
is another structural feature of the German trans movement since the mid-
1990s. Of these, the TGNB is the largest and most prominent one (TGNB 
2006). The TGNB was founded during the annual Transgender Conference 
(Transtagung) in Berlin in 2001. Founding members were the dgti Berlin, the 
Drag Kingdom,79IdentX,80 the then IGTF and now IVTF (Interessenvertretung 
transsexueller Frauen; Lobby Group for Transsexual Women), the Sonntags-
Club e. V.,81 TransSisters82 and v.e.b. transgender united, which is nowadays 
known as Wigstöckel transgender united83 (TGNB 2006a). By 2006, the TGNB 
constituted a network of 21 transgender and intersex groups that are active in 
the areas of education, counselling, support, social and political life, religion, 
migration, academia, fine arts, show and recreation (ibid).84
Since the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, networking and 
lobbying exceeds the local, regional and national level. Several German trans 
79 | The Drag Kingdom is a group of drag kings and transmen which stages shows, 
organises workshops, maintains a website at www.dragkingdom.de and launches 
parties for political causes, such as the aid party on 09 Oct. 2010 called »Boobs, Brain 
& Bollocks« as a means to support a court case against ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG (Drag 
Kingdom undated).
80 | IdentX was a group of transmen, which has folded in the meantime.
81 | The Sonntags-Club e. V. is a centre that organises events and serves the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and trans communities in Berlin (Sonntags-Club 2015). The Sonntags-Club 
e. V. was founded in 1990. Its roots lie in the East German gay movement (Sonntags-Club 
2015a). 
82 | TransSisters is a group of transvestites and transsexual individuals in Berlin.
83 | Wigstöckel e. V. emerged as an association in 2004 (Wigstöckel 2004-2015). It 
hosts an annual festival to »celebrate trans ways of life and performances« (Wigstöckel 
2004-2015a). The first Wigstöckel transgender united festival in Berlin took place in 1996 
(Wigstöckel 2004-2015b).
84 | Among these groups are e. g. 1-0-1 [one ’o one] intersex, a political fine arts and 
archive project on intersexuality, the Black Girls Coalition, the Free Sisters of Perpetual 
Indulgence (Freie Schwestern der Perpetuellen Indulgenz), Inbetween, which has become 
a part of ABqueer e. V., an information and counselling organisation for adolescents, and 
Transgender-Radio (TGNB 2006b). In addition, the TGNB founded several workgroups, 
such as »Arbeitskreis Vernetzung« (Workgroup Networking) (TGNB 2006c), »Arbeitskreis 
Recht« (Workgroup Law and Antidiscrimination) (TGNB 2006d) and »Arbeitskreis 
Beratung und Fortbildung« (Public Education and Counselling) (TGNB 2006e). In 2004, 
the TGNB established a scientific board (TGNB 2006f) and issued the online magazine 
Liminalis (TGNB 2006g). The so far last issue of the Liminalis appeared in 2009 (Liminalis 
2009), and the scientific board no longer operates at the time of writing.
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groups, such as the dgti e. V. and the TGNB or individual members engage in 
shaping the policies of e. g. the international network and lobby organisation 
Transgender Europe (TGEU) (TGEU 2009). The latter was founded in Vienna, 
Austria in 2005 (ibid).85 By Sept. 2011, TGEU consisted of 38 member groups 
from 23 countries (TGEU 2012).86 While most of the groups come from Euro-
pean countries, the association is also host to members outside Europe.87
New means of communication, in particular the internet added a further 
structural dimension to the trans movement. The internet not only greatly 
facilitated common policy-making over large geographical distances (Whittle 
1998: 393) that organisations such as e. g. TGEU face. It also became a host for 
solely internet-based trans organisations, such as trans forums. In Germany, 
a group of transmen for instance established FTM-Portal.net (FTM-Portal.net 
2009-2011) in December 2005.88 It has since then become the largest German-
speaking internet forum and the most comprehensive source of information 
and debates on e. g. transition-related legal, medical and social issues and gen-
der politics specifically for transmen.
Structural change is however not limited to institutional change. Several 
organisations in part include in their policies or are even headed and staffed by 
community members who were marginalised, if at all present in transsexual 
support groups and on the political agenda of transsexual lobby groups until 
the mid-1990s. TransMann e. V. for instance initially emerged from a group 
of transmen’s regulars in Cologne with the goal of creating a supportive in-
frastructure for transmen (TransMann undated), since transsexual support 
groups at the time mostly catered to the needs of transsexual women (Regh 
2002: 196).
The dgti e. V. and ATME e. V. include trans children in their support ef-
forts. The former provides trans children and adolescents and their parents 
support in everyday life.89 On a political terrain, ATME e. V. demands an end 
85 | TGEU defines as its mission to counter discrimination, in particular on the grounds 
of gender identity and gender expression and to achieve conditions in Europe that enable 
individuals to live according to any gender they prefer, without interference (TGEU 2010).
86 | By 2015, TGEU was host to 78 member organisations from 40 countries (TGEU 
2015).
87 | See e. g. Armenia and Kyrgyztan (TGEU 2012).
88 | Until then, the website of TransMann e. V. served as a platform for this particular 
forum. Apart from ftm-portal.net, there have been several other forums for transmen, such 
as jungx.de, which folded in the early 2000s and ftm-city.de, which adopted conservative 
concepts of masculinity and no longer exists, either.
89 | Among these services are e. g. a comprehensive brochure for trans children and their 
parents (dgti 2015a), recommendations for parents of children with an atypical gender 
expression (Alter 2000), a networking service for parents and young trans individuals 
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to conversion therapies aimed at homo- and transsexual minors in Germany 
(ATME 2012: 46-51).
Similarly, the dgti e. V. and the Berlin-based association TransInterQueer 
e. V. (TrIQ e. V.)90 include intersex individuals91 in their respective staff, support 
programmes and policies.92 While the preamble of the by-laws suggests that the 
dgti e. V. focuses on trans (cf. dgti 1998), it includes intersexuality in its name 
and ss. 2.1 and 2.3 of its by-laws (ibid) and at least temporarily created a space for 
intersex individuals and their respective issues.93 As its name suggests, TrIQ 
(dgti undated b) and sample letters written by the trans activist Alter that support trans 
children in schools (ibid undated c; d; e).
90 | TrIQ e. V. was founded in Berlin in Sept. 2006. The association was initially designed 
to offer professional counselling services in collaboration with inbetween/ABQueer e. V. 
and the TGNB, to educate the general public on issues related to trans, inter and queer 
individuals and to establish a centre, including a café for groups and events for the above 
mentioned individuals (TrIQ undated). TrIQ e. V. has, like several other organisations 
mentioned earlier on since then expanded its agenda to cover lobbying (cf. TrIQ 2013: 2), 
a process that will be addressed in chapter 3.2.2.
91 | Unlike the dgti e. V., TrIQ e. V. frequently uses the term ›intergender‹ (Inter ge­
schlechtlichkeit) or as of late ›inter‹ (Inter*) to refer to the phenomenon subculturally 
otherwise known as intersex. ›Inter*‹ stands for a number of different possible identities 
and self-designations, such as intersex individuals (Intersexuelle), hermaphrodites 
(Hermaphroditen) or Zwitter (TrIQ 2009). The term Intergeschlechtlichkeit signifies 
a depathologising perspective on intersexuality (TrIQ 2009a) and serves as a gender 
identity without however suggesting that intersex individuals necessarily identify as such 
(ibid).
92 | Trans and inter may occasionally overlap. However, they are a set of different 
phenomena with specific issues. They have in common that they trouble conventional 
physical and/or socially normalised gender expectations. The relationship between trans 
and intersex organisations in Germany has been (Ghattas 2009: 1), and continues to be 
quite conflict-ridden.
93 | Support and lobbying by, and on behalf of intersex individuals within the dgti e. V. are 
e. g. mirrored in a so-called first aid brochure on intersexuality compiled by the intersex 
activist Claudia Klüsserath (Klüsserath 2001), a presentation by the trans activist 
Katrin Helma Alter during a hearing on 27 Feb. 2002 (Alter 2002), several talks on the 
Transsexual Act which take into consideration specific issues intersex individuals face 
(e. g. Alter 2000a; 2007) and the dgti e. V. key issues paper of 20 Mar. 2011 on the reform 
of the Transsexual Act (dgti 2011: 2). All of the lobbying efforts and talks mentioned above 
call for a right to intersex self-determination, such as the right to leave vacant the gender 
entry in the birth registry (ibid) and/or a ban on cosmetic surgery on intersex infants (ibid; 
Alter 2000a; Alter 2002).
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e. V. serves the trans, intersex and queer communities. The activities and by-
laws of TrIQ e. V.94 suggests that intersex activism and services for intersex in-
dividuals appear to be more integrated into the organisation as a whole.95
3.2.2 Conceptual change and differentiation
Drawing upon different social contexts and discursive traditions, the new asso-
ciations and networks mirror conceptual change and differentiation that have 
taken place in the trans movement since the mid-1990s. So far, and minor dif-
ferences between associations and networks notwithstanding, two fundamen-
tally different concepts of trans and transsexuality, respectively, have evolved 
within the trans-political arena in Germany, most notably between the dgti 
e. V., TransMann e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. on the one hand and ATME 
e. V. on the other. The respective concepts have different implications for inclu-
sion. Despite these differences, the associations and networks mentioned above 
have in common that they demand the right to self-determination and an end 
to discrimination. 
Conceptual change: Social and discursive factors
The dgti e. V., TransMann e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. emerged amidst wider 
social change, developments in communication technology and both personal 
and theoretical debates on gender and sexuality. These interlocking processes 
were conducive to calling into question apparent truths of gender and sexual-
ity, such as the seemingly causal link between a person’s morphology, gender 
expression and heterosexual orientation as well as the gender binary.
The DGfS and the trans activist Regh succinctly summarise tendencies 
towards social change in wider society that have taken place during the past 
decades. In its submission to the German government, the DGfS observe »an 
94 | See the by-laws of TrIQ 2007; 2014.
95 | TrIQ e. V. closely collaborates with OII Germany/IVIM e. V., a fact that is e. g. mirrored 
in the adoption of the latter’s understanding of intersexuality (see TrIQ 2009a) and the 
conference »Inter* Aktion« in Oct. 2011 in Berlin, which was organised in collaboration 
with the German chapter of OII/IVIM e. V. The conference was designed to create a 
space for intersex individuals, their respective parents and other relatives to meet, 
exchange experiences and establish networks (IVIM e. V./TrIQ 2011). Moreover, TrIQ 
e. V. offered a free of charge workshop on trans and inter in work situations (Trans­ und 
Intergeschlechtlichkeit in der beruflichen Praxis) for executives, equal opportunities 
commissioners, personnel administrators, among others in 2011 (TrIQ 2011). TrIQ e. V. 
also offers counselling services and hosts the Zwittercafé, also known as »Hermcafé« or 
»Inter* Café«, a meeting point for intersex individuals, their friends and relatives (TrIQ 
2007-2012).
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ongoing flexibilisation of formerly rigid characteristics of gender belonging« 
(Becker et al. 2001: 260). The authors argue that the representation and social 
recognition of masculinity and femininity are based on a number of specific 
cultural signs that occasionally render sexed features of the body less promi-
nent in everyday life (ibid). 
While the authors of the abovementioned statement suggest a dwindling 
significance of the sexed body, Regh observes an increasing flexibility of gender 
roles. Arguing that cis lesbian and gay individuals were no longer denied their 
femininity or masculinity, respectively when choosing employment tradition-
ally associated with the ›other‹ gender, he suggests that in the light of these 
developments, trans individuals no longer saw a point why they were expected 
to live (or feign) heterosexual lives or seek employment conventionally deemed 
appropriate for their respective gender (Regh 2002: 193).
The internet and poststructuralist concepts of gender and sexuality most 
dramatically propelled conceptual change in the trans movement in Germany 
in the period from the mid-1990s to the turn of the century. As Regh states, 
the internet provided access to medical information, including the risks and 
limitations of genital surgery, and to theoretical debates on gender and sexual-
ity, most notably queer theory (ibid: 192). These technological and theoretical 
developments allowed trans individuals whose gendered and sexual lives de-
viated from the standardised route prescribed for transsexual individuals to 
become visible and to communicate with each other. As a result, trans individu-
als gained more independence of transsexual support groups and the medical 
community, which at the time generally endorsed conservative perspectives on 
gender and sexuality (ibid 191; 195).
The new organisations that evolved amidst the abovementioned processes 
provided sites for self-reflection and the development of trans subjectivity, of-
fered a space for the development of a counter-discourse to hegemonic under-
standings of masculinity, femininity, gender and sexuality and became a basis 
for claiming trans as an identity (de Silva 2005: 264). These shifts are mirrored 
in the terminology and concepts of trans and gender the dgti e. V., TransMann 
e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. endorse.
Conceptual change: Terminolog y
Struggles over terminology have marked the German trans movement since at 
least the mid-1980s. The use of various terms other than ›transsexual‹ (trans-
sexuell) or ›transsexuality‹ (Transsexualität) to describe trans individuals or the 
phenomenon, respectively, initially served as a means for trans organisations, 
such as Transidentitas e. V., to distance themselves from the pathologising con-
notations of medical ascriptions. 
As the name of the organisation suggests, the dgti e. V. initially followed in 
the footsteps of Transidentitas e. V. by referring to individuals sexologists called 
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›transsexuals‹ as individuals with trans identities (Transidente) and the phe-
nomenon as trans identity (Transidentität).96 The dgti e. V. adopted this particu-
lar term for two reasons. First and as mentioned earlier on, like Transidentitas 
e. V., it rejected the pathologisation associated with the medical term ›trans-
sexuality‹. Second, the dgti e. V. wanted to avoid the common misunderstand-
ing that transsexuality is a sexual orientation (Ottmer 2011).
However, the term ›trans identity‹ was contested, too. While TransMann 
e. V. rejected ›transsexuality‹ as a general term for trans individuals,97 it also 
decided against using the term ›trans identity‹, arguing that this particular 
term suggests an individual identity problem.98
Starting with TransMann e. V. in 1999, by the turn of the century the or-
ganisations mentioned above as well as the local networks mentioned earlier on 
that were founded in the course of the first decade of the 21st century decided to 
take on the term ›transgender‹ when speaking of trans individuals in general 
(Alter 2007; TransMann 2004a; TGNB 2006a; TrIQ 2009).99 At the same 
time, the associations and networks continue to refer to individuals as trans-
sexual or as persons with a trans identity, if the latter identify as such (see 
e. g. Alter 2000; TGNB 2006a; TransMann 2004a; TrIQ undated a: 11). Fre-
quently, the organisations use the German translation ›Transgeschlechtlichkeit‹ 
96 | At the time of writing, the dgti e. V. faces a history of one and a half decades. In the 
light of rapid developments in trans politics, perspectives on a number of issues, such as 
e. g. the perceived legitimacy of medical expertise and aspects related to law reform, have 
changed over time. The same applies to the term ›trans identity‹. While current members 
of the dgti e. V. doubt the founders of the organisation would nowadays use this particular 
term against the background of a policy that insists on the self-determination of one’s 
own individual gender identity, the current leadership decided to stick to the name as a 
historical »brand name« (Ottmer 2011). 
97 | TransMann e. V. objected to the term ›transsexuality‹ for two reasons. First, and 
like the dgti e. V. TransMann e. V. holds that transsexuality is frequently and incorrectly 
associated with a sexual preference (TransMann e. V. 2004a). Second, the organisation 
disagrees with the notion that medical and surgical measures constitute the defining 
feature of transsexuality, suggesting instead that trans phenomena such as transvestites 
and transsexual individuals cannot be clearly distinguished from each other (ibid).
98 | Despite its unease with the term ›trans identity‹, TransMann e. V. uses this term in its 
by-laws of 2004 (TransMann e. V. 2004).
99 | The suggestion for a Transgender Bill (Transgendergesetz; TrGG) which the dgti e. V. 
and TransMann e. V., among other organisations and individuals, produced and submitted 
to the Federal Home Office in 2000 mirrors the consensus to use the term ›transgender‹ 
among these at the time two trans organisations with a national scope. 
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(TrIQ undated a: 1), the abbreviation ›Trans*‹100 (trans) (TransMann 2004a) or, 
more specifically ›Transmann‹ (transman) or ›Transfrau‹ (transwoman) (Alter 
2002; TransMann undated a; 2001).
Conceptual change: Concepts of gender and trans
This particular terminological shift towards the end of the 20th century within 
trans organisations with a decidedly political agenda in Germany not only de-
fies heteronomous and pathologising medical concepts. Setting out from the 
premise of a plurality of highly individualised genders and a concept of gender 
that challenges conventional notions of masculinity and femininity, ›transgen-
der‹ or simply ›trans‹ stands for diverse phenomena and multiple social iden-
tities, challenges heteronormative expectations, disrupts the normalised link 
between a person’s morphology, gender expression and identity, reclaims trans 
from the medical realm and challenges the gender binary.
The dgti e. V., TransMann e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. set out from a 
concept of gender that challenges gender dualism. The dgti e. V. holds that re-
gardless of whether a vast majority of individuals are able to relate to either of 
the exclusively framed categories ›male‹ and ›female‹ or ›man‹ and ›woman‹, 
respectively, these phenomena are at best bi-polar with fluid boundaries (Alter 
2007). Similarly, TransMann e. V. suggests that ›male‹ and ›female‹ are not ir-
reconcilable opposites, but »two halves of a scale that spans the whole spectrum 
of human possibilities« (TransMann 2001). Like the dgti e. V., TransMann e. V. 
suggests that the sparsely populated but highly volatile region in the middle 
of the spectrum is inhabited by individuals who identify as bi-gendered, non-
gendered or intersex (ibid; Alter 2002).
The associations and networks discussed here also question the notion of 
the immutability of an individual’s gender. The dgti e. V. e. g. notes that gender 
is not necessarily a permanent condition (Alter 2000). The TGNB conceptual-
ises gender as a fluid spectrum of diverse identities (TGNB 2006a), a concept 
reminiscent of Bornstein’s idea of gender fluidity, which she defines as »the 
ability to freely and knowingly become one or many of a limitless number of 
genders, for any length of time, at any rate of change. Gender fluidity recog-
nizes no borders or rules of gender.« (Bornstein 1994: 52)
Moreover, the dgti e. V., TransMann e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. chal-
lenge the notion that a person’s gender performance and gender identity can be 
deduced from physical properties and functions, such as genitalia, hormones 
and procreative capacity. Rather, as the dgti e. V. notes, it is a cultural practice to 
assign a person to a particular gender on the basis of genitalia (Alter 2002) or to 
100 | Borrowed from computer language, the asterisk denotes the inclusivity or indefinite 
number of individuals who either temporarily or permanently do not or only in part identify 
with the assigned gender and who identify as trans (Regh 2002: 192).
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assume a particular parental role and identity based on reproductive potential 
(ibid 2000), rendering unimaginable subject positions, such as male mothers 
and female fathers.
Finally, the organisations insist on the right of an individual to determine 
its respective gender and to be socially recognised. Like the dgti e. V. (cf. Al-
ter 2002), TransMann e. V. holds that every gender is valid. The organisation 
demands that nobody should be forced to move from a position the respective 
person feels comfortable with, simply for the purpose of maintaining the cur-
rently hegemonic bi-polar gender system (TransMann 2001; ibid undated a). 
TrIQ e. V. defines ›transgender‹ as an umbrella term for individuals who 
cannot, or do not want to live according to the gender they were assigned to at 
the time of birth (TrIQ 2009; ibid undated a: 11). Similarly, the TGNB concep-
tualises ›transgender‹ as being comprised of individuals to whom the experi-
enced gender is not a binding consequence of the gender they were assigned 
to at the time of birth (TGNB 2006a). Analogously TransMann e. V. defines 
›transmen‹ (Transmänner) as individuals who feel they are not, or insufficiently 
described by their original birth entry as girls (TransMann undated).101 These 
definitions imply that the body or, more specifically, a person’s genitalia are 
neither decisive for an individual’s self-perception, nor of that of others. Rather, 
as TransMann e. V. notes, it is the identity and an individual’s performance that 
determine a person’s gender (ibid 2004a).
The dgti e. V. emphasises that ›transgender‹ is not equivalent to the con-
cept of a ›third gender‹, arguing that the latter reproduces a normative category 
(Alter 2000). Instead, transgender is composed of diverse identities on a fluid 
spectrum that as the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. suggest include, but are not limited 
to self-identified cross-dressers/transvestites (Transvestiten), drag kings, drag 
queens, trannies (Transen), some transsexual individuals, transwomen, trans-
men, individuals with trans identities, transgender and fairies (Tunten) (TGNB
2006a; TrIQ undated a: 11).102 Following the same principles, ›transman‹ covers 
multiple social identities, such as e. g. FTMs (FzM-Transsexuelle), drag kings, 
boys and fags, just to name a few.103
›Transgender‹ also stands for individuals with heterogeneous decisions 
with regard to surgical and legal measures, without however compromising 
101 | Hence, an individual with a female anatomy might not identify as a woman, but in 
part or entirely as a man and wishes to be recognised as such (TransMann e. V. 2004a).
102 | While the TGNB does not use medical terms, such as ›transsexuals‹ or ›transves-
tites‹, replacing them instead with terms, such as ›trannies‹ or ›cross-dressers‹, TrIQ e. V. 
endorses a concept of radical self-determination, hence accepting that some individuals 
might self-identify as transsexual individuals. 
103 | In his landmark study on FTMs and transmen in the USA, Cromwell observes a 
similar heterogeneity among transmen (Cromwell 1999: 28-30).
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individuals who require some or all of the measures possible to ensure their 
survival. As TransMann e. V. notes in its web-based list of frequently asked 
questions (FAQ), 
And what happens after achieving the self-awareness that one is trans? Some don’t do 
anything except for to live their lives as they deem right for themselves. Medical and le-
gal measures are not necessarily required. However, they make some things easier (and 
render things possible for some in the first place). They are, however, neither necessary, 
let alone defining. (TransMann e. V. 2004a) 
Hence, TransMann e. V. like TrIQ e. V. advocates self-determination with re-
gard to the abovementioned measures, arguing that whether a person requires 
medical and/or legal interventions and recognition of any sort depends on the 
person’s individual needs when negotiating a life with him/herself and his/her 
environment (ibid).104
The diversity of trans individuals subsumed under the term ›transgender‹ 
extends to sexuality, too. Sexual preferences cover a large spectrum that not 
only questions heteronormative expectations. They question an immutable 
choice of subjects (or objects). TransMann e. V. observes that trans individuals 
more frequently than non-trans individuals live as lesbians or gay men. Some 
trans individuals do not even bother to define their respective sexual prefer-
ences (ibid). In fact, if trans spans a range of gendered subjects, not to mention 
individuals that refuse to be gendered, or persons who consider themselves 
bi-gendered, categories such as homo- or heterosexuality no longer make any 
sense.
More consistently than the dgti e. V. or TransMann e. V., the TGNB and 
TrIQ e. V. integrate into their respective policies an intersectional approach to 
transgender, hence acknowledging the multiplicity of vectors of power that con-
stitute an individual and deprive it of, or bestow upon it social privilege. Both or-
ganisations are acutely aware of e. g. racism, sexism, heterosexism, ableism, age-
ism and lookism that influence a person’s access to social and medical goods and
services.105 This particular insight is a precondition for developing a politics of 
inclusion.
104 | TrIQ e. V. and the dgti e. V. provide some reasons why some trans individuals do 
not, or only partially follow the prescribed legal and medical route. Among these are an 
incompatibility between self-perception and pathologisation, health reasons that do not 
allow for extensive medical and surgical interventions (TrIQ undated a: 11) or simply the 
desire not to become unambiguously male or female (Alter 2000).
105 | TrIQ e. V. e. g. explicitly notes that there is no space for racism, sexism, right-wing 
extremism or fascism or any other offending or discriminatory practices on its premises 
(TrIQ 2009b). Like TrIQ e. V., the TGNB intends to create an inclusive environment, to 
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Like TransMann e. V., TrIQ e. V. rejects a policy of ›passing‹, hence render-
ing trans visible while acknowledging different individual needs at the same 
time.106 The TrIQ e. V. and TGEU member Julia Ehrt suggests in her speech on 
perspectives and aims of the transgender movement that a poorly shaved trans-
woman need not hide herself in TrIQ e. V. According to Ehrt, this particular 
network is a space in which »nonconformity constitutes the norm and not the 
deviation« (Ehrt 2009: 3). By insisting on the right not to pass, the associations 
and networks not only rearticulate the meaning of bodies. They take the, as 
Sandy Stone puts it »responsibility for all of their history, to begin to rearticu-
late their lives not as a series of erasures […], but as a political action begun 
by reappropriating difference and reclaiming the power of the refigured and 
reinscribed body« (Stone 1991: 298 f.).
The dgti e. V., TransMann e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. also reclaim 
transgender from the medical realm. Arguing that other societies managed 
to, and continue to deal with trans without resorting to medical and surgical 
interventions, TransMann e. V. holds that transgender is not foremost a medi-
cal problem, but a social phenomenon. Regardless of the fact that many trans 
individuals opt for medical and surgical measures, they are not the solution to 
which hosting groups such as the Black Girls Coalition, a group created for, and by trans 
migrants, attests to (TGNB 2006b). 
In s. 2(4) of its by-laws, TrIQ e. V. states that it aims at countering prejudice and 
discrimination with regard to the body, gender identity, gender expression and sexual 
orientation and tries to cushion their social effects (TrIQ 2007). The local network strives 
to support elderly trans, inter and queer individuals (ibid: s. 2[17]). In addition, TrIQ e. V. 
hosts the group Transsexuelle Menschen mit Behinderungen (Transsexual Individuals with 
Disabilities), a group of individuals with mental and physical disabilities, who frequently 
encounter larger obstacles in diagnostic assessment and surgical situations than trans 
individuals who are deemed healthy in this regard by medical standards. As the 2012 
motto »Wigstöckel for every_BODY« (Wigstöckel 2004-2015b) suggests, TrIQ e. V. as the 
main organiser of the event challenges dominant body norms by hosting performances 
e. g. by wheelchair-bound individuals or individuals who, according to weight norms 
prevailing in German society would be considered as obese.
106 | Whittle, Bornstein and Stone stress the inadequacy of a policy of ›passing‹ or 
›assimilation‹. They argue that this type of policy and personal conduct have contributed 
to hierarchising subjects within the community (Whittle 1998: 397; Bornstein 1994: 
67 f.). ›Passing‹ and ›assimilation‹ have also developed a narrow focus on privacy rights as 
opposed to anti-discrimination policies (Whittle 1998: 397) and a lack of solidarity with 
trans individuals, in particular transwomen, who frequently cannot pass beyond casual 
inspection (ibid: 398). Moreover, such a policy has created trans as a homogeneous 
category and forecloses authentic relationships (Stone 1991: 298).
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the problem. According to TransMann e. V. medical interventions are simply 
a means of survival for some in current German society (TransMann 2001).
›Transgender‹ also figures as a political concept, which identifies and chal-
lenges the heteronormative gender binary as the source of discrimination and 
seeks emancipation from its debilitating effects. The dgti e. V., TransMann 
e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. consider the gender binary a pervasive norma-
tive, reductionist and oppressive regime that marginalises all other genders, 
using structural discrimination, pathologisation and exoticisation as its means 
(Alter 2002; TransMann 2001; ibid undated a; TGNB 2006; TrIQ 2011a; ibid 
2011; Ghattas 2009: 2 f.).
Setting out from a depathologising and emancipatory concept of transgen-
der, the associations and networks aim to achieve self-acceptance, social inclu-
sion, freedom of prejudice and discrimination, and acceptance by society as 
one of many facets of human life (dgti 1998: 1; TransMann 2001; TrIQ 2009b; 
TGNB 2006). These aims are succinctly summarised in s. 3 of the TGNB by-
laws:
It is the aim and task of the TGNB to create links between transgender groups operating 
in Berlin in order to campaign more effectively for the individual and social matters of 
trans individuals. Moreover, [the TGNB] brings home to society the limits and the fallibil-
ity of the binary gender system. The TGNB aims at sensitising the public for prejudices 
against transgender individuals and to reduce their pathologisation, criminalisation, 
discrimination and exoticisation. In doing so, the constraints that arise from a bi-polar 
gender concept are meant to be dissolved for the benefit of all individuals in our society. 
(TGNB 2006h)107
Conceptual differentiation: Social and discursive factors
With the advent of ATME e. V. in 2008, concepts of trans(sexuality) began to 
differentiate substantially among trans organisations with a political agenda. 
Drawing upon other discursive traditions, frustrated with continuing govern-
ment inactivity in the face of discrimination, and threatened by prolonged and 
humiliating procedures on the route to health-insurance-covered sex reassign-
ment measures and legal recognition, ATME e. V. developed a concept of trans-
sexuality that, a common stance on the issue of self-determination notwith-
standing, is incompatible with those of the aforementioned associations and 
networks.
While sexologists in Germany have overall been less preoccupied with ae-
tiological research and considerations since the 1990s, German and interna-
107 | See also ss. 2(1) to 2(10) of the original by-laws of TrIQ e. V. (TrIQ 2007), the 
preamble of the by-laws of the dgti e. V. (1998: 1) and ss. 2.1.1 to 2.1.3 of the programme 
of TransMann e. V. (TransMann e. V. 2001).
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tional research on potential somatic causes of transsexuality did not cease. The 
period around the turn of the century faced a surge of international neuro-
endocrine research and research in human genetics that was frequently based 
on the assumptions of two polarised sexes and a prenatally induced predisposi-
tion towards cross-gender identification in transsexual individuals. ATME e. V. 
heavily draws upon the findings, or what the association considers to be find-
ings of this research.
ATME e. V.’s policy also is motivated by continuing government indiffer-
ence towards trans, legal and parliamentary demands to reform trans legis-
lation. Since its very enactment in 1981, trans individuals and organisations 
have challenged several sections of the Transsexual Act, if not the entire Act. 
Moreover, and initiated by trans litigants, from 1983 onward, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court ruled several sections of the Act unconstitutional and there-
fore either void or inapplicable. Furthermore, individual parliamentarians and 
opposition party members increasingly launched parliamentary enquiries and 
made suggestions for law reform to the respective governing coalitions to no 
avail. Despite obvious and widespread discontent with the Transsexual Act and 
with exception of the Bill on Transsexual Law Reform, which was devised and 
quashed, the respective federal governments have been unwilling to seriously 
engage with transsexual law reform.
Furthermore, demands for a more individualised and self-determined ap-
proach to trans did not lead to less psycho-medical surveillance and health 
insurance obstacles and increased options for a flexible and self-determined 
use of medical and surgical interventions covered by statutory health insur-
ances. Instead, instructions of the MDS e. g. reinforced a uniform regimen 
with a fixed timeframe for psychotherapeutic and psychiatric treatment prior to 
any rather rigid sequence of medical and surgical interventions (MDS 2009), 
while at the same time insisting that every individual step requires assessment. 
These developments rendered particularly those individuals vulnerable who re-
lied on health insurance coverage of medical and surgical interventions. These 
factors inform ATME e. V.’s concepts and policies.
Conceptual differentiation: Terminolog y
Unlike the dgti e. V., TransMann e. V., the TGNB and TrIQ e. V., ATME e. V. 
embraces the term ›transsexuality‹. The organisation employs the terms ›Trans-
sexualität‹ (transsexuality), or more specifically ›transsexuelle Frau‹ (transsexu-
al woman) or ›transsexueller Mann‹ (transsexual man), respectively, to describe 
the subjects it claims to represent (ATME/MUT 2008: 5). At the same time, 
ATME e. V.’s concept of transsexuality differs from sexological meanings in 
several ways.
Concepts prior to, and during the law reform process 221
Conceptual differentiation: Concepts of gender and transsexualit y
Other than refuting the notion that a person’s gender can be determined ex-
ternally and the assumption that an individual’s identity can be derived from 
his or her genitalia, ATME e. V.’s concepts of gender and transsexuality have 
little in common with those of the aforementioned organisations. Rather, 
ATME e. V. endorses an essentialist, homogenising and pathologising concept 
of transsexuality and only by implication questions the gender binary.
ATME e. V. endorses an essentialist, ahistorical, species-transcending con-
cept of gender and transsexuality. The organisation claims that transsexual-
ity is innate and immutable: »Scientific research is convinced by now that the 
gender identity is determined before birth and cannot be changed after birth.« 
(ATME 2010: 51)108 ATME e. V. argues that transsexuality occurs in all cultures 
and has done so at all times (ibid 2010a: 1; 2011b).109 Spokeswomen of the as-
sociation suggest that, »transsexual behaviour can also be observed […] among 
animals« (ibid 2013: 51).110
Consequently, ATME e. V. refutes social constructionist or deconstruction-
ist approaches to gender and, more specifically, transsexuality or any approach 
that suggests that transsexuality develops cumulatively. The organisation ar-
gues that the latter are either »nonsense« (ATME 2015b) or »ideological« (ibid 
2010: 22 and 29). The association relies on the premises and (assumed) find-
ings of neuroscientific research and research in human genetics instead, argu-
ing that this type of research produces »scientific facts« (ibid 2013: 56).111
108 | In a later report, ATME e. V. however claimed that gender identity »is not very 
suitable to describe the problems of transsexual people«. According to ATME e. V., 
[t]ranssexuality is not about what you do, it’s about who you are« (ATME 2012b: 5).
109 | While individuals who do not identify with the gender assigned at birth exist in other 
several other cultures, too, different societies offer different interpretive patterns and in-
dividuals develop different concepts of self, use different terms to describe themselves 
and experience historically-specific forms of discrimination and/or social recognition and 
appreciation.
110 | For an analysis and critique of applying human concepts of gender on animals, see 
Ebeling 2011.
111 | However, neuroscientific research and research in human genetics are informed 
by gender discourses circulating in society. With few exceptions (cf. Luders et al. 2009), 
studies on the aetiology of transsexuality to date in the abovementioned fields for example 
share the assumptions that cis is normal and transsexuality pathological. This notion is 
mirrored in frequently used attributes such as ›healthy‹ for men and women whose gender 
identity appear to follow from male and female genitalia (see, e. g., Hulshoff Pol et al. 
2006) and by referring to transsexuality as a ›gender identity disorder‹ (see, e. g. Kruijver 
et al. 2000; Bentz et al. 2007; Bentz et al. 2008; Bauer 2010).
»
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Results of neuro-biological studies to date do not allow firm conclusions 
to be drawn (Nieder/Jordan/Richter-Appelt 2011: 205; Cubasch undated) and 
at best allow to generate hypotheses (Nieder/Jordan/Richter-Appelt 2011: 216). 
Nevertheless, ATME e. V. interprets the findings as though they either provide 
evidence for a biological basis of transsexuality (ATME 2009: 9; 2010: 15; 2011b; 
2013: 6) or at the very least render such a conclusion highly probable (ATME/
MUT112 2008: 7).113
ATME e. V. adopts assumptions on gender as given and polarised entities 
as they feature in several studies on transsexuality in neuroendocrinology and 
human genetics (cf. ATME 2013). Based on the premise that prenatal hormo-
nal processes configure male and female brains differently (ATME 2013: 24) in 
conjunction with the assumption that »transsexual women are really women, 
because they have an anatomically female brain« (ibid 2012a: 3), ATME e. V. 
defines transsexual individuals as people whose genitalia and chromosomes do 
not correspond with their »brain sex« (ibid: 2011a).
According to ATME e. V., gender consists of multiple factors, such as go-
nads, genitalia, hormones and the brain. While an arbitrarily chosen physical 
feature such as e. g. genitalia may indicate a person’s gender, it is according to 
ATME e. V. the brain that determines an individual’s gender identity (ATME/
MUT 2008: 2; ATME 2009: 32; 2010: 51; 2011b). Hence, »[a] transsexual women 
who was born as a girl with a penis and testicles is a woman. A transsexual man 
who was born with a uterus and a vagina is a man.« (ATME 2009: 32)
Since the development is according to ATME e. V. based on biological fac-
tors that are either invisible or at least not immediately visible, the association 
112 | ATME e. V. emerged from the group »Menschenrecht und Geschlecht« (Human Right 
and Transsexuality; MUT) (ATME 2009: 32).
113 | For example, neuroendocrine studies by Zhou et al. (1995) and Kruijver et al. (2000) 
suggest that the volume of transsexual women’s central subdivision of the bed nucleus of 
the stria terminalis (BSTc) (Zhou et al. 1995) or the number of somatostatin-expressing 
neurons in the BSTc (Kruijver et al. 2000), respectively, are equal to those of ciswomen 
rather than men’s. Both research teams interpreted their findings as supportive of the 
hypothesis that transsexuality develops in interaction between the developing prenatal 
brain and sex hormones (Zhou et al. 1995: 70; Kruijver et al. 2000). Research from within 
the discipline and by sexologists alike have challenged these studies. Chung, De Vries and 
Swaab’s neuroendocrine study for instance generated different findings. The researchers 
suggest that sex dimorphism in the BSTc begins at puberty (Chung/De Vries/Swaab 
2002: 1031) and may also be shaped by experience (ibid: 1032). Sigusch questioned the 
abovementioned studies for methodological reasons (cf. Sigusch 2007: 352). Regardless 
of these critical interventions, ATME e. V. insists that the initially mentioned studies 
indicate a neuro-biological cause of transsexuality (ATME 2012a: 3; see also 2013: 6; 
43; 2010: 15).
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claims that only the individual itself can impart reliable information on his or 
her gender identity (ibid; 2011; 2011b; 2013: 5). ATME e. V. argues that while gen-
der assignments based on the inspection of the genitalia at the time of birth fre-
quently apply, in a case of transsexuality, however, a gender assignment based 
on genitalia at birth leads to physical and emotional distress and violates a per-
son’s dignity (ibid 2010: 82 f.; 2011; 2011c: 25; 2012: 47 f.).
While ATME e. V. does not consistently subsume transsexuality under in-
tersexuality, there are three indicators suggesting that the organisation toys 
with such a classification. First and based on the assumption that the brain 
develops in another direction than e. g. the genitalia, ATME e. V. assumes that 
there is a somatic cause of transsexuality that causes distress (ibid 2012a: 22). 
Second, in its report to the WHO in 2012 and its compendium on the develop-
ment of transsexuality in 2013, ATME e. V. quotes researchers who argue that 
transsexuality is a form of intersexuality (ibid: 14; 2013: 53), without however 
commenting on this assumption. Finally, ATME e. V. tentatively suggests that, 
»[i]n all likelihood, transsexuality is a form of intersexuality« (ibid 2010: 82) 
and that, »[t]hat transsexuality is a natural sex variation« (ibid 2015c).
However, in other instances, ATME e. V. distinguishes between transsexu-
ality and intersexuality. This distinction occurs in the 2012 report against re-
parative therapies in children featuring gender expressions and identities that 
are conventionally associated with the other of the two socially accepted gen-
ders (ibid 2012: 14). The same applies to ATME’s second UPR human rights 
report in 2012: »But in contrast to intersex people transsexual people are sexual 
normvariances [sic!] whose variation is considered as being outside the measur-
ability of sex, along the following lines: Those who aren’t able to prove who they 
are, are people who only have ›subjective feelings‹.« (Ibid 2012b: 1; cf. ibid 2015c)
ATME e. V. frames transsexuality as a pathological condition by invoking 
the concept of the ›wrong body‹, by suggesting classifying transsexuality as a 
somatic disorder and suggesting that the distress requires treatment. The or-
ganisation describes a »transsexual woman […] [as] a woman from birth on and 
a transsexual man […] [as] a man from birth an [sic!] – just born with the wrong 
gonads« (ibid 2010: 51). ATME e. V. suggests to create a somatic classification 
Q 57.0 in the ICD or to subsume transsexuality under »congenital dysplasia, 
deformities and chromosomal anomalies« (ibid 2009: 30; 2010: 84). Finally, 
ATME e. V. argues that transsexual individuals’ distress can only be mitigated 
by »adapting as far as medically possible the deviating body parts and organs to 
the real gender« (ibid 2012a: 22).
At the same time, ATME e. V. vehemently opposes the psychopathologisa-
tion of transsexuality. The organisation holds that so far there is no scientific 
evidence for considering transsexuality a mental disorder (ibid 2010: 65; 2012a: 
12, 18). Drawing upon Seikowski’s representative study on trans individuals’ 
need for psychotherapy, ATME e. V. suggests that transsexual individuals are 
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no more »mentally disturbed« than anybody else (ibid 2012a: 15). ATME e. V. 
argues that classifying transsexuality as a gender identity disorder violates hu-
man dignity (ibid 2010: 44; 2011; 2012a: 17 f.). Therefore, the organisation de-
mands removing the diagnosis transsexuality (F64.0) as a psychiatric disorder 
from the ICD and the diagnosis ›gender identity disorders‹ from the DSM (ibid 
2008: 1; 2011b; 2011c; 2010: 84).
ATME e. V. paints a rather homogeneous picture of transsexuality. The 
organisation for example generalises the need for surgery. This assumption 
is mirrored in the following statement: »German health insurance funds and 
insurance companies often refuse to pay for the costs of treatments otherwise 
provisioned in the Standards of Treating and Assessing Transsexuals. This 
contradicts scientific knowledge regarding the necessity of sex alignment pro-
cedures in cases of transsexuality.« (Ibid 2010: 63)
ATME e. V. also subscribes to a policy of ›passing‹. The association suggests 
that all medical and surgical measures possible should be considered necessary 
interventions. ATME e. V. argues that the head, here meaning the face, hair, 
voice and throat, constitute the most significant sex characteristics in everyday 
life.114 ATME e. V. holds that transsexual individuals’ distress caused by living 
›in the wrong body‹ and social discrimination against transsexual individuals 
can only be mitigated or prevented by granting access to all possible measures 
(ibid 2010: 68 f.). As an effect of this policy, individuals are left to fend for them-
selves, who for various reasons cannot, or do not want to undergo medical and/
or surgical treatment.
In addition, ATME e. V.’s concept is biased towards white transsexual in-
dividuals as evidenced when ATME e. V. conflates transphobia with racism. 
ATME e. V. claims that the discrimination against transsexual individuals is 
the »most widespread global form of racism of our days« (ibid: 15) and suggests 
that, »this racism is associated with a sort of worldwide ›race ideology‹ that 
isn’t propagandized by National Socialists, but rather is spread worldwide by 
unscrupulous doctors and psychologists. To view humans as inferior, mentally 
disordered or non-intelligent due to their physical otherness is racism of the 
worst kind.« (Ibid: 15 f.) While racism and transphobia are based on the crea-
tion of differences and ascriptions in order to legitimate the unequal distribu-
tion of resources and violence, they are different relations of power with differ-
114 | According to the relevant guidelines generated by the MDS in 2009, statutory 
health insurances do not cover facelifts, rhinoplasties and liposuction, because they are 
considered cosmetic interventions (MDS 2009: 14). In exceptional cases, statutory health 
insurances may take on the costs of phonosurgery prior to the ›real life test‹ (ibid: 29). 
Although the MDS holds that a chondrolaryngoplasty is primarily a cosmetic intervention, 
it does not entirely rule out that the statutory health insurance cover the costs of such an 
intervention in cases of female-to-male transsexuality (ibid: 30).
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ent historically-specific manifestations (de Silva 2014: 162). The conflation of 
transphobia and racism renders invisible transsexual individuals whose lives 
are affected by transphobia and racism.
The gender binary does not seem to be the declared target of ATME e. V. 
Rather, the association focuses on having transsexuality recognised as a bio-
logically based, innate and unalterable condition as a means to end human 
rights violations and discrimination against transsexual individuals (ATME 
2010: 69 f.; 2012a: 22). ATME e. V. identifies sexology, legal and medical reg-
ulations, practices and classifications and the premises they build upon, the 
media, Christianity and its institutions and public opinion and discrimination 
in education and at work as the prime sources of discrimination against trans-
sexual individuals (ibid 2010: 17-36).
3.2.3 Trans perspectives on legal rules, procedures 
 and practices and psycho-medical premises, procedures 
 and practices
Despite representing very different concepts of gender and trans, or transsex-
uality, respectively, the trans organisations operating on a national scale and 
the local networks mentioned earlier on voice considerable dissatisfaction with 
the provisions and procedures under the Transsexual Act and psycho-medical 
premises and procedures. The issues that contributed to, and in part continue 
to fuel this discontent will be addressed in the following.
Trans perspectives on legal rules, procedures and practices
Since their very foundation, trans organisations have voiced grievances over 
four sets of issues related to legal rules, procedures and practices. These are hu-
man rights breaches entailed in the Transsexual Act, procedures laid out in its 
individual provisions and the implementation, concepts of transsexuality that 
inform the wording and practices that are not necessarily covered by the Act but 
nevertheless occur to the detriment of trans individuals.
Trans organisations hold that several rules of the Transsexual Act violate 
human rights, which are supposed to be protected by a number of fundamental 
rights laid down in the Basic Law. The rules of the TSG at issue are the provi-
sions that define the preconditions for submitting an application for a change 
of first names (s. 1[1] TSG)115 and gender status (ss. 8[1]1-4 TSG), and the condi-
tions that lead to the nullity of a change of first names (ss. 7[1]1-2 TSG) as well 
115 | Section 1(1)3 TSG which provides that an applicant needs to be at least 25 years 
of age for a change of first names was successfully challenged in 1993. The Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that this particular provision is incompatible with Art. 3(1) GG 
and void (BVerfG 1993: 112).
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as the use of expert reports in s. 4(3) TSG.116 The basic rights that these rules 
are considered to contravene in various constellations are the inviolability of a 
person’s dignity guaranteed by Art. 1(1) GG, the right to the free development of 
one’s personality (Art. 2[1] GG), the right to life and physical integrity (Art. 2[2] 
GG), the equality of men and women (Art. 3[2] GG), the right not to be dis-
criminated against on the basis of gender (Art. 3[3] GG) and the right to state 
protection of marriage and family (Art. 6[1] GG).
After defining the gender of individuals who may apply under the Act, s. 1(1)1 
TSG specifies the scope of individuals entitled to apply under the Act. The rule 
includes German citizens according to the Basic Law, stateless or homeless 
foreigners with common residency or persons entitled to asylum or foreign 
refugees with a place of residence in the area of the validity of the law. Trans or-
ganisations critically point out to the constitutionally problematic exclusion of 
transsexual refugees from the provisions under the Transsexual Act. The latter 
lose their status as refugees as soon as the conditions apply for a return to the 
home country, regardless of whether the respective individual, who may there-
after have obtained exceptional leave to remain is in the process of transitioning 
medically and surgically or not. The activist Alter argues that this situation is 
incommensurate with human rights (Alter 2007).117
Sections 7(1)1 and 7(1)2 TSG and s. 8(1)3 TSG are among the provisions of 
the Act that either regulate the conditions under which the decision to change 
first names becomes invalid (ss. 7[1]1-2 TSG) or the preconditions for a change 
of gender status, respectively (s. 8[1]3 TSG). Section 7(1)1 TSG rules that the 
decision which led to the applicant’s change of first names is reversed when 
a child is born to the applicant three hundred and two days after the decision 
to change the first names has entered into effect, starting with the day of the 
child’s birth. The same applies when the applicant’s parentage of a child has 
been recognised or declared by a court after the same period of time, begin-
ning with the recognition or the legal effect of the declaration (s. 7[1]2 TSG). 
116 | In the meantime, the Federal Constitutional Court declared several of the provisions 
of the Transsexual Act unconstitutional and either void or inapplicable. While the Federal 
Constitutional Court decisions will be pointed out to in the footnotes in this section, the 
following chapter will deal with the cases in more detail.
117 | On 18 July 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that s. 1(1)1 TSG 
contravenes the non-discrimination precept (Art. 3[1] GG) in combination with the basic 
right to the free development of one’s personality (Art. 2[1] in conjunction with Art. 1[1] 
GG), when it excludes foreign transsexual individuals who are legally and not only 
temporarily staying in Germany from the right to apply for a change of first names and 
gender status according to s. 8(1)1 TSG, provided that their respective right of residence 
does not have comparable regulations (BVerfG 2007: 14).
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As mentioned in the systematic outline of the Transsexual Act, s. 8(1)3 TSG 
rules that a court declares the applicant a member of the ›other‹ gender on 
application of a person, provided he or she is permanently sterile. Trans organi-
sations oppose these provisions, arguing that the right to procreate or to bear 
children is a human right (ATME 2010: 55; TransMann 2001) and that forcing 
individuals to undergo sterilisation violates the right to health (ATME 2009a: 
9; 2010: 53).118
Sections 7(1)3 TSG and 8(1)2 TSG determine further reasons for revok-
ing a decision to change first names (s. 7[1]3 TSG) or define prerequisites for 
a revision of gender status, respectively, that are considered to infringe upon 
constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights. Section 7(1)3 TSG specifies that the 
court decision to grant the applicant’s change of first names becomes invalid 
when he or she marries.119 Section 8(1)2 TSG provides that the court declare
118 | ATME e. V. attributes the sterility requirement outlined in s. 8(1)3 TSG to remnants 
of National Socialist policies in the Federal Republic of Germany. In its human rights 
report Transsexual People in Germany/Transsexuelle Menschen in Deutschland, ATME 
e. V. notes with reference to the verdicts of the National Socialist Hereditary Health Courts 
(Erbgesundheitsgerichte): »In this context, it is nearly blood-curdling that the German 
Transsexuals Act also arose under the influence of the German Society for Sex Research 
and there exists to this day transsexuals who were force sterilized, similar to the »law 
for the prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring [Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken 
Nachwuchses; insertion mine] from 1933. In this way, Nazi ideologies live on to this day 
in Germany, especially with regard to the Transsexuals Act and the medical treatment of 
transsexual people.« (ATME 2010: 24) 
However, the parliamentar y debate on the Transsexual Bill suggests that the legislator 
was more concerned about maintaining the link between a person’s sex/gender and 
reproductive function. In its response to the parliamentary enquiry by Schenk and the 
parliamentary faction of the Democratic Socialist Party (Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus; PDS; since 16 June 2007 DIE LINKE; The Left) on 31 July 2002, the then 
governing Christian Democratic and Free Democratic Party coalition reiterated this 
»cultural dogma« (Alter 2007) that women may not procreate and men may not bear 
children (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 7). Moreover, the sterility prerequisite was 
also demanded of transsexual individuals in Sweden, which suggests that compulsory 
sterilisation is rather an effect of a gender regime than National Socialist ideology. This 
does however not mean that it renders the prerequisite less of a breach of human rights.
119 | On 06 Dec. 2005, the Federal Constitutional Court declared s. 7(1)3 TSG inappli-
cable, since it violates a homosexual transsexual individual’s right to a name, i. e. a basic 
right that is protected under Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG and constitution-
ally guaranteed privacy rights as long as the respective individual is barred from entering 
a legally secured partnership without losing the first name, that corresponds with his or 
her own sense of gender belonging (BVerfG 2006: 102).
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the applicant a member of the ›other‹ gender on the condition that he or she is 
unmarried.120
Trans organisations argue that these provisions force transsexual individu-
als to either forgo the right to enter (s. 7[1]3 TSG) or to maintain a marriage 
(s. 8[1]3 TSG), respectively, in return for the constitutionally protected rights 
under Art. 1(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 2(1) GG or vice versa (Alter 2000; 
2007). Moreover, trans organisations suggest that s. 8(1)3 TSG conflicts with 
ss. 1565-1568 BGB, which define the conditions for getting divorced. A divorce 
is premised upon the breakdown of a marital relationship. Hence, transsexual 
individuals and their respective partners wishing to continue to live together do 
not fulfil the conditions for a divorce (ibid 2007; MUT 2007: 8).
Section 8(1)4 TSG requires of the applicant to have undergone a surgical 
intervention on his or her external sex characteristics to the effect of having 
clearly approximated the outer appearance of the ›other‹ gender.121 As in the 
case of s. 8(1)3 TSG, the legislator did not define the concrete measures required 
to fulfil the prerequisites for a formal change of gender status. However, nei-
ther of these conditions for a revision of gender status can be met without in-
vasive means, unless the applicant is for other reasons unable to procreate or 
bear children.
Trans organisations oppose to these requirements. They argue that ss. 8(1)3 
TSG and 8(1)4 TSG violate a person’s dignity and physical integrity and conse-
quently contravene Articles 2(1) and (2) GG in conjunction with s. 1(1) GG (Alter 
2000; 2007; TransMann 2001: 6; ATME 2010: 59). The organisations hold that 
nobody but the person concerned can determine, whether genital surgery is 
necessary (TransMann 2001; Ghattas 2009). In addition and considering the 
medical risks and the risk of poor surgical results, which contrary to medi-
cal rhetoric affect transmen and transwomen alike (TransMann 2000: 6; Alter 
2000), the organisations hold that the legislator should not be entitled to render 
surgery mandatory for a revision of gender status (TransMann 2001).
Trans organisations also criticise the narrow focus on surgery in general. 
TransMann e. V. argues that transgender is too complex a phenomenon than 
that it could be reduced to measures that modify an individual’s body (Trans-
Mann 2001). In particular, the dgti e. V., ATME e. V. and TransMann e. V. 
criticise the focus on genital surgery, especially since genitalia are usually not 
discernible in public (Alter 2007; ATME 2009a: 7; TransMann 2001). Finally, 
120 | This particular section may no longer be applied. On 27 May 2008, the Federal 
Constitutional Court decided that s. 8(1)2 TSG was incompatible with Art. 2(1) GG in 
conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG and Art. 6 (1) GG (BVerfG 2008: 312).
121 | On 11 Jan. 2011, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that to require sterility and 
surgical measures of a person who wishes to enter a registered life partnership violates 
Art. 2(1) and Art. 2(2) GG in conjunction with Art. 1 GG (BVerfG 2011).
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the dgti e. V. suggests that the requirement of genital surgery violates Art. 3(1) 
GG, since transwomen and transmen are not treated alike in this respect (Alter 
2000).122
Section 4(3) TSG rules that the court may only grant an application accord-
ing to s.1 TSG after it has obtained reports by two experts who are, »based 
on their training and their professional experience sufficiently familiar with 
the specific problems of transsexualism«. According to trans organisations, a 
heteronomous assignment to a gender violates the constitutionally protected 
dignity of a person (Art. 1[1] GG) and his or her right to develop his or her per-
sonality freely (Art. 2 [1] GG), since gender identity is a part of an individual’s 
personality (ATME 2010: 50; TransMann 2001).123
Trans organisations also criticise the procedures defined in the Transsexual 
Act and the deficient implementation. The provisions at issue here are in par-
ticular the parties involved in the proceedings (s. 3[2] TSG), the court proceed-
ings (ss. 4[1] and [3] TSG) and the prohibition of disclosure (s. 5[1] TSG).
Section 3(2) TSG determines that the applicant (s. 3[2]1) and the representa-
tive of the public interest (s. 3[2]2)124 are the only parties involved in the pro-
ceedings. Trans organisations hold that the representative of the public interest 
is not only dispensable, but unnecessarily contributes to delays in the court 
proceedings (Alter 2007).
Section 4(1) TSG rules that proceedings under the Transsexual Act follow 
the regulations provided for family matters and non-contentious jurisdiction. 
122 | Until the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the mandatory surgery provision 
was unconstitutional, transwomen and transmen were treated differently for three rea-
sons. First, and as pointed out in chapter 2.3.3, the legislator at the time wanted to avoid 
homosexual marriages and genital sex among male-bodied individuals. Second, the sur-
gical construction of phalloplasties was considered insufficiently developed. Third and 
partly due to the abovementioned reasons, transmen successfully litigated against man-
datory genital surgery (see chapter 3.3.4).
123 | As the trans organisations note, this provision has additional effects. First, it cre-
ates a difference between ›normal‹ individuals and transsexual individuals, since the lat-
ter are required to have their gender identity approved of by psychologists (Ghattas 2009: 
2) instead of leaving it up to transsexual individuals themselves to decide which gender 
they identify with (TransMann 2001). Second, law and medicine have become amalga-
mated in practice. While it is possible to obtain a change of first names without having 
to undergo medical and surgical treatment, experts frequently do not write supportive 
reports, if the individual signalises that he or she does not want to transition physically 
(ibid). Furthermore, experts have transformed a procedure that was initially devised to 
facilitate a transition into a »steeplechase« (ibid).
124 | Based on statutory instruments, the governments of the Länder determine the 
representative of the public interest (s. 3[3] TSG).
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Hence, individuals who apply for a change of first names and/or a revision of 
gender status are required to pay for the court proceedings and to take on the 
costs for the expert reports. Trans organisations object to the facts that a court 
procedure is required to this end, especially since these entries were initially 
based on a heteronomous administrative act and that, depending on the respec-
tive trans individual’s income,125 either the applicant or the taxpayers have to 
pay for these costs (ibid; TransMann 2001; ATME 2010: 48).
As mentioned earlier on, s. 4(3) TSG rules that the court proceedings rely 
on expert reports. In addition to considering this provision unconstitutional 
and a source of considerable delay, trans organisations argue that transsexual-
ity cannot be diagnosed, albeit for different reasons. The dgti e. V., for exam-
ple, argues that transsexuality cannot be diagnosed, because it is not a disease. 
Rather, transsexuality deviates from a standardised concept of human being 
(Alter 2008). Hence, if transsexuality cannot be diagnosed, examinations 
by experts do not make sense (Alter 2000). In line with its premises that in 
the case of transsexuality, a person’s sex cannot be easily measured and that, 
»[o]ur knowledge on variations of sex tells us that transsexual individuals exist 
in nature« (ATME 2012a: 3), ATME e. V. argues that transsexual individuals’ 
statements on behalf of themselves are true (ibid).
Section 5 TSG provides for the prohibition of disclosure, which was devised 
to protect the privacy rights of transsexual individuals (s. 5[1] TSG) as well as 
their next of kin (s. 5[2] and [3] TSG). Section 5(1) TSG rules that if the decision 
that changed the applicant’s first names is legally binding, it is prohibited to 
disclose or conduct research on the applicant’s first names at the time of the de-
cision, unless special reasons pertaining to the public interest or legal matters 
require this information. Trans organisations criticise that official notices, such 
as e. g. election voting cards, are frequently addressed to the respective individ-
ual, using the new first names and the address of the official gender status. The 
dgti e. V., ATME e. V. and its predecessor MUT claim that this and similar
procedures are impermissible and discriminate against transsexual individu-
als (dgti 2007; ATME/MUT 2008: 4).126
Considerable dissatisfaction also arises with the wording of the Act. Trans 
organisations in particular object to the narrow focus of the Act, the concept 
of transsexuality it endorses and the imprecise, if not unanswerable questions 
they pose for the experts in ss. 1(1) and 1(1)2 TSG.
125 | Individuals with a low income may apply for legal aid.
126 | On 15 Aug. 1996, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Art. 2(1) GG in 
conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG demands that the gender-specific address that correlates 
with a person’s first names be used with individuals who have changed their first names 
according to the ›small solution‹ (BVerfG 1997: 1632).
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Section 1(1)2 TSG rules that the first names of a person who due to his or 
her »transsexual imprinting« no longer identifies with the gender recorded in 
the birth entry but with the ›other‹ gender and who has since three years felt 
compelled to live according to his or her ideas are to be changed on application 
to the court, if it can be expected with a high degree of probability that the sense 
of belonging to the ›other‹ gender will not change anymore.127
Trans organisations criticise the narrow scope of the Transsexual Act. The 
formulation »belonging to the other gender« only makes sense against the 
background of the gender binary. Hence, an individual who does not identify 
with the gender in the birth entry nor with the other of the two legitimised op-
tions or with both of them is excluded from the provisions of the Transsexual 
Act (Alter 2007).
Discontent with the concept of transsexuality is threefold. First, trans or-
ganisations reject the concept of ›transsexual imprinting‹. The latter suggests 
that extraneous influences cause transsexuality. As the dgti e. V. and ATME 
e. V. suggest, upbringing or any other extraneous influence could so far not be 
substantiated (Alter 2007; ATME 2009: 10).
Second, the section mirrors the legislator’s assumption that it is possible 
to diagnose transsexuality. The activist Alter argues that all attempts to estab-
lish general criteria for transsexuality have so far failed. As mentioned earlier 
on, she suggests that transsexuality is a self-diagnosis, which can only be sup-
ported by a differential diagnosis (Alter 2007). 
Third, the Transsexual Act leaves it up to experts other than the applicant 
him- or herself to decide whether a person is transsexual or not, a procedure 
ATME e. V. considers demeaning and humiliating (ATME 2011c: 20). This how-
ever means that individuals who do not fulfil the criteria listed under the diag-
nosis ›transsexualism‹ (F 64.0), such as e. g. those who reject genital surgery, 
can be denied a change of first names and gender status (Alter 2007). 
Trans organisations also consider formulations, such as »who has since 
three years been compelled to live according to his or her ideas« and »with 
a high degree of probability« problematic. Both formulations are imprecise. 
127 | Three questions can be derived from these requirements, which experts are 
expected to answer in their reports on an individual who has applied for a change of first 
names according to s. 1 TSG. The first question enquires into the applicant’s gender 
identity, more specifically, whether the applicant is transsexual. The second question 
asks whether the applicant has felt compelled to live according to the ›other‹ gender for 
three years. The third question asks of the expert to predict whether the applicant’s sense 
of belonging to the ›other‹ gender will with a high degree of probability not change anymore 
(MDS 2009: 11; Alter 2008a).
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While the former gives experts the opportunity to define the criteria for the 
›compulsion‹,128 the latter cannot be measured objectively (ibid).
Trans organisations also voice dissatisfaction with legal practices that ex-
ceed the provisions of the Act. Trans organisations particularly criticise the 
process of selecting experts as well as procedural errors and discrimination at 
court. With regard to the selection of experts, ATME e. V. states that, »a judge 
must simply be satisfied that a person is suitable to be an expert. A special skill 
or training is not necessary.« (ATME 2011c: 10)
The dgti e. V. points out to a number of procedural errors and discriminatory 
practices at court. Although e. g. s. 4(3) TSG specifies that experts are required 
to work independently of each other, the dgti e. V. observed that some judges 
order reports consecutively instead of simultaneously and send the first report 
to the second expert (Alter 2008a). In other instances, judges make judgmental 
comments on the applicant’s gender performance. Frequently, trans individu-
als who have obtained a change of first names are addressed incorrectly on the 
grounds that the experienced gender is not yet legally valid (ibid 2000).
Trans perspectives on psycho-medical premises, procedures 
and practices
Trans organisations’ concepts of trans or transsexuality, respectively, and no-
tions of good medical practices frequently collide with psycho-medical assump-
tions, procedures and practices. Despite considerable differences among trans 
organisations, they object to (psycho)pathologising psycho-medical premises, 
heteronomous definitions and procedures and practices perceived to be degrad-
ing. These issues will be addressed, using the German Standards, the most 
recent MDS instructions on transsexuality and practices performed by psycho-
medical experts in the assessment process according to ss. 1(1)1 TSG, 8(1)3-8(1)4 
TSG.
The German Standards and the MDS instructions classify transsexuality as 
a »special form of gender identity disorder« (Becker et al. 1997: 147) or simply »a 
gender identity disorder« (MDS 2009: 3). In addition, both guidelines assume 
that transsexual individuals feature additional psychopathological »abnormali-
ties« (Becker et al. 1997: 149; MDS 2009: 8). Unlike the German Standards, 
however, the MDS instructions specify that psychiatric comorbidities need to 
be reassessed when dealing with »transsexual disorders« (MDS 2009: 8).
The classification of transsexuality as a gender identity disorder is not ac-
ceptable to trans organisations who consider trans or transsexuality as one of 
many possible ways of expressing gender (cf. TrIQ undated a: 11) or a way of 
128 | Some experts have come to interpret this particular formulation to the effect that 
the transsexual individual is required to have lived according to the conventions of the 
›other‹ gender for three years (Alter 2008a).
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being human (cf. dgti 1998: 1; TransMann 2001). The same applies to organi-
sations, such as ATME e. V., who understand transsexuality to be a somatic 
disorder (ATME 2010: 51). As ATME e. V. suggests, »[t]o foist a psychic disorder 
on a mentally healthy transsexual individual, because the occurrence of trans-
sexuality does not fit into his world view is injustice« (ATME 2009a: 9).
Unlike the German Standards, the MDS instructions formally adopt a less 
homogenising concept of transsexuality. While the definitions of transsexual-
ity initially resemble each other,129 the MDS instructions differentiate between 
›primary‹ and ›secondary‹ transsexualism, of which the former signifies a gen-
der identity disorder beginning in childhood or adolescence, while the latter 
emerges in early adulthood to middle aged individuals (MDS 2009: 7).
Despite this slightly broader concept of transsexuality, the concept endorsed 
by the MDS is incompatible with a concept of gender fluidity (cf. TGNB 2006a), 
a variable construction (cf. dgti undated f) or a concept of transsexuality as an 
innate und immutable condition (cf. ATME 2010: 51). Moreover, the MDS in-
structions continue to distinguish between transsexualism and transvestitism. 
While TransMann e. V. suggests that this distinction cannot be maintained 
(TransMann 2004a), ATME e. V. implicitly insists on such a distinction (ATME 
2015c).
Like the German Standards, the MDS instructions reinforce psycho-med-
ical surveillance and underline the role of (sole) psycho-medical expertise. 
Couched in paternalism, the MDS instructions demand that any somatic in-
tervention needs to be preceded by psychiatric or psychotherapeutic treatment 
(MDS 2009: 9). The MDS instructions have in common with the German 
Standards that they demand a fixed schedule for psychological observation and 
a ›real life test‹ of at least twelve months prior to hormone treatment (ibid 18) 
and eighteen months before surgical measures may be undertaken (ibid 23).
Against the background of a radical claim to self-determination and chal-
lenges to (sole) psycho-medical expertise, all nation-wide trans organisations 
and the local networks mentioned earlier on oppose these specifications. Trans-
Mann e. V. and the dgti e. V. suggest that psychological support and living ac-
cording to the respective gender role might be helpful in individual cases. How-
ever, they hold that neither a psychotherapy, nor a ›real life test‹ may be forced 
upon transsexual individuals (Alter 1998; TransMann 2004a). Similarly, ATME 
129 | The MDS instructions define transsexualism as follows: »The permanent certainty 
of belonging to the biologically other sex, the rejection of the role expectations that are 
associated with the biological sex and the pressing desire to live socially and legally 
recognised in the desired gender characterises transsexualism. The necessity to align 
the physical appearance to the gender identity as far as possible, using hormonal and 
surgical measures, results from a rejection of the characteristics of the innate sex to 
various degrees.« (MDS 2009: 7)
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e. V. rejects psycho-medical assessments (ATME 2010: 82 f.),130 and a ›real life 
test‹ (cf. ibid 2010: 62).131
While the MDS instructions, unlike the German Standards, formally ap-
pear to account for individualised approaches to medical and surgical inter-
ventions, the approach has little in common with demands brought forward 
by trans organisations. Trans organisations demand not to indiscriminately 
expect certain medical or surgical measures to be undertaken and to grant 
medical or surgical interventions to trans individuals who need them (cf. 
TransMann 2004a). While the guidelines claim that the expert assessment is 
foremost informed by an appropriate case-sensitive assessment (MDS 2009: 
17), the assessment procedure becomes more complicated for individuals who 
deviate from the standard route. The following statement on bilateral mastec-
tomies for transsexual men prior to the ›real life test‹ attests to this fact: »In 
special exceptional cases the bilateral mastectomy may for instance take place 
in advance in order to facilitate the real life test. This needs to be substantiated 
by an expert with reference to medical circumstances.« (Ibid 24)
Trans organisations also criticise malpractices that occur during the expert 
assessment period according to s. 4(3) TSG. Among these are e. g. physical ex-
aminations and the photographic documentation of the applicant’s genitalia,132 
procedures that because the genital status is irrelevant for a change of first 
names according to s. 1 TSG, are grossly inappropriate. Trans organisations 
claim that these practices encroach upon trans individuals’ privacy and violate 
Art. 1(1) GG (Alter 2008a; TransMann 2001).
Trans organisations report that these practices also occur during expert as-
sessments for a revision of gender status. While TransMann e. V. suggests that 
the verification that surgery has taken place should not be performed in front 
of medical students (TransMann 2001), MUT demands that no such verifica-
tion should take place at all (MUT 2007: 6 f.). In addition, trans organisations 
object to enquiries into an applicant’s sexual practices and orientation in the 
130 | ATME e. V. argues that it is so far »not possible to measure a person’s gender 
identity. […] Only each individual person is capable of determining the gender they belong 
to, their gender identity and the sex of the soul.« (ATME 2010: 82 f.)
131 | ATME e. V. considers a mandatory ›real life test‹ as a means of diagnostics cruel, 
inhumane and degrading. The means that render a ›real life test‹ possible, such as e. g. 
epilation for transsexual women are according to ATME e. V. frequently withheld (ATME 
2010: 61), hence forcing a transsexual woman »to make a fool of herself« (ATME/MUT 
2008: 6). At the same time, ATME e. V. suggests that it is necessary for transsexual 
individuals to gain sufficient self-awareness about their gender identities. However, this 
self-awareness ought to be achieved in a protected environment (ibid; ATME 2010: 62).
132 | See ATME 2011c for examples of humiliating and inappropriate conduct during 
assessment procedures.
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assessment situation for a change of first names and a revision of gender status 
and subjection to experts’ normative understandings of sexuality, masculinity 
or femininity (Alter 2000; 2007).133
3.2.4 Trans organising for social change
In the face of discrimination, all trans organisations mentioned earlier on 
strive for social change. Drawing upon the by-laws of trans organisations in 
Germany with a decidedly political agenda and using examples of their respec-
tive activities in the areas of support and outreach, information and education, 
and lobbying and networking, this subchapter addresses goals and means to 
achieve trans law reform, human rights and equality.
Support and outreach
With exception of the TGNB, the trans organisations mentioned above define 
support and outreach as one of three major areas of activity in their respec-
tive by-laws. The dgti e. V. states in ss. 2.4 and 2.5 of its by-laws that it intends 
to offer counselling services, assist support groups and promote training pro-
grammes for volunteers (dgti 1998: 1 f.). As the preamble of its by-laws sug-
gests, the organisation initially focussed on re(integrating) unemployed trans 
individuals into the labour process in order to counter the danger of downward 
mobility, which was at the time, and frequently continues to be, linked to a so-
cial change from one gender to another (ibid: 1).
As mentioned earlier on, TransMann e. V. was for lack of an infrastructure 
for transmen initially founded to establish regulars’ tables in order to create a 
space for transmen to exchange experiences and to discuss aims and problems 
(TransMann undated). However, as the by-laws of 2004 suggest, TransMann 
e. V. soon aimed to extend its activities in the area of support and outreach. 
Sections 2(8) and 2(9) of its by-laws state that TransMann e. V. is committed to 
providing a counselling centre (s. 2[9]), assisting local transmen’s groups and 
trans groups in general as well as organising conferences for trans individu-
als and anybody interested in trans persons (s. 2[9]) (TransMann 2004). Like 
the dgti e. V. (dgti 1998: 1), TransMann e. V. offers these support and outreach 
services to parents, relatives, partners and friends of trans individuals (Trans-
Mann undated).
In close collaboration with inbetween / AB Queer e. V. and the TGNB, TrIQ 
e. V. was among other things designed to offer professional counselling services 
in the areas of transgender, intersex and queer (TrIQ 2009b). As the local net-
work states in its by-laws, it e. g. aims at supporting trans- and intergender as 
133 | The dgti e. V. for instance reports that trans individuals have been denied a change 
of first names, because they got married and had children (Alter 2008a).
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well as queer individuals in personal and social crises (s. 2[3]) and campaigning 
for health education among the aforementioned target groups (TrIQ 2007: 1).
So far, the organisations mentioned above have initiated and maintained 
a number of activities in the areas of support and outreach. Among these are 
peer- and volunteer-based counselling services for adolescent and adult trans 
individuals, peers, partners and parents of children with an unusual gender 
performance;134 counselling on welfare issues (TrIQ 2013); online and print 
brochures providing information on social, medical and legal aspects of a 
transition;135 offering a space for groups that deal with issues, such as com-
ing out (TransMann undated b) or health promotion (TrIQ 2009b); hosting 
internet forums,136 conferences, such as the trans conference (Transtagung) in 
Berlin; emergency hotlines and organising hospital visitations (TransMann un-
dated b; ibid 2007).
While support and outreach are not the major area of ATME e. V.’s activities, 
ss. 2(1) and 2(2) of the by-laws suggest that the organisation strives to support 
transsexual individuals in need of help as well as parents and partners encoun-
tering difficulties when dealing with transsexuality (ATME 2011a). Section 2(3) 
of ATME e. V.’s by-laws specifies that consulting services, the establishment of, 
and involvement in local and regional facilities for transsexual individuals and 
e. g. their respective parents as well as training and supervising consultants 
and moderators are among the major forms of support and outreach ATME 
e. V. aims to provide (ibid).137 
While all trans organisations agree that trans individuals are discriminated 
against,138 the organisations convey different images of trans or transsexual 
individuals, respectively. TrIQ e. V. e. g. also mirrors trans individuals as self-
confident subjects, an attitude demonstrated in the motto of the 2012 trans con-
ference in Berlin that was announced as »Trans*? Selbstverständlich!« (Trans? 
Of course!). The poster features a compass, which points to directions that 
summarise the main values and principles the organisers stand for: visibility, 
freedom, self-determination, pride, self-confidence, respect, security and ac-
ceptance (Trans*tagung undated). In contrast, ATME e. V. portrays transsexual 
individuals as victims, which becomes evident in s. 2(1) of the organisation’s 
by-laws:
134 | See e. g. Alter undated; TrIQ undated b.
135 | See e. g. TransMann 2004a; ibid 2008.
136 | See e. g. dgti undated g.
137 | At the time of writing ATME e. V.’s website however does not indicate to which extent 
any of the envisaged activities have materialised so far.
138 | See, for instance, TGNB 2006; ATME 2011; TrIQ 2011a; dgti undated f: 2 f.; 
TransMann 2001.
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The purpose of the association is to press for the rights of people […] who are due to 
their physical or psychological features dependent on support, because they a) dislike 
themselves, b) live isolated lives for fear of discrimination, c) do not dare to defend 
themselves against human and civil rights violations, d) and do not have the courage to 
confide in other people. (ATME 2011a)
Information and education
All trans organisations mentioned in this chapter engage in the task of inform-
ing and educating the public on trans or issues related to trans, respectively. In 
the preamble of its by-laws, the dgti e. V. states its commitment to campaign 
»for more openness towards the own identity and to account for the diversity 
of human existence« (dgti 1998: 1). According to s. 2(3) of the by-laws, the as-
sociation intends to collect and provide information on transidentity and inter-
sexuality as a means to contribute to »a self-determined life of individuals with 
transidentity and intersexuality« (ibid).
Phrased almost identically, TransMann e. V. adds in s. 2(3) of its by-laws that 
it especially wishes to collect and disseminate knowledge on transmen (Trans-
Mann 2004: 10) with the goal of promoting the social visibility and acceptance 
of transmen (s. 2[4]). In another document, TransMann e. V. specifies the range 
of its planned activities and the means to achieve the abovementioned goal. The 
organisation intends to reach the general public, the media, the administration 
and courts, psychologists, physicians and health insurances, experts and clin-
ics, using personal consultations, information meetings, training in schools, 
universities and hospitals, the internet, brochures, radio interviews and public 
appearances in newspapers and on TV (ibid undated b).
Sections 2(5) to 2(7) of TrIQ e. V.’s by-laws specify the declared aims in the 
areas of information and education of the local network. These foremost consist 
of counselling and providing information on trans- and intergender as well 
as on queer ways of life (s. 2[5]), advocating and providing information on the 
abovementioned phenomena (s. 2[6]) and campaigning »for the promotion of 
research that respects the concerns of the emancipatory transgender and / or 
intersex movements« (s. 2[7]; TrIQ 2007: 1).
Setting out from a concept of diversity and a critical interrogation of the 
gender binary as a supposedly natural given, the TGNB outlines in its by-laws 
that it strives to present the various ways of life and the situation of transgender 
individuals in society, using public relations instruments (s. 3[1]), workgroups 
on general and current topics (s. 3[4]), a website (s. 3[5]) and a mailing list 
(s. 3[6]) as means (TGNB 2006h).
Based on the premise that it is scientifically verified that, »individuals who 
are born with organs of the other gender represent a part of natural variants of 
human life« (s. 2[4]) and that transsexual individuals have an innate core gen-
der identity that deviates from their physical properties (s. 2[5]), ATME e. V. de-
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fines as its purpose in the field of education and education »to inform the pub-
lic about transsexuality [and] to reduce widespread prejudices« (ATME 2011a). 
In s. 2(5) of its by-laws, ATME e. V. specifies as means public events, comments 
on relevant sexological, pedagogical, theological, medical, psychological, social, 
legal and political issues, collaboration with national and international organi-
sations with similar aims, information tables, public relations, public action, 
producing and distributing material on medical and psychological treatment, 
such as sex reassignment surgery and hormone replacement therapy (ibid).
So far, trans organisations have pursued a number of activities in the area 
of information and education. Among these are e. g. extending and rendering 
available the archives of the exhibition 1-’o-1 intersex to the public (TrIQ 2013: 
1), workshops on trans and intersex in employment that provide information 
and recommendations for best practices for employers (ibid 2011), brochures 
and seminars for, and open letters to physicians and psychologists,139 lectures 
on legal issues pertaining to trans for law students,140 the trans/inter lecture 
series organised by the TGNB in collaboration with TrIQ e. V. (TGNB 2006i), 
a TGNB workgroup called »Public Education and Counselling«, which is de-
signed to deliver professional information on transgender and intersex issues 
for individuals working with trans or intersex persons, organisations or other 
groups (TGNB 2006e) and an online journal with research that discusses de-
constructionist approaches and critically reflects upon the role research plays in 
the construction, normalisation and naturalisation of the gender binary (TGNB 
2006g), online information for the general public on the Transsexual Act,141 
an online list of frequently asked questions on trans (TransMann 2004) and 
information tables on Christopher Street Day events (ibid 2007).
Lobbying and networking
Lobbying and networking constitute the third major area of activity. The by-
laws of the dgti e. V. and TransMann e. V. either do not142 or barely refer to politi-
cal means and goals. In s. 2(7) of its by-laws, TransMann e. V. merely mentions 
that the organisation intends to operate as an advocacy group for transmen and 
individuals with a trans identity vis-à-vis political, medical, social and other 
public institutions (TransMann 2004).143 Instead, TransMann e. V. expands on 
139 | See e. g. TrIQ undated a; Alter 1998.
140 | See e. g. Alter 2007.
141 | See e. g. Alter 2000.
142 | See dgti 1998.
143 | However, the marginal space allocated to political activism in the by-laws does 
not correspond with the organisations’ actual political involvement. This discrepancy 
can be explained by two factors. First, both organisations emerged in the context of a 
lacking large-scale infrastructure for trans individuals. Second, as TransMann e. V. notes, 
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its political goals and the means to achieve them in a separate programme. 
The organisation subsumes its goals under the terms ›emancipation‹, which 
it applies to transgender individuals, transmen and society as a whole,144 ›self-
determination‹145 and ›integration‹,146 using information and exchange among 
trans organisations and coalitions with e. g. organisations that work on health-
related issues or lesbian and gay organisations and international solidarity with 
trans organisations as means (TransMann 2001).
In s. 3 of its by-laws, the TGNB defines as its purposes to create a network 
among transgender groups in Berlin in order to effectively engage with individ-
ual and social affairs relevant to trans individuals, render visible the shortcom-
ings of the gender binary and reduce the pathologisation, criminalisation, dis-
crimination against, and the exoticisation of trans individuals (TGNB 2006h). 
The TGNB defines as its means supporting individuals and groups that engage 
in activities in the area of transgender (s. 3[2]), a monthly plenary (s. 3[3]) and 
work groups on general and current topics (s. 3[4]), among others (ibid).
Similar to the TGNB, TrIQ e.V defines as one of its political goals and means 
advocating the reduction of pathologisation and exoticisation of transgender 
and intersex individuals and all other individuals whose gender or gender ex-
pression do not fulfil binary expectations as well as to counter the taboo on 
trans- and intergenderism (s. 2[2]). In addition, TrIQ e. V. strives to counter, re-
duce or mitigate the social effects of prejudices and discrimination with regard 
to the body, gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation (s. 2[4]). 
Furthermore, the organisation intends to campaign for the promotion of na-
tional and international networks of transgender, intersex and queer groups 
and individuals (s. 2[9]). In s. 2(10) TrIQ e. V. also outlines as one of its aims 
the organisation did not accrue much importance to its by-laws, which is mirrored in its 
understanding of by-laws as a »quite meagre framework, which is far from being filled with 
life« (TransMann undated c).
144 | According to TransMann e. V., ›emancipation‹ of transgender individuals and 
transmen means to consider legal and medical options as rights without however being 
expected to fulfil dated gender norms or having to comprise basic rights, such as the 
freedom of personal development and respect for human dignity (TransMann 2001). Like 
the dgti e. V. (undated f), TransMann e. V. defines an emancipated society as one which 
accepts human diversity as its most valuable asset (TransMann 2001).
145 | TransMann e. V. demands self-determination in the context of a change of first 
names and gender status and the medical treatment process (TransMann 2001).
146 | TransMann e. V.’s concept of ›integration‹ e. g. encompasses the integration of 
gender expression into anti-discrimination laws, the integration of trans individuals into 
the queer community, the integration of trans issues into education, research, culture 
and the media and the acceptance of prosecution on the basis of gender identity and/or 
expression as a ground for granting asylum (TransMann 2001).
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to campaign for equal rights for all individuals, regardless of their respective 
gender identity and sexual orientation and to work towards achieving equal op-
portunities (TrIQ 2007: 1).
Setting out from the premise that transsexuality is innate, ATME e. V. 
works towards forcing the Federal Republic of Germany to comply with ratified 
human rights treatises (ATME 2011). The organisation primarily compiles hu-
man rights reports (ibid) and uses public statements on human rights treatises, 
the law and regulations as a means (s. 3) (ibid 2011a).
Lobbying and networking: Prominent examples of networking
activities for human rights and equalit y
Since the end of the 1990s, political interventions have increased substantially, 
and political strategies have diversified. Political initiatives involve individual 
organisations and ad hoc as well as rather stable coalitions147 around clearly de-
fined issues. Trans organisations in the Federal Republic of Germany have so 
far focused particularly on trans law reform and networking for human rights 
and equality. Prominent examples of the latter on various levels of politics will 
be briefly outlined, starting with international networking activities, before 
turning to three major suggestions for trans law reform from the late 1990s 
until the federal government unsuccessfully tried to table the Transsexual Law 
Reform Bill in 2009.
Trans networking and lobbying for human rights and equality covers local, 
regional, national and international levels. The TGNB, which itself originated 
as a local network, contributed to successful international networking and or-
ganising for human rights and equality. In the aftermath of the first European 
Transgender Council in Vienna in Nov. 2005, the TGNB established the work-
group »Networking«. The workgroup hosted the second TGEU conference in 
Berlin in 2008. Since then, the workgroup has focused on collaborating with 
147 | Building coalitions around single issues have become a frequently chosen method 
of pressing for change for a number of reasons. First, coalitions frequently enable 
trans organisations to collaborate on a common issue without necessarily having to 
compromise their basic principles and standpoints. Second, the strategy of speaking in 
unison is more compatible with the operations of representative democracy. Third, since 
the heteronormative gender binary affects queer, trans and intersex individuals, albeit in 
different ways, broad coalitions allow for a larger number of individuals and organisations 
to intervene into institutionalised politics (cf. TrIQ 2009a; Ehrt 2009: 3). While coalition 
politics have generated common demands and a possible guide for the respective 
governments, they are also frequently challenging endeavours. First, negotiating across 
different concepts, communities and political styles has proven to be conflict-ridden. 
See, for instance, Regh (2002: 199) with regard to the PGG and Ghattas (2009: 1) with 
regard to the collaboration between trans and intersex individuals.
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trans and inter groups in Germany and non-European countries, in particular 
in the Americas (TGNB 2006c).148
Frustrated with federal government inactivity, ATME e. V. addresses the 
UN as a strategy of forcing the federal government to comply with ratified hu-
man rights treatises. To this effect, ATME e. V. has so far submitted several 
human rights reports outlining practices and regulations vis-à-vis transsexual 
individuals that the association considers contravening the respective agree-
ments, declarations and treatises149 and formulates measures to redress human 
rights breaches.150
148 | The TGNB workgroup »Law and Anti-Discrimination« proved to be less successful. 
Established in 2003, this particular workgroup collaborated with LGBT organisations to 
establish ›sexual or gender identity‹ as prohibited grounds of discrimination under the 
Anti-Discrimination Act (Antidiskriminierungsgesetz; ADG). The attempts to introduce 
this category into anti-discrimination legislation failed. At the end of 2005, the workgroup 
shifted its focus to the Transsexual Act and demanded that the change of first names 
be rendered easier and the change of gender status become possible without the 
preconditions of infertility and mandatory sex reassignment surgery (TGNB 2006d).
149 | Among these are e. g. the Alternative Report to the Sixth Report of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) (MUT 2007), the Alternative Report to CAT (ATME 2011c), a 
bilingual human rights report to the Fifth State Report of the Federal Republic of Germany 
according to Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (ibid 2010) and a report on reparative therapies on children (ibid 
2012).
150 | In its most comprehensive human rights report to date ATME e. V. summarises eight 
demands. First, the organisation demands of the UN to request that the WHO no longer 
classify transsexuality as a mental disorder (ATME 2010: 84). Second, ATME e. V. urges 
the UN to pressure the federal government to remove the requirement of expert reports 
from the Transsexual Act (ibid: 85). Third, the association suggests to the UN to render 
the Yogyakarta Principles (2013), i. e. the application of international human rights law to 
sexual orientation and gender identity legally binding and to press the Federal Republic 
of Germany to recognise these principles (ATME 2010: 86). Fourth, ATME e. V. demands 
the right to sex reassignment treatment (ibid: 86 f.). Fifth, the association requests of 
the UN to advise the Federal Republic of Germany to introduce gender identity into the 
Anti-Discrimination Act (ibid: 87). Sixth, ATME e. V. demands that all media in Germany be 
held accountable for transphobic reports and that transsexual individuals be included in 
broadcasting committees (ibid). Seventh, ATME e. V. demands more financial support and 
services for support groups and networking activities (ibid: 87 f.). Finally, the association 
demands that transsexual individuals represent themselves (ibid: 88).
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The introduction of the supplementary ID (Ergänzungsausweis) is an ex-
ample of a political activity in the area of equality and human rights on the 
national level. The dgti e. V. developed the supplementary ID for individuals 
whose outer appearance during the ›real life test‹ does not match the gender of 
the first names and gender status according to conventional standards and who 
have been diagnosed with transsexuality (dgti undated h). The document re-
sembles the national ID card and is meant to prevent discrimination on behalf 
of the bureaucracy and difficulties that arise in situations that require produc-
ing an ID (ibid). The supplementary ID is the dgti e. V.’s response to govern-
ment reluctance to implement a demand of the European Parliament to issue 
IDs valid throughout the then European Community to transsexual individu-
als bearing their chosen first name(s) (ibid).
Networking and lobbying takes place on a regional level, too. Intra-BW is 
one of the most recent networks of trans organisations at the time of writing. 
Founded in 2013 by ATME e. V., the dgti e. V., and the support group Tran-
sident X in Stuttgart,151 the network elaborated on a set of demands directed 
towards the Social Democratic and Green Party coalition in Baden-Württem-
berg. The major demands were to establish an equal opportunities advisory 
council consisting of an equal number of transsexual individuals and mem-
bers of the bureaucracy, to grant equal access to existing equal opportunities 
bodies and to seek direct contact with transsexual individuals (ATME 2013a). 
The dgti e. V. left the loosely connected coalition at the end of 2013 (intra-BW 
undated).
Lobbying and networking: Prominent examples of attempts 
to achieve trans law reform
There were several, in part collective, attempts to achieve trans law reform in 
the period between 1999 and 2009. Three major attempts were initiated of 
which one was carried out by the Project Group Gender and the Law (Projek-
tgruppe Geschlecht und Gesetz; PGG) from late 1999 to the end of 2000, an-
other by the TGNB Workgroup Law (Arbeitskreis Recht) in 2006 and the third 
by TGNB and TrIQ e. V. in 2009. Initiatives to achieve trans law reform took 
on various forms, occurred in various organisational constellations, mirrored 
rapidly changing social and legal developments with regard to homosexuality, 
successful trans litigation on a national level, international developments in 
151 | The organisations forming the network are based on very different premi s es. However, 
the founding members of the network initially managed to agree on two major goals. One of 
these was to exert pressure on the Länder government to end the psychopathologisation 
of transsexual individuals. The second was to improve medical provisions for transsexual 
individuals, in particular for transsexual minors in Baden-Württemberg (ATME 2013a).
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trans legislation, an increasing assertiveness of trans organisations as well as 
varying degrees of political compromise.
The Project Group Gender and the Law, and the Transgender Bill152
Established in late 1999 (dgti undated i), the formation of the nationwide work-
group PGG was, as a member of the dgti e. V. suggests, fostered by social de-
velopments. Successful lesbian and gay movement struggles left an imprint in 
legislation. For example, in 1994, the legislator abolished s. 175 StGB and, while 
the PGG was devising proposed trans legislation, the German parliament was 
debating the Registered Life Partnership Bill (dgti undated j). These legislative 
developments inspired rethinking sections of the TSG that had been devised in 
a more homophobic social and political environment.
Legitimation issues and developments within the lesbian and gay move-
ment influenced the constitution of the workgroup. A project focusing on the 
development and submission of proposed legislation necessarily required gain-
ing the consent of a broad spectrum of trans organisations. Moreover, parts 
of the lesbian and gay movement were starting to take into consideration 
transgender individuals, as the following excerpt of the Transgender Resolu-
tion (Transgenderresolution) adopted by the organisation Lesben und Schwule in 
der SPD (Lesbians and Gay Men in the SPD; [Schwusos]) on 15 Apr. 2000 in 
Stuttgart suggests: 
[i]t is only since quite recently that transgender individuals are struggling for the right 
to live beyond gender role stereotypes. The extent to which an individual takes on old 
roles or creates new ones for him- or herself is an individual decision everybody needs 
to decide for him- or herself. This freedom also needs to include the freedom to align 
one’s body with one’s inner feelings and/or the desired role or simply not to. This also 
applies to formal issues such as, for example, the name and civil status. It is precisely 
in this respect that the Schwusos will support ef for ts to reform the TSG accordingly. 
(dgti undated k)
152 | The Transgender Bill is not a bill in the sense that the Bundestag, the Bundesrat 
or the government drafted it. However, I will stick to the name of this suggestion for law 
reform, because it has become known as such.
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Hence, the PGG consisted of a broad coalition of trans associations with a polit-
ical agenda,153 local trans workgroups and support groups,154 lesbian and gay or-
ganisations155 and some intersex individuals from Berlin and Kiel (dgti 2000).
In 2000 and after consultations with lawyers, intersex individuals and poli-
ticians, in particular members of the Green Party (dgti undated i), the PGG de-
veloped the Bill on the choice or revision of first names and the establishment 
of gender status (Transgender Bill) (Gesetz über die Wahl oder Änderung der 
Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit (Transgendergesetz; 
[TrGG]). The workgroup submitted it to Members of the Bundestag and the 
government on 20 Nov. 2000 (ibid).
The Transgender Bill156 provided rules for three situations. Part one (ss. 1-5 
TrGG)157 was devised to regulate the choice of first names and gender status in 
cases of ›biological ambiguity‹. Part two (ss. 6-11 TrGG) was designed to regu-
late a change of first names in instances of ›deviating gender identity‹. Part 
three (ss. 12-16 TrGG) was created to provide rules for establishing an individ-
ual’s gender status.
Part one of the Transgender Bill mirrored the aim of PGG members to 
include intersex individuals as beneficiaries of the proposed legislation (Alter 
153 | The dgti e. V. and TransMann e. V. contributed to the project team (dgti 2000).
154 | Among these were the Arbeitkreis Transsexualität Kiel (Workgroup Transsexuality 
Kiel; AK-TS Kiel), »Ost­TS« (East-TS), a group of transsexual individuals from the eastern 
part of Berlin, Transidentitas e. V., VIVA TS e. V. Munich, TransPeople Nuremberg and the 
Selbsthilfe Kontakt und Informationsstelle Berlin (The Central Support, Contact and 
Information Office Berlin [SEKIS Berlin]; dgti 2000).
155 | The Schwusos and the Sonntags-Club e. V. in Berlin were members of the PGG (dgti 
2000).
156 | The PGG defined ›transgender‹ to include transmen, transwomen and intersex 
individuals (Alter 2001). Having just begun to organise in Germany in the 1990s, intersex 
individuals criticised subsuming ›intersex‹ under ›transgender‹, arguing that the umbrella 
term rendered them invisible. Given that intersex was – in contrast to transsexuality – 
literally erased due to medical policies of misleading information, secrecy and ›corrective‹ 
surgery in infancy, i. e. without intersex individuals’ informed consent, and the legal 
dogma of intersex as unknown to the law, this is a valid point. For a critique of the 
medical management at the time, see for example Beh/Diamond 2000, Fausto-Sterling 
2000, Guhde 2002, Chase 2003, Hester 2004 and de Silva 2007. For a critique of legal 
premises and practices, see for example Plett 2003; 2007. For an analysis of concepts 
of gender and sexuality that inform medical treatment concepts, see for example Kessler 
1997, Fausto-Sterling 2000; Klöppel 2002; 2006, Hester 2003; 2004, Zehnder 2006 and 
de Silva 2008.
157 | All citations of the Transgender Bill are based on the edition provided by the dgti 
e. V. website (dgti undated l).
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2001). Section 1 TrGG defined the conditions. Sections 2 and 3 TrGG dealt with 
issues related to birth entries (s. 2 TrGG) and revisions of birth entries (s. 3 
TrGG). Sections 4 and 5 TrGG regulated areas of competency (s. 4 TrGG) and 
implementation (s. 5 TrGG).
Section 1 TrGG was foremost designed to ensure intersex individuals’, their 
parents’ or legal guardians’ rights to information and intersex individuals’ right 
to physical integrity. The first section of the proposed legislation was meant to 
prohibit the common medical practice of non-disclosure of an intersex status 
to the respective individual and of genital surgery at an age that necessarily 
precludes the infant’s informed consent.
Sections 2 to 4 TrGG were devised to secure intersex individuals’ legal rec-
ognition with minimum bureaucratic barriers. Section 2 offered several possi-
bilities for registering first names in the birth entry. These included the choice 
of gender-neutral names, names of both socially accepted genders (s. 2[1] TrGG) 
or names given to one specific accepted gender, however with an additional 
indication of intersex in brackets (s. 2[3] TrGG).
With regard to the sex/gender entry, the proposed TrGG suggested leaving 
the initial entry vacant or allowing an entry as intersex (s. 2[2] TrGG). Moreo-
ver, the proposed draft bill provided options for an intersex individual to either 
accept or change the sex/gender entry at any point in life (s. 3 TrGG) at the local 
register office (s. 4[1] TrGG).
Section 5 TrGG was created to ensure protection against discrimination, 
secure privacy rights and to regulate issues related to marriages and registered 
partnerships. Section 5(3) TrGG, for example, specified that an intersex indi-
vidual with either a vacant sex/gender entry or the entry as intersex may not 
be put at a disadvantage with regard to regulations that are commonly tied to a 
sex/gender. Section 5(4) TrGG provided for a prohibition of disclosure as pro-
vided for trans individuals in s. 9 TrGG. According to s. 5(5) TrGG, existing 
marriages and registered partnerships were meant to remain unaffected by a 
change of first names, whereas in the case of a revision of gender status, the 
same rules would apply as specified in the sections regulating the establish-
ment of gender status.
The Transsexual Act served as a template for parts two and three of the 
Transgender Bill. Overall, the Transgender Bill suggested accelerated proce-
dures and less demanding prerequisites for a change of first names and a revi-
sion of gender status than the Transsexual Act.
The TrGG suggested lowering the barriers for a change of first names for 
trans individuals. Rather than endowing the local court with the competency 
to decide upon a change of first names as s. 2 TSG determines, s. 7 TrGG sug-
gested the register office should be responsible for attending to applications to 
this effect.
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In contrast to ss. 4(3) and 9(3) TSG, the TrGG suggested to dispense with 
expert reports. Instead, the TrGG provided that an applicant provide a doctor’s 
or psychologist’s note for a change of first names (s. 8[1]1 TrGG) which was also 
to be valid for a revision of gender status (s. 12[1]1 TrGG). This particular note 
was simply to state that the applicant wished to improve or prevent a deteriora-
tion of his or her psychological and social situation. Moreover, the proposed 
legislation suggested that a medical statement suffices as a proof of the somatic 
measures undertaken (s. 13[4] TrGG). As a means to accelerate court proceed-
ings dealing with a revision of gender status, the TrGG also determined that 
the judge hears the applicant and the representative of the public interest in 
person in one session (s. 13[3] TrGG).
The TrGG also suggested reducing somatic requirements. Rather than de-
mand surgical interventions as a prerequisite for a revision of gender status as 
determined in s. 8(1)4 TSG, the TrGG provided that the applicant needs to have 
undergone medical measures to effect that his or her external sex characteris-
tics have approximated the outer appearance of the ›other‹ sex (s. 12[1]3 TrGG). 
Unlike the TSG, the TrGG did not stipulate any sterility requirements.
The TrGG also suggested reformulating the requirements with regard to 
existing and future marriages and considering a registered partnership as an 
option for trans individuals. Like the TSG, the proposed legislation suggested 
that an existing marriage (or a registered partnership) remain unaffected by 
a change of first names. However, while the TSG ruled that the decision to 
change first names becomes void as soon as the applicant marries (s. 7[3] TSG), 
the TrGG suggested that an applicant may marry or enter a registered partner-
ship according to the sex/gender specified in the birth certificate (s. 11 [3] TrGG). 
While s. 8(1)2 TSG stipulated that an applicant needs to be unmarried before 
being granted a revision of gender status, the TrGG provided that a marriage 
could either be divorced or converted into a registered partnership (s. 12[1]2.1 
TrGG) or vice versa (s. 12[1]2.2 TrGG).
In addition, the PGG considered the Federal Constitutional Court decisions 
until the time of devising the proposed legislation and in part went beyond the 
decisions. The TrGG did not contain any age limits for a change of first names 
and gender status. It provided for the right that an applicant with a change of 
first names needs to be addressed according to the gender the name signifies,158 
including the entitlement to have his or her official documents and qualifying 
reports amended to match the chosen name (s. 8[3] TrGG). Well before the 
Federal Constitutional Court decided on the eligibility of foreigners with per-
manent residency in the Federal Republic of Germany to an application under 
the Transsexual Act, the PGG decided to include foreigners intending to obtain 
158 | For the Federal Constitutional Court decision on the gender-specific address of a 
trans individual after a change of first names, see chapter 3.3.4.
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an unlimited residency permit and whose home countries do not provide for 
gender recognition or demand unreasonable prerequisites (s. 6[1]1.2 TrGG).
While the Transgender Bill would have met some demands of the then 
trans movement, taking into consideration the conservative political climate 
and anticipating conflicts with policy makers, the PGG included compromises 
in the TrGG. This becomes particularly obvious when comparing the provi-
sions of the draft law with trans movement concepts of trans, gender and the 
gender regime. The workgroup conceded on the number of gendered options 
in the event of a transition, the notion of gender as independent of morphology, 
the concept of gender fluidity and radical self-determination.
Although the recognition of intersex and the inclusion of protective meas-
ures against medical and legal encroachments challenged the gender binary, 
the proposed legislation fell short of providing for the options not to be gen-
dered or to be recognised as two or more genders in instances in which in-
dividuals were assigned either female or male at birth. The Transgender Bill 
suggested that female or male individuals have the choice of being recognised 
as the ›other‹ gender only (ss. 6[1]2 and 12[1] TrGG).
The PGG also anticipated that the legislator would not accept a revision 
of gender status without somatic measures. While ›medical measures‹ do not 
necessarily mean ›surgical measures‹, s. 12(1)3 TrGG implicitly perpetuated the 
notion that gender needs to be mirrored in physical traits.
Moreover, the workgroup also tried to appease potential adversaries by 
conveying the notion of ›gender‹ as a stable condition. The TrGG sought to 
lower the prognostic demands on the stability of a gender identity by suggest-
ing as a prerequisite for a change of first names for trans individuals that it is 
»assumed that identifying with the other gender will not change anymore« 
(s. 6[1]2 TrGG), rather than adding »with a high degree of probability« as the 
TSG does in s. 1(1)2. However, the PGG increased the barriers for a reversal 
of the decision. While the TrGG suggested that the competency for an initial 
change of first names rest with the register office, s. 10(1)1 TrGG proposed that 
a reversal of the decision should, like a revision of gender status (s. 13[1] TrGG), 
take place in a local court proceeding.
Finally, the PGG anticipated that the legislator would not accept a change 
of first names or a revision of gender status without some medical evidence. 
The Transgender Bill neither repeated the debatable and pathologising formu-
lations »transsexual imprinting« and »if the applicant has felt compelled to 
live according to his or her ideas since three years« in s. 1(1)1 TSG, nor sug-
gested to obtain two expert reports. Nevertheless, the PGG estimated that a 
doctor’s or psychologist’s note, respectively, would be necessary, rather than a 
self-declaration.
The TrGG had an effect on the federal government, headed by a Social 
Democratic and Green Party coalition. In addition to grievances voiced else-
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where, in particular over assessment practices and the duration of proceedings 
under the Transsexual Act, the Home Office announced that it intended to re-
vise the Transsexual Act comprehensively. For this purpose and in contrast to 
the political process leading to the Transsexual Act, the Home Office asked for 
submissions from sexologists and psycho-medical practitioners known to be 
specialised in the field of transsexualism as well as from trans lobby groups 
and some support groups (BMI 2000: 1).159 Despite its announcement and swift 
responses, the government remained inactive for years.
Suggestions for reforming the Transsexual Act by the TGNB
Workgroup Law (Arbeitskreis Recht des Transgender-Netzwerks 
Berlin)
In 2006, the Workgroup Law of the TGNB160 prepared a set of suggestions for 
a fundamental reform of the Transsexual Act. Unlike the PGG, the Workgroup 
was able to draw upon national developments in jurisdiction on the Transsexu-
al Act, international developments in trans legislation, developments in society, 
scientific findings on trans(sexuality) and concrete suggestions for trans law re-
form made by other trans organisations and networks to support its course. In 
the light of these developments, the Workgroup Law was, with few exceptions, 
much less pressed and willing to trade demands for self-determination and 
limitations on human rights for reasons of political feasibility than the PGG.
The fact that the Workgroup contemplated a reform of the Transsexual 
Act itself constituted a compromise, since it favoured an abolishment of the 
special act and the integration of regulations providing for a change of first 
names and a revision of gender status in the Act on the change of family names 
and first names (Namensänderungsgesetz; NamÄndG) and the Civil Status Act 
(TGNB 2006j: 3), including the creation of ›intergender/transgender‹ or ›other‹ 
as an additional category for a sex/gender entry in the birth register (ibid: 5). 
The Workgroup however devised suggestions for a fundamental reform of the 
Transsexual Act in case their preferred solution would not find support (ibid: 3).
In contrast to the PGG, the Workgroup Law decided to adapt the structure of 
the Transsexual Act. Part one was meant to regulate issues related to a change 
of first names. Part two contained provisions for an establishment of gender 
status (ibid: 1 f.). Rather than create elaborate provisions for intersex individuals 
which had been a priority for the PGG, the Workgroup suggested that given 
159 | While the submissions to the Federal Home Office for the Draft Transsexual Law 
Reform Bill lend themselves to an analysis of trans, gender and gender regime, they 
with few exceptions mirror perspectives in sexological journals and handbooks, trans 
organisation programmes and the Draft Transgender Bill produced by the PGG. 
160 | The TGNB Workgroup Law will be referred to as the Workgroup Law or the Workgroup 
in this chapter.
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that the legislator planned to create an additional gender option, individuals 
seeking a revision of gender status must be eligible for the provisions outlined 
in the second part of the reformed Transsexual Act (ibid: 2).
While the Workgroup Law and the PGG opted for non-pathologising lan-
guage in the conditions for applying for a change of first names and a revi-
sion of gender status, the wording of the Workgroup Law did not limit gender 
options to two or conceptualise gender identity as a permanent disposition. 
Rather, the Workgroup suggested to rephrase ss. 1(1) and 8(1) TSG to simply 
state as a condition that the person no longer identifies with the gender entered 
in the birth register (ibid: 1; 2).
In contrast to the PGG, the Workgroup Law suggested not only to locate pro-
ceedings for a change of first names with the register office. Rather, the Work-
group proposed to have applications for a change of first names, a reversal of 
the decision and applications for a revision of gender status processed with the 
abovementioned institution (ibid: 1; 2). Such a procedure would have reduced 
the barriers for any application under the Transsexual Act and accelerated the 
proceedings by dispensing with a representative of the public interest (ibid: 4).
With regard to the proceedings for a change of first names, the Workgroup 
reasoned in its explanatory notes that locating the competency with a local 
court, including the costs of expert reports and procedural costs, deters trans 
individuals from applying for a change of first names. As a result, respecting 
their chosen first names depends on the goodwill of their surroundings and 
exerts them to discrimination (ibid: 3). While the PGG tried to appease the 
legislator by suggesting that a reversal of the decision should be located with 
the local courts, the Workgroup Law only proposed to allow such an option in 
the event of repeated changes of first names or in case of reasonable suspicion 
of an improper use of the provision (ibid: 4).
Unlike the TrGG, the suggestions offered by the Workgroup Law wrested 
the legal procedure entirely from the medical realm. While the Workgroup’s 
suggestions for a reform of the Transsexual Act did not rely entirely on an in-
dividual’s self-declared intention to undergo a change of first names or a revi-
sion of gender status, the Workgroup acted on a suggestion the dgti e. V. had 
developed in the meantime (ibid: 1). According to this suggestion, the applicant 
would have been required to produce a counselling certificate (Beratungsschein) 
as evidence of having consulted a self-chosen counselling service on the issue 
and its potential consequences (ibid: 1; 2). The Workgroup specified the qualifi-
cations of the counselling service staff and that of any other institution as indi-
viduals who are based on their training and their professional experience suf-
ficiently familiar with issues related to transgender and gender identity (ibid: 1).
Like the PGG, the Workgroup Law was intent on including foreigners with 
an unlimited residency permit as potential applicants under a reformed Trans-
sexual Act. In contrast to the PGG, the Workgroup Law was able to refer to the 
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Federal Constitutional Court decision on 18 July 2006. Based on the Court’s 
decision that ruled that the legislator needs to find a solution for s. 1(1)3 TSG 
that is compatible with equality rights laid down in Art. 3(1) GG and the right to 
the protection of one’s personality (Art. 2[1] GG) in conjunction with the right to 
dignity (Art. 1[1] GG) (BVerfG 2007: 16), the Workgroup suggested as individu-
als eligible for a change of first names and a revision of gender status EU citi-
zens, individuals with a permanent residence in the EU, stateless or displaced 
persons with usual residence within the territory of German law and individu-
als entitled to asylum or foreign refugees (TGNB 2006j: 1; 2).
Like s. 5 TSG and ss. 5(4) and 9 TrGG, the Workgroup Law suggested that 
a reformed Transsexual Act provide for a prohibition of disclosure. In contrast 
to the Transsexual Act, however, the Workgroup proposed a more restrictive 
provision. Based on suggestions made by the Workgroup Transsexuality in 
Northrhine-Westphalia (Arbeitskreis Transsexualität in Nordrhein-Westfalen), the 
Workgroup for example demanded that s. 5 TSG be extended to prohibit explo-
rations on the initial gender, first names and the reasons leading to the respec-
tive gender status and first names (ibid: 2). Moreover and based on the Federal 
Constitutional Court decision on the address of a trans person who had been 
granted a change of first names, the Workgroup proposed to add to the section 
on the prohibition of disclosure the obligation to address a person according to 
the first name (ibid). While the Home Office had already decreed that a person’s 
gender be amended in the passport to match the individual’s first name (ibid: 
4), the Workgroup suggested to legally secure this fact in the rules regulating 
the prohibition of disclosure (ibid: 2).
Like the PGG, the Workgroup Law suggested to dispense with the provi-
sions regulating the invalidity of the decision to change first names (s. 7 TSG) 
and the rule in s. 8(1)2 TSG that requires of a transsexual individual to be un-
married prior to applying for a revision of gender status. With regard to the 
former rule, the Workgroup referred to the increasing number of ›rainbow 
families‹, scientific facts and social realities suggesting that there are trans in-
dividuals who do not seek a legally recognised change of gender status (ibid: 
3). The Workgroup also referred to the Federal Constitutional Court decision 
on s. 7(1)1 TSG in Dec. 2005 (ibid: 4) to support its proposal. Arguing that, 
»[t]here is simply no reason why a person who has accomplished a change of 
first names according to s. 1 should be refused the right to found a family« 
(ibid), the Workgroup held that denying a person a changed first name in the 
case of a marriage or fathering or bearing a child is »pointless« (ibid).
With regard to s. 8(1)2 and in the light of the introduction of the registered 
life partnership for same-sex individuals, the Workgroup suggested that neither 
marriage nor a registered life partnership constitute an obstacle to establish-
ing an individual’s gender status. While the PGG suggested integrating in the 
TrGG rules that deal with issues related to marriage and registered life partner-
Concepts prior to, and during the law reform process 251
ships in the event of a revision of gender status (ss. 12[1]2.1 and 2.2 TrGG), the 
Workgroup Law suggested dealing with these issues in the respective acts that 
regulate marriages and registered life partnerships, rather than in a reformed 
Transsexual Act (TGNB 2006j: 3).
Like the TrGG, the Workgroup’s suggestions did not entail any references 
to measures for achieving sterility. In its explanatory notes, the Workgroup Law 
dismissed any such prerequisite for a revision of gender status, arguing that 
such a stipulation violates human rights. According to the Workgroup, »[i]t is 
not justifiable to deny individuals wishing to change their gender status the 
right to reproduction and to found a family« (ibid: 4).
The Workgroup’s suggestions most dramatically differed from the Trans-
sexual Act and the Trangender Bill with regard to the somatic requirements 
for a revision of gender status. While the TrGG lowered the requirements from 
›surgical‹ measures as stipulated in s. 8(1)4 TSG to ›medical‹ measures (s. 12[1]3 
TrGG), the Workgroup Law rejected any somatic measures as prerequisites for 
a revision of gender status on the grounds that such a requirement violates the 
right to physical integrity (TGNB 2006j: 4).
In addition, the Workgroup pointed out to state of the art scientific find-
ings, trans individuals’ diverse social realities and international developments 
in trans legislation to refute the notion that a gender identity necessarily re-
quires »adapted« genitalia (ibid: 4). Instead, the Workgroup suggested to follow 
the example of the Gender Recognition Act (2004), which does without any 
surgery requirements (ibid: 4 f.).161
The key issues paper on the reform of the Transsexual Act 
by the TGNB and TrIQ e. V.
In April 2009, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. developed a key issues paper contain-
ing basic demands for law reform. Since the Federal Home Office was in the 
process of devising the Transsexual Law Reform Bill, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. 
elaborated on potential amendments to the Transsexual Act, rather than on 
suggestions to integrate provisions for changing first names and revising gen-
der status in existing statutes. Taking into consideration the political context, 
the abovementioned organisations compiled the key issues paper as a highly 
strategic paper162 that was designed to bridge the gap between central trans 
movement demands and issues related to political implementation in a con-
servative political environment. As such, the key issues paper on the one hand 
included demands to consider diverse trans individuals in legislation and de-
161 | For more details on the Gender Recognition Act (2004), see the UK government 
website on legislation.
162 | The paper was submitted to the Federal Home Office the same month as a statement 
on the Draft Transsexual Law Reform Bill (Transsexuellenrechtsreformgesetz; TSRRG).
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mands for accelerated procedures for a change of first names and a revision of 
gender status based on rules that are compatible with human rights, including 
the rights to self-determination and physical integrity, as well as pursuing a 
policy of appeasement and providing legally elaborate suggestions on the other 
hand.
The TGNB and TrIQ e. V. acted on several ideas developed by the TGNB 
Workgroup Law three years earlier on, such as simplifying procedures for a 
change of first names and a revision of gender status and suggesting prereq-
uisites for the latter in compliance with human rights, and developed them 
further. Like the Workgroup Law, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. demanded that the 
competence for processing applications for a change of first names and a revi-
sion of gender status should be removed from local courts and handed over 
to the register office (TGNB/TrIQ 2009: 1). With regard to the procedure for a 
change of first names, the organisations argued that court procedures were too 
time-consuming and, as such, increase the risk of discrimination, violate the 
basic right to privacy guaranteed in Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG 
and Art. 8 ECHR and – quoting the Federal Constitutional Court – contradict 
the original intention of s. 1 TSG (ibid: 2). When considering the procedure for 
a revision of gender status, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. argued that an application 
could be dealt with analogously to the initial sex/gender entry at birth, which is 
also located with the register office (ibid: 3).
While the Workgroup Law had already suggested dispensing with medical 
statements on a person’s gender identity as a prerequisite for either a change of 
first names or a revision of gender status, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. went a step 
further. The organisations demanded that the applicants should be asked to de-
liver a statutory statement only for a change of first names (ibid: 1). They argued 
that experience so far suggests that transgender and transsexual individuals do 
not apply for a change of first names frivolously (ibid: 2). As a result, a decision 
to change first names would have become a self-determined decision.
The TGNB and TrIQ e. V.’s demand for simplifying the procedure for a re-
vision of gender status required more intricate suggestions and reasoning in 
order to ease the tension between trans movement demands for self-determi-
nation and issues related to political feasibility. The organisations solved this 
problem by radically separating medical and legal processes and concentrating 
on achieving maximum self-determination in the latter, while using the issue 
of medical supervision strategically as a means of appeasement, hence defer-
ring the struggle for depathologisation to another arena for the time being. 
In addition, the organisations demanded that the practice of obtaining expert 
reports be replaced by three options instead. The TGNB and TrIQ e. V. sug-
gested that a revision of gender status should be granted no sooner than twelve 
months after a change of first names or if the applicant has undergone sex reas-
signment measures or if the applicant has been diagnosed with transsexuality, 
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respectively (ibid: 1). The choice of three options would have left it up to the 
individual whether or not to opt for somatic measures for a revision of gender 
status.
In the explanatory notes, the organisations presented several reasons to 
substantialise their demands. With regard to the first option, they suggested 
that a period of one year between an individual’s change of first names and an 
application for a revision of gender status sufficiently proves the stability of a 
person’s gender identity. They justified the second option by arguing that trans 
individuals do not choose to undergo sex reassignment measures frivolously. 
Moreover, they are only possible after having obtained a medical indication, 
and the measures are usually irreversible. With regard to the third option, the 
TGNB and TrIQ e. V. suggested that assessing the stability of a person’s gender 
identity is part of the medical diagnosis transsexuality, and as such, an adapta-
tion of the sex/gender entry would be consistent (ibid: 3).
As the proposed procedures suggest, the organisations demanded proce-
dures that comply with basic human rights, specifically with regard to the right 
to physical integrity and, in addition, to the right to the protection of marriag-
es. Like the Workgroup Law, they demanded abolishing permanent sterility, 
sex reassignment surgery as well as having to be unmarried as prerequisites 
for a revision of gender status (ibid: 1). For strategic reasons, they quoted the 
opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court and referred to the latest develop-
ments in trans legislation elsewhere, rather than argue on the grounds of their 
own principles.
Setting out from the observation the Federal Constitutional Court had 
made in its decision on 06 Dec. 2005 that transsexual individuals are the only 
group of persons of whom the state requires permanent sterility (ibid: 2), the 
TGNB and TrIQ e. V. presented three reasons as part of their strategy of assur-
ing the legislator that banning this requirement would not result in large-scale 
gender disorder. First, they suggested that ›contrasexual‹ hormone treatment 
usually leads to sterility, hence enabling few individuals only to reproduce. Sec-
ond, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. argued that pregnancy is incompatible with most 
transmen’s self-perception. Third, they held that, »[p]ossible individual cases 
on no account justify that the state renders an intervention into transsexual 
and transgender individuals’ physical integrity a prerequisite for a revision of 
gender status« (ibid).
The organisations proceeded similarly with regard to the requirement for 
sex reassignment surgery, while attempting to safeguard the rights of individu-
als requiring surgery at the same time. The TGNB and TrIQ e. V. quoted the 
Federal Constitutional Court, which opined in its decision on 06 Dec. 2005 
that there were no acceptable reasons for treating transsexual individuals seek-
ing a revision of gender status differently, regardless of whether they had under-
gone sex reassignment surgery or not. The TGNB and TrIQ e. V. interpreted the 
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statement as a recommendation to dispense with the sex reassignment stipula-
tion (ibid: 2). In addition, they pointed out that neither the Gender Recognition 
Act (2004), nor the Spanish Act, passed in 2007, demanded somatic measures 
(ibid: 2 f.). However, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. also referred to the Federal Social 
Court decision on 10 Feb. 1993, which ensured that statutory health insurance 
companies assume the costs of sex reassignment measures for individuals ex-
periencing distress related to transsexuality. Anticipating that a reform of the 
Transsexual Act might impact on social jurisdiction, they suggested that the 
legislator guarantee that necessary sex reassignment measures remain part of 
the services offered by health insurance companies. The TGNB and TrIQ e. V. 
suggested adding s. 27b to the Social Security Code to this end (ibid: 3).
The TGNB and TrIQ e. V. also drew upon the then most recent Federal Con-
stitutional Court decision on 27 May 2008163 to demand that the legislator abol-
ish s. 8(1)2 TSG, which requires of the applicant to be unmarried prior to filing 
an application for a revision of gender status. Employing the same strategy as 
they had used when arguing in favour of abolishing s. 8(1)4 TSG, the organi-
sations reiterated one of the Court’s options that the legislator may allow for 
a continuation of marriage in the light of the very small number of married 
transsexual individuals seeking a revision of gender status.164 In addition, the 
organisations invoked Art. 6(1) GG, arguing that this option would re-establish 
marriage as a constitutionally protected institution and safeguard the respec-
tive partner’s rights (ibid: 4).
Finally, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. demanded renaming the reformed Act. 
Arguing that transsexual individuals only constituted a fraction of the target 
group (ibid: 4), they suggested that the Act be renamed »An Act on the change 
of first names and gender status« (Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und 
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit), hence providing for diverse individuals to be cov-
ered under the rules of the Act.
163 | On 27 May 2008, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that s. 8(1)2 TSG is 
unconstitutional on the grounds that the rule violates Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) 
GG and Art. 6(1) GG, because the rule does not allowed a married transsexual individual 
to gain legal recognition of his or her gender without him or her having to terminate his or 
her marriage (BVerfG 2008: 317). For more details on this decision, see chapter 3.3.3.
164 | While the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. did not depart in substance from the suggestion the 
Workgroup Law brought forward three years earlier on, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. opted for a 
different route to solve the legal problem.
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In contrast to the PGG and the Workgroup Law, the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. de-
cided to garner support for their demands. The key issues paper was signed by 
several trans,165 lesbian and gay or queer organisations166 and two individuals.167
3.2.5 Summar y: Concepts of gender, trans and gender regime 
 in trans lobby organisations
Fuelled by a number of internal and external factors, the trans movement was 
marked by a substantial growth, differentiation and consolidation of lobby or-
ganisations, an increased visibility of diverse trans subjects and the develop-
ment of various concepts of trans, gender and gender regime. Influenced by 
different discursive traditions and emerging within shifting social contexts, 
concepts of trans(sexuality) and gender emerged that ranged from understand-
ings shaped by social constructionist and poststructuralist thought that chal-
lenge the gender binary and clearly delineated concepts of trans to notions in-
fluenced by neuro-biological hypotheses that consider transsexuality a somatic 
disorder. While trans organisations endorsing the former set of concepts pur-
sue a policy of inclusion, representatives of the latter focus on issues pertaining 
to a fraction of the transsexual community.
Despite these conceptual differences, trans lobby organisations share a 
number of demands and perspectives, most prominently demands for self-
determination and the recognition of trans individuals as experts on their own 
behalf as well as the rejection of (psycho)pathologisation and a perspective that 
suggests that a person’s gender identity can be derived from the sexed body. 
With regard to legal rules, procedures and practices, trans organisations oppose 
legal requirements that require sterility, sex reassignment measures, expert as-
sessments and affect officially sanctioned living arrangements, arguing that 
these rules violate basic human rights. With regard to psycho-medical assump-
tions, procedures and practices, trans organisations reject the (psycho)patholo-
gisation of trans(sexuality), psycho-medical expertise and procedures and prac-
tices they consider violations of human dignity and privacy. These include the 
obligatory ›real life test‹, undue physical examinations, inappropriate enquir-
ies into trans individuals’ sexual orientations and practices and a subjection 
to expert understandings of sex, femininity, masculinity and gender regime 
165 | Among these were e. g. ABqueer e. V., the drag king group Kingz of Berlin, the support 
group SHG Chemnitz, TransGenderTown (Rosalinde Leipzig e. V.), Transvita Karlsruhe and 
VIVA TS e. V. München (TGNB/TrIQ 2009: 4).
166 | Lesbian and gay cosignatories of the paper were Queer Christ Berlin, the Sonntags-
Club e. V. and the LSVD e. V. (TGNB/TrIQ 2009).
167 | These were the lawyer Reinert and the former MP Schenk (TGNB/TrIQ 2009).
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in a setting that is marked by unequal power relations in order to achieve legal 
recognition and trans-related medical and surgical services.
Without compromising support and outreach, information and public edu-
cation, trans organisations engage in networking on local, regional, national 
and supranational levels and individual or coalition-based lobbying aimed at 
achieving human rights and equality and trans law reform. Activities directed 
at achieving trans law reform have so far ranged from suggestions to elaborate 
proposed legislation. The analysis of designs for trans law reform suggest two 
conclusions. On the one hand, they mirrored rapidly changing social and legal 
developments with regard to homosexuality, national developments in juris-
diction on the Transsexual Act and growing assertiveness of trans organisa-
tions. On the other hand, trans organisations were faced with unswerving fed-
eral government gender-political conservatism. They to varying degrees tried 
to meet this challenge by strategically deploying the aforementioned national 
and international developments in their suggestions for law reform, by resort-
ing to appeasement policies and/or by separating the struggle on the legislative 
terrain from the psycho-medical plane as means to achieve maximum self-de-
termination and rules compliant with human rights in legislation on a change 
of first names and a revision of gender status.
3.3 legal de velopments and debates on tr ansse xualIt y
 from the 1980s to 2010
The period from the 1980s to 2010 witnessed a number of developments in le-
gal scholarship and jurisdiction on trans with contradictory effects on transsex-
ual individuals, depending on the area of the law, and a weakening, although 
not displacement, of the heteronormative character of the gender regime. This 
chapter traces major developments in jurisdiction and legal scholarship in in-
surance law and on the Transsexual Act in this period.
Based on relevant rules in social regulation and social court jurisdiction, 
reported in the NJW, Versicherungsrecht (Insurance Law [VersR]) and the online 
data bases sozialgerichtsbarkeit.de (social jurisdiction) and openJur, the first sec-
tion of this chapter elaborates on developments in statutory health insurance 
coverage of sex reassignment measures in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The relationships between definitions of disease and legal understandings of 
transsexuality pursuant to health insurance law, the legal distinction between 
sex reassignment surgery and cosmetic interventions and the relationship be-
tween transsexuality and other unusual gender identities in social court juris-
diction as well as in the context of general developments in health insurance 
law will be addressed.
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The next three sections deal with jurisdiction and legal scholarship on 
the Transsexual Act. Taking into consideration sexological perspectives and 
points of view in legal scholarship and using as examples Federal Constitu-
tional Court decisions on the age limits for a change of first names (s. 1[1]3 
TSG) and a revision of gender status (8[1]1 TSG) and the eligibility of foreigners 
with permanent residency in the Federal Republic of Germany to an applica-
tion under ss. 1(1)1 and 8(1)1 TSG, the second section of this chapter focuses on 
the construction of transsexuality in relation to conventionally gendered men 
and women.
Jurisdiction under the Transsexual Act that deals with issues related to 
a registered life partnership (Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft), marriage, so-
matic measures and generational reproduction are particularly relevant to an 
assessment of shifts in concepts of trans, gender and gender regime. Taking 
into consideration legal interpretations of sexological concepts of transsexual-
ity and developments in legal scholarship and jurisdiction, including Federal 
Constitutional Court decisions on these issues prior to, and during the reform 
period, the third section traces developments on civil partnership and marriage 
as they relate to the Transsexual Act and briefly addresses the government reac-
tion to the Federal Constitutional Court decision on s. 8(1)2 TSG. The fourth 
section deals with sexological and legal interpretations of the rules on somatic 
measures and generational reproduction under the Transsexual Act in this par-
ticular period and briefly addresses government activities. 
The analysis is based foremost on sexological and legal publications in NJW, 
Zeitschrift für Rechtsmedizin (Journal of Legal Medicine [Z Rechtsmed]), Recht & 
Psychiatrie (Law and Psychiatry [R & P]), the submission of the DGfS, reported 
court decisions on the abovementioned issues in NJW and StAZ, the Draft 
Transsexual Law Reform Bill (Transsexuellenrechtsreformgesetz [TSRRG]), the 
Draft Bill to change first names and establish gender status (Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszuge-
hörigkeit [ÄVFGG]) proposed by the political party bündnis 90/die grünen 
and the Act to amend the Transsexual Act.
Insurance law and constitutional law follow different rationales and operate 
within different parameters that have led to more regulation of transsexuality 
in the former and less in the latter area since the late 1990s. Nevertheless, they 
have in common that they acknowledge an increasing diversity of transsexu-
al individuals and bar trans individuals who do not qualify as transsexual in 
strictly medical terms from health insurance coverage of sex-modifying inter-
ventions and legal recognition. Moreover, Federal Constitutional Court juris-
diction on the Transsexual Act contributed to a shift within the gender regime, 
and the federal government was essentially content to follow one of the Federal 
Constitutional Court suggestions to do away with s. 8(1)2 TSG altogether. The 
gradual undoing of deeply homophobic rules in the Transsexual Act led to a 
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disruption of the heteronormative character of the gender binary under clearly 
defined circumstances. While the legal recognition of a trans person’s gender 
continued to rely on somatic measures, the controversy among legal scholars 
on this issue in the first decade of the 21st century and Federal Constitutional 
Court jurisdiction in this period indicate that this link was becoming undone. 
3.3.1 Jurisdiction on transsexualit y in health insurance law
Statutory health insurance coverage of sex reassignment measures on trans 
individuals in Germany can so far be subdivided into three diffusely delimited 
stages. From the 1970s to 1987 statutory health insurance companies unevenly 
assumed the costs of sex reassignment surgery. Since the seminal Federal So-
cial Court decision on 06 Aug. 1987, statutory health insurance companies are 
obliged to cover sex reassignment procedures in individual cases of transsexu-
ality. The third and continuing period began in the late 1990s and is marked by 
a number of specifications and a general limitation of interventions statutory 
health insurance companies are required to cover.
Uneven statutor y health insurance coverage of 
sex reassignment surger y
Despite a statutory basis that was oriented towards an expansion of the benefits 
catalogue of statutory health insurance companies, a broad definition of disease 
and the unanimous sexological assessment of transsexuality as a condition that 
required medical and surgical interventions, statutory health insurance compa-
nies initially assumed the costs of surgical sex reassignment surgery unevenly. 
According to s. 182 RVO (Reichsversicherungsordnung),168 a disease is defined 
as an anomalous physical or mental condition that requires treatment or causes 
an inability to work or both (BSG 1973: 582). ›Anomalous‹ signifies a condition 
that deviates from the concept of a healthy human being (BSG, decision on 16 
Mar. 1972, reported in BSG 1973: 582). The Federal Social Court specified that a 
condition requires treatment, if it prevents an aggravation (BSG 1973: 582; BSG 
1975: 2268) or is amenable to a cure or relief (ibid). Arguing that it would be 
168 | The Reichsversicherungsordnung (RVO) was passed on 19 July 1911. It served as 
a statutory basis of the German welfare state from 1913 to 1992. Covering the statutes 
of the workers’ health, the accident, the disability and the old age insurance companies, 
the RVO was one of the largest bodies of statutes of the German Reich (Deutsches Reich). 
Since 1975, the Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch; SGB) has gradually replaced 
the RVO. In 1988, the Health Care Reform Act (Gesundheitsreformgesetz) extracted the 
statutes that regulate statutory health insurance companies from the RVO and placed 
them into Volume V of the Social Security Code (Fünftes Buch des Sozialgesetzbuchs; 
SGB V) (Wirtschaftslexikon.co 2015).
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irresponsible to the community of the insured and unacceptable to the insured 
individual not to intervene medically, if there were better and less sophisticated 
means of treatment to prevent a serious risk of illness, the Federal Social Court 
held that such a risk qualified to obtain medical aid services (ibid).169
Although sexologist research concluded in the course of the 1970s that 
hormonal and surgical treatment appeared to be the best available means to 
prevent depression, self-mutilation, suicide and work incapacity in transsexual 
individuals, statutory health insurance companies dealt inconsistently with ap-
plications for sex reassignment surgery. Several insurance companies refused 
to cover sex reassignment surgery (Spengler 1978: 1193). Spengler summarised 
a number of arguments the latter put forth to turn down applications. Among 
these were that representatives of statutory health insurance companies held 
that transsexuality was not a disorder, did not impair a person’s well-being and 
that transsexuality was based on an arbitrary decision. In other instances, sex 
reassignment surgery was not considered an appropriate treatment or was re-
garded as cosmetic treatment (ibid).
Statutory health insurance companies were in general more willing to as-
sume the costs of extensive psychological and physical examinations as well 
as hormone treatment (Spengler 1978: 1193). The issue of hormone treatment 
was legally resolved earlier than the question of who was to meet the costs of 
sex reassignment surgery. Drawing heavily on Spengler’s and Nevinny-Stickel 
and Hammerstein’s narrow and homogeneous concepts of transsexuality in 
their respective articles published in the legal journal NJW, the Regional Social 
Court in Stuttgart applied to transsexuality the principles that define an illness 
according to the RVO.170 Suggesting that transsexuality does not feature the 
169 | While the Federal Social Court emphasised that this rule also applied to mental 
disorders, it anticipated that drawing the boundary between a mental illness and a simple 
psychological strain could pose some difficulties (BSG 1975: 2268). The Court dealt with 
a person who had given birth to a child with a hereditary illness. Fearing that any further 
child would be born with the same condition, she brought an action against her health 
insurance company, which had turned down her application for hormonal contraceptives 
(ibid: 2267). 
The Federal Social Cour t formulated two guiding principles and remanded the case to the 
regional court. The Court held that measures to prevent a pregnancy are generally not 
considered medical aid benefits. This principle also applies, if a pregnancy leads to the 
birth of a sick child. However, hormonal contraceptives may be considered medical aid 
benefits, it they avert the risk of a serious impairment in individual cases, such as e. g. in a 
case in which the physical or mental health of the person giving birth is threatened (ibid).
170 | Statutory health insurance companies proceed according to the principle of 
benefits in kind. However, in this particular case, the court made an exception, arguing 
that the complainant had approached her health insurance company in time. The Court 
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relationship between the psychological and the physical condition in ›healthy‹ 
individuals, the Court defined transsexuality as a disease pursuant to statu-
tory health insurance company regulations (LSG Stuttgart 1982: 718). After 
having considered the alleviating effects of the hormones on the ›disorder‹, 
the commensurability of the measure and its success, the Court ruled that the 
statutory health insurance company was obliged to reimburse the costs (ibid: 
719).171 However, the issue of meeting the costs of sex reassignment surgery by 
statutory health insurance companies remained unresolved for approximately 
another six years.172
held that if the health insurance company did not grant a benefit in kind and this procedure 
proved to be unlawful at a later point in time, the respondent was obliged to reimburse the 
costs (LSG Stuttgart 1982: 719).
171 | In this particular case, a post-operative male-to-female transperson sued the 
health insurance company for refusing to reimburse the costs of hormones (LSG Stuttgart 
1982: 718).
172 | The obligation to meet the costs of privately insured transsexual individuals’ sex 
reassignment surgery was legally settled in 2003. On 08 Mar. 1995, the Federal Court of 
Justice decided not to accept a complaint launched by a private health insurance company 
against a decision of the appellate court. The appellate court had ruled that surgical 
modifications of the external sex characteristics need to be considered a medically 
required treatment for a disease pursuant to the model conditions for sickness costs and 
the hospital daily benefit insurance (Musterbedingungen für die Krankheitskosten­ und 
Krankentagegeldversicherung; MB/KK) of private health insurance companies, if the 
member’s recognition as a member of the ›other‹ sex was declared legally binding (BGH 
1995: 447 f.). 
In another instance, a female-to-male trans individual sued her private health insurance 
company for reimbursement of the costs of hormone therapy, 50 % of the costs of a sex 
reassignment operation and the assumption of costs of further hormone therapy. The 
national courts dismissed the case, arguing that the claimant had failed to prove the 
necessity of the treatment and that she was not entitled to reimbursement of costs, since 
she had deliberately caused her disease (ECtHR 2003: Van Kück v. Germany, nos. 22 f.). 
The transwoman turned to the European Cour t of Human Rights (ECtHR), claiming that 
German court proceedings had contravened the right to a fair trial provided in Art. 6(1) 
ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), the right to respect for an individual’s 
private life (Art. 8 ECHR) and the prohibition to discriminate against an individual, here, 
on the basis of sex (Art. 14 ECHR) (ibid: no.3). On 12 June 2003, the European Court on 
Human Rights decided in the case of van Kück v. Germany that with regard to the alleged 
violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR and taking into consideration »the determination of the medical 
necessity of gender re-assignment measures in the applicant’s case and also of the cause 
of the applicant’s transsexuality, […] the proceedings in question, taken as a whole, did 
not satisfy the requirements of a fair hearing« (ibid: no. 64). With regard to the alleged 
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Gaining and extending statutor y health insurance coverage 
of sex reassignment surger y
The second phase in striking the balance between transsexual individuals 
requiring sex reassignment surgery and statutory insurance companies is 
marked by legal security, a differentiated concept of transsexuality, a demarca-
tion of sex reassignment surgery from so-called cosmetic interventions and 
an extension of surgical sex reassignment measures to be covered by statutory 
health insurance companies.
On 06 Aug. 1987, the Federal Social Court ruled that statutory health insur-
ance companies were obliged to assume the costs of sex reassignment surgery 
in individual cases.173 The Court maintained the Regional Court Lower Saxo-
ny – Bremen’s (LSG Niedersachsen-Bremen) definition of disease pursuant to 
insurance law and its concept of transsexuality. With regard to the former, the 
Federal Social Court added to the initially depicted concept of disease a psycho-
logical strain that renders an anomaly a disease (BSG 1988: 1551). With regard 
to transsexuality and unlike the Regional Court in Stuttgart, the Federal Social 
Court did not act on the assumption that transsexuality was in general a patho-
logical state requiring sex reassignment surgery. While the Court suggested 
that transsexuality constitutes an anomaly, only a case-by-case review could 
tell whether the inner tension between a transsexual individual’s sex and his 
or her identity was pathologically significant (ibid: 1550 f.). In addition, the Fed-
eral Social Court suggested that the Regional Court Lower Saxony – Bremen 
might have misconceived the concept of expedience entailed in the concept 
of necessity of treatment, if it had not considered a priority of psychiatric and 
psychotherapeutic treatment. However, the Federal Social Court was satisfied 
violation of Art. 8 ECHR, the Court concluded »that no fair balance was struck between 
the interests of the private health insurance company on the one side and the interests 
of the individual on the other« (ibid: no. 84). In addition, the Court held »that the German 
authorities overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to them under paragraph 2 
of Article 8« (ibid: no. 85). According to the Court, the applicant’s allegation of a violation 
against Art. 14 of the Convention »did not give rise to any separate issue under Article 
14 in conjunction with Article 6§1 and Article 8« (ibid: no. 92). The Court awarded the 
complainant compensation for non-pecuniary damage (ibid: no. 96) and for costs and 
expenses (ibid: nos. 97[I] and [II]).
173 | The Court dealt with a case in which a statutory health insurance company refused 
to meet the costs of sex reassignment surgery on a male-to-female trans person. Arguing 
that there was no anomalous physical condition prior to surgery that could have been 
cured, relieved or kept from aggravation (BSG 1988: 1550), the health insurance company 
brought the case before the Regional Court Lower Saxony-Bremen (LSG Niedersachsen-
Bremen). The complainant did not succeed and appealed to the Federal Social Court.
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that the lower court had noted that this kind of treatment had failed in this 
particular case.174
In the 1990s, courts established a distinction between sex reassignment 
surgery and so-called cosmetic surgery maintained to this day. In this regard, 
the Federal Social Court decision on 10 Feb. 1993, gave direction to further 
rulings. In this particular case, the Court dealt with a dispute between an indi-
vidual who had undergone a surgical procedure to extend the length of his legs 
and the statutory health insurance company. The health insurance company 
refused to assume the costs of surgery, arguing that the latter are not obliged 
to pay for a surgical intervention into a physical state within a normal range in 
order to remedy a psychic disorder. The Federal Social Court decided in favour 
of the health insurance company (BSG 1993: 2398).
The Court rejected an analogy between cosmetic interventions and sex 
reassignment surgery, arguing that in the case of transsexuality the patient’s 
entire condition is an anomaly. Quoting the reasons presented in the Federal 
Social Court decision on 06 Aug. 1987, the Court suggested that the inner 
tension between the morphology and the gender identity may in individual 
cases lead to a disease pursuant to insurance law requiring treatment. Statu-
tory health insurance companies are required to assume the costs of sex reas-
signment surgery only after psychiatric and psychotherapeutic measures fail 
to provide relief or eliminate the tension. The Court suggested that the differ-
ence between the case at hand and that of transsexuality is that in exceptional 
cases of transsexuality, surgery poses the only remedy (ibid: 2400), regardless 
of whether the transsexual individual agrees to undergo psychiatric or psycho-
logical treatment or not.175
174 | The Medical Services of the Statutory Health Insurance Companies interpreted 
the Federal Social Court’s suggestion to the effect that surgery needs to be preceded 
by psychiatric or psychological treatment as the case of the MDK Northrhine reveals (cf. 
Banaski 1996: 65). In a case that will be addressed later on, a post-operative complainant 
who did not undergo psychological treatment prior to surgery in vain sued her health 
insurance company for reimbursement of sex reassignment surgery (BSG 2005, MDS 
2009a: 103).
175 | The Federal Social Court presented two further arguments to dismiss the intervening 
party’s request. First, the physical condition of the individual who had undergone surgery 
did not deviate from the norm prior to surgery and therefore did not qualify as a disease 
requiring treatment according to ss. 182 and 184(1) RVO (BSG 1993: 2399). Second, the 
Court held that even if the surgical procedure was the only possible remedy for the mental 
disease, statutory health insurance companies could not be expected to assume the costs 
of surgery, since such a procedure would lead to an extension of measures they would 
have to pay for. The Court reasoned that such an approach was incompatible with the 
provisions entailed in ss. 182 and 184(1) RVO. If statutory health insurance companies 
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In its decision on 11 Apr. 1994, the High Regional Court and Court of Ap-
peal in Cologne (OLG Köln) reinforced the distinction between sex reassign-
ment and cosmetic surgery.176 The Court held that
[t]he need to treat transsexuality in its individual development defies any comparison 
with other cosmetic operations or other hormonal or mental disorders in the develop-
ment of an individual’s gender identity and can only be assessed according to the very 
concrete individual facts of the individual case […]. (OLG Köln 1995: 448)177
Most significantly, however, the Court determined that if transsexuality is 
pathologically significant as in the complainant’s case, it is medically justifiable 
to indicate surgery, including a phalloplasty, especially since the Transsexual 
Act requests a physical alignment with the ›new‹ gender (ibid: 449).178 Thus, in 
a period in which cost pressure in the health system was quite tangible, social 
court rulings established the obligation of statutory health insurance compa-
nies to meet the costs of sex reassignment surgery and extended the measures 
they had to cover.
were to cover surgical interventions into a regular physical state simply because the 
individual is psychically fixated on the desired modifications, health insurance companies 
would have to assume the costs of expensive cosmetic interventions in individuals with a 
similar psychic fixation (ibid).
176 | In this particular case, a health insurance company appealed against a lower 
court decision, which had ruled that the company was obliged to meet the costs of sex 
reassignment surgery in the case of a transman who had undergone surgery, including a 
phalloplasty, abroad (OLG Köln 1995: 448).
177 | With reference to the trans individual’s long lasting psychological strain that 
had resulted in a physical breakdown and after having undergone an unsuccessful 
psychotherapy, the Court ruled that regardless of whether transsexuality was a disease or 
not, in this particular case transsexuality had a pathological significance and required sex 
reassignment treatment (ibid: 448).
178 | In this particular case, surgery was in part unsuccessful. The Court argued that re-
gardless of whether the intervention was successful or not, medical statements did not 
rule out the possibility of a successful outcome. The Court suggested that it was obvious 
that a sex change from female to male would include the construction of a penis that 
resembled the ›natural features‹ of a male person. In addition, it would be an unwarrant-
able danger, if the individual’s appearance resembled that of a hermaphrodite (ibid: 449).
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Limiting and regulating statutor y health insurance coverage 
of sex reassignment surger y
The third phase in the regulation of statutory health insurance assumption of 
costs of sex reassignment measures began in the late 1990s and developed in 
the context of continuing cost pressure and efficiency rule of health care. The 
latter is mirrored in statutory change, legal interpretations of this change and a 
limitation and heavier regulation of statutory health insurance coverage of sex 
reassignment measures while maintaining the exceptional position of trans-
sexuality as a condition that in clearly specified circumstances justifies health 
insurance coverage of costs of sex reassignment surgery.
In the course of this period, s. 27(1) SGB V took effect, replacing ss. 182 and 
184 RVO and becoming part of the statutory framework for regulating principles 
of, and access to statutory health insurance benefits. Section 27(1) SGB V broadly 
provides that insured persons may claim medical treatment, if it is necessary to 
recognise or cure a disease, to prevent an aggravation or to relieve ailments. How-
ever, s. 1 SGB V rules among other things that insured individuals are jointly 
responsible for their health, hence indicating a tendency towards limiting the 
benefits catalogue of statutory health insurance companies (BMJV undated d).
The Federal Social Court interpreted the law to the effect that not every 
physical anomaly qualifies as a pathological condition under health insurance 
law. Rather, a physical condition only qualifies as a disease, if an insured in-
dividual experiences an impairment of bodily functions or if an anatomical 
deviation is defacing (BSG 2004a).
The limitation of the benefits catalogue of statutory health insurance com-
panies also had effects on the obligation of statutory health insurance cover-
age of sex reassignment measures. From the late 1990s onward, courts began 
to define measures formerly subsumed under sex reassignment measures as 
cosmetic, while generally maintaining a distinction between sex reassignment 
surgery and cosmetic surgery.
In cases dealing with micromasties or breasts the respective transwomen 
considered disproportionately small, courts decided that statutory health insur-
ance companies are not obliged to pay for mammo-augmentation-plasties. The 
High Regional Court and Court of Appeal in Saxony (Sächsisches OLG), the 
Social Court in Aachen (SG Aachen) and the Regional Social Court in Baden-
Württemberg (LSG Baden-Württemberg) reasoned among other things that 
a psychological strain does not justify a surgical intervention at the expense 
of statutory health insurance companies (Sächsisches OLG 1999; SG Aachen 
2009; LSG Baden-Württemberg 2012).179
179 | In all cases, transwomen had sued their respective health insurance companies 
after the latter had granted applications for vaginoplasties, but turned down applications 
for mammo-augmentation-plasties.
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In the first case, the High Regional Court and Court of Appeal in Saxony 
held that small breasts do not constitute an irregular physical condition. Based 
on the assumption that female breasts cover a broad range of sizes, the Court 
argued that small breasts just as well fit the image of a healthy woman as do 
large breasts. More specifically, the Court held that it is not appropriate to de-
fine parameters for the size of breasts on a healthy woman and to pathologise 
deviations from this particular norm (Sächsisches OLG 1999).180
Moreover, the Court held that the health insurance company was not obliged 
to assume the costs of surgical measures in order to remedy a psychological 
disorder. A successful treatment is not measured by the individual’s subjec-
tive notion or a physical contour considered »ideal« or »appropriate«, even in a 
180 | In its aftermath, statutory health insurances continued to refer to the court ruling 
of the Regional Social Court of Saxony in order to avert coverage of costs. In one instance, 
the Social Court Wiesbaden (Sozialgericht Wiesbaden; SG Wiesbaden) dealt with the case 
of a transman who had undergone a subcutaneous mastectomy. Depending on several 
factors, such as size of breasts, skin texture and form of the breasts, such an intervention 
can be performed in one- or two-step procedures on small to medium-sized breasts, 
leaving less visible scars than double-incision mastectomies. The health insurance had 
initially granted coverage of costs of a mastectomy. The transman applied for a revision 
of the mastectomy, arguing that an enlarged breast envelope had been left over (SG 
Wiesbaden 2012, 35401: para 5). Unlike the surgeons who had unanimously stated that 
surgery did not achieve the goal of creating a male chest, since it featured visible and 
palpable bulges, the MDK however decided that there was neither excessive skin left over 
worth mentioning, nor functional impairment that would justify further surgery. Rather, 
additional surgery would simply be cosmetic (ibid: para 6). Based on the assessment of 
the MDK, the statutory health insurance refused to assume the costs of further surgery. 
The transman filed an objection, which was rejected by the health insurance company, 
whereupon the transman filed a case against the health insurance company (ibid: para 
7). The Social Court Wiesbaden ordered additional medical reports, which in addition 
to the findings brought forth by the complainant stated a significant asymmetry of the 
breasts (ibid: para 15). The Court ruled that the complainant’s breasts required revisions, 
since the surgical outcome did not correspond with a legitimately expected outcome of 
sex reassignment surgery (ibid: para 19). The Court held that the decision of the Regional 
Social Court of Saxony did not apply in this case (ibid: para 20). It argued that, if a health 
insurance company agrees to cover the costs of sex reassignment surgery, it – as in this 
case – has consented to assume the costs of surgery to model male breasts. The aim was 
not to eliminate defacement or functional impairment (ibid: para 21). Rather, and referring 
to the Federal Constitution Court decision on 11 Oct. 1978, it argued that transsexual 
individuals want to reach a congruence of the mind and the body of which surgery 
constitutes part of realising the goal (ibid: para 22). The Hessische LSG (Hessisches 
Landessozialgericht) confirmed the lower court decision (Hessische LSG 2014).
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case in which the discrepancy between the outer appearance and the respective 
individual’s self-perception produces considerable psychological strain. Rather, 
it is decisive that from the perspective of a »sensible« observer, an approxima-
tion towards the outer appearance of the ›other‹ gender has taken place (ibid).181
In the second case and in response to the complainant’s statements,182 the 
Social Court in Aachen held that a claim to mammo-augmentation-plasty at 
the expense of statutory health insurance companies is premised on a disease. 
A micromasty cannot be considered a disease requiring treatment, because it is 
not connected with a physical malfunction. Missing fatty tissue does not render 
the condition of breasts pathological, nor are they defacing. They can only be 
assessed as defacement, if their condition is objectively and significantly notice-
able and if they are subject to reactions, such as curiosity or consternation (SG 
Aachen 2009).
In addition and with reference to the Federal Social Court decision in the 
case of a ciswoman seeking health insurance coverage of breast augmentation 
surgery,183 the Court held that a transsexual individual is not entitled to every 
kind of surgical measure deemed necessary to approximate a supposed ideal. 
The Court argued that it is not justifiable that a transsexual individual can 
claim benefits a ciswoman with the same size of breasts may not. If the com-
plainant wanted to be recognised and treated like a woman, she would have to 
accept the rules that apply to all women (ibid).
The third case, like the second case, dealt with mammary hypoplasia. The 
Regional Court in Baden-Württemberg reinforced the former court’s decision 
that statutory health insurance companies are not required to take on the costs 
of a mammo-augmentation-plasty in transwomen. However, the Court conced-
ed that transwomen may claim health insurance coverage for breast construc-
tion, provided there is no disposition towards developing breasts at all and the 
181 | The Court decided to ignore the expert reports that supported the complainant’s 
cause (SG Aachen 2009).
182 | In this particular case, the complainant argued that her micromasty constituted 
an anatomical deviation and defacement in her view, which produced significant 
psychological strain (SG Aachen 2009).
183 | In this case, a ciswoman experiencing a psychological strain due to small breasts 
with little glandular tissue in vain appealed to the Federal Social Court to revise the 
Marburg Social Court (SG Marburg) decision, which had imposed the costs of mammo-
augmentation-plasty on the complainant. The Federal Social Court dismissed the 
complaint (BSG 2004a), referring among other things to its decision on 13 July 2004 of 
which some of the core arguments are mentioned above and recur in the court reasoning 
on mammo-augmentation-plasties on transwomen.
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respective individual has obtained an indication for surgical measures due to 
transsexualism (LSG Baden-Württemberg 2012).184
Court rulings differed more strongly on issues pertaining to epilation on 
transwomen. While statutory health insurance companies do not cover epila-
tion treatment on ciswomen, they do on transwomen, provided a physician 
carries out the measure. However, court rulings on health insurance coverage 
of costs of epilation performed by cosmeticians are contradictory. On 11 Dec. 
2007, the Social Court in Düsseldorf (SG Düsseldorf) decided that the health 
insurance company had to reimburse the costs of needle epilation performed 
by a cosmetician on a transwoman and to assume the costs of a total of 120 
hours of epilation (SG Düsseldorf 2007). By contrast, the Regional Court of 
Baden-Württemberg decided in a similar case that statutory health insurance 
companies are not obliged to take on costs of epilation treatment with a cosme-
tician (LSG Baden-Württemberg 2009).
184 | The LSG Baden-Württemberg also discussed the legitimacy of insurance-covered 
surgery into a healthy body in cases of transsexuality with pathological significance in 
the light of the Federal Constitutional Court ruling on ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG on 11 Jan. 
2011 and the debate on depathologisation (LSG Baden-Württemberg 2012). The Federal 
Constitutional Court had stated that based on the latest sexological findings, 20 to 30 % 
of all transsexual individuals do not opt for surgery. However, the Federal Constitutional 
Court assumed that many transsexual individuals nevertheless require surgery to relieve 
psychological strain (cf. BVerfG 2011: para 31). Referring to the sexological debate 
on depathologisation, the Regional Social Court suggested that pursuant to current 
health insurance law, health insurance companies might no longer be responsible for 
covering the costs of somatic measures in transsexual individuals once transsexuality 
is depathologised or considered a healthy variant of an individual’s gender identity (LSG 
Baden-Württemberg 2012). The Regional Social Court concluded however that the special 
position of transsexuality in terms of insurance law continues to be justified, arguing 
that, »[t]ranssexualism currently continues to be considered a mental irregularity rather 
than a simple variant. Due to its continuing exceptional position when manifested with 
pathological significance, this psychological abnormality generally justifies surgical 
interventions into a healthy body.« (Ibid) As Wielpütz points out, while it is problematic to 
compare transsexuality with a mental disorder, since the cause of transsexuality remains 
unknown (Wielpütz 2012: 286), she agrees with the Court’s argumentation that it is likely 
that health insurance companies would no longer be obliged to assume the costs of sex 
reassignment surgery, once transsexuality is no longer classified as a disease (ibid: 284). 
However, it remains to be examined whether sex reassignment surgery for all individuals 
requiring these measures can e. g. be covered on the basis of a social indication, like 
abortions, or whether sex reassignment measures can be integrated into Volume V of the 
Social Insurance Code, like regulations on alternative insemination (cf. BAK TSG-Reform 
2012: 10).
Negotiating the Borders of the Gender Regime 268
Despite limiting interventions statutory health insurance companies are 
obliged to cover, courts adhered to the special position of transsexuality as 
compared to other so-called gender identity disorders and cis individuals. This 
stance becomes evident in court cases that dealt with mammo-reduction-plas-
ties and augmentation mammoplasties on ciswomen and in a case the respec-
tive court called ›cisidentity‹ (Zisidentität).
In 2004, the Federal Social Court argued in cases dealing with the re-
imbursement of costs of breast reduction185 and meeting the costs of breast 
augmentation surgery that neither a mammary hyperplasia nor a mammary 
hypoplasia can be compared with transsexuality. Without failing to define the 
circumstances that limit or allow health insurance companies to meet the costs 
of sex reassignment surgery,186 the Federal Social Court presented three ar-
guments to substantiate its opinion. First, the Court pointed out that unlike 
s. 27(1) SGB V, s. 182(1)1 RVO was oriented towards expanding the benefits cata-
logue of statutory health insurance companies (BSG 2004a). Second, the Court 
185 | In this particular case, a ciswoman with mamma hyperplasia sought reimburse ment 
of costs of breast reduction surgery. Arguing that the disproportionate size of her breasts 
cannot be influenced by weight loss and that her breasts cause muscle tenseness in the 
neck and shoulders and a trachelokyphosis, she held that her irregular physical condition 
required treatment in order to prevent physical and psychological after-effects. Moreover, 
and in reference to transsexuality, the complainant suggested that there is no principle that 
psychological impairment excludes an indication for surgery (BSG 2004b). The Federal 
Social Court decided that the health insurance company is not obliged to reimburse the 
costs of breast reduction surgery on several grounds. With regard to the complainant’s 
former argument, the Court held that not every physical irregularity qualifies as a disease 
pursuant to insurance law. In this particular case, the Court argued that the size of breasts 
does not limit bodily functions, and the orthopaedic problems can be eliminated, using 
physiotherapy. Moreover, the Court reasoned that statutory health insurance companies 
are not required to provide their respective members with every possible means that 
promote his or her health. In addition, the Court held that surgery on a healthy body only 
indirectly affects another health deficiency without a secure prognosis whether surgery 
will solve the problem (BSG 2004b). Reiterating the reasons presented by the Federal 
Social Court, the Regional Social Court in Northrhine-Westfalia (LSG NRW) arrived at the 
same decision in a similar case on 24 Jan. 2013 (LSG NRW 2013, 20249: paras 21; 22; 
24; 26).
186 | As outlined earlier on, statutory health insurance companies were at the time of 
this Federal Social Court ruling only obliged to meet the costs of sex reassignment surgery 
in cases with severe symptoms. Moreover, the insured members usually had undergone 
psychiatric treatment or psychotherapy. Finally, courts did not grant transsexual 
individuals every possible kind of surgery that is oriented towards an alleged ideal image 
(BSG 2004a; 2004b).
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reiterated the reason provided in an earlier court ruling that transsexuality 
was a complex and profound disorder affecting the entire personality, includ-
ing psychological and physical impairment (ibid; ibid 2004b). Third, the Court 
argued that the fact that the legislator passed the Transsexual Act justifies an 
extraordinary legal assessment of transsexuality (ibid).
The Court also emphasised the special position of transsexuality among 
other so-called gender identity disorders. In the case of a ›gender identity disor-
der‹ the Court referred to as ›cisidentity‹,187 a person with a female body wished 
to obtain male physical features while retaining the remaining physical charac-
teristics defined as female. The health insurance had met the individual’s costs 
of psychotherapy, hormone treatment with testosterone and a subcutaneous 
mastectomy. However, it refused to assume the costs of a surgical procedure 
to enlarge the clitoris and provide the labia with implants (BSG 2011, 95709: 
para: 4).
The Court dismissed the complainant’s appeal against a lower court deci-
sion, which had ruled that the health insurance company was not required to 
meet the costs of masculinising surgery on a female person with a cisidentity 
(ibid: para 5). The Federal Social Court reiterated the arguments it had pre-
sented in earlier cases to substantiate the special position of transsexuality with 
regard to health insurance coverage of sex reassignment surgery (ibid: paras 
17b; 19).
In addition, the Court held that the requirement to treat an individual ac-
cording to the assessment in the Transsexual Act was linked to the approxima-
tion of a »regular« condition, i. e. the physical condition of a man or a woman, 
respectively, a state the complainant obviously did not intend to achieve (ibid: 
para 8). The Court argued that the desired physical goal of treatment in this 
particular case was not covered by s. 27(1) SGB V, since the hormonally induced 
anomalous physical condition was not conducive to healing an existing dis-
ease, preventing an aggravation or relieving the person’s symptoms. Rather, 
the complainant was intent on creating a condition that deviates even further 
from the concept of a »healthy« person by opting for surgery to the effect of 
having male and female physical features: 
The debatable treatment is according to the complainant’s wish meant to create a phys-
ical state between the two human gender types and not a most approximately regular 
state, such as that of a male body. The desire to develop a micropenis while maintaining 
187 | The complainant was diagnosed with F64.8 according to the ICD-10, a category, 
which covers a number of so-called gender identity disorders other than transsexuality. 
According to Seikowski, ›cisidentity‹ describes individuals who identify as ›both‹ 
genders. Seikowski suggests that surgery is contraindicated in individuals with such an 
identity (Seikowski 1997: 352).
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and enlarging the existing labia at the same time, using plastic surgery, neither corre-
sponds with the regular state of a woman, nor of a man. The fact that there are individu-
als with features of both sexes, occasionally from bir th onwards, does not, contrary to 
the complainant’s opinion commend the regularity of such a […] state. Such cases can 
be causes of claims to medical treatment oriented to aligning the respective insured 
individual with a normal sex type and not to deepen the state of ambisexedness. This 
would neither be a cure, nor a prevention of aggravation. (Ibid: para 22)
The third phase is also marked by a heavier regulation of eligibility to statutory 
health insurance coverage of sex reassignment measures. So far, court rulings 
have affected access to treatment in specialised private clinics, regulated reim-
bursement practices and unambiguously established the priority of psychiatric 
treatment or psychotherapy.
On 30 Oct. 2003, the Bavarian Regional Social Court (Bayrisches Landesso-
zialgericht; Bayr. LSG) dealt with a dispute between a statutory health insur-
ance and a transman over the full reimbursement of costs of a phalloplasty in a 
specialised private clinic. The Court ruled that the complainant did not qualify 
for the coverage of the remaining costs of surgery in this particular clinic (Bayr. 
LSG 2003).
The Court offered two reasons for its decision. First, the Court held that 
according to s. 108 SGB V, statutory health insurance companies may only pay 
for treatment in university hospitals that are part of the German Hospital Plan 
or hospitals that have signed a hospital provision contract. The Court specified 
that s. 13[2] SGB V rules out reimbursement, if a voluntarily insured member 
undergoes inpatient treatment in a hospital not approved by statutory health in-
surance companies (ibid). The Court held that the complainant was not eligible 
to reimbursement of costs, since he did not require urgent treatment and there 
was no gap in health care offered by contract hospitals (ibid).188
188 | More specifically, s. 13(2) SGB V provides that individuals insured with statuto-
ry health insurance companies may choose between benefits in kind instead of reim-
bursement. However, insured members are required to inform the health insurance 
company before undergoing treatment. The health insurance company is required to 
inform the insured member in advance that the latter needs to pay for the costs the health 
insurance company will not assume. In addition, s. 13(2) SGB rules that a limitation of 
the choice of medical care, dental care, inpatient care and induced benefits and services 
is possible. Statutory health insurance companies may approve of treatment, if medical 
or social reasons justify recourse to other health care providers and if an equivalent 
treatment is ensured. However, reimbursement may only be claimed to an extent that 
does not exceed the amount the health insurance company would have to cover for a 
benefit in kind. Section 13(3) SGB V provides that a health insurance company is required 
to provide a benefit that may not be delayed in time. If the health insurance wrongfully 
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Second, and in response to the transperson’s argument that he believed the 
specialised private clinic offered the best possible treatment, the Court held 
that optimal patient-centred care is not the standard for statutory health in-
surance companies. Rather, the quality and effectiveness of the benefits need 
to correspond with the generally accepted state of art medical expertise and 
consider medical progress.189 The Court ruled that an individual insured with 
a statutory health insurance company may not claim costs of treatment in a 
private clinic, even if the surgeon is – as in this particular case – internation-
ally outstanding or if the hospital is specialised in the type of surgery sought 
after (ibid). On 06 Jan. 2005, the Federal Social Court confirmed the decision 
(BSG 2005).
In another instance, the Regional Court Berlin-Brandenburg (LSG Berlin-
Brandenburg) dealt with a case involving a transman who had undergone an 
ambulant bilateral mastectomy. He sued the health insurance company for re-
imbursement of costs, despite the fact that the latter had in advance refused to 
assume the costs of this particular measure (LSG Berlin-Brandenburg 2012: 
para 21). On 16 Sept. 2009, the Court decided that the complainant was not 
entitled to a pecuniary claim towards his health insurance (ibid: para 24).
The Court presented three reasons for its decision. First, the Court held 
that an ambulant bilateral mastectomy did not qualify as an intervention that 
had to occur without delay (ibid: para 25). Second, the Court reasoned that the 
complainant was no longer insured with the health insurance company at the 
time surgery took place and that the health insurance company did not approve 
of the desired measure while the complainant was insured with this particu-
lar health insurance company (ibid: para 35). Third, a prescription for hospital 
treatment is only valid for inpatient treatment (ibid: para 30).
The decision of the Federal Social Court on 20 June 2005 regulates the 
relevance of psychiatric treatment or psychotherapy for health insurance cov-
erage of costs of sex reassignment surgery. In this particular case, the Court 
dismissed a transwoman’s complaint against the non-admission of the decision 
of the Regional Social Court Baden-Württemberg (LSG Baden-Württemberg). 
The latter had overturned the lower court decision that the health insurance 
company reimburse the costs of sex reassignment surgery, arguing that it was 
not possible to state that sex reassignment procedures were the only means 
to relieve the impairment, since the complainant did not undergo psychiatric 
treatment or psychotherapy (BSG, MDS 2009a: 103 f.).
refuses to provide a benefit and if the ensured member as a result had to pay for the 
costs of treatment, the health insurance is required to reimburse the costs of necessary 
treatment. 
189 | Section 12(1) SGB V provides that the benefits of the health insurance need to be 
sufficient, appropriate and efficient and may not exceed a certain degree.
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While the Federal Social Court had tentatively suggested on 06 Aug. 1987 
that psychiatric treatment and psychotherapy might have to precede surgery, 
the Court unmistakably ruled in this decision that statutory health insurance 
companies are only required to meet the costs of sex reassignment surgery 
when psychotherapy or psychiatric means have failed to provide relief or elimi-
nate the tension between a person’s physical gender and the individual’s iden-
tity as a member of the so-called other gender (ibid).
3.3.2 Federal Constitutional Court decisions on age limits 
 and the eligibilit y of foreigners with permanent residency 
 in the Federal Republic of Germany to an application under
  the Transsexual Act
Transsexual individuals began to challenge provisions of the Transsexual Act 
soon after it had come into force. From 1982 to 2010, the Federal Constitutional 
Court made six decisions on the Act. Taking into consideration sexological per-
spectives and standpoints in legal scholarship, the following section deals with 
Federal Constitutional Court decisions on age limits for a change of gender 
status and first names, and the eligibility of foreigners with lawful and more 
than temporary residency in the Federal Republic of Germany to applications 
to procedures provided by ss. 1(1)1 and 8(1)1 TSG.190 The abovementioned Federal 
Constitutional Court decisions remedied human rights breaches against trans-
sexual individuals. However, the fact that the Court consistently examined the 
relevant sections of the Transsexual Act according to the general rule of equal-
ity (Art. 3[1] GG) rather than discrimination based on gender and/or native 
country (Art. 3[3] GG) underlines that the Court did not consider transsexuality 
on a par with cis individuals.191
Relevant provisions of the Transsexual Act
Sections 1(1)1 to 1(1)4 and 8(1)1 to 8(1)4 TSG define the requirements transsexual 
individuals needed to comply with for a change of first names and gender sta-
tus until trans individuals began to successfully challenge several rules of the 
Act before the Federal Constitutional Court. Section 1(1)3 TSG rules that a court 
must upon application change an applicant’s first names who due to his or 
her transsexual imprinting no longer feels he or she belongs to the sex/gender 
entered in the birth register, but to the ›other‹ sex/gender and who has felt com-
pelled to live according to his or her ideas for at least three years, provided he or 
she is at least 25 years of age.
190 | For summaries of all Federal Constitutional Court decisions on provisions of the 
Transsexual Act so far, see Adamietz 2011: 125-150.
191 | See also Adamietz 2011.
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Section 8(1)1 TSG rules that a court must state that an applicant be con-
sidered a member of the ›other‹ sex/gender who due to his or her transsexual 
imprinting no longer feels he or she belongs to the sex/gender entered in the 
birth register, but to the ›other‹ sex/gender and who has felt compelled to live 
according to his or her ideas for at least three years, provided he or she fulfils 
the conditions outlined in s. 1(1)1 to 1(1)3 TSG. Section 1(1)1 TSG defines that 
German citizens according to the Basic Law or stateless or displaced foreigners 
with usual residence in the areas of validity of the Act or a person who has been 
granted the right to asylum or a foreign refugee may file an application.
The Federal Constitutional Court decision on the age limit 
of 25 years for a revision of gender status
The age limit of 25 years for a change of gender status according to s. 8(1)1 
TSG was designed to prevent possibly immature individuals from following 
the transsexual route (Augstein 1981: 11).192 However, the legislator did not de-
termine an age limit for sex reassignment surgery. As a result, transsexual 
individuals under the age of 25 who had undergone sex reassignment surgery 
could not apply for a revision of gender status or for a change of first names 
(ibid).193 The lawyer Augstein put the problem in a nutshell when asking, »What 
sense does it make to leave a person in the former legal gender after he or she 
has undergone gender-correcting operations, simply because he or she is not 
yet 25 years old?« (Ibid: 13) In addition to considering the particular vulnerabil-
ity of young transsexual individuals, she suggested the reason for maintaining 
the age limit provided in s. 8(1)1 TSG was incompatible with the general rule of 
equality provided in Art. 3(1) GG (ibid).
Initiated by a constitutional complaint by a transwoman under 25 years of 
age who had undergone sex reassignment surgery, the Federal Constitutional 
Court dealt with the question whether it was compatible with the Basic Law to 
establish an age limit of 25 years when individuals fulfil all other criteria for a 
revision of gender status, especially since the legislator did not provide for an 
age limit for sex reassignment surgery (BVerfG 1983: 170).
192 | This precaution underlines the undesirability of a transsexual development, since 
there are no such precautions for cis individuals.
193 | As Augstein’s surveys reveal, the age limit provided in s. 8(1)1 TSG affected a con-
siderable number of young transsexual individuals. Augstein stated in her survey of deci-
sions on transsexuality and intersexuality until 31 Dec. 1980 that 38.9 % of trans indi-
viduals of a total of 72 persons who had undergone sex reassignment surgery were under 
25 years of age (Augstein 1982: 240). In her survey two years after the Transsexual Act 
had come into force, the number of individuals of the same age group who had undergone 
sex reassignment surgery amounted to 17.1 % of 123 individuals (Augstein 1983: 340).
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The transwoman complained that the age limits for a change of first names 
(s. 1[1]3 TSG) and gender status (s. 8[1]1 TSG) infringed upon her constitution-
ally guaranteed rights to the inviolability of a person’s dignity (Art. 1[1] GG) 
in conjunction with the right to the free development of one’s personality 
(Art. 2[1] GG). Moreover, she held that the abovementioned provisions contra-
vene Art. 3(1) GG, which states that all individuals shall be equal before the law 
(ibid: 171). The Court decided to deal with the question of the constitutionality 
of s. 8(1)1 TSG only (ibid).
On 16 Mar. 1982, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that s. 8(1)1 TSG 
contravenes Art. 3 (1) GG. The Court held that the age requirement excludes 
transsexual individuals under 25 years of age from the possibility to have their 
respective gender status revised, despite having undergone sex reassignment 
surgery and having fulfilled the other prerequisites (ibid: 170). Moreover, the 
Court argued that a provision contravenes the general rule of equality guaran-
teed under Art. 3(1) GG, if addressees of a statute are treated unequally, even 
though there are no substantial differences that justify unequal treatment. 
Since the legislator left it up to physicians to decide whether medical and surgi-
cal interventions are medically indicated, its margin of appreciation is limited. 
Legislation is not entitled to deny a transsexual individual under 25 years of age 
a revision of gender status a person over 25 years of age may obtain (ibid: 172).
However, the Court held that the unconstitutionality of the age requirement 
for an establishment of gender status does not indicate the unconstitutionality 
of the age limit for a change of first names (s. 1[1]3 TSG). The Court argued that 
the latter is possible under conditions that cannot be compared with those de-
manded under s. 8[1]1 TSG and therefore requires separate examination (ibid: 
173).
The Federal Constitutional Court decision on the age limit 
of 25 years for a change of first names
While ss. 1(1)3 and 8(1)1 TSG indeed regulate different matters (Augstein 1982: 
173), sexologists and legal scholars alike criticised that the Court did not ex-
amine the constitutionality of the age limit of 25 years for a change of first 
names. The legal experts Augstein and Sieß as well as the sexologist Pfäfflin 
pointed out that the age limit for the so-called small solution was an effect 
of political compromise (Augstein 1981: 10; Sieß 1996: 110) or tactics (Pfäfflin 
1986: 201) rather than factual reasons.
Augstein and Pfäfflin presented a number of reasons in favour of either 
eliminating (Pfäfflin 1986: 201; Augstein 1983: 340) or at least reducing the age 
limits to 21 years of age (Augstein 1983: 340). Augstein held that the legislator 
needs a valid reason for the age limit regulated by s. 1(1)3 TSG. Augstein and 
Pfäfflin argued that the legislator’s anxiety about a misuse of the ›small solu-
tion‹ had not materialised so far and continues to be highly unlikely, since the 
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legal decision to grant a change of first names involves two experts (Augstein 
1983: 340; Pfäfflin 1986: 202).194
Furthermore, Augstein argued that the phase in the life of a transsexual in-
dividual who has not yet undergone surgery deserves the same protection pro-
vided in Art. 1(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 2(1) GG. A change of first names 
does not entail differences of such significance that it would justify unequal 
treatment (Augstein 1982b: 173).
Finally, Augstein and Pfäfflin argued that the legislator designed the so-
called small solution in accordance with state of the art medicine, especially to 
allow transsexual individuals to test their new role in everyday life, regardless 
of whether the respective individual is over 25 years of age or not (Pfäfflin 1986: 
202; Augstein 1982b: 173). Instead, the legal situation has the opposite effect to 
the one intended (Pfäfflin 1986: 202). 
Local courts dealing with applicants for a change of first names who were 
younger than 25 years of age prompted the Federal Constitutional Court exami-
nation of the age limit for a change of first names under the Transsexual Act. 
The courts stayed the proceedings and called upon the Federal Constitutional 
Court to decide whether s. 1(1)3 TSG was constitutional (BVerfG 1993: 111).
The lower courts held that the cases suggest that irreversible transsexual-
ism can be ascertained in individuals younger than 25 years of age. Moreover, 
the defeasance of s. 8(1)1 TSG forces young transsexual individuals to undergo 
sex reassignment surgery in order to acquire a change of first names, which 
runs contrary to the legislator’s intention to prevent young individuals from 
undergoing surgery prematurely. Furthermore, the courts argued that it is a 
contradiction, if a change of first names depends on a minimum age, while 
surgical measures, which are a prerequisite for a revision of gender status, do 
not. Finally, the courts argued that there were no medical reasons for an age 
limit of 25 years (ibid).
On 26 Jan. 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that s. 1(1)3 TSG 
was indeed incompatible with Art. 3(1) GG and void (ibid: 112). The Court added 
to its reasoning in the decision on the ›big solution‹ that legislation requires a 
particularly strict examination, if the rule of equality involves personal char-
acteristics that approximate those protected under Art. 3(3) GG.195 In these in-
stances unequal treatment risks discrimination against a minority (ibid).
The Court held that the unequal treatment of individuals under 25 years 
of age whom experts described as irreversibly transsexual with a high degree 
194 | Osburg and Weitze’s follow-up study ten years after the Transsexual Act came into 
force confirms Augstein and Pfäfflin’s assessment (Osburg/Weitze 1993: 106).
195 | Art. 3(3) GG rules that, »[n]o person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of 
race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person 
shall be disfavoured because of disability.« (BMJV 2017)
Negotiating the Borders of the Gender Regime 276
of probability severely discriminates against this group of individuals. Unlike 
transsexual individuals who have reached the age of 25 years, they are denied 
the option of living according to the gender role prior to undergoing sex reas-
signment surgery without encountering incriminatory situations e. g. at the 
workplace, in education or in everyday life (ibid). This discrimination is ever 
more severe when considering that the ›small solution‹ aimed at providing con-
ditions for testing life in the ›other‹ gender before deciding to undergo surgery 
(ibid: 112 f.).
Since the legislator did not introduce a new age limit for individuals apply-
ing for a change of gender status, there was no plausible reason for protecting 
the same group of individuals from a reversible and less far-reaching decision. 
Referring to the latest sexological findings on this issue, the Court suggested 
that the ›small solution‹ seems to have contributed to improving the situation 
of transsexual individuals prior to surgery and enlarging the leeway in deci-
sion-making on behalf of physicians and transsexual individuals (ibid: 113).
The Federal Constitutional Court decision on the eligibilit y of 
foreigners with permanent residency in the Federal Republic 
of Germany to an application under the Transsexual Act
As early as in 1986, the sexologist Pfäfflin pointed out to the difficulties foreign 
transsexual individuals living in (West) Germany face. He argued that, based 
on clinical observations, foreign transsexual individuals frequently struggle 
in vain for years with the consulates and embassies of their respective home 
countries, while their social situation deteriorates from day to day due to the 
discrepancy between their outer appearance and their documents. Referring 
to comparatively lenient regulations in the Netherlands, Pfäfflin called on the 
West German legislator to solve this particular problem (Pfäfflin 1986: 203).
Roughly about ten years later, and based on referral proceedings provided 
by the Bavarian Highest Regional Court (Bayrisches Oberstes Landgericht; Bayr. 
ObLG)196 and the High Regional Court in Frankfurt,197 the Federal Constitu-
196 | The Bavarian Highest Regional Court dealt with the case of a Thai citizen living 
in Germany who had undergone surgery and wished to marry her German partner. Her 
application to exempt her from producing a certificate of no impediment to marriage was 
denied her with reference to the Transsexual Act. The complainant entered a registered life 
partnership with her partner, but continued to strive for a marriage (Bayr. ObLG 2004: 67).
197 | The High Regional Court Frankfurt dealt with the case of an Ethiopian citizen who 
had started with sex reassignment surgery in Germany. He was not deported from Germany 
on the grounds that he would neither be accepted as a transsexual individual in Ethiopian 
society, nor be treated medically in an appropriate manner (OLG Frankfurt 2005: 73). In 
the aftermath of a complaint by the representative of the public interest against a local 
court, the regional court decided that the applicant was not a foreign refugee, nor did 
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tional Court dealt with the question, whether it is constitutional to exclude 
transsexual foreigners from the options provided by the Transsexual Act to 
change first names and gender status, even if the law of the home country does 
not provide for such an option (BVerfG 2007: 9).
The referring courts held that s. 8(1)1 TSG in conjunction with s. 1(1)1 TSG 
was incompatible with Art. 3(1) GG and Art. 3(3) GG, if the home country of 
the foreign transsexual individual with usual residence in Germany did not 
have regulations or practices that correspond with s. 8 TSG (Bayr. ObLG 2004: 
68; OLG Frankfurt 2005: 73). They presented four reasons for their legal opin-
ion. First, they argued that this particular group of individuals is discriminated 
against when compared with applicants who are eligible for an application ac-
cording to s. 8(1)1 TSG in conjunction with s. 1(1)1 TSG (Bayr. ObLG 2004: 68; 
OLG Frankfurt 2005: 73).
Second, they held that this particular discrimination violates the principle 
of commensurability. The reason provided by the legislator to leave the decision 
to change the foreign transsexual individual’s gender status up to the home 
country is not of such significance that it would justify unequal legal conse-
quences for German and foreign transsexual individuals, who are lawfully liv-
ing in Germany (Bayr. ObLG 2004: 68; OLG Frankfurt 2005: 74). 
Third, the courts reasoned that analogously to Art. 7 of German Private 
International Law (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch; EGBGB),198 
a person’s gender status is incumbent upon the law of the individual’s home 
country. However, if the law of the transsexual individual’s home country does 
not grant a revision of gender status, s. 1(1)1 TSG collides with Art. 2(1) GG in 
conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG (Bayr. ObLG 2004: 68 f.; OLG Frankfurt 2005: 
75). The OLG Frankfurt added that the protection of an individual’s basic rights 
is paramount to another state’s writ of law (OLG Frankfurt 2005: 75).
Finally, the Bayr. ObLG added that the legislator did not maintain such a 
limitation in a similar area. The registered life partnership does not require 
German citizenship, nor a place of residence in Germany (Bayr. ObLG 2004: 
69).
On 18 July 2006, the Federal Constitutional Law decided that s. 1(1)1 TSG 
is incompatible with the non-discrimination precept provided in Art. 3(1) GG 
in conjunction with the basic right to the protection of the free development of 
one’s personality guaranteed in Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG, 
insofar as it exempts foreign transsexual individuals who are lawfully and not 
temporarily residing in Germany from applying for a change of first names and 
he hold a comparable status. He was therefore not eligible to apply for a change of first 
names. The complainant appealed to the OLG Frankfurt (ibid).
198 | Art. 7(1) EGBGB rules that a person’s capacity to act and capacity to contract are 
subject to the law of the state the person belongs.
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the establishment of gender status according to s. 8(1)1 TSG, if the law of their 
respective countries does not provide comparable regulations (BVerfG 2007: 
14).
The Federal Constitutional Court arrived at its decision after examining 
three aspects as they relate to the facts of the cases. First, the Court examined 
whether s. 1(1)1 TSG contravenes the general rule of equality (Art. 3[1] GG). Sec-
ond, the Federal Constitutional Court examined whether the principle of citi-
zenship contravenes the purpose of ss. 1(1)1 and 8(1)1 TSG to protect transsexual 
individuals’ basic rights declared in Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) 
GG. Third, the Court related s. 1(1)1 TSG to Art. 6 EGBGB.
With regard to the general rule of equality (Art. 3[1] GG), the Court estab-
lished that if the unequal treatment of groups of individuals is linked to an 
impairment of personal privacy, it requires a justification that is commensurate 
with the extent of the impairment. The exclusion of foreign transsexual indi-
viduals under s. 1(1)1 TSG constitutes an unequal treatment of German citizens 
or individuals with a German status on the one hand and transsexual foreign-
ers on the other hand. Unequal treatment is particularly severe for those trans-
sexual individuals who cannot resort to similar regulations in their respective 
home countries. This discrimination severely and unjustifiably impairs the 
rights protected in Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG of those law-
fully and not only temporarily residing in Germany, who are excluded from 
any possibility to be recognised as the gender they perceive themselves to be 
(cf. ibid: 14).
With regard to the second issue, the Court conceded that the legislator pur-
sued a legitimate goal by limiting the group of individuals eligible to an ap-
plication under ss. 1(1)1 and 8(1)1 TSG to German citizens and individuals with 
a German status. The legislator’s considerations were based on the respect for 
the legal orders of other states199 and the assumption that a foreigner is more 
familiar with the law of the home country.
However, the Court argued that relegating without exception foreign trans-
sexual individuals residing lawfully and more than temporarily in Germany to 
the law of their respective home country means that those foreign individuals 
experience discrimination whose home countries do not dispose of comparable 
regulations for a change of first names and gender status (ibid: 15). As a re-
sult, this particular group of individuals cannot enjoy the right to their respec-
tive gender identity and privacy protected by Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with 
Art. 1(1) GG and provided for in s. 1(1)1 TSG for German citizens or individuals 
with a German status (ibid).
199 | Art. 10(1) EGBGB provides that a person’s name is subject to the law of the state to 
whom the individual belongs.
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Moreover, since s. 8(1)1 TSG refers to s. 1(1)1 TSG, foreign transsexual individ-
uals cannot apply. If their respective home country does not provide for a change 
of gender status, foreign transsexual individuals are forced to live with a discrep-
ancy between their outer appearance and their official documents, which, too, 
disadvantages this group of individuals compared to those individuals who may 
apply and dramatically impairs their right to the free development of one’s per-
sonality guaranteed in Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG (ibid). The 
Court concluded that the unrestricted validity of the citizenship principle for a 
change of first names and gender status is not a sufficiently substantial reason for 
depriving foreign transsexual individuals whose home countries do not provide 
for a legal recognition of their respective gender identity and who lawfully and 
more than temporarily live in Germany from the fundamental rights protected 
by Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG (ibid).
The Court added that recognising the sovereignty of other states and re-
specting the independence of other legal orders in principle justify an approach 
that follows the principle of citizenship and refers foreigners to the respective 
national rules. However, neither international law, nor constitutional law de-
mand the use of the principle of citizenship in private international law. Refer-
ring to the registered life partnership, the Court pointed out that the legislator 
has proven that there are exceptions to this principle (ibid).
Finally, the Court problematised the relationship between s. 1(1)1 TSG and 
Art. 6 EGBGB.200 In particular, the Federal Constitutional Court found fault 
with the fact that s. 1(1)1 TSG follows the citizenship principle without entail-
ing a choice of law clause with regard to the respective law of the individual’s 
home country, which German courts could apply. As a result, courts can nei-
ther grant foreign applicants the rights provided in the Transsexual Act, nor 
apply and examine the compatibility of the corresponding foreign law with the 
ordre public. By denying foreign transsexual individuals eligibility to apply for 
a change of first names and an establishment of gender status, s. 1(1)1 TSG ac-
cepts violations of their basic rights, without courts having a chance to prevent 
these violations. The Court concluded that s. 1(1)1 TSG cannot be interpreted 
constitutionally, since foreign transsexual individuals whose home countries 
do not provide for a change of first names and gender status are excluded from 
the protection of basic rights secured by Art. 6 EGBGB and are exerted to a 
serious impairment of their right to the free development of one’s personality 
provided by Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG (ibid: 16).
200 | Art. 6 EGBGB provides for instances in which foreign regulations are not applied, 
if they lead to a result that is incompatible with fundamental principles of German law. 
In particular, a foreign regulation is inapplicable, if its use contravenes basic rights. This 
provision is also known as ordre public (public order).
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Unlike the Federal Constitutional Court decisions on the age limits, the 
Court decided that the unconstitutionality of s. 1(1)1 TSG does not lead to its nul-
lity, but to a declaration of its incompatibility with Art. 3(1) GG in conjunction 
with the basic right to the free development of one’s personality (Art. 2[1] GG in 
conjunction with Art. 1[1] GG). The Court reasoned that the legislator has a few 
options to remedy the impairment of the rule of equality (ibid).
The first suggestion was to transform s. 1(1)1 TSG into a conflict rule or to 
integrate such a provision into private international law by providing a right to 
change the first name and gender status. While such a solution would mean 
adhering to the principle of citizenship, Art. 6 EGBGB would apply to foreign 
transsexual applicants whose home countries do not provide for comparable 
rights (ibid: 16 f.).
The second suggestion was that the legislator extend the provisions of the 
Transsexual Act to foreigners, using instruments, such as the lawful stay or the 
duration of the lawful stay in Germany as criteria for access to the procedures 
provided by ss. 1 and 8 TSG (ibid: 17).
The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that s. 1(1)1 TSG remains in force. 
However, the Court set a deadline until 30 June 2007 for the legislator to create 
a constitutional regulation (ibid).
The legislator decided to pursue the second option. Section 4(1) of the Act 
to amend the Passport Act and further prescriptions (Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Passgesetzes und weiterer Vorschriften; PassGÄndG) rules that a person whose 
first name has been changed according to s. 1 TSG may apply for a passport 
signifying the ›other‹ gender than the one entered in the birth register. The 
Transsexual Act was amended accordingly. Section 1(1)3d TSG specifies that 
in addition to the requirements that apply to all applicants, a foreigner whose 
home country does not provide for a comparable regulation may apply, provided 
he or she holds an unlimited right of residence or a renewable residence permit 
and is a lawfully a permanent resident in Germany.
Legal opinions were mixed on the legislator’s choice. Windel welcomed the 
legislator’s decision, arguing that the second suggestion would have unneces-
sarily disavowed foreign civil status law (Windel 2008: 73). Similarly, Pawlows-
ki (2007: 413) recommended the second option. Grünberger however deplored 
the decision. The latter held that the placing the onus on local courts to com-
mission expert reports in order to compare foreign laws and regulations with 
German regulations would delay proceedings involving transsexual individu-
als (Grünberger 2007: 368; 2008: 92). Adamietz subscribed to Grünberger’s 
view (Adamietz 2011: 141).
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Implications of the Federal Constitutional Court examination 
of Art. 3(1) GG as opposed to Art. 3(3) GG with regard to 
transsexualit y, gender and gender regime
The Federal Constitutional Court did not examine the constitutionality of the 
sections of the Act according to Art. 3(3) GG, which among other grounds pro-
tects individuals from discrimination based on gender and home country.201 
Rather, the Court decided to examine human rights breaches of sections of the 
Act according to the general rule of equality (Art. 3[1] GG).
In its decision on the age limit for a change of gender status, the Federal 
Constitutional Court did not mention Art. 3(3) GG at all as a possible test for 
the constitutionality of the age limit for a revision of gender status. While the 
Court held that the personal characteristics approximate those protected un-
der Art. 3(3) GG in its decision on the age limit for a change of first names, 
discrimination of transsexuality once more fell short of being considered dis-
crimination on the grounds of gender. In the case on the eligibility of a particu-
lar class of foreigners to an application under the Transsexual Act, the Federal 
Constitutional Court evaded the issue.202 The Court argued that since s. 1(1)1 
GG violates the general rule of equality provided in Art. 3(1) GG in conjunction 
with the basic right to the free development of one’s personality guaranteed in 
Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG and is therefore unconstitutional, it is 
unnecessary to decide whether the regulation contravenes further basic rights 
(BVerfG 2007: 16).
While legal scholars agree that given the current anti-discrimination 
framework in Germany discrimination against transsexual individuals can 
only be considered a violation of Art. 3(3) GG after the respective individual has 
gained legal recognition as either a man or a woman,203 Adamietz, Koch-Rein 
and Tolmein problematised this approach with regard to transsexuality, gender 
and gender regime. Adamietz suggests that the main reason for the Court’s 
approach can be explained with a concept of gender which is based on the di-
chotomy between (cis)men and (cis)women. Hence, discrimination can only be 
detected under the Constitution, if a member of one of the legitimate genders 
is treated differently than a member of the other legitimised gender: »The com-
parison with a non-transsexual person without a ›problematic‹ gender was, and 
201 | At the time of writing, the same applies to all Federal Constitutional Court decisions 
preceding or following the decisions mentioned above.
202 | The Bayr. ObLG and the OLG Frankfurt had called upon the Federal Constitutional 
Court to decide whether it was compatible with Art. 3(1) and Art. 3(3) GG to exclude 
foreign transsexual nationals usually living in Germany from eligibility to apply for a 
change of gender status and first names, if the respective home country does not provide 
for such procedures (Bayr. ObLG 2004: 67; OLG Frankfurt 2005: 73).
203 | See e. g. Windel 2008: 69 and Adamietz 2011: 129.
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continues to be, unimaginable according to dominant constitutional dogmatics 
on Art. 3(3) GG« (Adamietz 2011: 129). While Tolmein cautions that transsexu-
ality does not constitute a gender, since many transsexual individuals wish to 
live inconspicuously as a person according to the gender they identify with (Tol-
mein 2008: 114), he likewise suggests that ›gender‹ is conceptualised too nar-
rowly. By defining ›gender‹ as a polarised construction of ›men‹ and ›women‹, 
the period of transitioning from one gender to another as well as ›ambiguous‹ 
genders are blocked out (ibid: 115). Moreover, and as Koch-Rein suggests, the 
gender binary itself is not considered a process of stereotyping and a problem 
(Koch-Rein 2006: 13).
3.3.3 Jurisdiction and legal scholarship on marriage and 
 registered life partnership under the Transsexual Act
Sections 7(1)3 and 8(1)2 TSG affect transsexual individuals’ options to enter or 
maintain a legally sanctioned marriage or registered life partnership in con-
junction with a change of first names or gender status, respectively. Both rules 
were based on the sexological assumption that transsexual individuals are het-
erosexual and the rules were designed to prevent the appearance of, or de facto 
same-sex marriages. Jurisdiction and legal scholarship barely contested the 
abovementioned sections throughout the 1980s and 1990s.204 During the first 
decade of the 21st century, jurisdiction and legal scholarship began to examine 
ss. 7(1)3 and 8(1)2 TSG in the light of recent developments in sexology on trans-
sexuality and against the background of the Basic Law. As a result, the Federal 
Constitutional Court finally declared both sections unconstitutional, paving 
the way for same-sex marriages under specific circumstances. By implication, 
the Federal Constitutional Court decision on s. 7(1)3 TSG heralded a legal devel-
opment towards recognising transsexual individuals’ gender without surgery.
Relevant provisions of the Transsexual Act
Section 7(1)3 TSG defines one of three reasons for invalidating a change of first 
names, while s. 8(1)2 TSG defines one of four prerequisites for a revision of 
gender status. The former rules that the decision through which the applicant’s 
first names were changed is reversed, if the applicant enters a marriage upon 
filing a statement according to s. 1310(1) BGB.205 The latter rules that upon ap-
204 | Exceptions are Augstein 1981 and the Hanseatic High Regional Court Hamburg 
(Hanseatisches OLG Hamburg 1980: 245).
205 | Section 1310(1) BGB provides that a legal marriage may only be entered, if the 
couple wishing to enter into marriage declares its desire to marry before a registrar. 
The registrar is not allowed to deny his or her co-operation, unless it is evident that the 
marriage can be annulled according to s. 1314(2) BGB. Among these reasons are, e. g., 
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plication a court must state that a person be considered a member of the ›other‹ 
sex/gender who due to his or her transsexual imprinting no longer has a sense 
of belonging to the sex/gender entered in the birth register, but to the ›other‹ 
sex/gender and who has felt compelled to live according to his or her ideas for 
at least three years, provided he or she is not married.
Interpretations of sexological concepts of transsexualit y and 
gender in the Federal Constitutional Court decisions on ss. 7(1)3
and 8(1)2 TSG
The Federal Constitutional Court revised its earlier assumptions on gender 
and sexuality in its decision on s. 7(1)3 TSG, leaving an impact on all of the 
Court’s decisions on the Transsexual Act that were to follow. The Court drew 
upon sexological notions that acknowledge the heterogeneity of transsexuality. 
Reconsidering transsexuality also had effects on the Court’s understanding of 
gender, which while not displacing the gender binary marked a shift within the 
gender regime.
The Federal Constitutional Court’s rethinking of its concept of transsexu-
ality apply to transsexual individuals’ sexual orientations, the idea of sex reas-
signment surgery as an indispensable feature of transsexuality and the signifi-
cance of the so-called small solution. While the Court had previously adopted 
dominant sexological concepts of transsexuality that described transsexual in-
dividuals as heterosexual,206 it based its argumentation in its decision on s. 7(1)3 
TSG on findings provided by studies and sexological statements that question 
the homogeneity of transsexual individuals’ sexual orientations. Referring to 
Sigusch (1991: 309; 322), Eicher (1992: 171), and Hartmann and Becker (2002: 
162), the Federal Constitutional Court adopted the insight that transsexual 
individuals reveal all sexual orientations that can be found in cis individuals 
(BVerfG 2006: 103). Therefore, engaging in same-sex activities no longer ques-
tions a person’s transsexuality (ibid: 106; cf. Adamietz 2006: 374).
Similarly, the Federal Constitutional Court revised its understanding of sex 
reassignment surgery as a key feature of transsexuality. Based on sexological 
assumptions of the time, the Court had initially considered sex reassignment 
if one of the partners is in a state of unconsciousness or temporarily mentally disordered 
(s. 1314[2]1 BGB) or unaware of the fact that he or she is entering a marriage (s. 1314[2]2 
BGB), if the marriage was based on malicious deceit (s. 1314[2]3 BGB) or is an effect of 
a threat (s. 1314[2]4 BGB), or if the partners are not willing to take on responsibility for 
each other (s. 1314[2]5 BGB).
206 | The Federal Constitutional Court had stated in its first decision on transsexuality 
that, »according to scientific knowledge, the male transsexual does not desire homosexual 
relationships, but a bond with a heterosexual partner« (BVerfG 1979: 12).
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surgery essential to transsexuality.207 In its decision on s. 7(1)3 TSG, it adopted 
more recent findings provided by the DGfS that somatic measures do not nec-
essarily follow from a largely secured diagnosis of transsexuality (Becker et al. 
2001: 261) and, by implication, refuted the notion entailed in the definition of 
transsexuality provided by the German Standards. Quoting the published sub-
mission of the DGfS, the Court argued that the demand to undergo surgery has 
led to more surgical interventions in the past than were individually indicated 
(ibid: 266, quoted in BVerfG 2006: 103).
These findings are closely, but not reducibly related to findings on the legal 
measures transsexual individuals opt for. The Federal Constitutional Court de-
parted from its earlier assumption that the change of first names constitutes 
a transitional stage for a change of gender status. Quoting the observations in 
Osburg and Weitze’s study (1993: 102; 106) and the abovementioned statement 
produced by the DGfS, the Court considered as proven that about 20 to 30 % of 
all transsexual individuals seeking legal recognition apply for a change of first 
names only (BVerfG 2006: 103).
Reconceptualising transsexuality involved a reconsideration of gender. 
Based on recent sexological insights, the Court suggested that, »gender cannot 
be determined on the basis of physical characteristics alone. It also essentially 
depends on an individual’s psychological constitution and his or her sustain-
able self-perceived gender.« (Ibid: 105) This perspective was reiterated in Fed-
eral Constitutional Court decisions on ss. 8(1)2, 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG (BVerfG 
2008: 314; ibid 2011: para 56). The emphasis on a person’s gender identity rather 
than on physical properties served as a harbinger for the Federal Constitutional 
Court’s decision on somatic requirements as a prerequisite for a revision of 
gender status roughly half a decade later.208
Moreover and without questioning the initial allocation to one of the two 
legally recognised genders at the time of birth, the Court concluded from the 
existence of homosexual transsexual individuals that a person’s gender cannot 
be deduced from his or her sexual orientation (BVerfG 2006: 105), hence dis-
rupting the heteronormativity of the gender binary. The Federal Constitutional 
207 | In its first decision, the Federal Constitutional Court suggested that, »[a]ccording 
to secured knowledge in science, transsexual individuals do not want to manipulate their 
sex. Their emphasis is not on sexuality, but to strive towards the congruence of the mind 
and the body. […] the operation needs to be considered a part of the realisation of this 
goal« (BVerfG 1979: 12; cf. Adamietz 2006: 377).
208 | As Adamietz suggests, »[i]t is conceivable for the Federal Constitutional Court 
that the future civil status may differ from the gender suggested by the given external sex 
characteristics, that is: it is possible that men with vaginas and women with penises exist« 
(Adamietz 2006: 375). 
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Court integrated these premises into its legal considerations on ss. 7(1)3 and 
8(1)2 TSG.
The Federal Constitutional Court decision on s. 7(1)3 TSG
As early as in 1981, the lawyer Augstein questioned the constitutionality and 
the premises upon which s. 7(1)3 TSG was based. She suggested that the desire 
to marry does not necessarily mean that a person has decided to revert to the 
sex/gender assigned at the time of birth. It could also mean that a transsexual 
individual prefers same-sex relationships. Augstein observed that this particu-
larly applies to transwomen (Augstein 1981: 12). Moreover, she pointed out that 
the regulation produces contradictory effects and violates Art. 3(1) and Art. 6 
GG. While a transsexual individual cannot marry a person of either of the two 
officially recognised sexes/genders after a legal recognition of first names with-
out risking a reversal of the decision to alter the first names, a person who was 
married prior to an application for a change of first names, may remain mar-
ried (ibid).
It took nearly two-and-a-half decades, until the Federal Constitutional Court 
took up the issue. In 2003, the Regional Court Itzehoe asked the Federal Con-
stitutional Court for clarification as to the constitutionality of s. 7(1)3 TSG.209 
Reiterating and exceeding the reasons Augstein had presented in 1981, the re-
ferring court suggested that the rule contradicts Art. 1(1) in conjunction with 
Art. 2(1) GG as well as Art. 3(1) and Art. 6(1) GG for a number of reasons. First, 
a change of first names is an equally valid option as is a revision of gender sta-
tus that involves sex reassignment surgery. Therefore, a change of first names 
does not simply constitute an interim phase. Second, there are several reasons 
for transsexual individuals to decide not to undergo sex reassignment sur-
gery. Third, since the Federal Constitutional Court clarified the advance effect 
of first names in an earlier decision, a compulsorily enforced change of first 
names violates Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG. Fourth, s. 7(1)3 TSG is 
209 | In this particular case, a transwoman with a change of first names married a 
ciswoman, upon which the registrar reversed the court decision to change the trans-
woman’s first names. The trans individual in vain filed a constitutional complaint. 
Moreover, the Local Court Itzehoe refused to revise the birth register according to s. 47 
PStG. The Court argued that the applicant’s marriage revealed that she did not intend 
to undergo sex reassignment surgery, since s. 8(1)2 TSG stipulates as a prerequisite for 
a revision of gender status that a transsexual individual may not be married. The Court 
suggested the applicant reapply for a change of first names according to s. 1 TSG. However, 
the Local Court Oldenburg rejected the application, arguing that the applicant was trying 
to circumvent s. 7(1)3 TSG (BVerfG 2006: 103 f.). Upon an immediate complaint, the 
Regional Court Oldenburg stayed its proceedings and referred the question whether 
s. 7(1)3 TSG was unconstitutional to the Federal Constitutional Court (ibid: 104).
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premised upon the heterosexuality of transsexual individuals, an assumption 
that does not generally apply. Rather, transsexual individuals reveal all kinds 
of sexual orientations. Fifth, s. 7(1)3 GG does not prevent the impression of 
a homosexual marriage, since the legislator accepts a change of first names 
within a marriage. Finally, the rule violates Art. 6(1) GG and the general rule of 
equality provided in Art. 3(1) GG, because it discriminates against transsexual 
individuals wishing to marry vis-à-vis those who want to remain single (LG 
Itzehoe, quoted in BVerfG 2006: 104).
Taking into consideration recent developments on transsexuality in sexol-
ogy and older minority opinions, the Federal Constitutional Court decided on 
06 Dec. 2005 that s. 7(1)3 TSG contravenes Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) 
GG. The Court held that s. 7(1)3 TSG violates a homosexual transsexual per-
son’s legally protected right to a name and the right to the protection of his or 
her intimate sphere as long as a homosexual transsexual individual does not 
have an option to enter a legally secured partnership without losing the names 
corresponding with his or her identity (BVerfG 2006: 102).210
The Court arrived at its decision after examining two aspects as they relate 
to the facts of the case. After having reaffirmed the relevance of first names in 
relation to the basic right to develop one’s personality freely as guaranteed in 
Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with the right to privacy protected under Art. 1(1) 
GG, the Court examined whether s. 7(1)3 TSG violates the aforementioned ba-
sic rights. Thereafter, the Court examined the legitimacy, suitability, necessity 
and the proportionality of the rule against the background of the interplay of 
the regulations of the Transsexual Act with civil status law, marriage law regu-
lations and those of the Registered Life Partnership Act in the light of new 
sexological findings on transsexuality.
210 | As usual, the Court invited a statement from the federal government, represented 
by the Federal Home Office. However, this time the Court also invited statements from 
civil society organisations, such as, the Deutsche Familiengerichtstag, the DGfS, the 
LSVD e. V., Homosexuals and the Church (Homosexuelle und Kirche; HuK), the Sonntags- 
Club e. V. and the dgti e. V. Except for the Deutsche Familiengerichtstag, all civil society 
organisations considered s. 7(1)3 TSG unconstitutional (BVerfG 2006: 104). 
To this day, the Federal Constitutional Cour t has maintained the practice of inviting 
statements from trans organisations, among others, when considering contested rules 
under the Transsexual Act. When considering the constitutionality of s. 1(1)1 TSG, for 
instance, the Federal Constitutional Court invited statements from the dgti e. V., the 
Sonntags-Club e. V. and the TGNB (BVerfG 2007: 12). With regard to s. 8(1)2 TSG, the 
Federal Court invited statements from the support group Transsexuelle Selbsthilfe 
München and the dgti e. V. (BVerfG 2008: 314) and with regard to ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 
TSG, the dgti e. V., Sonntags-Club e. V. and the TGNB (BVerfG 2011: para 45).
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With regard to the first issue, the Federal Constitutional Court reiterated an 
earlier decision that had established that the basic right to one’s free personal 
development in conjunction with the right to privacy cover a person’s sexual 
self-determination, including his or her gender identity and sexual orientation. 
Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG protect an individual’s first names as a 
means of finding and expressing his or her identity and individuality, including 
his or her gender identity. The Court argued that s. 1 TSG takes into considera-
tion that sex characteristics are not the only determinants of an individual’s 
gender identity. The latter essentially depends on an individual’s psychological 
constitution and his or her self-perceived gender (ibid: 104).
The Court suggested that in the light of these deliberations, s. 7(1)3 TSG 
restricts the basic rights protected under Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) 
GG. The withdrawal of the legally recognised first names when entering a mar-
riage runs counter to the individual’s gender identity (ibid), hence restricting 
the constitutionally protected intimate and sexual sphere (ibid: 105). Since mar-
riage and registered life partnership are based on gender status and not on 
sexual orientation, the transsexual individual’s consent to the loss of his or her 
first names cannot be assumed, if he or she wishes to enter a legally secured 
partnership. This especially applies, if entering a marriage happens to be the 
only option for a formal recognition of a relationship (ibid).
With regard to the second issue, the Federal Constitutional Court consid-
ered the legislator’s intention to foreclose the notion that same-sex partners 
may enter a marriage a legitimate public objective and a suitable and necessary 
end to this means (ibid: 105 f.). However, the Court found that s. 7(1)3 TSG was 
unreasonable as long as the law does not provide homosexual transsexual indi-
viduals who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery an option to enter 
a legally secured partnership without losing the first names that correspond 
with their respective identities (ibid: 106). The Court argued that this especially 
applies, since the concepts of transsexuality that informed legislation were out-
dated, such as the perception of the so-called small solution as an interim stage 
and genital surgery and heterosexuality as defining features of transsexuality 
(ibid).
The Court argued that adhering to external sex characteristics as a means of 
determining a person’s gender in civil status law and basing legal institutions 
on these ascriptions leads to a situation in which a homosexual male-to-female-
transsexual individual without sex reassignment surgery wishing to formalise 
her partnership with another woman cannot enter a registered life partnership 
because of her civil status as a man. Although marriage is the only remaining 
option for a legally secured partnership, she loses the legally recognised first 
names that correspond with her gender identity. The Court held that this legal 
interplay violates the constitutionally protected right to her intimate sphere and 
the right to a name that mirrors her gender identity (ibid: 107).
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The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the abovementioned breach 
of the Constitution did not lead to the nullity of the rule, because there were 
several options for a revision. The Court made three suggestions to the legisla-
tor. First, the legislator could decide to delete s. 7(1)3 TSG without replacement. 
Second, the legislator could revise the Civil Status Act to the effect of allocat-
ing a transsexual individual with a legally recognised change of first names to 
the experienced gender. Third, the Registered Life Partnership Act could be 
revised to accommodate homosexual transsexual individuals. The Court ruled 
that until the legislator devises a new regulation that enables a transsexual indi-
vidual with a homosexual orientation and without sex reassignment surgery to 
enter a legally secured partnership without losing the first names, s. 7(1)3 TSG 
may no longer be applied (ibid).
The legal debate on the Federal Constitutional Court suggestions for 
a revision of s. 7(1)3 TSG and possible solutions for s. 8(1)2 TSG
The options the Federal Constitutional Court provided for a revision of s. 7(1)3 
TSG sparked a controversy among legal scholars and, anticipating that the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court would declare s. 8(1)2 TSG unconstitutional before 
long, too, triggered a debate on s. 8(1)2 TSG.211 Their respective recommen-
dations for dealing with either rule is inextricably linked to the perspectives 
they endorse on marriage, gender and sex/gender as a necessary feature of a 
person’s civil status. The legal debate reveals that maintaining institutionalised 
heteronormativity and the cis binary presupposes the legal category ›gender‹ 
and special regulations that limit the constitutional rights of individuals mi-
noritised on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender.
Windel favoured solutions that defend marriage as a heteronormative and 
privileged institution and dismissed suggestions that threaten the concept of 
gender as a somatically-based phenomenon and sex/gender as a relevant fea-
ture of a person’s civil status. Setting out from the premise that preventing 
the appearance of, or actual same-sex marriages constitute a legitimate public 
claim (Windel 2006: 266), he argued in favour of the third solution with re-
gard to s. 7(1)3 TSG, i. e., of opening up the registered life partnership to les-
bian and gay transsexual individuals who have legally been granted a change of 
first names. He suggested that it is preferable to opt for referring homosexual 
transsexual individuals with a change of first names to the registered life part-
nership, because »[t]he anomaly of a life partnership between individuals with 
different sexes/genders can be accepted more easily than that of a marriage 
of individuals who appear to be of the same sex/gender, since the partnership 
211 | For a comprehensive comparative law study on the revision of gender status with 
regard to transsexuality in family law, including the legal consequences for German, 
English and French law, see Theile 2013.
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has no tradition of sexed/gendered fixation comparable to that of marriage« 
(Windel 2008: 77). With regard to s. 8(1)2 TSG he suggested limiting access to 
marriage to transsexual individuals whose first names and civil status manifest 
that the partners are assigned to different sexes.
At the same time, Windel rejected the other solutions the Federal Constitu-
tional Court provided. He dismissed the first solution, i. e., to delete s. 7(1)3 TSG 
on the grounds that such a measure would create the impression of marriage 
as a same-sex union and, hence, contradict the public interest to avoid such 
an impression (ibid). He rejected the second solution, i. e., to revise the Civil 
Status Act for two reasons. First, rendering the experienced gender a legal fact 
would mean giving up the distinction between the ›small‹ and the ›big solu-
tion‹. Second, the legal concept of sex/gender and the reproductive function of 
sex/gender would become undone (ibid).
Differences on individual issues notwithstanding,212 Grünberger and 
Bräcklein argued in favour of revisions that treat marriage and registered life 
partnership alike213 and allow an identity-based and self-determined under-
standing of gender.214 With regard to s. 7(1)3 TSG, Grünberger suggested delet-
ing the section without replacement (Grünberger 2007: 360; 2008: 98) or else 
to follow up with the second solution, i. e., to assign a transsexual individual 
to the gender he or she identifies with, without surgery (ibid: 360; 2008: 98). 
Like Augstein (1981: 12), he suggested that the only purpose of this particular 
rule, if not the entire section 7 TSG, was to police non-compliant behaviour in 
the ›new‹ gender role. Since sanctioning gender expression is not a legitimate 
public concern, curtailing the right to determine one’s gender identity is unjus-
tifiable (idem 2006: 518; 2007: 360).
212 | While Grünberger and Bräcklein questioned somatic or behavioural foundations 
of gender, Bräcklein explicitly challenged the legitimacy of ›gender‹ as a feature of 
an individual’s civil status in the light of the right to self-determination over personal 
data (Bräcklein 2008: 298). Moreover, Bräcklein argued that removing ›gender‹ as a 
legitimate category in the Civil Status Act could render the Transsexual Act at least in part 
unnecessary and contribute to avoiding discrimination on the grounds of gender (ibid: 
304).
213 | Grünberger identified opening up marriage to all individuals, regardless of their 
respective gender as a fourth option to solve the legal problem of granting transsexual 
individuals a legally secured partnership. However, he conceded that it was consistent 
with the Federal Constitutional Court’s understanding of marriage as a union of a man and 
a woman that it did not mention this solution (Grünberger 2007: 366).
214 | While Grünberger discussed potential constitutional solutions for ss. 7(1)3 and 
8(1)2 TSG in detail, Bräcklein only mentioned her favoured solution for s. 8(1)2 TSG in 
passing. Her article focuses on her concept of gender and the relevance of this particular 
category to an individual’s civil status.
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Grünberger dismissed Windel’s preferred solution for legal and constitu-
tional reasons. With regard to the legal reasons, he presented a systematic and a 
practical argument. While Windel held that, »in contrast to the reciprocal prob-
lem with marriage, there are no pressing reasons for exclusively opening up 
the registered life partnership for same-sex individuals« (Windel 2006: 266), 
Grünberger pointed out that referring homosexual transsexual individuals 
to the registered life partnership constitutes a system discontinuity, since the 
partners’ sexual orientation is not the criterion for entering a legally secured 
partnership. Rather, it is a person’s gender status. Moreover, having a registrar 
enquire into the partners’ sex/gender and sexual orientation is incompatible 
with the right to privacy (Grünberger 2006: 519; 2007: 364 f.). With regard 
to the constitutional objection, Grünberger reiterated Augstein’s observation 
(Augstein 1981: 12) that the Transsexual Act already allows the impression of 
same-sex marriages in the event of an existing marriage. According to Grün-
berger, the unequal treatment of individuals who are granted a change of first 
names within an existing marriage and those who lose their first names when 
entering a marriage violates Art. 3(1) GG (Grünberger 2006: 519; 2007: 365). 
Moreover, he identified heteronomous gender assignments as the cause of the 
civil status problems transsexual individuals with a change of first names en-
counter (Grünberger 2007: 365).
Grünberger considered the second solution, i. e. to grant a gender reassign-
ment without surgery, superior to the third solution, because it provides for a 
consistent and constitutional Transsexual Act. Arguing that while the Federal 
Constitutional Court left it at the legislator’s discretion to decide which option 
to follow up with, Grünberger suggested that the Court implied that ss. 8(1)2 
and 8(1)4 TSG no longer comply with constitutional requirements (ibid: 360 f.). 
In contrast to Windel, Grünberger disagreed that dispensing with the surgery 
requirement necessarily contradicts distinguishing between the ›small solu-
tion‹ and the ›big solution‹. According to Grünberger, »[t]he ›small solution‹ is 
the constitutionally required instrument, if a change of first names sufficiently 
satisfies a transsexual individual’s gendered concept of self, whereas the ›big 
solution‹ is the constitutionally required instrument, if the gendered concept of 
self requires changing the legal gender« (Grünberger 2008: 89).215
With regard to s. 8(1)2 TSG, Grünberger outlined and discussed three pos-
sible scenarios in compliance with the current legal framework. According to 
Grünberger, one option would be to stick to the current rule (ibid: 104), an 
option that is identical to Windel’s recommendation. Another solution would 
be to delete s. 8(1)2 TSG. A third option consists of converting a marriage into 
215 | In the end, the legislator remained inactive, tacitly allowing for marriages between 
legally differently gendered cis and transsexual individuals that socially appear as a 
married same-sex couple and that are considered as such by the partners themselves.
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a registered life partnership (ibid: 105). Of all options mentioned, he preferred 
the second one for constitutional reasons (ibid).
Grünberger identified three problems with the first option. First, he point-
ed out to the constitutionally problematic situation that it is legally possible to 
achieve a revision of gender status without having to give up a registered life 
partnership, while this option does not exist for a marriage. Grünberger argued 
that there are no reasons for legitimating the unequal treatment of individu-
als in instances that affect the fundamental rights guaranteed in Art. 6(1) GG 
and Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG (ibid 2007: 362). Second, he 
suggested that the conditions for divorcing a partner do not exist, if a marriage 
is not broken (ibid 2008: 105). Third, if partners are forced to get divorced in 
order to register as life partners, the former spouse and now life partner loses 
benefits (ibid).
According to Grünberger, the third option is problematic, too. He argued 
that despite the fact that the rights secured in a registered life partnership have 
in the meantime come to resemble those granted in a marriage, the latter con-
tinues to be privileged in several areas (ibid).
Grünberger and Bräcklein preferred the option to delete s. 8(1)2 TSG. While 
Grünberger anticipated that deleting the rule is incompatible with the »dogma 
that marriage is a union of a man and a woman« (ibid), he held that this option 
does justice to Art. 6(1) GG, since a marriage may not be dissolved against the 
spouses’ will (ibid). Similarly, Bräcklein argued that with exception of deleting 
s. 8(1)2 TSG, all other options are legally problematic (Bräcklein 2008: 303).
The Federal Constitutional Court decision on s. 8(1)2 TSG
Shortly after the Federal Constitutional Court declared s. 7(1)3 TSG unconstitu-
tional, and based on a referral proceeding provided by a local court, the Federal 
Constitutional Court dealt with the question whether s. 8(1)2 TSG is compatible 
with the Basic Law.216 The referring court suggested that s. 8(1)2 TSG violates 
Art. 1(1) in conjunction with Art. 2(1) GG, Art. 6(1) GG and Art. 3(1) GG.
The lower court presented three major arguments to support its opinion. 
The local court argued that to force a transsexual individual to get a divorce in 
order to gain gender recognition infringes upon an individual’s human dignity 
and the basic right to the free development of one’s personality, which also cov-
216 | The case dealt with an elderly transwoman who was married for more than half 
a century, had undergone sex reassignment surgery in 2002 and wished to be legally 
recognised as a woman without having to divorce her spouse. The applicant argued that 
neither of the partners considered their relationship broken, which is a precondition for a 
divorce. Rather, their marriage was very valuable and of vital importance to them, since 
they were socially, emotionally and economically committed to, and dependent on each 
other (BVerfG 2008: 313).
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ers the imperative to assign an individual to the gender he or she psychologi-
cally and physically identifies with. Moreover, the court held that the applicant’s 
and her wife’s marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state, 
especially since their marriage does not satisfy the requirements for a divorce. 
Finally, the court suggested that to render a divorce mandatory for gender rec-
ognition contravenes the general rule of equality, since married transsexual 
individuals are affected by the provisions outlined in s. 8(1)2 TSG, while un-
married transsexual individuals are not (BVerfG 2008: 313).
On 27 May 2008, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that s. 8(1)2 
TSG is incompatible with Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG, because 
the rule grants a married transsexual individual who has undergone sex reas-
signment surgery gender recognition only under the condition that he or she 
gets divorced (ibid: 312). While the Court did not examine whether s. 8(1)2 TSG 
violated Art. 3(1) GG (ibid: 317), it confirmed the lower court’s opinion on the 
other constitutional violations.
The Court arrived at its decision by examining four issues. First, it estab-
lished an infringement of Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG. Second, the 
Court examined whether the legislator’s concern to secure marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman was legitimate. Third, it put the ensuing limita-
tion of a trans individual’s rights to the test of proportionality. Finally, the Court 
weighed the legislator’s interest against the trans individual’s right to achieve 
gender recognition without having to get divorced.
The Federal Constitutional Court ascertained that considering that a per-
son’s gender may change and that an individual’s gender basically depends on 
his or her psychic constitution, s. 8(1)2 TSG in principle fulfils the right laid 
down in Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG. The rule recognises a trans-
sexual individual’s gender identity and allows for a legal assignment to the 
gender to which he or she belongs to psychologically and physically after sex 
reassignment surgery. However, the Court argued that the prerequisite to be 
unmarried infringes upon a transsexual individual’s right to gender recogni-
tion, despite the fact that he or she has undergone sex reassignment surgery, 
if the respective individual is forced to decide between trading his or her mar-
riage for gender recognition, even though both partners wish to remain mar-
ried or maintaining his or her marriage at the expense of a revision of gender 
status. The Court held that such a substantial limitation of basic rights is only 
permissible, provided it serves a legitimate goal and is proportionate (ibid: 314).
With regard to the second issue, the Federal Constitutional Court argued 
that the legislator pursued a legitimate goal by wanting to maintain marriage 
as a union between a man and a woman in order to prevent same-sex marriag-
es. The Court suggested that the legitimacy of this goal is not diminished by 
the fact that the legislator accepts that the current legal situation allows the im-
pression of, or actual same-sex marriages under specific circumstances. Due 
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to the legislator’s inactivity, it has e. g. become possible for homosexual trans-
sexual individuals with a legally recognised change of first names to marry a 
person bearing first names that signify the same gender without having under-
gone sex reassignment surgery. Moreover, married partners of which one has 
undergone sex reassignment surgery without having applied for a change of 
gender status appear as same-sex couples (ibid: 315).
The Court held that limiting gender recognition to the prerequisite of be-
ing unmarried constitutes an unreasonable strain on a married transsexual 
individual whose partnership continues to exist (ibid). Since a marriage may 
not be divorced, if it is not broken, a transsexual individual cannot gain gender 
recognition, unless he or she feigns the intention of permanently separating 
from his or her partner during the divorce proceedings. The Court suggested 
that it is neither reasonable to bar a transsexual individual from legal recogni-
tion of his or her gender, nor to create a situation where he or she is forced to 
impart untrue information with the court (ibid: 315 f.).
The Federal Constitutional Court argued that s. 8(1)2 TSG affects both 
partners wishing to continue their marriage. Upon entering the marriage, 
the transsexual individual’s partner relied in bona fide upon the fact that the 
marriage would exist as long as the partners were willing to live together and 
bear responsibility for each other. Section 8(1)2 TSG forces the partner to de-
cide whether he or she wishes to maintain the marriage, hence preventing the 
transsexual partner’s gender recognition, or to get divorced against his or her 
volition and to relinquish legal protection that goes along with marriage (ibid: 
316).
The Court held that Art. 6(1) GG protects a lawfully entered marriage of 
partners. This right also applies to lawfully married partners of which one 
turns out to be transsexual in the course of matrimony. This includes the situ-
ation in which the transsexual spouse has undergone sex reassignment sur-
gery through which the union has become a same-sex marriage. The Court 
explained that marriage constitutes the sphere of privacy that is exempted from 
state interference. Therefore, it is up to the spouses to shape their marriage. 
State interventions that press spouses to get divorced runs counter to the fea-
ture of marriage as an enduring community in which partners share their lives 
and responsibility, deprives it of constitutionally guaranteed protection and en-
croaches upon the partners’ decision to permanently live together and the trust 
in the preservation of the status quo that follows from a marriage (ibid).
While the Court initially suggested that the legislator’s concern to reserve 
marriage for differently sexed partners on the one hand and the married trans-
sexual individual’s desire for gender recognition and the spouse’s interest in 
the continuation of their marriage on the other hand bear significant weight 
(ibid), it decided that the latter outweighs the former in the light of the concrete 
facts of the case and, more generally, based on constitutional considerations:
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When […] the individuals concerned refer to the permanency of their marriage, they 
refer to their personal wedding vows that affect their identities and that are considered 
irrevocably binding. In this respect, it is about the fate of a commonly shared path of life 
and as such about consequences of a subjectively existential dimension. In contrast, 
the impact of the principle of dif ferent sexes is only marginally affected in the face of 
the concrete circumstances. As with the case mentioned here, we are dealing with a 
small number of transsexuals who initially marry a woman as a man, discover or disclose 
their transsexuality during marriage and whose marriage did not break due this pro-
found change in their partnership. Rather, it should according to the spouses’ intention 
be continued. Moreover, the formative effect of the principle for the public is reduced 
for these constellations, since the couples concerned live according to the same sex/
gender and legally bear the names of the same sex/gender anyway. (Ibid: 317)
In summary, the Court reasoned that the interplay of Art. 6(1) GG with Art. 2(1) 
in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG and, as a result, the significance of the pro-
tected right to the legal recognition of an individual’s self-determined gender 
identity are decisive. According to the Court, s. 8(1)2 TSG produces a specific 
burden in the sense that the realisation of one right depends on the abandon-
ment of another in order to satisfy the legislator’s intentions. Section 8(1)2 TSG 
requires married transsexual individuals to either decide in favour of gender 
recognition or the continuation of marriage. As a result, the other spouse’s 
right to protection of his or her marriage under Art. 6(1) GG is compromised, 
too, and not only leads to a nearly insoluble inner conflict, but to an unrea-
sonable encroachment on basic rights. The Court concluded that s. 8(1)2 TSG 
violates Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG and Art. 6(1) GG, because the 
rule does not allow a married transsexual individual to gain legal recognition of 
his or her gender without him or her having to terminate his or her marriage. 
Therefore, s. 8(1)2 TSG is unconstitutional (ibid).
As in the case of s. 7(1)3 TSG, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that 
the unconstitutionality of s. 8(1)2 TSG did not lead to its nullity, since there 
were solutions for the abovementioned problem that comply with the Constitu-
tion. The Court suggested that if the legislator wished to maintain marriage 
as a union of two differently sexed individuals, it could either convert the mar-
riage to a registered life partnership without stripping it of the duties and privi-
leges arising from a marriage or it could create a legally secured partnership sui 
generis holding the same duties and rights of a marriage. Considering the small 
number of cases such as the one discussed above and the spouses’ intention to 
continue their marriage, the legislator could also delete s. 8(1)2 TSG, thus al-
lowing a same-sex marriage. 
The Court set a deadline until 01 Aug. 2009 for the legislator to solve the 
problem and ruled that s. 8(1)2 TSG is no longer applicable until a new regula-
tion comes into force (ibid).
Concepts prior to, and during the law reform process 295
The government reaction
While the Social Democratic and Green Party government coalition had an-
nounced a comprehensive revision of the Transsexual Act in 2000, the then 
government as well as the subsequent Christian Democratic/Christian-Social 
and Social Democratic governing coalition remained inactive for years. I will 
briefly address the Draft TSRRG before turning to the Green Party draft ÄVF-
GG and the Government Bill.
In 2009, the Federal Home Office presented the announced Draft Trans-
sexual Law Reform Bill (BMI 2009). Since the submissions by psycho-medical 
professionals and trans organisations had been heterogeneous, the Draft TSR-
RG was a compromise. According to the draft, s. 9(5) TSRRG provided for the 
continuation of marriages of consenting partners (BMI 2009: 2), the rest of it 
addressed what had been announced as a fundamental revision of the Trans-
sexual Act and of which I will address a few aspects.
Like the Transsexual Act, the Draft Bill proposed regulating a change of 
first names and a revision of gender under the proceedings of non-contentious 
jurisdiction. Sections 1(1) and 8(1)1 TSRRG tightened the prognostic require-
ments, suggesting a »continuing and irreversible inner conviction« (BMI 
2009: 2). However, an option for a reversal of the decision was included (BMI 
2009a; dgti 2014). In contrast to the Transsexual Act, the representative of 
the public interest was no longer a participant of the procedure. However, s. 3 
TSRRG ruled that partners should be involved in the procedure (BMI 2009: 2).
In contrast to the Transsexual Act, the invalidity rule in the event of a mar-
riage or birth of a child after a change of first names was no longer included 
(ibid). The Draft Bill suggested requiring sterility and sex reassignment meas-
ures for a revision of gender status, unless contraindicated on the grounds of 
health (ibid). The provision for assessment was reduced to a doctor’s note (ibid). 
Trans organisations (e. g. ATME/MUT 2009; TGNB/TrIQ 2009), psycho-med-
ical and legal experts (e. g. Grünberger 2009; Güldenring 2009) alike criti-
cised the draft, and it never entered parliament.
The draft legislation proposed by Bündnis 90/Die Grünen differed sub-
stantially from the Draft TSRRG. One major difference was that proceed-
ings for a change of first names and a revision of gender status would have 
been relocated to an administrative body, rather than involve court proceed-
ings (Deutscher Bundestag 2009a: 2). Moreover, the ÄVFGG suggested that a 
change of first names and gender status rely on a self-declaration only (ss. 1[1]1 
and 3[1]1 ÄVFGG; ibid). In addition, the wording of the proposed Bill did not 
specify the gender the applicant desired to be recognised as (ibid: 2). The draft 
legislation also left it up to the applicant to either continue a registered life part-
nership or marriage or to apply to transfer a life partnership into a marriage 
and vice versa (ibid). Moreover, it did not specify any particular gender, which 
implies that the draft would have included further genders.
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In contrast, the governing coalition tabled the Bill to amend the Transsex-
ual Act. All the Bill suggested was to delete s. 8(1)2 TSG (Deutscher Bundestag 
2009b: 1). Based on the recommendation of the Bundestag Committee on Inter-
nal Affairs to pass the Bill (Deutscher Bundestag – In 2009: 4), the Bundesrat 
simply conducted an opinion poll (Bundesrat – Ausschuss für Frauen und Ju-
gend 2009). There was no debate on the draft legislation worth mentioning (cf. 
Deutscher Bundestag 2009d), and given the CDU/CSU and SPD majority, the 
Act to amend the Transsexual Act passed on 19 June 2009 (Deutscher Bunde-
stag 2009c: 25519 D).
3.3.4 Jurisdiction and legal scholarship on somatic requirements
 for a revision of gender status under the Transsexual Act
Sections 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG vaguely define the somatic requirements for a 
change of gender status, leaving space for medical and legal interpretations. The 
concrete legal interpretation of the abovementioned sections depended on a 
number of factors. These were most notably developments in surgical tech-
niques, the adoption of conservative or dynamic concepts of law, notions on 
transsexuality and assessments of the relationship between the social order 
and constitutionally guaranteed rights. While sexologists, legal scholars and 
the judiciary alike grappled with possible interpretations of the somatic re-
quirements in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, they have increasingly called 
into question these requirements since the turn of the century with the effect 
of gradually eroding the principle that gender is necessarily marked by physical 
properties.
Relevant provisions of the Transsexual Act
While ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG stipulate the objectives of somatic interventions 
for a change of gender status, the legislator did not prescribe concrete meas-
ures. Rather, among other prerequisites for a revision of gender status, the law-
maker broadly established in s. 8(1)3 TSG that the applicant must be »perma-
nently unable to reproduce«. Likewise, s. 8(1)4 TSG non-specifically demands 
that the applicant »must have undergone a surgical intervention to alter exter-
nal sex characteristics, through which a distinct approximation of the appear-
ance of the other sex has been achieved«.217
217 | As outlined earlier on, the reasons for demanding somatic alterations in the first 
place were informed by heteronormative and binary gender assumptions. With regard to 
s. 8(1)3 TSG, the lawmaker wanted to avoid a divergence of gender and gendered func-
tions, in particular that men bear children and women father progeny (BT-Drs. 14/9837; 
Grünberger 2007: 363; de Silva 2012: 157 f.). The demand for gender-conforming surgery 
was meant to prevent a transwoman from marrying as long as she can »function sexually 
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The legislator did not prescribe any concrete measures for ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 
TSG for two reasons. First, the legislator followed expert recommendations not 
to narrowly define specific surgical procedures, since surgical methods change 
more rapidly than legislative adaptations (Pfäfflin 1996: 108). Second, with re-
gard to the requirement stipulated in s. 8(1)4 TSG, the lawmaker wanted to 
provide equal rights for male-to-female and female-to-male transsexual indi-
viduals, considering that surgical techniques for constructing phalloplasties 
were deemed less developed than those for vaginoplasties (ibid).
Medical interpretations of somatic requirements for a revision of 
gender status in the 1980s and 1990s
While sexologists hailed the decision not to specify any concrete surgical meas-
ures in the Act (Sigusch 1980: 274; Pfäfflin 1993: 108), formulations in s. 8(1)3 
TSG and even more so in s. 8(1)4 TSG caused irritation218 and initially provoked 
different interpretations. Sexologists’ interpretations of the somatic provisions 
of the Act were informed by the legislator’s intentions, limitations of state of the 
art surgical techniques and prevailing concepts of transsexuality. 
Interpretations of the somatic requirements diverged more pronouncedly 
with regard to female-to-male than male-to-female transsexual individuals. Si-
gusch suggested that a penectomy, orchiectomy and a vaginoplasty in female-
to-male transsexual individuals definitely fulfil all the somatic requirements 
(Sigusch 1980: 2744). Similarly, Wille, Kröhn and Eicher held that the »com-
plete demasculinising operation« involves an orchiectomy, the removal of parts 
of the penis and the creation of a neovagina and neopudendum, which they 
believed produces »quite appealing results« (Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 1981: 419).219
as a man« and from engaging in sexual activities with a male person under 18 years of age. 
The latter was considered a criminal offence until the abolishment of s. 175 StGB in 1994 
(cf. BT-Drs. 8/2947: 12; Grünberger 2007: 361).
218 | See e. g. the following questions posed by Wille, Kröhn and Eicher: »When are 
these two somatic prerequisites considered to be fulfilled? Is breast formation in 
male-to-female transsexuals only allowed to be affected by a surgical intervention or 
by hormonal provocation? How pronounced does the female body silhouette have to 
be? Is a phalloplasty required in female-to-male transsexuals? Does it suffice to sever 
the fallopian tubes to achieve permanent inability to reproduce in the light of as of late 
improved refertilisation possibilities or only a hysterectomy? Does menstruation belong 
to the external female sex characteristics?« (Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 1981: 419)
219 | However, several sexologists, including Kröhn and Wille, cautioned that feminising 
genital surgery is, regardless of the respective individual’s postoperative satisfaction, 
fraught with complications. Drawing upon a catamnestic study of 18 male-to-female 
transsexual individuals, who had undergone feminising genital surgery, Kröhn and Wille 
note that depending on the age of the patients, significant postoperative complications 
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Sigusch doubted that breast augmentation surgery, shaving the larynge 
and osteotomies are required (Sigusch 1980: 2744). More emphatically, Wille, 
Kröhn and Eicher held that these procedures are medically highly controver-
sial and should not be rendered a prerequisite (Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 1981: 419). 
While the former set of surgical interventions became the standard procedures 
for three decades which transwomen had to undergo in order to fulfil the re-
quirements outlined in ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG, the latter were considered ir-
relevant for »a distinct approximation of the outer appearance of the other sex«.
With exception of phalloplasties and bilateral mastectomies, sexologists de-
bated somatic requirements for female-to-male transsexual individuals contro-
versially. Sexologists unanimously held that a phalloplasty could not be required 
as a means to fulfil the prerequisite stipulated in s. 8(1)4 TSG due to the experi-
mental stage of surgical techniques (Sigusch 1980: 2744 f.; Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 
1981: 419; Pfäfflin 1993: 116), lest legal requirements decreed »lifelong bodily 
harm« (Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 1981: 419). According to sexologists, a bilateral mas-
tectomy definitely constituted an appropriate measure to approximate the ap-
pearance of the male sex (Sigusch 1980: 2744; Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 1981: 419).
However, sexologists disagreed on further surgical measures, such as a 
colpectomy and a hysterectomy as requirements for female-to-male transsexu-
al individuals under ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG. Although Sigusch noted that a bi-
lateral mastectomy, the transformation of the outer labia to a scrotum, testicle 
prostheses and either a phalloplasty or severing the hypertrophied clitoris from 
its ligaments would meet all requirements, he warned not to call for more than 
a mastectomy. According to Sigusch, a hysterectomy and oophorectomy do not 
necessarily contribute to altering the external sex characteristics (Sigusch 1980: 
2744).
Particularly concerned about the requirement to be permanently unable to 
reproduce, Wille, Kröhn and Eicher suggested that in cases of female-to-male 
transsexualism a mastectomy and a colpohysterectomy would best meet the 
prerequisites demanded in s. 8(1)3 TSG (Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 1981: 420). They 
argued against an oophorectomy in order to prevent a post-menopausal syn-
drome (ibid: 419). While Wille, Kröhn and Eicher conceded that it was highly 
arose. In three cases, a partial necrosis of the neovagina occurred. In addition, four 
individuals had to undergo dilation of their neovaginas. Two individuals experienced 
a stenosis of the urethra and required a meatomy. In two cases, the entire procedure 
of grafting a neovagina had to be repeated. In summary, half of the patients had to 
undergo revision surgery dues to postoperative dysfunctions (Kröhn/Wille 1981: 118). 
While Pfäfflin asserted that the surgical technique of creating vaginoplasties in male-to-
female transsexual individuals was mature, he more than a decade later affirmed that the 
creation of neovaginas involves considerable complications requiring surgical revisions 
(Pfäfflin 1993: 113).
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unlikely that a pregnancy would occur, if a hysterectomy was performed with-
out a colpectomy, they argued that an absolute inability to reproduce was not 
guaranteed by a hysterectomy alone. Since there was a 20 % chance of refertili-
sation, severing the fallopian tubes was not an option either (ibid: 420).220
By contrast, Pfäfflin argued against demanding an extirpation of the va-
gina. Since a vagina was an inner organ, a colpectomy would not contribute to 
an approximation of the outer appearance of the male sex. Moreover, he sug-
gested that several years of treatment with testosterone would cause the vagina 
to atrophy, rendering it useless for cohabitation (Pfäfflin 1993: 117).
Sigusch, Wille, Kröhn and Eicher followed the dominant concept of trans-
sexuality of the time when suggesting that transsexual individuals strive to 
adapt their respective bodies to the gender they identify with (Sigusch/Mey-
enburg/Reiche 1979: 279; Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 1981: 419). However, they opted 
for different surgical approaches, in particular with regard to female-to-male 
transsexuality, depending on whether they emphasised the notion of the 
›wrong body‹ or normative assumptions on transmen’s sexuality. This becomes 
evident in the grounds presented for either removing or leaving the vagina.
Sigusch, Meyenburg and Reiche assumed that transsexual individuals were 
heterosexual (Sigusch/Meyenburg/Reiche 1979: 252). While a heterosexual ori-
entation says nothing about individual sexual practices, Pfäfflin more specifi-
cally argued that transmen would »fight cohabitation tooth and nail« (Päfflin 
1993: 117).
By contrast, Wille, Kröhn and Eicher’s more radical approach to generating 
permanent reproductive incapacity in transmen, which includes the extirpa-
tion of the vagina, was motivated by a concept of transsexuality that was based 
on the notion of the ›wrong body‹. Wille, Kröhn and Eicher opined that, 
the stability of the transsexual feeling according to ss. 1(1)2 and 8(1)1 [TSG] can no 
longer be attested to with a high degree of probability, if apart from the amputation 
of the breasts only a sterilisation is asked for, thus preserving the ovaries, a vagina 
with the potential to cohabitate and the ability to menstruate […]. (Wille/Kröhn/Eicher 
1981: 420)
Interpretations of somatic requirements for a revision of gender 
status in legal scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s
The vague wording of the somatic requirements for a revision of gender sta-
tus also prompted legal scholars and the judiciary to deliver interpretations of 
220 | However, as the legal scholar Koch noted, »[t]he mere statistical possibility of 
refer tilisation gives no indication of whether it is feasible in individual cases« (Koch 
1986: 176).
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ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG.221 Drawing upon different medical assessments, weigh-
ing the feasibility of surgery differently in relation to the social order and build-
ing upon different understandings of the law, legal scholarship and jurisdiction 
altogether covered a broad range of interpretations throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, offering extensive to restrictive interpretations. However, neither legal 
scholarship nor the judiciary questioned the constitutionality of the require-
ments in the abovementioned period.
Perspectives in legal scholarship were heterogeneous with regard to mini-
mum requirements in cases of female-to-male and male-to-female transsexu-
alism. Augstein advocated an interpretation of the somatic requirements laid 
down in the Act that was oriented towards greatest possible inclusion under 
conditions of constraint. Her suggestions for surgery to approximate the outer 
appearance of the ›other‹ gender fell below the surgical measures sexologists 
deemed feasible for transsexual women. While the aforementioned sexologists 
did not question the feasibility, let alone the reasonability, of constructing a 
neo-vagina despite studies that reported considerable complications, Augstein 
referred to the risks a vaginoplasty poses in particular to older transsexual 
women. As a result, she suggested that a penectomy and the removal of the 
testicles suffice to meet the prerequisites outlined in s. 8(1)4 TSG (Augstein 
1981: 14).
With regard to transsexual men, Augstein’s interpretation fell below the 
surgical interventions sexologists suggested for compliance with s. 8(1)3 TSG 
and concurred with sexologists that endorsed minimum interventions for the 
fulfilment of the prerequisites demanded in s. 8(1)4 TSG. Augstein held that 
the prerequisite of being permanently unable to reproduce is sufficiently met 
with long-term testosterone treatment, since this particular steroid causes fe-
male reproductive organs to deteriorate (ibid: 13). Like Sigusch, Augstein ar-
gued that a bilateral mastectomy fulfils the prerequisites stipulated in s. 8(1)4 
TSG (ibid: 14).
Schneider offered the most restrictive interpretation of ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 
TSG at the time. Schneider’s interpretation was based on three considera-
tions. First, the lawmaker’s original intention provides the basis for an interpre-
tation of the provisions of the Transsexual Act (Schneider 1984: 142). Second, 
issues of social regulation require ample consideration (ibid: 142; Schneider 
1992: 2940). Third, the Transsexual Act constitutes a special case in legislation 
(ibid: 2941).
Focusing on transsexual men only, Schneider held that s. 8(1)3 TSG de-
mands either a hysterectomy and adnectomy or an oophorectomy, respectively, 
221 | See e. g. Koch who stated that, »the minimum requirements pose significant 
problems: When has a distinct approximation of the appearance of the other sex been 
achieved?« (Koch 1986: 175)
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since these interventions meet the legislator’s intention to permanently disable 
reproductive capacity in transsexual individuals (Schneider 1984: 141 f.). Re-
garding s. 8(1)4 TSG, Schneider found it alarming for reasons of »social regula-
tion and the politics of marriage« that a transman should not have to undergo 
genital surgery (Schneider 1984: 146; 1992: 2941):
The biologically female transsexual could […] after the removal of the breasts and with-
out an approximation of the male gender in the genital area marry as a man a person of 
his initial gender, thus a woman, whose external sex characteristics can basically only 
be distinguished from her partner due to her breasts, a consequence, which is for rea-
sons of social regulation and the politics of marriage alarming and is barely compatible 
with the purpose of the Transsexual Act. (Schneider 1984: 142)
In another instance Schneider suggested that, »it is questionable whether it is 
[…] unproblematic for reasons of social regulation and the politics of marriage 
to interpret s. 8(1)4 TSG extensively in the sense that the impossibility to per-
form sexually according to the original gender is sufficient« (Schneider 1992: 
2941).222 As a result, Schneider held that s. 8(1)4 TSG be interpreted to demand 
a clitoris penoid (ibid).223 Finally, Schneider opined that the somatic provisions 
should be interpreted restrictively, since it is the only act, which was passed 
especially for a »group of patients« (ibid).
Like Schneider, Koch dealt with possible applications of ss. 8(1)4 and 8(1)3 
TSG to transmen only. Koch’s interpretation is based on three premises. First 
and following Wille, Kröhn and Eicher’s concept of transsexuality, he assumed 
that transsexual individuals strive for an approximation to the ›other‹ gender 
to the greatest possible extent (Koch 1986: 175). Second and unlike Schneider, 
he postulated that legal requirements may not exceed medical feasibility, since 
s. 8 TSG would otherwise become inapplicable (ibid). Third and in contrast to 
interpretations in sexology and legal scholarship of his time, he assumed that 
s. 8(1)3 TSG existed for declaratory purposes only in order to show transsexual 
individuals the consequences of treatment (ibid).
222 | Schneider’s interpretation of s. 8(1)4 TSG suggests that his perspective is informed 
by a polarised concept of human bodies, normative and reductionist understandings of 
sexuality and disregard for the private lives of partners.
223 | A clitoris penoid, also known as a metadoioplasty, is the outcome of a procedure, 
in which the clitoris, usually enlarged by testosterone, is severed from its ligaments 
and frequently provided with an extended urethra made of the inner labia. If surgery 
is successful, the outcome is an organ that resembles a small penis with regard to 
appearance and erectile and urological functions. Frequently, surgeons nowadays 
construct a scrotum of the outer labia and implant testicle prostheses.
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With regard to s. 8(1)4 TSG, he suggested a restrictive interpretation of ›de-
feminising‹, and an extensive interpretation of ›masculinising‹ surgery. Like 
Wille, Kröhn and Eicher, he suggested that a transsexual individual could only 
be considered a member of the desired gender, if the individual had discarded 
»the essential characteristics of the original sex« (ibid). He suggested that the 
Act requires a permanent and irreversible loss of the ability to cohabitate. Oth-
erwise, there is ample reason to doubt the individual’s transsexual »imprint-
ing« (ibid).
Like the aforementioned sexologists and in contrast to Schneider, Koch re-
jected calls for demanding genital surgery to the effect of constructing a penis 
and a scrotum, arguing that such procedures were not sufficiently developed. 
Moreover and referring to surgery that would allow an appropriate use of bath-
room facilities, he held that any legally binding borders drawn in this respect 
would inevitably be ridiculous (ibid).
In contrast to the sexologists Wille, Kröhn and Eicher and the legal scholar 
Schneider, Koch took a relaxed stance towards the requirement to be perma-
nently unable to reproduce (s 8(1)3 TSG). He suggested that the simple statisti-
cal option of refertilisation after a tubal ligation does not mean that the proce-
dure can be successfully realised in individual cases. In line with his premise 
that this particular provision serves declaratory purposes only, he suggested 
that the debate did not bear a practical significance (ibid: 175 f.).
Interpretations of somatic requirements for a revision of gender 
status in jurisdiction in the 1980s and 1990s
In contrast to legal scholarship, the judiciary overall interpreted the prerequi-
sites extensively in cases of female-to-male transsexual individuals and restric-
tively regarding male-to-female transsexualism. The first reported case on the 
somatic requirements under the Transsexual Act dealt with a transman who for 
health reasons refused to undergo hormone treatment with androgens and any 
surgery to incapacitate his reproductive functions (OLG Hamm 1983: 167).224 
Like the lower courts, the OLG Hamm decided on 15 Feb. 1983, that the perma-
nent inability to reproduce was according to the law a condition precedent for 
an establishment of the gender status as a man (ibid). However, the relevance of 
this court case is that the Court discussed minimum requirements for render-
ing a transman unable to reproduce and surgery for approximating the outer 
appearance of the ›other‹ gender.
224 | The complainant had undergone psychotherapy, a subcutaneous bilateral mastec-
tomy and had obtained a change of first names according to s. 1 TSG. He decided not 
to undergo any further somatic measures due to hepatic damage and after having been 
seriously injured during a road accident (OLG Hamm 1983: 167).
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In contrast to Wille, Kröhn and Eicher’s opinion, the Court suggested not 
to insist on the mandatory removal of the reproductive organs for three rea-
sons. First, the Court suggested, albeit without a legally binding effect that a 
tubal ligation would suffice, if other methods to exclude the ability to reproduce 
were unreasonable due to serious health risks. Second, refertilisation would 
require a microsurgical intervention with low chances of achieving the goal. 
Third and drawing upon a concept of transsexuality that deemed the female 
reproductive capacity incompatible with the desire to live as a man, the Court 
argued that it would be highly unlikely that a transman would consent to refer-
tilisation surgery (ibid: 169).
Taking into consideration sexologists’ unanimous stance that surgery to 
construct a penis and scrotum was not feasible considering the experimental 
stage of masculinising genital surgery, the Court decided that any such proce-
dure could not be demanded. In line with Sigusch, the Court held that trans-
men could only be expected to undergo a surgical removal of their breasts in 
order to meet the requirements outlined in s. 8(1)4 TSG.
The issue of surgery to achieve a distinct approximation to the outer ap-
pearance of the ›other‹ sex/gender was readdressed eight years later. The sec-
ond reported case determined whether s. 8(1)4 TSG required of a transman 
to undergo surgery to align the external genitalia to the appearance of a male 
sex organ. In this particular case, a transman who had been diagnosed with 
transsexuality and had undergone hormone treatment, a bilateral mastectomy, 
a hysterectomy and adnectomy successfully applied for a change of gender sta-
tus. However, the representative of the public interest filed a complaint against 
the local court’s decision, arguing that the establishment of gender status was 
impermissible without the construction of a neo-phallus and scrotum (OLG 
Zweibrücken 1992: 761). Due to procedural errors, the OLG Zweibrücken ac-
cepted the complaint (ibid: 760 f.).
The OLG Zweibrücken set out from two basic assumptions. First, the Court 
followed a dynamic concept of the law, which takes into consideration changes 
that have occurred since its enforcement. In contrast to Schneider’s interpreta-
tion of the Act, the Court held that the purpose of any act was not to reconstruct 
the historical legislator’s subjective ideas (ibid: 761). Second and in accordance 
with prevalent sexological and legal concepts of transsexuality of the day, the 
Court assumed that the provisions of the Act did not collide with interests de-
serving protection, since medically feasible sex reassignment surgery was con-
sidered to correspond with transsexual individuals’ aspirations (ibid).
With regard to ›masculinising‹ surgery, the Court held that contrary to 
Schneider’s opinion and in line with sexological assessments and the earlier 
court decision, a transsexual man could not be expected to undergo surgery 
to construct a penis and a scrotum in the light of the current state of the art of 
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surgical technique without invading his privacy (ibid: 761 f.). Unlike the OLG 
Hamm, however, the OLG Zweibrücken interpreted s. 8(1)4 TSG to the effect 
that the applicant must have undergone a surgical procedure on the vagina to 
prevent the applicant from »functioning sexually as a woman« (ibid: 762).225
However, the interpretation of s. 8(1)4 TSG in the case of female-to-male 
transsexualism re-emerged as a subject of legal proceedings soon after. The 
Bayr. ObLG dealt with a complaint filed by the representative of the public inter-
est against the decisions of the local and regional courts to change or maintain 
a transman’s gender status, respectively without requiring a phalloplasty and 
the surgical closure of the vagina.226 In contrast to the OLG Zweibrücken the 
Bayr. ObLG decided that there was no justification to demand either somatic 
measure in order to comply with s. 8(1)4 TSG.227 Rather, a mastectomy and a 
hysterectomy sufficed to revise the gender status according to the letter of the 
Act (Bayr. ObLG 1996: 792).
The Court presented several legal and medical arguments for its decision. 
First, the Court held that the legislator formulated s. 8(1)4 TSG to prevent statu-
tory offence according to s. 175 StGB (ibid: 792). Second, the Court argued that 
the interpretation of s. 8(1)4 TSG needs to be appropriate with regard to the 
social order and feasible for the transsexual man, also with regard to his inten-
tion to retain his congenital features (ibid: 793). Third and referring extensively 
to Pfäfflin’s influential article, the Court argued that the possibilities and out-
come of genital surgery on transsexual men and transsexual women differed 
fundamentally. The Court reiterated the generally accepted opinion that the 
methods to construct an organ equivalent to a penis were not sufficiently devel-
225 | Pfäfflin severely criticised the Court’s reductionist concept of female sexuality. He 
argued that, »[w]hether somebody can ›function sexually according to his original gender‹ 
[…] is not linked to whether a vagina is open or closed, because cohabitation is only one 
of many possible sexual activities. Women who due to a vaginal atresia, cancer or other 
diseases do not have a vagina can function sexually, too. The same applies to women who 
have a vagina, but cannot engage in sexual intercourse due to vaginism. They are amply 
able to engage sexually as a woman. Finally, there are women whose vagina is sound 
in every sense, but who for whatever reasons reject involving this organ in their sexual 
activity. The point of matter is that a female-to-male transsexual individual cannot due 
to his male gender identity engage according to his female original sex, because he does 
not experience himself as a woman. The mechanistic concept of the vagina as a ›sex tool‹ 
misses out on the complex operations of sexual experience.« (Pfäfflin 1993: 117)
226 | In this particular case, the local court had granted a transman a change of first 
names and gender status based on the fact that he had undergone a hysterectomy and 
subcutaneous mastectomy (Bayr. ObLG 1996: 791).
227 | The OLG Zweibrücken departed from its position. Therefore, the Bayr. ObLG did not 
refer the case to the Federal Court of Justice (ibid: 793).
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oped (ibid). Moreover, the Court suggested that the same applies to the surgical 
closure of the vagina, especially since such a procedure involved severe health 
risks without contributing to the realisation of his desired sex/gender and in-
stead complicated surgery towards creating a phalloplasty at a later point in 
time (ibid: 793).
While courts were prepared to interpret the somatic provisions outlined in 
ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG to the effect of taking into consideration transmen’s 
subjective decisions with regard to genital surgery, this did not apply to trans-
women in the 1980s and 1990s. After having been denied a revision of gender 
status, a transwoman living in divorce who had not undergone sex reassign-
ment surgery and did not intend to do so in the future turned to the OLG Düs-
seldorf, claiming that the prerequisites for a change of gender status in s. 8 
TSG were unconstitutional. However, the Court decided on 26 Apr. 1995 that 
s. 8 TSG was constitutional and that the transwoman’s complaint was unjusti-
fied and unfounded (OLG Düsseldorf 1996: 43).
The Court argued that the existing legal and moral order and social life 
are based on the principle that every person is either male or female and that 
a person’s gender is not freely chosen, disposable or independent of his or her 
physical constitution. Rather, an individual’s gender depends on psychic and 
physical gender characteristics. According to the Court, the Basic Law does not 
allow for prioritising a person’s subjective gender identity over physical features 
when assessing a person’s gender status (ibid).
Despite the fact that courts interpreted the somatic requirements stipulated 
in s. 8 TSG differently with regard to genital surgery on transwomen and trans-
men, they did not question the constitutionality of the prerequisites, nor the 
surgical rationale as such in the 1980s or 1990s.228 Until the Federal Constitu-
228 | At the same time, a Federal Constitutional Court decision on the address of a trans-
sexual individual after a change of first names according to s. 1 TSG enabled transmen 
and transwomen alike to live socially according to their respective gender identities with-
out having undergone somatic measures and having been granted a revision of gender 
status according to ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG. In this particular case, a male-bodied trans-
woman serving life imprisonment in vain complained to the head of the institution and the 
federal-state administration of justice department that prison officers addressed her as a 
man, despite the fact that she had obtained a change of first names (BVerfG 1997: 1632). 
The execution of sentence chamber to which she turned to thereafter held that she was not 
entitled to be addressed as a woman, since s. 10(1) TSG rules that the rights that follow 
from a gender only materialise after the gender status has changed according to s. 8 TSG, 
a decision the high regional court upheld (ibid: 1632 f.). Prompted by the transwoman’s 
constitutional complaint, the Federal Constitutional Court decided on 15 Aug. 1996 that 
Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG demand to interpret ss. 1 and 10(1) TSG to 
the effect that a person is after a change of first names to be addressed in written and 
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tional Court ruled ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG unconstitutional and inapplicable, the 
standard requirements for a change of gender status were a penectomy, orchi-
ectomy and a vaginoplasty for transsexual women and usually a bilateral mas-
tectomy, hysterectomy and adnectomy for potentially fertile transsexual men.
Sexological perspectives on the somatic requirements for a 
revision of gender status since the turn of the centur y
Since the turn of the century, sexologists engaged less with interpreting the 
somatic measures required for a legal change of gender status than through-
out the 1980s and 1990s. However, the statement the DGfS submitted to the 
Federal Home Office in 2001 provides an authoritative sexological perspective 
on ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG. The continuing sexological debate on transsexual-
ity notwithstanding, the statement mirrored a shift in the understanding of 
transsexuality, which refutes the notion that transsexuality inevitably requires 
surgical measures.
Based on the premise that in the past decades »an ongoing tendency towards 
a flexibilisation of heretofore relatively rigid characteristics of gender« (Becker 
et al. 2001: 266) has rendered physical features less relevant to determining 
a person’s gender and increased social tolerance towards ambiguous gender 
characteristics (ibid), Becker, Berner, Dannecker and Richter-Appelt suggested 
that while transsexuality may require hormone treatment and surgery in indi-
vidual cases, this does not apply to all transsexual individuals (ibid: 262).
The authors argued that against this background, the requirement to un-
dergo surgery on the external sex characteristics for a revision of gender status 
has become problematic and scientifically untenable (ibid: 261). Rather, s. 8(1)4 
TSG forces applicants to undergo operations they »by no means generally 
want« (ibid: 266).
With regard to the requirement to be »permanently unable to reproduce« 
(s. 8[1]3 TSG), the authors held that especially transmen experience the de-
mand to remove the uterus as »an attack on their physical integrity« (ibid: 12). 
Becker, Berner, Dannecker and Richter-Appelt presented three arguments to 
rethink the current practice. First, a uterus does not necessarily interfere with 
spoken communication according to his or her »new role perception« (ibid: 1632). Cit-
ing earlier Federal Constitutional Court decisions, the Court reasoned that everybody can 
expect government bodies to respect a person’s gender identity, which is as part of the 
private sphere protected by Art. 1(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 2(1) GG (ibid: 1633). 
Moreover, the Court argued that these constitutional principles apply to the interpretation 
and application of the Transsexual Act. The address as Mr or Ms is vital in order to perform 
according to a specific gender role, and the legislator created s. 1 TSG as an option to this 
effect. The Court concluded that the lower court’s interpretations did not do justice to the 
regulations provided in ss. 1 and 10(1) TSG, nor to the complainant’s basic rights (ibid).
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the self-experience as a man, since transmen only consider their breasts and 
menstruation as stressful (ibid: 8). Second, although pregnancy in transmen 
cannot be entirely ruled out, the ›risk‹ of female-to-male transsexual individu-
als becoming mothers is highly unlikely, since motherhood is incompatible 
with the self-concept as a man (ibid: 12 f.). Third and this argument holds true 
for female-to-male and male-to-female transsexual individuals, developments 
in reproductive medicine have rendered this demand obsolete (ibid: 13).229 In 
summary, the authors suggested that the Transsexual Act should no longer 
demand surgical interventions for a revision of gender status (ibid).
Perspectives on somatic requirements for a revision of gender 
status in legal scholarship since the turn of the centur y
Since the turn of the century, legal scholars gradually began to rethink their 
approach to the somatic requirements stipulated for a revision of gender status 
under the Transsexual Act. Taking into consideration the latest developments 
in sexology on transsexuality in the reform period and focusing less on surgical 
feasibility than on the legitimacy, necessity, reasonability and commensurabil-
ity of mandatory sex reassignment measures in the light of constitutionally 
guaranteed basic rights, legal scholars began to question the requirements out-
lined in ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG.
Differences on single issues between individual perspectives notwithstand-
ing, legal scholars involved in the debate on the somatic requirements pre-
scribed for a revision of gender status under the Act represented two distinct 
229 | A case before the OLG Köln (High Regional Court Cologne) confirms this develop-
ment. In this particular case, a transwoman had deposited sperm in a sperm bank prior to 
transitioning from male to female. Her partner underwent an insemination procedure in a 
Belgian clinic, using her partner’s sperm. After twins were born, the partners decided to 
enter a registered life partnership, and the transwoman acknowledged her paternity (OLG 
Köln 2010: 45). 
The register of f ice however was not sure whether the acknowledgement of paternity was 
effective, since the transwoman was legally recognised as a woman before she had fa-
thered the children. Upon an enquiry with the local court, the latter ordered the register 
office to register the transwoman’s paternity in the birth entry. The register office filed an 
immediate complaint with the OLG Köln on the grounds of wanting to obtain a higher court 
clarification of the legal situation (ibid). 
The Cour t argued that ever y child has a right to know about its descent. Arguing that s. 11 
TSG regulates the relationship between parents and their children (ibid: 46), the Court 
decided that the person who fathered progeny is entitled to acknowledge her paternity, 
even if a child was born after the decision according to s. 8(1) TSG came into force. In such 
a case, the first name and gender before gender recognition took effect are registered in 
the child’s birth registry (ibid: 45).
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perspectives on gender and the gender regime, the role of the law in struc-
turing the gender regime and on trans(sexuality). While Windel and Wielpütz 
defended hegemonic notions on gender and the gender regime, Adamietz and 
Grünberger challenged them. The former perspective implies a minoritising 
approach to unconventionally sexed and gendered individuals, whereas the lat-
ter challenges hegemonic concepts precisely because of their marginalising ef-
fects.
Adamietz’s perspective on gender and gender regime is informed by stud-
ies that reveal different understandings of sexed bodies and gender relation-
ships in various cultures, (Adamietz 2011: 69), studies on the historicity of the 
sexed body (ibid: 79 f.) and medical and natural scientific studies that suggest 
that neither the notion of a ›natural‹ division into two polarised sexes, nor that 
of the gender binary can be maintained (ibid: 84). Drawing upon social in-
teractionist and discourse theories that focus on the production of seemingly 
natural and unambiguous sexes/genders (ibid: 85-98) and without denying that 
there are biological factors that contribute to anatomical differences (ibid: 109), 
she developed a queer legal theory approach that frames ›gender‹ as an expecta-
tion (ibid: 250-271).
According to Adamietz, the notion of the ›natural difference of the sexes‹ 
features as the root of gender-based discrimination (ibid 2006: 380). As a re-
sult, she rejects the currently hegemonic concept of gender that insists on »co-
ercive biological differences« (ibid 2011: 174). According to Adamietz, they deny 
those trans individuals recognition whose »bodies are not sufficiently ›male‹ or 
›female‹ and who cannot fulfil expectations based on stereotypical notions of 
gender roles« (ibid 2006: 380). Instead, she envisions a state of »basic-rights-
oriented gender freedom« (ibid: 370). According to Cottier, »[g]enuine gender 
freedom would defy a classification within the bipolar system ›male-female‹ 
and render possible a choice of gender identities« (Cottier 2006: 407, quoted in 
Adamietz 2006: 376).
In contrast, Wielpütz’s approach is based on everyday knowledge and sexo-
logical approaches that set out from naturalised assumptions on sex/gender. 
With regard to the former, Wielpütz notes a deeply rooted preconception of the 
binary division into male and female individuals that coincides with notions of 
a typically male or female outer appearance and habitus (Wielpütz 2012: 138). 
Referring to Röttger-Rössler (2005), she holds that, »the fact may not be disre-
garded that the classification of another person as male or female resembles a 
biological reflex or is even described as a pre-reflexive mechanism of classifica-
tion« (ibid: 145).230
230 | The sociologist Hirschauer notes that it is precisely »the pre-reflexive character of 
conduct that facilitates masking its construction process« (Hirschauer 1994: 674).
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Based on these premises, Wielpütz develops an affirmative perspective to-
wards the gender regime and necessarily rejects deconstructionist approaches 
to gender and the gender binary. She suggests that, »[t]he gender classification 
into which the vast majority of individuals integrate themselves into without
any difficulty has stood the test of time as an assignment system« (ibid: 144).231 
In response to deconstructionist approaches, she holds that, »[t]his social fact 
[i. e. the gender binary; insertion mine] cannot of course simply be abolished by 
a challenge dictated from the outside« (ibid: 145).232
In the light of these irreconcilable perspectives on gender and the gender 
regime, defenders and critics of the gender binary attribute different roles to 
the law. Critics of the gender binary question the law’s involvement in coercive 
gendering processes. Arguing that provisions that sanction gender behaviour 
intervene into a core area of the right to determine one’s own sexual identity, 
Grünberger e. g. suggests that the role of the law should not be to perpetuate 
or reinforce stereotypical images of men and women (Grünberger 2007: 366). 
Rather, civil status law should grant gender self-determination (ibid: 368). Sim-
ilarly, Adamietz suggests the Federal Constitutional Court interpret Art. 3(2) 
and Art. (3)1 GG to the effect that gender role expectations be prohibited in 
general (Adamietz 2006: 380; 2011: 258).
Defenders of the gender binary advocate the regulatory function of the law 
with regard to gender, albeit for different reasons. Wielpütz holds that the as-
signment of an individual to a gender is a »legal necessity« (Wielpütz 2012: 137) 
for two reasons. First, she considers a person’s sex/gender to be the basis of the 
assignment to family structures (ibid). Second, she argues that the gender clas-
sification has despite legal equality not become obsolete (ibid: 144). Contrary to 
Adamietz who questions whether legal equality can ever be achieved as long as 
gender and sexual orientation exist as categories (Adamietz 2011: 174), Wielpütz 
suggests that, »this model needs to be maintained in order to be able to com-
pensate for, or to struggle against, existing unequal treatment, using suitable 
countermeasures« (Wielpütz 2012: 145).
Windel presents three arguments in favour of supporting the regulatory 
function of the law. For reasons of legal doctrine and in opposition to Grün-
berger’s and Adamietz’s call for gender self-determination, he suggests that 
as long as a differentiation based on gender is generally permissible, privacy 
231 | While it is questionable whether numbers are the appropriate parameters when 
dealing with fundamental human rights, such a perspective does not take into account the 
cost of maintaining the gender binary for those individuals who trouble and are troubled 
by it.
232 | A concept of society that expels counter-hegemonic approaches to an imagined 
›outside‹ suggests a limited understanding of social antagonisms and delegitimises 
struggles for social change.
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rights of individuals need to be directly balanced with immediately affected 
public concerns (Windel 2008: 71).
Second, Windel refers to procedural reasons. He notes that legal facts do 
not immediately correspond with social reality, since they are established and 
changed through proceedings. With regard to sex/gender, he argues that the 
medico-biological division into two biological sexes is a legal fact since the end
of the 19th century at the very latest.233 Hence, civil status law can overall only 
consider social aspects of gender on a medico-biological basis, more narrowly, 
on the establishment of a person’s sex at the time of birth (ibid: 72).234
Third, and contrary to Wielpütz who focuses on the reactive function of the 
law, Windel advocates a productive role of the law in structuring gender. Argu-
ing that religious and worldview-based regulatory factors have increasingly lost 
their functions, it is nowadays the law that gives members of society guidance. 
Suggesting that this regulatory framework grants freedoms and offers protec-
tion from discrimination, he classifies concepts of self-determination of sex 
identity or gender freedom as arbitrary and undesirable, if not illusionary (ibid: 
74 f.).235
Despite using different terminology, defenders and critics of the gender 
binary to different degrees acknowledge the diversity among trans(sexual) indi-
viduals. Nevertheless and consistent with their respective perspectives, defend-
ers of the gender regime mainly focus on transsexual individuals seeking sex 
reassignment surgery and legal recognition only, hence leaving unproblema-
tised exclusionary effects on individuals whose understanding of self conflicts 
with the limited sexed and gendered options available.
233 | Grünberger and Windel endorse historical understandings of law. However, they 
focus on different points of reference to support their respective perspectives. Unlike 
Windel, Grünberger advocates gender self-determination by referring to intersex self-
determination in the General State Law for the Prussian States (1794).
234 | Grünberger contests such a perspective, arguing that laws regulating gender are 
effects of various constructions of gender. While the sterility prerequisite in the Transsexual 
Act e. g. reduces gender to a biological function, the German law distinguishes between 
biological and legal facts in the case of a child’s descent. In the latter case, the man who 
was married to the woman at the time of the birth of a child is considered the child’s father 
(Grünberger 2008: 104).
235 | In another instance, he considers the prospect of basic-rights-oriented gender 
freedom a »nightmarish vision«, since it would mean that cis individuals would have to 
consider themselves »misdirected by the ›power of the gender-binary‹« (Windel 2008: 73). 
However, the notion of gender freedom could also be read to suggest that morphological 
conditions are no longer privileged markers of gender. As a result, all genders would 
become equally legitimate, rather than being a privilege for some at the expense of others..
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Grünberger, Adamietz and Wielpütz use the term ›transsexual individu-
als‹, whereas Windel resorts to the term ›transidentified individuals‹, albeit in 
a narrower sense than Transidentitas e. V. and the dgti e. V. defined the term. 
The legal scholars using the term ›transsexual individuals‹ draw upon medi-
cal observations and developments in the trans movement that suggest that 
some transsexual individuals do not require surgery (Grünberger 2007: 361; 
2008: 102; Adamietz 2006: 361; 2011: 170 f.; Wielpütz 2012: 133).236 In addition, 
Wielpütz and Adamietz distinguish between ›transsexual‹ and ›transgender‹ 
individuals.
Despite the, with exception of Windel, commonly shared knowledge that 
trans individuals and, more specifically, transsexual individuals constitute a 
diverse set of individuals, defenders of the gender binary either homogenise 
trans(sexual) individuals or simply assign a marginal space in their respective 
frameworks to those individuals whose self-understanding challenges the gen-
der binary. Windel, e. g. unduly homogenises transidentified individuals when 
suggesting that, »[t]he phenomenon transidentity does not give gender orien-
tation any impulses. […] Due to their desire that leads to physical and psycho-
logical suffering, the individuals concerned confirm the gender difference to a 
greater extent than cisidentified individuals do.« (Windel 2008: 72) Adamietz 
counters this notion, suggesting that,
the phenomenon transsexuality would contradict the theory of the deconstruction of 
the gender binary, if there were two alternatives only and all transsexual individuals 
were compelled to classify themselves unambiguously. Hence, if there was nobody 
among the transsexual individuals who was not compelled to surgically align his body 
to the ›other‹ sex as far as possible and to remove the characteristics of the ›old‹ sex. 
However, it has been ar ticulated since the 1990s that there are such individuals. (Ada-
mietz 2006: 371)
Moreover, she contextualises individuals with a transgender identity who wish 
or need to confirm their concept of gendered selves using hormonal and surgi-
cal interventions as a means within the regulatory context in which a transition 
frequently takes place. I. e., trans individuals are frequently required to fulfil 
the respective expectations of psychotherapeutic, medical and court experts, if 
they wish to be recognised as the gender they identify with (ibid: 380).
Despite distinguishing between transsexual individuals who opt for medi-
cal treatment and those that do not, Wielpütz – like Windel – homogenises 
transsexual individuals, too. She sets out from the premise that, a »society that 
divides its actors into male and female automatically seeks for visible charac-
236 | Grünberger refers to Becker et al. 2001, while Wielpütz and Adamietz rely in addition 
on the findings of Osburg and Weitze’s study in 1993.
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teristics for classification in order to be able to classify individuals according 
to sex/gender without continuous enquiries« (Wielpütz 2012: 145). She applies 
this principle to transsexual individuals, suggesting that they »do not want to 
›abolish‹ this gender regime. Instead, they only fight against their own classi-
fication as the – in their opinion – ›wrong sex/gender‹.« (Ibid)237 Here, Wielpütz 
does not distinguish between subjective ways of shaping one’s life and a politi-
cal attitude towards the gender regime. While some transsexual individuals do 
not question the gender binary, others do while trying to negotiate a liveable life 
within a regulatory regime at the same time. Like Windel, Wielpütz decontex-
tualises transsexual lives from the social demands the gender binary places on 
them. According to Genschel, however, processes of negotiating one’s practices 
never occur beyond concrete contexts, conditions and their functions for subjectivity. 
Hence it is necessary to consider transsexual individuals as subjects […] who are re-
quired to solve a (social) contradiction that cannot be solved (individually), but needs 
to be solved subjectively […]. (Genschel 2001: 831)
While Wielpütz and Adamietz distinguish between ›transsexual‹ and ›transgen-
der‹, Adamietz’s definition of ›transgender‹ is identical with understandings of 
the term that circulate in parts of the trans movement conceptually influenced 
by social constructionist and desconstructionist thought, and her framework 
takes into account the rights of several possibilities of living a gendered life. 
According to Adamietz, ›transgender‹ denotes an umbrella term for a range of 
subjectivities that conflict with traditional gender norms and stereotypes and 
that may not produce exclusions itself. This spectrum of gendered possibilities 
237 | In another instance, Wielpütz assumes that, »transsexual individuals do not suffer 
from a binary gender system. Rather, they consider themselves as having been assigned to 
the wrong sex/gender in this system and struggle for the subjectively correct assignment 
and not for the entire negation or abolishment of sex/gender as a category. By insisting on 
not being assigned to a third or no sex/gender, but simply to the other one, they to some 
extent cede binary coding.« (Wielpütz 2012: 178 f.)
Wielpütz also homogenises transsexual individuals when suggesting that, »[a] transsexual 
person who acts sexually (according to his birth sex) and as a result fathers progeny or 
experiences a pregnancy needs to consider this occurrence as a contradiction to his gender 
identity« (Wielpütz 2012: 204). While such a perception applies to some transsexual 
individuals, transsexual individuals overall develop different perspectives on this issue. 
While some individuals temporarily put on hold the desire to present themselves as the 
gender they identify with in their own eyes and in those of others, others question the 
seemingly causal link between a specific gender and its reproductive function, allowing 
them to integrate their respective reproductive capacity into their self-concept as a man, 
woman or transperson.
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includes individuals, regardless of change of first names and gender status, 
hormonal and surgical measures, duration of sex/gender affiliation or position 
in relation to legitimised sex/genders (Adamietz 2006: 371). Unlike Adamietz, 
Wielpütz only mentions ›transgender‹ fleetingly and constructs transsexual in-
dividuals as proponents and transgender individuals as opponents of the gen-
der regime (Wielpütz 2012: 184).
While a minoritising approach to trans(sexuality) does not necessarily co-
incide with reading somatic and sterility requirements as constitutional, ap-
proaches that question current gender norms and the gender binary definitely 
consider the requirements stipulated in ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG unconstitution-
al. Before turning to the debate on the general legitimacy of demanding an 
alignment with hegemonic sexes/genders for a revision of gender status, I will 
focus on the commonly shared critique of the legislator’s arguments to devis-
ing s. 8(1)4 TSG.
Grünberger, Windel and Wielpütz discuss and dismiss several reasons 
given by the legislator for s. 8(1)4 TSG. One of the reasons the legislator de-
manded surgery »to alter external sex characteristics, through which a distinct 
approximation of the appearance of the other sex has been achieved« was to 
avoid that a ›male transsexual‹ is able to render herself liable to prosecution un-
der s. 175 StGB (Windel 2006: 269; Grünberger 2007, 361). The legal scholars 
agree that this particular rational has become obsolete since the abolishment of 
the abovementioned provision that criminalised male homosexuality (Windel 
2006: 269; Grünberger 2007: 361; Wielpütz 2012: 138).
The legal scholars also suggest that the legislator’s objective to prevent a 
male-to-female transsexual individual from marrying as long as she is able »to 
engage sexually as a man« is no longer relevant. Windel argues that the right 
to privacy renders the legislative argumentation obsolete (Windel 2006: 269). 
Grünberger adds that the Act would be contradictory, if it on the one hand as-
sumed that the individual identified as the ›other‹ gender and was compelled 
to live according to this idea, and on the other hand implied that a transperson 
who considered herself a woman would act sexually like a man (Grünberger 
2007: 361).
Grünberger and Wielpütz also examine the legitimacy of limiting constitu-
tional rights in s. 8(1)4 TSG against the background of the legislator’s concern 
about the improper use of the Act. Both scholars consider a limitation of basic 
rights in order to preclude an improper use of the Act legally and socially le-
gitimate (Grünberger 2007: 361; Wielpütz 2011: 140). However, they suggest 
that such a use of the Act is highly unlikely. Grünberger argues that expert 
opinions and the requirement to have felt compelled to live according to the 
idea of belonging to the ›other‹ sex/gender for at least three years (s. 8[1]1 TSG) 
provide sufficient precautions against an improper use, e. g. to escape gender-
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specific legal obligations, such as compulsory military service238 (Grünberger 
2007: 361). Similarly, Wielpütz holds that the bureaucratic procedures during a 
transition suggest that the risk of using the Act to abscond from prosecution is 
marginal (Wielpütz 2012: 142).
Windel adds further reasons for a revision of s. 8(1)4 TSG. First, he warns 
that current progress in medicine could lead to ever more restrictive prerequi-
sites for the so-called big solution, which contradicts the general tendency in 
society that the outer appearance of genders »has not become clearer« (Windel 
2008: 76). Second, he points out that the terms for female-to-male and male-
to-female transsexual individuals are unequal. Unlike male-to-female trans-
sexual individuals, female-to-male transsexual individuals are not required to 
undergo surgery to undermine sexual activities as a woman (ibid 2006: 269).
While the abovementioned scholars consider the current regulation unten-
able, their perspectives on the constitutionality of any demands that call for a 
physical alignment with conventionally gendered men and women as a pre-
requisite for gender recognition diverge. The major difference between gender 
regime critics and defenders of the gender binary is that the latter consider the 
notion of conventionally gendered women and men the background norm for 
all genders, hence offering a perspective of social and legal integration to trans-
sexual individuals on cis terms, while the former reject a hierarchical concept 
of genders and develop a perspective of inclusion instead.
While Grünberger doubts that s. 8(1)4 TSG addresses a substantial public 
concern or pursues a legitimate goal in the first place (Grünberger 2007: 361), 
Windel (2008: 76) and Wielpütz argue to the contrary. Based on the premise 
that it serves a legitimate purpose that a person can be identified as a man or 
a woman (Wielpütz 2012: 137), she holds that a free and unconditional choice 
of gender without any limiting requirements does not appear to do sufficient 
justice to the public interest (ibid: 147). In contrast to Windel, however, she 
problematises the issue of authority in deciding whether a person resembles 
more a man or a woman, the lacking option for transsexual individuals to opt 
for individually appropriate measures and observes that the diversity of sexed 
bodies does not allow for any stereotypical characteristics (ibid: 133).
Having established or questioned the general legitimacy of alignment to 
hegemonic concepts of gender as a means to realise regulatory interests, the 
scholars discuss whether surgical and/or hormonal measures are proportion-
ate prerequisites to achieve the goal of alignment. While Windel does not rule 
out the legitimacy of physical interventions as a prerequisite, Wielpütz rejects 
any general demands to this effect, and Grünberger considers any such stipu-
lation unconstitutional. Windel tentatively suggests that e. g. demanding neg-
238 | On 24 Mar. 2011, the Bundestag passed a bill to suspend compulsory military ser-
vice in peacetime. The Act came into force on 01 July 2011 (Deutscher Bundestag 2011). 
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ative measures to the sex that does not apply might constitute a reasonable 
compromise (Windel 2008: 76). According to Grünberger, any surgery require-
ment is unjustifiable under the Constitution, arguing that such a requirement 
is coercive and limits a person’s right to sexual self-determination (Grünberger 
2007: 361). Similarly, Wielpütz argues that, 
[t]he precondition of a surgical intervention in s. 8(1)4 TSG is incompatible with the 
basic rights of transsexual individuals. The indirect coercion to undergo surgery inter-
venes into general privacy rights, in particular the right to sexual self-determination 
guaranteed in Ar t. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Ar t. 1(1) GG as well as the right to bodily 
integrity in Ar t. 2(2) GG. (Wielpütz 2012: 187) 
According to Wielpütz, a demand for hormone therapy would also place an 
unreasonable burden on transsexual individuals because of health risks and 
unwanted side effects. Such a stipulation contravenes the principle of propor-
tionality (ibid).
Setting out from the premise that giving way to an unconditional choice of 
gender does not sufficiently consider the legitimate interests of a society that 
relies on allocating individuals to a gender (ibid: 147), she defends the notion 
that the legislator may in principle demand measures towards an adaptation of 
conventionally gendered individuals (ibid: 148). She discusses three models to 
arrive at a solution she deems constitutional and legitimate at the same time. 
She rules out current practices and interpretations of s. 8(1)4 TSG, arguing that 
a transperson’s sexuality is none of the state’s business (ibid: 182). She also 
rejects a dynamic requirement for an alignment to the ›other‹ sex, suggesting 
that demanding as many medical interventions as possible violates trans indi-
viduals’ fundamental rights (ibid: 183). Instead, she suggests considering each 
case individually. Such a procedure would take into consideration a trans indi-
vidual’s personal and health situation. Moreover, she holds that the measure for 
gender alignment is conducive to successful social integration (ibid).
However, Wielpütz’s proposed solution reveals two shortcomings. First, 
since it is unconstitutional to stipulate surgical and hormonal interventions 
and unlawful to prescribe gender-conforming attire and habitus in everyday 
life, there is no constitutionally sound measure that a trans person can be re-
quired to meet. Second, in Wielpütz’s concept, hegemonic gender roles expec-
tations continue to be the norm against which trans individuals are granted or 
denied recognition. However, »[t]he superficial impression of third parties and 
the diffuse notion what constitutes a man or a woman according to the outer 
appearance are no considerable matters of public interest that would justify a 
limitation of basic rights« (Grünberger 2007: 366).
While legal scholars agree on the reasons the legislator put forward to jus-
tify the demand for permanent sterility in s. 8(1)3 TSG, controversy arose over 
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the interpretations. According to Grünberger, the requirement was meant to 
prevent a discrepancy between a person’s gender and his or her reproductive 
functions (Grünberger 2007: 363). Windel and Wielpütz add that the legisla-
tor intended to maintain the »unambiguity« of descent (Windel 2006: 269; 
Wielpütz 2012: 202). However, Windel argues that, 
[t]he requirement of the permanent inability to reproduce in s. 8(1)3 TSG should not 
be understood as a constraint or even as a prohibition to reproduce. […] If it was medi-
cally feasible to generate reproductive capacity according to the desired gender, there 
would be no systematic conflict with the »big solution«. (Windel 2006: 269) 
Wielpütz refutes Windel’s argumentation. She suggests that it is cynical in the 
light of its impracticability to argue that the legislator did not object to repro-
duction in the experienced sex/gender (Wielpütz 2012: 190).
In contrast to the debate on s. 8(1)4 TSG, legal scholars agree that s. 8(1)3 TSG 
can be done away with. In Windel’s opinion, however, deleting s. 8(1)3 TSG re-
quires revisions to the law of descent (Windel 2008: 76). Grünberger and Wielpütz 
strongly oppose the sterility requirement on constitutional grounds. Grünberg-
er holds that the sterility requirement is disproportionate for four reasons and 
should therefore no longer be applied (Grünberger 2007: 364). Like Wielpütz 
(2012: 210), with reference to Becker et al. (2001) and Whittle (1998a) and in con-
trast to Windel, Grünberger argues that the ›risk‹ of transsexual men becoming 
mothers and transsexual women becoming fathers is small, since these process-
es collide with their respective social roles (Grünberger 2007: 373).239 Second, 
and relying once more on the abovementioned sexologists, Grünberger doubts 
that the possibility of a few trans individuals giving birth to, or procreating chil-
dren, respectively, justifies requiring of all transsexual individuals to undergo 
an extensive intervention (Grünberger: 264; 2008: 103 f.). Moreover, Grünberger 
points out that the Transsexual Act provides for a reversal of the decision on the 
gender status upon application, while the prerequisite, permanent sterility, is ir-
reversible (Grünberger 2007: 364). Finally, he refutes the argument that s. 8(1)3 
TSG serves the best interest of the child by arguing that s. 9(7)1 LPartG provides 
for stepchild adoption, hence allowing for male or female couples to have chil-
dren (Grünberger 2008: 103).240
239 | Windel critically and correctly comments on Grünberger’s statement, arguing that 
it is inappropriate to suggest that there is no ›risk‹ of transidentified individuals becoming 
parents. First, the desire to have children ought not to be classified as a risk. Second, 
such a scenario is realistic (Windel 2008: 76 f.).
240 | Wielpütz presents a similar argument, albeit couched in hetero- and gendernormative 
rhetoric when she suggests that, »[t]he confusion of roles can be […] compared with a so-
called rainbow family, i. e., a same-sex parent couple« (Wielpütz 2012: 201).
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Wielpütz systematically examines s. 8(1)3 TSG in relation to the constitu-
tional rights chartered in Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG, and 
Art. 6(1) GG. The right to bear a child is in part covered by Art. 6 in conjunc-
tion with Art. 2(1) GG or by the basic right to the free development of one’s 
personality according to Art. 2(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG. Wielpütz 
explains that the freedom to reproduce is predominantly perceived to be part 
of the private conduct of life and is therefore allocated to the free development 
of one’s personality. In the case of a married couple, the desire to have children 
is additionally protected by Art. 6(1) GG, since founding a family entails the 
freedom to shape life in matrimony (Wielpütz 2012: 192).
Wielpütz discusses the legitimacy,241 necessity and proportionality of the ster-
ilisation requirement stipulated in s. 8(1)3 TSG against this constitutional back-
ground. Like Grünberger, Wielpütz suggests that sterilisation is unnecessary for 
legal and regulatory purposes. She deems a pregnancy in the case of a female-to-
male transsexual unlikely, since pregnancy and motherhood contradict his expe-
rience of being a man (Wielpütz 2012: 210). Moreover, she suggests that, »[i]t is 
not the task of the state to protect transsexuals from self-chosen conflicts« (ibid: 
212). Wielpütz also questions the proportionality of the requirements. Accord-
ing to Wielpütz, the sterility requirement renders the realisation of one basic 
right, such as gender recognition, dependent on the abandonment of another 
right, such as the right to bodily integrity (Art. 2[2]1 GG) and the right to found 
a family (Art. 6[1] GG). Arguing that the impairment of basic rights involved in 
the circumstances under s. 8(1)3 TSG are unreasonable and therefore not justi-
fiable in relation to generally legitimate community concerns,242 she concludes 
that the requirement of permanent sterility is unconstitutional (ibid: 215).
241 | Apart from the reasons brought forward by Grünberger and Windel, Wielpütz adds 
the protection of transsexual individuals from unwanted pregnancy (Wielpütz 2012: 204) 
and the avoidance of breaking a taboo (ibid: 207) as possibly legitimate reasons for a 
restriction of rights.
242 | However, Wielpütz’s understanding of legitimate community interests once more 
reveals the limitations of a hegemonic and minoritising perspective. This becomes evident 
in her discussion of the visibility of pregnant men vis-à-vis community interests:
»In the case of transsexual individuals, it is not possible to entirely negate that third-
party interests are involved, in particular of the community. However, the interests of 
the community are only marginally affected, for example, by the sight of a pregnant man 
compared to his own situation of a life-long prohibition to reproduce. It is only a narrowly 
delimited period of time that a pregnancy is visible to the social environment and lets 
the gender role of the pregnant person appear bizarre and strange. The community is 
irritated and unsettled by the divergence of the reproductive function and the gender 
role represented to the outside. It might even feel molested and disgusted. However, the 
confrontation is in general limited to a few random encounters.« (Wielpütz 2012: 197)
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3.3.5 Summar y: Legal constructions of gender, transsexualit y
 and gender regime in the reform period
The increasingly visible heterogeneity of transsexual individuals since the late 
1990s and corresponding sexological clinical observations were mirrored in 
legal scholarship and jurisdiction, albeit with contradictory effects, depending 
on the area of jurisdiction. Driven by constitutional considerations, jurisdiction 
on the Transsexual Act gradually eroded core rules of the Act, granting more 
space for individual transsexual developments. Confronted with, and shaping 
an increasingly budget-oriented health system, social jurisdiction contributed 
to tighter regulations and restrictions on health insurance coverage of sex reas-
signment measures since the late 1990s.
However, neither social jurisdiction nor the Transsexual Act were able 
to account for the heterogeneity of trans individuals other than those strictly 
defined as transsexual in medical terms. The Transsexual Act was from the 
outset meant to regulate the legal recognition of transsexual individuals only 
and continues to do so, while social jurisdiction bars non-transsexual trans 
individuals from health insurance-financed surgery.
Successful litigation in the course of the first decade of the 21st century 
against the rules that either prevented homosexual transsexual individuals 
with a change of first names from entering marriages or forced married trans-
sexual individuals to get divorced before being granted a revision of gender 
status contributed to weakening heteronormativity without delegitimising it. 
As a result of the Federal Constitutional Court decision on 06 Dec. 2005, a 
marriage appearing homosexual to society became possible (de Silva 2012: 159), 
whereas the decision on 27 May 2008, allowed for same-sex marriages in a 
legal sense in cases that involve a married transsexual partner (ibid: 160). Since 
cis individuals did not have the option to enter a same-sex marriage at that 
time, successful challenges on behalf of the continuation of marriages for trans 
individuals created a legal inconsistency (ibid).
Legal scholars and judges, like sexologists, grappled with interpretations 
of the somatic rules for a revision of gender status throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. Constitutional readings of the respective rules in conjunction with de-
velopments on transsexuality in sexology and trans organisation demands in a 
legal climate following the decriminalisation of male homosexuality increas-
ingly led to questioning the surgery mandate for a revision of gender status 
in legal scholarship. In this context, the Federal Constitutional Court decided 
to draw upon clinical observations that emphasise the heterogeneity of trans-
sexual individuals with regard to the desire to undergo sex reassignment sur-
gery, sexual orientation and the choice of legal options for recognition, stopping 
short of rendering the surgery requirement unconstitutional.
4 CONCEPTS OF GENDER AND 
 TRANS(SEXUALIT Y) AF TER THE ACT TO 
 AMEND THE TRANSSEXUAL ACT
4.1 legal de velopments wIth respect to 
 the tr ansse xual act In 2011
Soon after the Bundestag had passed the Act to amend the Transsexual Act, 
developments in jurisdiction on the Transsexual Act contributed to another 
profound shift within the gender regime without however displacing it. This 
chapter focuses on the Federal Constitutional Court decision on somatic re-
quirements for a revision of gender status as stipulated in ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 
TSG and aspects related to this decision.
While the first section of the chapter provides a summary of the Court’s 
deliberations leading to its decision, the second section deals with sexologi-
cal knowledge the Federal Constitutional Court decided to rely on. Drawing 
upon relevant press releases by TrIQ e. V., the dgti e. V. and ATME e. V. and 
Grünberger’s comment on the Court decision in the legal journal JZ, the third 
section addresses trans movement reactions and responses in legal scholarship 
to the Federal Constitutional Court before finally turning to lower court inter-
pretations in the immediate aftermath of the decision.
The effects of the Federal Constitutional Court decision were twofold. While 
the initial assignment based on the external genitalia to one of two genders 
only at birth remains in place, gender is no longer necessarily based on physical 
grounds at a later point in life (de Silva 2012: 160). At the same, the Court chose 
to follow dominant sexological opinions that stress psycho-medical authority at 
the expense of trans self-determination.
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4.1.1 The Federal Constitutional Court decision on somatic 
 requirements for a revision of gender status under the
 Transsexual Act
On 11 Jan. 2011, the Federal Constitutional Court rendered stipulations for per-
manent sterility and sex-reassigning measures in ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG uncon-
stitutional. The case dealt with the question whether a registered partnership 
can be denied a lesbian transwoman with a change of first names and without 
fulfilling the somatic requirements for a revision of gender status, since she 
has the option of marrying her partner.1 The Court ruled that, 
[i]t contravenes Ar t. 2(1) and (2) in conjunction with Ar t. 1(1) GG, if a transsexual indi-
vidual meeting the prerequisites demanded in s. 1(1)1 to 3 TSG and wishing to legally 
secure her same-sex partnership may enter a registered life partnership only after she 
has according to ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG previously undergone a surgical intervention 
to change her external characteristics and achieved permanent sterility on the basis of 
which she has according to civil status law gained recognition in her experienced and 
lived gender. (BVerfG 2011: head note)
Quoting earlier Federal Constitutional Court decisions, the Court set out from 
three principles. First, it held that Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG safe-
guards the personal area of sexuality and sexual self-determination, including 
an individual’s gender identity and sexual orientation (ibid: para 56). Second, 
the Court referred to the scientifically secured knowledge that a person’s gen-
der identity cannot be determined based on the external genitalia at the time 
of birth only. Rather, it significantly depends on an individual’s psychological 
constitution and self-identified gender (ibid). Third, the Court confirmed that 
if a transsexual individual experiences a lasting contradiction between his or 
her gendered understanding of self and the gender he or she was legally clas-
1 | In this particular case, a lesbian transwoman had changed her first names according 
to s. 1 TSG and was undergoing hormone treatment without however intending to undergo 
sex reassignment surgery. On 08 Dec. 2005, she and her partner in vain sought to enter a 
registered life partnership in Berlin. The local court rejected the application, arguing that 
founding a registered life partnership relies on the same sex of both partners. According 
to the Court, the applicant did not undergo a sex reassignment operation as a prerequisite 
specified in s. 8(1)4 TSG for recognition as a woman. As a result, the partners only had the 
option of getting married. Upon further complaints, the regional court and the highest court 
in Berlin, the Chamber Court, confirmed the decision. On 28 Dec. 2007, the transwoman, 
who had in the meantime married her partner, filed a constitutional complaint, claiming 
that the previous courts had violated her constitutional rights in Art. 2(1) in conjunction 
with Art. 1(1) GG (BVerfG 2011: paras 41-46).
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sified as based on external sex characteristics, human dignity in conjunction 
with the basic right to the protection of his or her personality demand that a 
person’s self-determination and gender identity be recognised in order to ren-
der possible a life accordingly, without his or her identity being exposed due to 
the contradiction between his or her adapted outer appearance and his or her 
legal treatment (ibid).
The Court examined two major issues before arriving at its decision. First, 
it discussed the options marriage as an institution for differently sexed partners 
and the registered life partnership as an institution for same-sex partners pre-
sent for homosexual transsexual individuals who have fulfilled the prerequisites 
stipulated by ss. 1(1)1 to 1(1)3 TSG without having undergone surgery to modify ex-
ternal sex characteristics or to bring about permanent sterility (ibid: paras 57-65). 
While the Court considered the legislator’s concept of distinguishing access to 
marriage or the registered life partnership on the basis of the individuals’ gender 
status legitimate (ibid: paras 58; 65), it suggested that for a homosexual transsex-
ual individual with a legally recognised change of first names to enter either in-
stitution means an encroachment on her right to sexual self-determination (ibid: 
para 60). In the case of a marriage, the individual is identifiable in a gender role 
that contradicts her understanding of self (ibid: para 61). Moreover, her transsex-
uality becomes evident (ibid). Such a situation conflicts with Art. 2(1) in conjunc-
tion with Art. 1(1) GG that protects the recognition of a person’s gender identity 
and privacy (ibid). If the homosexual transsexual individual chooses to enter a 
registered life partnership, he or she is required to undergo surgery to alter exter-
nal sex characteristics and achieve permanent sterility (ibid: para 60). While the 
Court conceded that it is legitimate to rely on objectively verifiable prerequisites 
for entering a registered life partnership (ibid: para 58), unreasonable precondi-
tions for gender recognition conflict with the right to sexual self-determination 
as understood in Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG (ibid: para 64).
Second, the Court discussed whether ss. 8(1)4 and 8(1)3 TSG constitute un-
reasonable requirements for gender recognition (ibid: paras 66-77). Arguing 
that a person’s gender can be relevant to the allocation of rights and duties and 
family attributions, the legislator’s concern to accord civil status stability and 
unambiguity, to prevent biological and legal gender from falling apart and to 
grant a revision of gender status on the basis of sound grounds is legitimate 
(ibid: para 60). Therefore, the Court considered prerequisites in cases of trans-
sexuality legitimate, such as e. g. further demands on medical supervision, the 
individual’s outer appearance or the quality of expertise (ibid: paras 67-69). 
However, the Court held that evidence for the stability of the gender identity 
and a life in the ›other‹ gender are unreasonable and hence incompatible with 
Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG, if ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG uncondition-
ally and without exception require surgery to alter the external sex characteris-
tics and bring about sterility (ibid: paras 68; 73).
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With regard to s. 8(1)3 TSG, the Court reasoned that surgery that largely 
removes or reorganises sex characteristics to approximate those of the ›other‹ 
sex massively encroaches upon the right to physical integrity safeguarded in 
Art. 2(2) GG (ibid: para 71). Depending on a person’s age and health condition, 
health risks and side effects can be so great that surgery of this magnitude is 
medically contraindicated (ibid: para 70). In addition, and relying heavily on the 
2001 statement by the DGfS, the Court held that sex reassignment surgery is 
not indicated in every transsexual individual. Rather, it is the consistency of life 
in the ›other‹ gender and the recognition as such that attests to the stability and 
irreversibility of a transsexual individual’s gender identity (Becker et al. 2001: 
261, quoted in BVerfG 2011: para 71). Moreover, the Court noted that the legisla-
tor accepted that not all members of a gender entirely possess the ›matching‹ 
external genitalia. Section 9(3) in conjunction with s. 6(1) TSG e. g. allows a 
reversal of the decision to be recognised as a member of the ›other‹ sex without 
a surgery mandate (BVerfG 2011: para 72).
Similarly, the Court held that permanent sterility constitutes an unreasona-
ble prerequisite for recognising a transsexual individual’s gender as long as the 
permanency of the inability to reproduce requires surgical interventions. Ac-
cording to the Court, s. 8(1)3 TSG demands of a transsexual individual to trade 
the right to physical integrity protected in Art. 2(2) GG for the right to sexual 
self-determination without reasons that bear sufficient significance to justify 
such an infringement of basic rights (ibid: paras 73-75). The Court suggested 
that the legislator pursues a legitimate goal by preventing men from bearing 
children and women from fathering progeny, because such procedures »would 
contradict the understanding of gender and would have far-reaching effects on 
the legal order« (ibid: para 75). However, it presented several reasons that sug-
gest that fears of disrupting widespread notions of gender and gender roles in 
generational reproduction are generally unfounded. While the Court did not 
rule out the possibility that transsexual individuals might make use of their re-
spective reproductive capacities, it assumed that – based on Becker’s statement 
(Becker 2004: 162) – the probability for female-to male transsexual individuals 
is low, since they are »predominantly heterosexual« (BVerfG 2011: 76). Whereas 
male-to-female transsexual individuals are more likely to procreate offspring, 
it needs to be considered that hormone treatment at least temporarily leads to 
sterility (ibid). With reference to the court case in Cologne (cf. OLG Köln 2010: 
45 f.), developments in reproductive medicine render futile bans on reproduc-
tion, despite the requirement for permanent sterility (BVerfG 2011: para 76). 
Finally, the Court suggested that in these rare cases s. 11 TSG2 secures a child’s 
2 | Section 11 TSG provides that the decision to consider the applicant a member of the 
›other‹ sex does not affect the legal relationship between the applicant and his or her 
children or his or her parents, respectively. It only affects the relationship between the 
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allocation to a mother and a father (ibid: paras 76 f.). Since the Court decided 
that ss. 8(1)4 and 8(1)3 TSG were unconstitutional (ibid: para 77), it annulled 
the decisions of the courts that had previously dealt with this particular case 
(ibid: 78).
The Federal Constitutional Court decided that the incompatibility of ss. 8(1)3 
and 8(1)4 TSG with Art. 2(1) and 2(2) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG does not 
lead to their nullity. Rather, the Court pointed out that the legislator has two 
options of creating constitutional prerequisites. One would be to develop more 
specific prerequisites for a legal recognition of a transsexual individual’s gen-
der that prove the seriousness of the desire to live in the ›other‹ gender in a 
way that exceeds the prerequisites laid down in s. 1(1) TSG. The other would be 
to generate a constitutional legal situation when revising the Transsexual Act 
(ibid: para 79). The Court declared ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG inapplicable until a 
new regulation takes effect (ibid: para 80). Since the legislator has so far been 
unable, if not downright unwilling to revise transsexual law, an individual’s 
gender has, with exception of the initial gender allocation become independent 
of physical properties.
4.1.2 Sexological knowledge in Federal Constitutional Court
 reasoning on somatic requirements
The Federal Constitutional Court decision on somatic prerequisites for a revi-
sion of gender status once more followed the principle that the legislator may 
not force an individual to trade one basic right entirely for another as a means 
for the legislator to pursue its regulatory aims (Grünberger 2011: 369). At the 
same time, the Court relied on sexological perspectives with contradictory ef-
fects on trans self-determination. While the Court continued the route taken in 
the decision on s. 7(1)3 TSG with regard to somatic measures, hence expanding 
trans self-determination in this area, it drew upon sexological perspectives that 
confirm and allow a reinforcement of the primacy of psycho-medical expertise 
in establishing a case of transsexuality.
The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that a diagnosis of transsexual-
ity does not necessarily imply somatic measures. Referring to the statement by 
the DGfS (Becker et al. 2001: 261), Rauchfleisch (2006: 17) and Pichlo (2008: 
119; 122), the Court suggested that transsexual individuals require individual 
solutions in order to live their lives according to their respective experienced 
gender. Therefore, therapeutic measures may range from no somatic interven-
tions, hormone treatment to extensive sex reassignment surgery (BVerfG 2011: 
para 36). The Court quoted Becker et al. (2001) and Grünberger (2007) who 
applicant and the children adopted after  the decision took effect. The same applies to the 
relationship to these children’s descendants.
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suggest that in the light of these findings, the requirements defined in ss. 8(1)3 
and 8(1)4 TSG are constitutionally problematic (BVerfG 2011: para 36).
With regard to establishing a case of transsexuality, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court’s perspective was in line with dominant sexological views that 
clearly limit self-determination rather than those that consider trans expertise 
at least equivalent to psycho-medical expertise. The Court for example empha-
sised the diagnostic significance of the ›real life test‹ as a means to determine 
whether an individual is able to handle the »change of gender roles« (ibid: para 
37). Moreover, in order to satisfy the legislator’s demand for the stability and 
irreversibility of trans individuals’ gender identities, the Court confirmed the 
constitutionality of the assessment process regulated in s. 4(3) TSG (ibid: para 
67). In fact, it suggested measures that reinforce psycho-medical gatekeeping 
and gender stereotypes: 
For this purpose, it [the legislator; inser tion mine] may in addition to the conditions in 
s. 1(1) TSG specify, for example, its demands on the medical supervision of the trans-
sexual individual, his outer appearance or the quality of the assessment. (Ibid)
4.1.3 Trans movement reactions and reactions in legal 
 scholarship to the Federal Constitutional Court 
 decision on somatic measures
Trans organisations with a political agenda and the legal scholar Grünberg-
er welcomed the Federal Constitution Court decision to declare ss. 8(1)3 and 
8(1)4 TSG unconstitutional and inapplicable until the legislator creates a new, 
constitutional regulation (dgti 2015; TrIQ 2005-2015; ATME 2015; Grünberger 
2011: 371). However, the reactions differed, depending on whether they took 
into consideration two further issues the Federal Constitutional Court raised. 
One of these issues was that the Federal Constitutional Court decision allows 
the government to devise a regulation that demands of transsexual individuals 
to adapt their outer appearance to the ›other‹ gender. The second issue revolves 
around the fact that the Court confirmed psycho-medical diagnostic authority 
in the legal procedure.
Declaring the surgery and castration requirement for a revision of gender 
status unconstitutional fulfilled a crucial demand of trans organisations and co-
incided with opinions in legal scholarship stated since 2011.3 In its press release 
on 28 Jan. 2011, TrIQ e. V. for instance hailed the Court decision, arguing that, 
»it was now possible for transgender individuals to achieve the gender status 
that corresponds with their gender, regardless of whether they undergo sex re-
assignment operations or not« (TrIQ 2006-2015). Similarly, the then president 
3 | See, for instance, Wielpütz 2012: 228 f. and Grünberger 2011: 371.
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of the dgti e. V., Alter, explained that, »[a]t long last, the Federal Constitutional 
Court gives individuals with a deviating gender identity the right to decide on 
their bodies themselves« (dgti 2015). More cautiously, ATME e. V. described the 
Court decision as »an important step« (ATME 2015).
While Alter posed the rhetorical question, »What remains of the TSG now?« 
at the end of her announcement (Alter 2011), ATME e. V., TriQ e. V. and Grün-
berger either implicitly or explicitly suggested that a lot remains to be done 
to create a regulation that complies with the Basic Law. ATME e. V. severely 
criticised the Court for reinforcing the psychopathologisation of transsexual 
individuals and suggesting that the government may require of transsexual 
individuals to adapt their outer appearance to stereotypical notions of the re-
spective gender they wished to be recognised as. According to ATME e. V., the 
latter contravenes the right to develop one’s personality freely as guaranteed in 
Art. 2 GG (ATME 2015).
Similarly, Grünberger suggested that the existing requirements for assess-
ment in s. 4 TSG contribute to paternalism, pathologisation and heteronomy 
(Grünberger 2011: 370). He pointed out that there are no standards compliant 
with personal rights and rights to privacy that would allow a decision on wheth-
er a person’s appearance and behaviour conforms to the respective individual’s 
gender identity (ibid: 369). While TrIQ e. V. did not expressly criticise either 
of these issues in its press release, the association pointed out that a reform of 
trans law to the effect of reducing and debureaucratising the procedure was 
overdue (TrIQ 2006-2015).
4.1.4 Initial lower court interpretations of the Federal 
 Constitutional Court decision on somatic measures
While the Federal Constitutional Court decision suggests that transsexual 
individuals achieve recognition without having to fulfil the unconstitutional 
prerequisites stipulated in ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG, various local, regional and 
higher regional courts initially interpreted the Federal Constitutional Court 
decision to the effect of staying proceedings for a revision of gender status alto-
gether. The local courts Mannheim (AG Mannheim) and Stuttgart (AG Stutt-
gart) and the High Regional Court Stuttgart (OLG Stuttgart) are examples of 
such an interpretation (AG Mannheim 2012; AG Stuttgart, quoted in BVerfG 
2011a: para 7; OLG Stuttgart, quoted in ibid: para. 9).
In its fourth guiding principle, the Local Court Mannheim opined that, 
»[p]ending actions whose decisions depend on unconstitutional (parts of) a 
section need to be stayed until a constitutionally required new law has been 
enacted. Anything to the contrary would at best apply, if the Federal Constitu-
tional Court had made concrete orders for the transition period« (AG Mann-
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heim 2012).4 Upon the transperson’s complaint against this decision, the High 
Regional Court Karlsruhe decided that, »[w]ith regard to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court decision on 11 Jan. 2011, […], it is not permissible to stay the pro-
ceedings for the establishment of a revision of gender status (s. 8 TSG) up to a 
new legal regulation« (OLG Karlsruhe 2012: 67178).
As a result of further appeals against decisions of the Local Court Stuttgart 
(AG Stuttgart) on 23 May 2011 (quoted in BVerfG 2011a: para 7) and the High 
Regional Court Stuttgart (quoted in ibid: para 9),5 the Federal Constitutional 
Court rendered clear that staying proceedings to revise the civil status violates 
basic rights protected in Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG, because it 
unlawfully delays the legal recognition of the complainant’s gender identity 
(ibid: para 15). The Federal Constitutional Court explained that transsexual in-
dividuals are constitutionally entitled to be legally recognised according to their 
gender identity. The purpose of its former decision was to declare ss. 8(1)3 and 
8(1)4 TSG unconstitutional and inapplicable until the legislator revises the sec-
tions in the not foreseeable future, hence allowing for individuals who do not 
fulfil the prerequisites to be granted a revision of gender status, regardless of 
whether the conditions for a change of first names and gender status are the 
same (ibid: para 16).
In addition, the Federal Constitutional Court reminded the High Regional 
Court Stuttgart that it had violated the complainant’s constitutional rights by 
addressing her according to the gender assigned at the time of birth, despite the 
fact that she had been granted a change of first names (ibid: para 17).
4.1.5 Summar y: Legal constructions of gender, transsexualit y
 and gender regime in the immediate aftermath of the Act
 to amend the Transsexual Act
While the gender regime remains in place, the Federal Constitutional Court 
decision on 11 Jan. 2011 contributed to another shift in the gender binary. Al-
4 | In this particular case, a transman who had obtained a change of first names had 
applied for a revision of gender status without having undergone sex reassignment surgery 
(AG Mannheim 2012: para 4). He argued that the Federal Constitutional Court decision 
on 11 Jan. 2011 had rendered the prerequisites for a change of first names and a revision 
of gender status equal and that the somatic prerequisites laid down by ss. 8(1)3 and 
8(1)4 TSG no longer applied (ibid: para 5).
5 | This case dealt with a transwoman who had successfully applied for a change of first 
names and was denied the recognition of her gender as a woman in both instances (AG 
Stuttgart, 23 May 2011 – F 4 UR III 571/2011 and OLG Stuttgart, 07 July 2011 – 8W 
206/11), since she had not fulfilled the prerequisites for a revision of gender status 
demanded in ss. 8(1)3 and 8(1)4 TSG (BVerfG 2011a: paras 2-5).
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though gender options remain limited to the categories ›man‹ and ›woman‹, 
with exception of the initial assignment at birth, the Court severed gender 
from a physical basis since the removal of the surgery mandate for a revision 
of gender status in cases of transsexuality. At the same time, determining an 
individual’s gender continues to be based on an external decision at any point 
of a person’s life.
The Federal Constitutional Court granted transsexual individuals the free-
dom to choose whether to undergo sex reassignment measures or not and ho-
mosexual trans individuals the right to choose between entering a marriage or 
a registered life partnership providing fewer rights. However, the Court deci-
sion also reveals that the two socially accepted genders remain the background 
norm against which transsexual individuals applying for a revision of gender 
status are measured. The Federal Constitutional Court allowed the legisla-
tor to develop more specific requirements for a revision of gender status that 
prove the seriousness of the transsexual individual’s desire to live as the ›other‹ 
gender. As some scholars and trans lobby organisations point out, any such 
evidence necessarily emerges from, and contributes to imposing stereotypical 
notions of legally recognised genders on transsexual individuals.
While s. 4(3) TSG was not the issue of the case the Federal Constitutional 
Court decided upon on 11 Jan. 2011, based on dominant sexological perspectives, 
it confirmed and reinforced psycho-medical supervision of transsexual indi-
viduals. By implicitly underlining the sexological assumption that transsexual 
individuals lack self-knowledge, the Court reinforced this paternalistic attitude 
towards transexual individuals to the detriment of trans self-determination.
4.2 de velopments In tr ans polItIcs from 2011 to 2014
The outcome of the reform process stifled any expectations that the federal 
government would make any further efforts to amend trans law in the foresee-
able future, even less so to the effect that it would take into consideration trans 
movement demands. Despite government reluctance to seriously engage with 
issues related to trans legislation, trans organisations continued to press for 
change.
Based on online sources provided by the dgti e. V., the Nationwide Work-
group Transsexual Law Reform (Bundesweiter Arbeitskreis TSG-Reform [BAK 
TSG-Reform]) and the Trans*Aktiv websites, this chapter deals with three ma-
jor and distinct political projects that to varying degrees dealt with transsexual 
law reform in the period between 2011 and 2014. The first chapter outlines the 
dgti e. V. key issues paper for a reform of the Transsexual Act developed in 2011. 
The second chapter deals with the catalogue of demands for transsexual law 
reform published by the BAK TSG-Reform in June 2012. The third chapter out-
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lines the Waldschlösschen declaration (Waldschlösschen Erklärung)6 released in 
2014. The premises, demands and strategies of each of the three political initia-
tives will be outlined and contextualised within the tradition of trans politics.
The three projects mentioned above indicate a number of political and 
structural developments in trans politics. First, the initiatives overall coincided 
on the issue that a special law is an inappropriate means to solve the problems 
in current transsexual law. Second, without ceasing to develop concepts for 
trans law reform, trans organisations and coalitions addressed the general pub-
lic rather than the federal government. Third, the trans movement sought pos-
sibilities for intervention in other areas of the federal state. Fourth, the social 
movement reinforced attempts at creating cohesion and common demands. Fi-
nally, the political projects took a clear stance against identity politics in lobby-
ing activities.
4.2.1 The dgti e. V. key issues paper for a reform of 
 the Transsexual Act
Developed in 2011, the dgti e. V. key issues paper was the first of three major po-
litical initiatives aimed at legal change in the post-reform period. The paper for-
mulates general principles upon which new legal regulations should be based.
Premises and parameters
The dgti e. V. set out from non-minoritising and non-identity premises and pa-
rameters. First and informed by a social constructionist perspective, the organ-
isation suggested that social and cultural arrangements create the problems 
sex and gender non-conforming individuals face. According to the dgti e. V., it 
is the cultural reduction of sexes and social limitations on the development of 
the personality that damage the individuals the key issues paper was meant to 
provide for (Alter 2011a).
Second, the association pointed out that any sex/gender entry in the birth 
register is based on a heteronomous decision made at a time individuals are 
unable to speak out on behalf of their personalities. As such, the external sex/
gender assignment applies to all individuals (ibid). Rather than emphasise the 
6 | The declaration is named after the Akademie Waldschlösschen. The Akademie 
Waldschlösschen was founded in 1981 (Akademie Waldschlösschen undated) and is 
rooted in the 1970s West German gay movement (ibid: undated a). The institution is a 
LGBTIQ educational centre operating nationwide and located close to Göttingen (ibid). 
Since 2013, the Akademie Waldschlösschen has hosted the annual meeting of trans 
activists representing several trans lobby groups and members of trans support groups 
from all over the country (Trans*Aktiv undated).
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special needs of the target groups, the dgti e. V. focused on systemic and proce-
dural foundations of minoritising.
Third and like the PGG of which the dgti e. V. was a member, the organisa-
tion’s political project was designed to include individuals whose morphologies 
do not fit polarised notions of ›male‹ and ›female‹. In contrast to the TrGG, the 
key issues paper does not subsume ›intersex‹ under ›transgender‹, nor does 
it define the target groups along the lines of identity. Instead, the dgti e. V. 
developed the set of principles to provide for individuals with ›ambiguous‹ sex 
characteristics and individuals whose respective gender identity differs from 
the sex/gender assigned at birth (ibid), hence acknowledging and providing for 
an indefinite number of sexed individuals and gender identities.
Fourth, the dgti e. V. stated that the Transsexual Act from the very outset 
did not comply with the Basic Law. Referring to the seven Federal Constitution-
al Court decisions on various rules of the Transsexual Act since its enactment 
in 1981, the association was convinced that no reform of the Transsexual Act 
would ever secure the abovementioned individuals’ basic rights, most notably 
the rights to self-determination, physical integrity and the free development of 
one’s personality (ibid).
Key issues for a new regulation
Based on the aforementioned premises and parameters, the dgti e. V. compiled 
five key issues. First and arguing that the sex/gender entry and the entry of first 
names in the birth register are based on a heteronomous decision in an admin-
istrative procedure, the dgti e. V. suggests that every individual should be en-
titled to change this information in an administrative procedure, too. Second, 
the organisation holds that parents should be entitled to choose gender-neutral 
first names and forgo a sex/gender entry in the birth register in the event of 
the birth of a child with ›ambiguous‹ sex characteristics.7 Third, and on the 
grounds that only the individual featuring these characteristics has the right 
to decide upon somatic measures for the sole purpose of producing sex unam-
biguity, the dgti e. V. proposes to prohibit somatic measures in infants with 
›unambiguous‹ sex characteristics to this end. Fourth, and in addition to reit-
erating trans movement demands for self-determination, the association sug-
gests dispensing with assessment procedures for a change of first names and 
7 | However, given that all sex/gender assignments at birth are based on heteronomous 
decisions, this particular key issue appears inconsistent. Taken to its radical end, a 
consistent solution would consist of either leaving the sex/gender entry vacant in general 
or dispensing with this category in the birth register altogether. Moreover, and as and 
OII-Germany suggests with regard to s. 22(3) PStG, singling out individuals with physical 
features that do not comply with conventional notions of ›male‹ and ›female‹ risks 
stigmatisation and discrimination.
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a revision of gender status, given that nobody else is exerted to an assessment 
procedure to verify the initial and external gender assignment, either. Fifth, in 
the light of the limits of the socially constructed render regime, the dgti e. V. 
suggests that individuals with ›ambiguous‹ sex characteristics and individuals 
whose respective gender identity differs from the sex/gender assigned at birth 
should by law be entitled to social, psychological and somatic measures as a 
means of rehabilitation (ibid).
In contrast to the PGG, the dgti e. V. did not submit the key issues paper to 
policy makers. Rather, the organisation decided to publish the paper as an open 
letter and to collect signatures for its political project (ibid).
4.2.2 The catalogue of demands for transsexual law reform 
 by the Nationwide Workgroup Transsexual Law Reform
Published in June 2012, the catalogue of demands for transsexual law reform8 
was the second major political project initiated and carried out for achieving 
trans law reform in the period between 2011 and 2014. While the dgti e. V. key 
issues paper broadly outlines the direction of desired legal reform, the cata-
logue of demands meticulously elaborates on suggestions for integrating rules 
regulating trans into existing statutes.
Reasons for founding the Nationwide Workgroup on Transsexual 
Law Reform and the constitution of the Workgroup
Established in Sept. 2011 for the purpose of developing a consensus among 
trans organisations with regard to transsexual law reform (BAK TSG-Reform 
2012a), the Nationwide Workgroup on Transsexual Law Reform9 consisted of 
representatives of more than 30 primarily trans and some intersex groups and 
organisations and individuals from the whole of Germany (ibid; ibid 2012: 1). 
Collaboration was open, participatory and decidedly non-party (ibid 2012a).
The Nationwide Workgroup dealt with the issue of transsexual law reform 
for two reasons. First and similar to the dgti e. V., the Workgroup considered 
the Transsexual Act to contain rules that collide with trans individuals’ dignity 
and right to self-determination, despite several Federal Constitutional Court 
decisions that rendered a significant number of rules of the Act inapplicable. 
8 | The catalogue of demands for transsexual law reform will be referred to as the 
catalogue of demands in this chapter.
9 | The Nationwide Workgroup Transsexual Law Reform will be referred to as the 
Nationwide Workgroup or simply the Workgroup in this chapter.
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Second, the Workgroup suggested that in other instances, rules of the Trans-
sexual Act had proven to be deficient and provoked discrimination (cf. ibid).10
The catalogue of demands for transsexual law reform
Presenting demands, offering a substantial body of reasons and suggestions for 
implementation, the catalogue of demands structurally resembled the key is-
sues paper on the reform of the Transsexual Act issued in 2009. While the cat-
alogue of demands also tied into the tradition of strictly outsourcing demands 
on issues related to psycho-medical premises and procedures, the demands 
were however, compared with those of the abovementioned model, overall more 
radical with regard to trans law reform. 
Demands
The catalogue contained five demands that overall aimed at securing the rights 
to self-determination, privacy and health and, as the reasons suggest, were mo-
tivated by a desire for an inclusion and de-stigmatisation of trans. First, the Na-
tionwide Workgroup demanded to abolish assessment and court proceedings 
in favour of trans self-determination (BAK TSG-Reform 2012: 1). The Work-
group presented five reasons to support this demand. The Workgroup held that 
expert reports cannot fulfil the purpose defined in s. 4(3) TSG. Arguing that 
a gender identity differing from the assigned gender cannot be diagnosed and 
that third parties cannot predict the stability of an individual’s gender identity, 
the Workgroup concluded that expert reports cannot fulfil the purpose defined 
in s. 4(3) TSG (ibid: 2). Moreover, the Workgroup claimed that an expert assess-
ment of an individual’s gender identity is incompatible with the right to self-
determination guaranteed in the Basic Law (ibid). In addition, the Workgroup 
claimed that implicitly linking the legal options of a change of first names and 
a revision of gender status to a diagnosis is not justifiable (ibid: 3). According to 
the Workgroup, the state is moreover not responsible for ›protecting‹ individu-
als from their respective decisions (ibid). Reiterating the reason put forth by the 
TGNB and TrIQ e. V. in 2009, there is little reason to believe that individuals 
will deal frivolously with these legal options due to their profound social ef-
fects (ibid). Finally, the Workgroup argued that social issues are unaffected by a 
change of first names and a revision of gender status, since a person’s habitus 
and the perception of the habitus are more relevant in everyday life. Therefore, 
there is no need for the legislator to protect society from trans and intersex 
individuals either (ibid).
10 | The Nationwide Workgroup identified the exclusion of relevant social law regu lations 
(BAK TSG-Reform 2012: 10) and insufficient regulations with regard to the prohibition of 
disclosure (ibid: 7) as major shortcomings.
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Second, and in contrast to the TGNB Workgroup Law, which for reasons of 
political feasibility dispensed with its favoured suggestion for trans law reform, 
the Nationwide Workgroup demanded the abolishment of the Transsexual Act 
and the integration of provisions granting a change of first names and a revi-
sion of gender status into existing statutes (ibid: 1). The Nationwide Workgroup 
presented two reasons to support this demand. The Workgroup argued that 
special acts are per se stigmatising, because they define the respective group 
of individuals as beyond what is considered ›normal‹ (ibid: 3). Moreover, the 
Workgroup argued that a special act suggests that all individuals defined as the 
target group share the same needs. As a result, different individual needs are 
glossed over, excluding individuals requiring provisions under the special act, 
if they do not, or only in part correspond with the definition of the target group 
in the act (ibid).
Third, and like the suggestions put forward by the TGNB Workgroup Law 
in 2006 and the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. key issues paper in 2009, the Nationwide 
Workgroup demanded replacing court proceedings for a change of first names 
and a revision of gender status by an administrative procedure with the respec-
tive office responsible for issues related to a person’s civil status (ibid: 1). The 
Workgroup argued that the current rules providing for a change of first names 
are unreasonable, unnecessarily laborious and provoke discrimination (ibid: 4). 
Fourth, the Nationwide Workgroup demanded to extend the prohibition of 
disclosure and to locate the provisions in the Administrative Offences Act (ibid: 
1), arguing that current provisions of the Transsexual Act are insufficient, par-
ticularly with regard to the address of individuals with a change of first names 
only, issuing reports and the private sphere (ibid: 7). The Workgroup argued 
that considering developments in social networks and relatives, public admin-
istration, schools and employers who frequently do not respect trans individu-
als’ decisions, »a normal life is rendered impossible« (ibid: 8). Instead, indi-
viduals »living gender diversity« are frequently forced to explain themselves, 
and the disclosure of a person’s former first name and gender history provokes 
discrimination. The Workgroup held that trans individuals’ rights are not only 
a private matter (ibid).
Fifth, the Nationwide Workgroup demanded that the legislator create a le-
gally binding provision to ensure health insurance assumption of transition-
related medical, surgical and other relevant somatic costs (ibid: 1). Arguing that 
a change of first names and a revision of gender status do not of themselves en-
title trans individuals to such measures, the Workgroup suggested that it is the 
legislator’s duty to protect trans individuals’ right to privacy and health (ibid: 11). 
In addition and based on past experiences (ibid: 10), the Workgroup suggested 
that failing to legally enshrine access to health insurance coverage of somatic 
measures risks that health insurance companies will not, or only insufficiently 
take on the costs of sex reassignment measures (ibid: 11).
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Suggestions for implementation
The Nationwide Workgroup made a number of recommendations for imple-
mentation compliant with the abovementioned demands. The Workgroup sug-
gested amending s. 11 of the Act to change family and first names (Gesetz zur 
Änderung von Familien- und Vornamen; NamÄndG) to include gender identity 
as an important reason for a change of first names (ibid: 4). The Workgroup 
drew upon the suggestion made by the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. key issues paper by 
recommending as a prerequisite for a change of first names that the applicant 
declares that he or she does not identify with the assigned gender. The Work-
group suggested that the applicant may apply with the register office for either 
a first name signifying another gender or a gender-neutral first name (ibid) and 
enjoy all the rights secured in Federal Constitutional Court decisions on rules 
of the Transsexual Act (ibid: 4 f.).
The Workgroup recommended to integrate regulations for a revision of 
gender status into the Civil Status Act and subordinate regulations (ibid: 4). 
Referring to Federal Constitutional Court decisions which had rendered the 
prerequisites for a change of first names and a revision of gender status iden-
tical, the Nationwide Workgroup suggested applying the same procedure for 
a revision of gender status as stated above (ibid). Moreover, it suggested that 
while the birth entry could be either male or female, a status should be created 
for individuals who consider themselves neither male nor female (ibid).11
The Nationwide Workgroup included in its recommendations that the ap-
plicant’s right to self-determination precludes third-party codetermination 
(ibid). In addition to referring to the Federal Constitutional Court ruling that 
existing marriages or registered life partnerships remain unaffected by a revi-
sion of gender status, the Nationwide Workshop recommended to provide for 
transforming one legally sanctioned partnership into the other upon applica-
tion (ibid: 6). Finally and in contrast to the TGNB and TrIQ e. V. key issues 
paper, the Nationwide Workgroup recommended regulations for a renewed 
change of first names and revision of gender status without suggesting sanc-
tions or delivering arguments for appeasement purposes (ibid).
With regard to an extension of the prohibition of disclosure, the Nation-
wide Workgroup recommended to integrate two regulations into the Admin-
istrative Offences Act. The first regulation suggests encoding the rules pro-
vided in ss. 5(1) and 10(2) TSG in the Administrative Offences Act. According to 
the aforementioned sections, a person’s former first names and gender status 
may not be disclosed or investigated into without the respective individual’s 
11 | Members of the Nationwide Workgroup only realised after the publication of the 
catalogue of demands that the Civil Status Act does not define sex/gender or the number 
of sexes/genders. Despite intentions to the contrary, the recommendations unnecessarily 
limit sex/gender options by suggesting three categories.
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consent, unless there are reasons or reasons to believe, respectively, that the 
purpose serves the public interest (ibid: 7). The second regulation sought to 
limit relatives’ right to refer to trans individuals with the former first name and 
gender status (ibid).
In addition, the Nationwide Workgroup recommended providing for three 
further regulations in the Civil Status Act in order to secure trans individu-
als’ right to privacy and protection from discrimination. These include a right 
to reports, documents and certificates featuring the new names in otherwise 
unchanged documents within an appropriate time and a right to change the 
first names in personnel files (ibid). The Workgroup recommended including 
a provision as outlined in s. 11 TSG to the effect that the birth entry of children 
born to trans individuals prior to a change of first names and a revision of gen-
der status remains unchanged (ibid).
In order to create a legally binding provision to ensure health insurance as-
sumption of transition-related medical and surgical costs, the Workgroup sug-
gested to extend s. 5 in chapter 3 of the fifth volume of the Social Code Book 
to ensure that, based on a medical indication, health insurance companies are 
obliged to cover the costs of all necessary somatic interventions, such as hor-
mone therapy, sex reassignment surgery and further measures, such as for ex-
ample, epilation (ibid: 10). With regard to epilation, the Workgroup suggested to 
include qualified professionals, such as cosmeticians among the service provid-
ers to be covered by health insurance companies (ibid). While the demands ad-
dressing a change of first names and a revision of gender status, including the 
effects, are overall more radical than the suggestions made by the TGNB and 
TrIQ e. V. in 2009, the demand for cost coverage of sex reassignment measures 
by health insurance companies necessarily involves a medical indication, thus 
compromising trans self-determination in the medical realm.
Like the dgti e. V., the Nationwide Workgroup did not submit the catalogue 
of demands to government officials. Instead, the Workgroup published the pa-
per, including an extensive list of individuals and primarily lesbian, gay, bi, 
queer and trans organisations as initial signatories (ibid: 2012b) and encour-
aged further individuals and organisations to follow suit,12 while rejecting 
signatures from political parties and their affiliated LGBTI organisations (ibid 
2012c).
12 | By 07 Sept. 2015, more than 30 further organisations and groups engaging in the 
lesbian, gay, trans, queer and feminist spectrum (BAK TSG-Reform 2012c) and 1952 
individuals cosigned the catalogue of demands (ibid 2012d).
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4.2.3 The Waldschlösschen declaration by the nationwide
 network Trans*Aktiv
Issued on 24 Aug. 2014, the Waldschlösschen declaration13 was the third major 
political project in the period between 2011 and 2014. Unlike the aforemen-
tioned initiatives, the declaration does not focus solely on trans law reform, nor 
does it elaborate on the implementation of its demands. Instead, the declara-
tion served as the prelude to further consolidation and cohesion within the 
trans movement.
The institutional and political context of the 
Waldschlösschen declaration
Trans*Aktiv emerged as a nationwide network in 2013 (Trans*Aktiv undated). 
The network is composed of representatives of several organisations commit-
ted to supporting individuals »living gender diversity« (Trans*Aktiv undated 
a). The broad invitation policy and the overall purpose of the network suggest 
that it was created to bring together activists and support groups and to serve a 
broad population that was particularly, but not limited to transsexual, transgen-
der and intersex individuals (ibid). As a summary of the second (ibid) and the 
invitation to the third annual network meeting reveal, the major purpose of 
the network was to establish a nationwide umbrella organisation for all par-
ticipating associations and groups, taking into consideration an intersectional 
perspective on individuals »living gender diversity« (ibid undated b.)14
The Waldschlösschen declaration
Extending the protection of human rights of individuals »living gender diver-
sity« by demanding that all legal, political, healthcare-related and social actions 
should follow the principles outlined in the Yogyakarta Principles,15 constitutes 
13 | In this chapter, the Waldschlösschen declaration will also be referred to as the 
declaration.
14 | Indeed, in Aug. 2015, the dgti e. V. announced in a press release that 59 members 
from the whole of Germany had founded the Federal Association Trans e. V. i. G. (Bun­
des verband Trans*; BVT*). The BVT* represents roughly 33 associations, groups and in-
di vi duals. It functions as a common platform for improving the social situation of trans 
individuals in Germany and serves as a contact for the federal government (dgti  2015).
15 | In the light of human rights violations towards individuals based on their actual or 
perceived sexual orientation, a group of human rights experts discussed and published a 
set of principles in 2006 that apply international human rights law specifically to sexual 
orientation and gender identity (The Yogyakarta Principles 2013a: 1). The Yogyakarta 
Principles cover rights to universal enjoyment of human rights, non-discrimination 
and recognition before the law (principles 1-3); rights to human and personal security 
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the overarching demand of the Waldschlösschen declaration (Trans*Aktiv 
2014). Other than this, the demands compiled in the declaration address legal, 
political and healthcare-related issues as they relate to trans and range from 
long-standing general to very specific demands based on recent developments 
in federal politics and medicine. Overall, the demands focus on political par-
ticipation, trans self-determination and human rights protection.
Trans*Aktiv formulated four political demands. Among these are the call 
for recognising and protecting the human rights of asylum seekers facing per-
secution and threats based on gender identity and/or sexual orientation in their 
home countries. According to the network, this demand includes full access to 
medical and surgical interventions during asylum procedures (ibid).16 More-
over, Trans*Aktiv demanded financial and structural support for umbrella or-
(principles 4-11); economic, social and cultural rights (principles 12-18), rights to 
expression, opinion and association (principles 19-21); freedom of movement and 
asylum (principles 22 f.), rights of participation in cultural and family life (principles 24-
26); rights of human rights defenders (principle 27); rights of redress and accountability 
(principles 28 f.) and additional recommendations as they relate to sexual orientation and 
gender identity (ibid: 2 f.). While the Yogyakarta Principles are not legally binding, they 
affirm the obligation of states to implement human rights (ibid: 3). For the authoritative 
version of the Yogyakarta Principles, see the Yogyakarta Principles 2013.
16 | The medical care of asylum seekers is in general precarious. Medical care of 
asylum seekers is regulated in s. 4 of the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (Asyl bewerber­
leistungsgesetz [AsylbLG]). According to s. 4(1) AsylbLG, an asylum seeker is granted 
necessary treatment, including medication and dressings, to ensure the recovery or relief 
of acute diseases and pain. Section 4(2) AsylbLG provides that expectant mothers and 
women in childbed are granted medical attendance and nursing care, midwife assistance, 
medication, dressings and remedies. As the nationwide workgroup for refugees PRO 
ASYL suggests, s. 4 AsylbLG is flawed, since the medical care of asylum seekers is 
excluded from the regular healthcare system and provides for emergency healthcare 
only (PRO ASYL 2013: 2). Moreover, the organisation points out that in practice asylum 
seekers do not obtain sufficient medical care, because frequently staff without medical 
qualifications decides on access to medical care for asylum seekers in refugee camps, 
and social welfare offices often deny asylum seekers preventive medical check-ups, if 
they do not consider them necessary (ibid: 11). Furthermore, the Asylum Seekers Benefits 
Act disregards the EU Reception Directive 2003/9/EG issued on 27 Jan. 2003. According 
to Art. 15(2) EU Reception Directive 2003/9/EG, particularly vulnerable asylum seekers 
should be granted necessary medical or other care. Art. 17 of the directive defines as 
especially vulnerable persons e. g. minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled individuals, 
elderly people, pregnant individuals, single parents with minors and individuals who have 
experienced torture, rape or other severe forms of psychological, physical or sexual abuse 
(ibid).
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ganisations, associations, networks, support groups and all other organisations 
serving individuals »living gender diversity« (ibid). Sparked by the establish-
ment of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group »Intersexuality/Transsexuality« 
(Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe »Intersexualität/Transsexualität« [IMAG]) in 
Sept. 2014,17 the network demanded the participation of individuals »living 
gender diversity« in this workgroup as well as in any other political institution, 
including health-related policy boards, and legislative panels and consultations 
on measures pertaining to the life situations of the aforementioned individuals 
(ibid). Finally, Trans*Aktiv demanded that the Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation 
(Bundesstiftung Magnus Hirschfeld [BMH])18 include gender diversity in its by-
17 | In September 2014, the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women 
and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [BMFSFJ]) set 
up the Inter-Ministerial Working Group »Intersexuality/Transsexuality« for the purposes of 
finding legislative solutions for the problems trans and intersex individuals encounter and 
for establishing social diversity in all areas of life (BMFSFJ 2015). The IMAG focuses on 
issues related to the medical treatment of individuals with sex variations, the expansion 
and strengthening of counselling, education and prevention, the investigation into 
required legislative changes and the analysis of transsexual individuals’ actual and legal 
situation (ibid).
18 | The BMH is a federal foundation located in Berlin (BMH 2015). According to the by-
laws of the BMH, the purpose of the foundation is to promote education and research, 
particularly with regard to commemorating the national-socialist persecution of 
homosexual individuals (s. [1]1), presenting and conducting research on the life and work 
of Magnus Hirschfeld and homosexual men and women’s living environments in Germany 
(s. [1]2) and countering social discrimination against homosexual men and women in 
Germany (BMH 2012: 1). The purpose of the BMH and the representation on the boards 
(cf. ss. 6 and 12 of the by-laws) suggest that the foundation was formally set up with a 
heavy white, gay, cis bias and a lopsided commemoration of Magnus Hirschfeld and his 
body of work. The staffing and purpose of the BMH sparked angry protest, particularly by 
TrIQ e. V. The latter demanded »an end to exclusion, ignorance, outside depictions and 
supposed inclusion« (TrIQ 2011b) and demanded an appropriate consideration of all 
LGBTI groups and research interests, including intersectional perspectives and trans and 
inter representatives on all boards of the foundation (ibid). While the by-laws were not 
amended, the BMH included one trans individual on the board of trustees and one intersex 
activist in the advisory committee. Moreover, the current research programme defines as 
its cornerstones history, diversity and intersectionality and promotes research and the 
inclusion of issues related to gender diversity in its events as the programme of the First 
LGBTI Science Congress in Berlin in 2013 attests to (cf. Hirschfeld-Kongress undated). 
These developments were an effect of intense struggles between trans organisations and 
the BMH as well as internal struggles.
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laws and proportionately represent individuals »living gender diversity« on all 
boards of its institution (ibid).
With regard to legal reform, the network made two demands. First and like 
the initiatives portrayed earlier on, the network called for a timely reform of 
the Transsexual Act, including a change of first names and a revision of gen-
der status without expert reports and court proceedings to the benefit of self-
determination or an abolishment of the Transsexual Act altogether. Second, 
Trans*Aktiv demanded to extend anti-discrimination measures and the protec-
tion of privacy rights (ibid).
With regard to healthcare, Trans*Aktiv focused on two issues. The network 
demanded to secure and improve accessible, comprehensive, needs-oriented 
and preventive healthcare based on informed consent and without additional 
assessment by medical advisory bodies to the statutory health insurance com-
panies for all individuals requiring healthcare services due to their gender 
identity (ibid). In addition, the network demanded that the committee of the 
Association of the Scientific Medical Societies in Germany (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
der Wissenschaftlichen Medizinischen Fachschaften e. V. [AWMF])19 work towards 
the depathologisation and destigmatisation of trans when revising their medi-
cal guidelines.20
4.2.4 Summar y: Concepts of gender, trans and gender regime in
 trans politics since the Act to amend the Transsexual Act
The period between 2011 and 2014 witnessed three major trans movement pro-
jects. While the political initiatives had in common that they turned away from 
lobbying for a reform of the Transsexual Act and demanded an integration of 
rules in existing legislation instead, they set different priorities. While the dgti 
e. V. devised a broad conceptual framework for future legal regulations, the Na-
tionwide Workgroup for Transsexual Law Reform developed concrete sugges-
tions for implementation. The newly formed network Trans*Aktiv in contrast 
compiled a broad set of concrete political, legal and healthcare-related demands.
19 | See chapters 4.3.1-4.3.3 on the AWMF guideline debate on gender dysphoria.
20 | ATME e. V. participated in the first meeting of Trans*Aktiv. The organisation refused 
to support the declaration. Spokespersons of ATME e. V. objected to the statement that 
the network trusts trans organisation representatives involved in the AWMF guideline 
process and supports their work. ATME e. V. claimed that individuals involved in a process 
based on the concept of ›gender dysphoria‹ or ›gender incongruence‹ do not speak in their 
name. Moreover, ATME e. V. argued that the trans individuals involved in this particular 
process do not represent all individuals concerned. Finally, they suggested that future 
developments on the treatment of transsexual and intersex individuals should be 
discussed publicly and in a transparent way (ATME 2014).
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Disillusioned with the half-hearted, if any, past and present government 
coalitions’ attempts to profoundly reform trans law, the political projects mark 
two shifts in transpolitical strategy. First, the projects indicate increasing ef-
forts to create cohesion within the trans movement. The tendency towards cre-
ating common demands and an umbrella organisation however also suggest 
an adaptation to liberal-democratic rules that interest groups represent them-
selves with one voice. Second, the networks reinforced efforts to gain support 
from, and involve civil society actors. At the same time, the abovementioned 
networks continued to monitor federal politics for opportunities to bring trans 
issues back onto the agenda.
Enabled by prior achievements in trans litigation and less pressed to make 
anticipatory compromises in the light of federal government unwillingness to 
engage with fundamental trans law reform, trans concepts and demands radi-
calised. This tendency is expressed in the definitions of the target group and 
demands for law reform that without exception subscribe to a perspective of 
(trans) gender diversity and individuality and healthcare demands that base 
medical and surgical interventions on informed consent only.
The radicalisation of demands in trans politics is also mirrored in the 
identification of the gender binary, including its institutionalisation and pro-
cedures, as the cause of problems. Consequently and in addition to continuing 
to insist on respecting the basic human rights to self-determination, the free 
development of one’s personality, privacy and health, the political projects re-
ject stigmatisation and minoritisation materialised for instance in special acts 
and special assessment procedures.
4.3 de velopments and debates In se xology on 
 tr ans(se xualIt y) from 2011 to 2014
While few issues have been resolved at the time of writing, current debates in 
sexology indicate four major developments. First, successful social movement 
struggles for an acceptance of gender and sexual diversity, the appreciation of 
theoretical developments on gender and international psycho-medical develop-
ments on trans prompted sexologists in Germany to reconceptualise trans. Sec-
ond, a shift in the balance of power between proponents of trans self-deter-
mination and defenders of psycho-medical surveillance within the discipline 
is mirrored in a number of contributions in the current sexological debate on 
trans. The former not only question central diagnostic instruments employed 
so far, but question the diagnostics of trans per se by any others than trans indi-
viduals themselves. Third, the abovementioned developments inspired sexolo-
gists to rethink the psycho-medical management of trans and to reinforce their 
critique of the rigid assessment instructions and practices exercised by advi-
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sory bodies of statutory health insurance companies in the process of assuming 
the costs of sex reassignment treatment. Fourth, voices in sexology emerged 
that advocate a withdrawal from psycho-medical involvement in the procedures 
under the Transsexual Act and heavily criticise government inactivity.
This chapter outlines the abovementioned developments as they unfolded 
from 2011 to 2014. The first section of this chapter deals with the terminology 
and definitions that have been suggested so far, taking into consideration the 
concepts that inform them. Thereafter this chapter presents an overview of 
suggestions for diagnosing and treating gender dysphoria, including the dis-
cussion on the necessity and function of psychotherapy as a diagnostic instru-
ment. The third section addresses developments in the psycho-medical man-
agement of trans, focusing particularly on the debate on the developing AWMF 
guidelines on gender dysphoria and on sexologists’ responses to the MDS in-
structions for the assessment of cost coverage for sex reassignment measures 
in cases of transsexuality. Finally, this chapter takes up the sexological debate 
on psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ role under the Transsexual Act, taking into 
consideration disparate perspectives on psycho-medical engagement in legal 
proceedings under the Act as well as suggestions for future psycho-medical 
contributions by those endorsing further involvement in this field.
The analysis of the aforementioned debates mainly draws upon two recent 
debates in the Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung. The first debate emerged in 2013 
and mirrors cis and trans contributors’ and/or psycho-medical practitioners’ 
demands for a reform of the Transsexual Act. The second debate began in 2014 
and engages with clinical and trans demands on the guidelines on gender dys-
phoria, which are in the process of being created and will replace the German 
Standards. Additional sources will be an article by Fritz that appeared in the 
journal Gestalttherapie Forum für Gestaltperspektiven (Gestalt Therapy Forum 
for Gestalt Perspectives) in 2013, the instructions produced by the MDS in 
2009 and an article published in 2008 that presents the perspective of the 
MDK Nordrhein.
The current debates reveal that sexologists nowadays accept as an undis-
puted fact a plurality of trans individuals with different health care needs, and 
the debate suggests that the margin between pathologising and depathologis-
ing concepts is in the process of shifting towards the latter. Moreover, while 
some sexologists continue to advocate psycho-medical involvement for diagnos-
tic and assessment purposes in legal proceedings under the Transsexual Act, 
regardless of whether they endorse pathologising or depathologising concepts 
of trans, others suggest withdrawing from any diagnostic and assessment op-
erations in psycho-medical and/or legal settings in favour of trans self-deter-
mination.
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4.3.1 The debate on reconceptualising transsexualit y
Reconceptualising transsexuality is part of the current AWMF guideline debate 
in Germany. This particular part of the sexological debate has so far involved 
psycho-medical professionals and/or trans community members and feminist 
sympathisers. While some discursive traditions overlap, psycho-medical and 
trans contributions to the debate mirror different disciplinary and social con-
texts. Regardless of these differences, the current reconceptualisation of trans 
indicates a shift towards the depathologisation of trans, a recognition of gender 
diversity and, ultimately, calls into question the gender binary.
Major factors contributing to the debate on terminological and 
conceptual revisions
Psycho-medical contributions were fuelled by three major factors. These were 
observations of rapidly diversifying clinical manifestations of transsexualism, 
a multiplicity of trans subjects that defied any clear-cut categorisation and who 
revealed different health care needs, poststructuralist and social construction-
ist thought as well as terminological and conceptual revisions of trans by influ-
ential Western psycho-medical associations. Trans community contributions 
to varying degrees drew upon gender and transgender research and to a lesser 
degree on premises of community-based participatory research.
Since the late 1990s, the growing visibility of various manifestations of trans 
had already begun to blow the narrow boundaries of psycho-medical classifi-
cations, posing theoretical and practical problems. While Vogel’s observation 
that transsexual developments manifest themselves in different ways and can 
no longer be subsumed under the twelve cardinal symptoms developed in the 
late 1970s (Vogel 2013: 181) seems overly cautious in the light of the debates on 
transsexualism throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Becker’s and Nieder 
and Strauß’s observations appear more to the point. The latter state that ›trans‹ 
constitutes a »plural phenomenon« (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 73), whereas Becker 
suggests that dichotomous concepts increasingly fail to capture the growing 
spectrum of gender identity variants, some of which she identifies as 
pregnant transmen; shemales, i. e. biological men, who consciously live as ›women with 
a penis‹; biological men who live as men socially and ›only‹ wish to have the testicles 
removed; biological women who do not want to live as men socially, but – as their version 
of gender identity – ›only‹ wish to have their breasts surgically removed; mtfs who want 
to live as women socially and demand hormone treatment that guarantees the growth of 
breasts as well as the preservation of erectibility and many more – but also individuals 
who reject any assignment to a gender […]. (Becker 2013: 151 f.)
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While poststructuralist and social constructionist premises on gender do not 
necessarily feature consistently in every individual contribution to the current 
debate, several contributors stress the social dimension of gender, question the 
gender binary, and some critically address psycho-medical involvement in the 
construction of transsexualism.
The term ›liquid gender‹,21 which Sigusch introduced into the sexologist 
debate »to do semantic justice to cultural change« (Sigusch 2013: 187) is one ex-
ample of a historically-specific notion of gender. He describes as ›liquid gender‹ 
individuals »who glide to and fro between the two big cultural genders while 
being able to live convincingly according to both gender roles« (ibid).
Becker’s article entails a self-reflexive perspective on psycho-medical con-
tributions to the construction of transsexuality. While Becker is sceptical of the 
apparent »immateriality of poststructuralist gender discourse« (Becker 2013: 
148),22 she concedes that deconstructionist perspectives contributed to a critical 
analysis of transsexuality as a »medical project« (ibid: 147).
Most prominently, deconstructionist axioms feature, albeit inconsist-
ently, in challenges to gender and the gender binary as hegemonic construc-
tions. When contemplating the future role of psychotherapy in the treatment 
of gender dysphoria, Löwenberg and Ettmeier suggest questioning the gender 
binary for two reasons. First, they argue that such an approach helps identify 
gender stereotypes in psychotherapeutic concepts. Second, they suggest that 
the deconstruction of the gender binary according to which every individual is 
required to live unambiguously as a ›man‹ or a ›woman‹ necessarily implies a 
deconstruction of ›trans‹ in the sense that every unambiguous man is expected 
to become an equally unambiguous woman and vice versa. They conclude that 
psychotherapy and any other form of treatment need to take into consideration 
the pluralisation of life-concepts and hence question the binary gender model 
(Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 49).
Quoting the transwoman Jean Lessenich,23 Becker affirms the former’s 
suggestion that, »masculinity and femininity are myths, transsexuality, too«
21 | Sigusch’s concept of ›liquid gender‹ resembles Bornstein’s concept of ›gender fluid-
ity‹. Bornstein developed the concept ›gender fluidity‹ in 1994 to denote subject positions 
that resist categorisation on either side of the gender binary (cf. Bornstein 1994: 52).
22 | In her critical appraisal of poststructuralism, Becker (2007: 57) suggests that post-
structuralist gender discourse has »disembodied« gender differences. »All that is left are 
language, discourse, symbolic construction and ›undoing gender‹, i. e. the representation, 
staging and performance of gender.« 
23 | Jean Lessenich is the author of Die transzendierte Frau.
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(Lessenich 2012: 175, quoted in Becker 2013: 154)24 in her critique of re-essential-
ising approaches to transsexuality in sexology and the trans movement. Most 
apodictically, Sigusch suggests that, »here at least, the period of the rule of 
›either man or woman‹ as well as of ›a man and a woman‹ is drawing to its dull 
close« (Sigusch 2013: 187).
Terminological and conceptual revisions in influential Western psycho-
medical associations finally sparked the debate on the reconceptualisation of 
trans among sexologists in Germany. In 2011, WPATH published the 7th ver-
sion of the Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and 
Gender-Nonconforming People.25 Two years later, the APA produced the DSM-
5. The latest version of the Standards of Care and the DSM-5 have in common 
that they depathologise gender identities and expressions that are not stereo-
typically associated with one’s assigned gender at birth, recognise gender iden-
tities that exceed the gender binary, focus on the distress gender dysphoria 
may cause as a core diagnostic criterion, acknowledge multiple ways of living 
trans(sexual) lives and individual health care needs and point out to the social 
and political dimension of health and health impairment.
The depathologisation of gender identities and expressions that are not ste-
reotypically associated with the assigned gender at the time of birth as well 
as the recognition of gender identities that exceed the gender binary feature 
in the definitions the abovementioned associations agreed on. As early as in 
May 2010, WPATH released a statement noting that, »the expression of gen-
der characteristics, including identities, that are not stereotypically associated 
with one’s assigned sex at birth is a common and cultural diverse phenomenon 
[that] should not be judged as inherently pathological or negative« (WPATH 
2012: 4). This perspective is reflected in the Standards of Care that suggest that, 
24 | Becker’s statements are inconsistent. Although she subscribes to the notion that 
all genders are myths, the consequences for the myths that do not follow the hegemonic 
ones are not the same. While Becker insists on mandatory psychotherapy for trans indi-
viduals prior to somatic interventions (Becker 2013: 156), she does not suggest applying 
the same measure to cis individuals seeking somatic treatment such as e. g. hormone re-
placement therapy in postmenopausal cis women or mastectomies in cis men who devel-
op gynaecomasty. While extending the assumption that individuals lack self-knowledge 
and require psychiatric assistance or surveillance to cis individuals would not be a desir-
able outcome from a human rights perspective, the question arises why trans and cis indi-
viduals should be treated differently with regard to similar issues, if all genders are myths.
25 | The Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Non-
conforming People will be referred to as the Standards of Care.
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»transsexual, transgender, and gender-nonconforming26 individuals are not 
inherently disordered« (ibid: 6). Similarly, the APA describes ›gender identity‹ 
without any further ascriptions as »a category of social identity«, which »refers 
to an individual’s identification as male, female, or, occasionally, some category 
other than male or female« (APA 2013: 451).
Both associations distinguish between gender identities and/or gender ex-
pressions on the one hand and gender dysphoria on the other. According to 
WPATH, ›gender dysphoria‹ is »broadly defined as discomfort or distress that 
is caused by a discrepancy between a person’s gender identity and that per-
son’s sex assigned at birth (and the associated gender role and/or primary and 
secondary sex characteristics)« (WPATH 2012: 2). Replacing ›gender identity 
disorders‹ with ›gender dysphoria‹,27 the APA likewise defines ›gender dyspho-
ria‹ as »the distress that may accompany the incongruence between one’s expe-
rienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned gender«, and it is the distress 
of gender dysphoria rather than an identity that forms the basis for a diagno-
sis (APA 2013: 453). In line with acknowledging non-binary genders, the APA 
considers ›gender dysphoria‹ a »multicategory rather than a dichotomy« (APA 
2013a: 14), which is expressed in the DSM-5 accordingly: »Experienced gender 
may include alternative gender identities beyond binary stereotypes. Conse-
quently, the distress is not limited to a desire to simply be of the other gender, 
but may include a desire to be of an alternative gender, provided that it differs 
from the individual’s assigned gender.« (APA 2013: 453) Nor does a particular 
gender identity necessarily involve a lifelong sense of belonging to one gen-
der as the definition of ›transgender‹ suggests: »Transgender refers to the broad 
spectrum of individuals who transiently or persistently identify with a gender 
different from their natal gender.« (Ibid: 451)
In addition, WPATH and the APA suggest that there are multiple ways of 
living trans lives, necessitating individualised health care regimens.28 This ap-
plies to any individual experiencing gender dysphoria (cf. APA 2013: 454) as 
well as to those defined as ›transsexual‹: »Transsexual denotes an individual 
who seeks, or has undergone, a social transition from male to female or from 
female to male, which in many, but not all cases involves a somatic transition 
by cross-sex hormone treatment and genital surgery (sex reassignment surgery).« 
26 | ›Gender nonconformity‹ is defined as »the extent to which a person’s gender identity, 
role, or expression differs from the cultural norms prescribed for people of a particular 
sex« (WPATH 2012: 5).
27 | For a compilation of changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5 on issues related to gender 
dysphoria, see APA 2013a: 14 f.
28 | WPATH e. g. notes that, »[f]or individuals seeking care for gender dysphoria, a variety 
of therapeutic options can be considered. The number and type of interventions applied 
and the order in which they take place differ from person to person.« (WPATH 2012: 9)
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(Ibid: 451) WPATH also considers ways of living trans lives that have until re-
cently been considered unthinkable among sexologists: »Many transgender, 
transsexual, and gender-nonconforming individuals will want to have chil-
dren. Because feminizing/masculinizing hormone therapy limits fertility […], 
it is desirable for patients to make decisions concerning fertility before start-
ing hormone therapy or undergoing surgery to remove/alter their reproductive 
organs.« (WPATH 2012: 50) Unlike the DSM-IV-TR (APA 2000: 4), the DSM-5 
no longer excludes intersex individuals from a diagnosis of gender dysphoria 
(APA 2013: 453).
Moreover, both associations recognise the impact of social interactions, 
policies and the legal environment on trans health. WPATH holds that stig-
ma attached to gender nonconformity impinges on trans individuals’ health 
(WPATH 2012: 4). While the APA points out to the adverse effects of prejudice, 
discrimination and victimisation (APA 2013: 458), WPATH additionally advo-
cates interventions into the public sphere to achieve favourable conditions for 
trans health: 
WPATH recognises that health is dependent upon not only good clinical care but also 
social and political climates that provide and ensure social tolerance, equality, and 
the full rights of citizenship. Health is promoted through public policies and legal re-
forms that promote tolerance and equity for gender and sexual diversity and that elimi-
nate prejudice, discrimination, and stigma. WPATH is committed to advocacy for these 
changes in public policies and legal reforms. (WPATH 2012: 1 f.)
Several statements in the revised Standards of Care reveal WPATH’s struggle 
for depathologisation and anti-discrimination, whilst attempting to secure ac-
cess to health care. While WPATH, like the APA, suggest that some instances 
of distress due to gender dysphoria may amount to a mental disorder (WPATH 
2012: 5), WPATH at the same time cautions that, »[a] disorder is a description of 
something with which a person might struggle, not a description of the person 
or the person’s identity« (ibid). WPATH notes that, »[t]he existence of a diag-
nosis for such dysphoria often facilitates access to health care and can guide 
further research into effective treatments« (ibid: 6).
Trans and feminist contributions to the debate on reconceptualising trans 
draw upon several sources. Among these are queer-feminist thought and re-
sults of gender and transgender research and trans activism, insights gained 
from community-based participatory research and human rights discourse. 
Trans and feminist contributions have in common that they are informed by 
research that renders visible multiple genders beyond the gender binary, ap-
proaches that question power relations and practices that marginalise genders 
and sexualities and demand that psycho-medical practitioners critically reflect 
upon their entanglement in the binary gender regime.
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Fritz bases her approach to trans counselling on queer-feminist axioms. Re-
ferring to Butler’s theorems of ›gender‹ as radically independent of ›sex‹ (Butler 
1990: 7) and ›gender‹ as a performative effect of a regulatory regime that po-
larises and hierarchises genders under constraint (Butler 1997: 17), Fritz ap-
plies the effects of taking the gender binary for granted to psychotherapeutic 
contexts (Fritz 2013: 139).
She argues that psychiatry and psychotherapy with trans individuals dur-
ing the assessment and therapeutic process mirrors a pronounced subject-ob-
ject-relationship. As long as experts define norms and their deviations, trans 
individuals will be degraded to objects and questioned, hence enforcing a hier-
archical relationship and leaving little space for exploring gender identity be-
yond the gender binary (Fritz 2013: 143). Fritz argues that it is »[o]nly reflexion 
and questioning the binary logic of gender that shed light on concepts of self-
determination and human rights discourses« (ibid 2013: 140).
Hamm and Sauer (2014) draw upon transgender studies research in Ger-
many. The authors particularly draw on two strands of transgender studies of 
which one engages with the broad spectrum of trans identities, lives and con-
cepts. Hamm and Sauer as well as Radix and Eisfeld (2014: 32) point out to the 
diversity of trans individuals. Hamm and Sauer note that, 
[t]rans individuals are extremely diverse. They have in common that they cannot and/
or do not want to occasionally, in part or at all relate to their assigned gender at bir th. 
Trans individuals may identify as the ›other gender‹ within the gender binary or locate 
themselves between or beyond it or completely refuse a gender assignment. Individuals 
that live as ›neither nor‹, ›(gender)queer‹, ›non-gender‹ and the like beyond polarity may, 
but need not necessarily, consider themselves as trans. (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 6)
Hamm and Sauer’s perspective also builds upon results of interdisciplinary 
gender and transgender studies research that examines the conditions and 
practices that construct certain genders and sexualities as deviant, while the 
norms and social negotiations minoritisation is based on remain unquestioned. 
This applies in particular to a body of research that examines how psychiatry 
and the law have contributed to normative concepts of gender and sexuality 
and the effects ›gender unambiguity‹ had (and continues to have) on social par-
ticipation. Hamm and Sauer conclude from the findings of this research that 
psycho-medical perspectives on trans identities and bodies have contributed to 
reproducing the heterosexually organised gender binary and sex/gender unam-
biguity as a prerequisite for social participation (ibid: 6 f.).
Based on these findings, Hamm and Sauer argue that medicine and psy-
chology have so far defined trans as psychological disorders and conducted 
research in the context of a paradigm of deviation, usually without having 
considered that ›gender‹ or the ›heteronormative gender binary‹ require an ex-
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planation (ibid). Therefore, the authors argue that the ›objectivity‹, ›validity‹ 
and ›results‹ of binary research designs and interpretations as well as the lack 
of self-reflexion need to be questioned (ibid).
Based on the critique of psycho-medical premises and research on, and the 
treatment and management of trans individuals so far, and informed by in-
sights from transgender studies research and trans activism, Hamm and Sauer 
suggest taking into consideration principles in community-based participa-
tory research and fundamental human rights guaranteed in the Basic Law and 
the European Convention on Human Rights. With regard to the former, the 
authors demand that psycho-medical researchers question power relations in 
their projects and consider the question who profits from such an undertak-
ing (ibid: 8). With regard to human rights, Hamm and Sauer argue that any 
research, development of guidelines and treatment of trans individuals needs 
to observe the right to the dignity of every person, which the Federal Consti-
tutional Court defined as the right to individuality (ibid: 14); the right to self-
determination, which includes the right to determine one’s identity freely and 
the right to adapt one’s body, name and gender status to one’s identity (ibid: 11); 
the right to health, i. e. the right to a humane existence and the free develop-
ment of one’s personality (ibid: 12) and the right to privacy, which – applied 
to trans individuals – includes the rights to be legally recognised according 
to one’s gender identity and to health insurance coverage of sex reassignment 
measures (ibid: 13).
Terminolog y and definitions from 2011 to 2014
The borders between psycho-medical and trans community concepts are 
not always clear-cut. However, most psycho-medical contributors to the cur-
rent sexological debate have so far adopted the term ›gender dysphoria‹ (›Ge-
schlechtsdysphorie‹), whereas trans community as well as some psycho-mediccal 
contributors use the term ›trans‹ (›Trans*‹), including variations of the term, 
such as ›trans individuals‹ (›Trans*-Menschen‹ or ›Trans*-Personen‹ or ›Transge-
schlechtlichkeiten‹).
The use of the term ›gender dysphoria‹ in the current sexological debate 
is inspired by the terminological shift in the DSM-5 (Strauß/Nieder 2014: 1). 
While Becker remains cautious of the term, suggesting that the merits and 
drawbacks remain to be seen (Becker 2013: 152 f.), most psycho-medical con-
tributors to the continuing debate have adopted the term ›gender dysphoria‹.29 
Like the APA, Nieder and Strauß define ›gender dysphoria‹ as the »distress 
[…] that may result from the incongruence between individual experience and 
the assigned gender, which is usually based on primary sex characteristics« 
29 | See, for instance, Strauß/Nieder 2014, Nieder/Strauß 2014, Löwenberg/Ettmeier 
2014 and Vogel 2013.
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(Nieder/Strauß 2014: 62). In essence, Vogel’s, and Löwenberg and Ettmeier’s 
(2014: 48) definitions are identical. Vogel e. g. defines ›gender dysphoria‹ as the 
psychological distress caused by the discrepancy between a person’s identity 
and experienced sex (Vogel 2013: 181).
The abovementioned authors welcome the revised terminology for concep-
tual and pragmatic reasons. Löwenberg and Ettmeier, Vogel as well as Strauß 
and Nieder positively highlight the depathologising impetus of the term, which 
allows for a recognition of diverse, non-binary genders (Löwenberg/Ettmeier 
2014: 48; Strauß/Nieder 2014: 1 f.) as well as the acknowledgement of trans-
sexuality as a heterogeneous, individual and self-defined identity (Vogel 2013: 
181). Moreover, the revised terminology avoids any standardisation of gender 
and renounces gender role stereotypes, since it does not evaluate experienced 
or expressed gender (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 61; Strauß/Nieder 2014: 1; Vogel 2013: 
182). In addition, Nieder and Strauß positively emphasise the inclusion of vari-
ations of sex development (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 61; Strauß/Nieder 2014: 2). Fi-
nally, Löwenberg and Ettmeier suggest that the term ›gender dysphoria‹ opens 
up a broader range of therapeutic options and individual solutions (Löwenberg/
Ettmeier 2014: 48).
The term ›trans‹ originated from the trans community and has ever since 
been a decidedly non-pathologising term. All contributors to the sexological 
debate who occasionally30 or continuously use the term ›trans‹ define ›trans‹ 
»as an umbrella term for diverse gender identities« (Fritz 2013: 135) or, more 
precisely, »for ›transsexual‹, ›trans-identified‹, ›transgender‹ etc. in order 
to include a multiplicity of self-identities and gendered (non-) localisations« 
(Hamm/Sauer 2014: 1), or, as Radix and Eisfeld suggest from a U.S. experience, 
»as an umbrella term […] that includes those, too, who live beyond the gender 
binary (e. g. genderqueer, androgynous, bi-gendered and two-spirit) and those 
not interested in sex reassignment measures« (2014: 32). Nieder and Strauß 
define ›trans‹ as a category comprised of »individuals whose experienced gen-
der identity does not (or not completely and/or permanently) concur with the 
gender assigned at birth« (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 59).
4.3.2 Diagnosing gender dysphoria
Reconceptualising trans necessarily involves reconsidering issues related to 
diagnostics. So far, the current sexological debate has addressed questions of 
classification, diagnostics and treatment models, in particular with regard to 
the necessity and function of psychotherapy and, to a lesser degree, further 
diagnostic instruments, most notably physical examinations and the so-called 
real life test. While the debate has only just begun and the struggle over trans 
30 | See, for instance, Nieder/Strauß 2014.
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self-determination remains contested, it indicates a shift towards more ›patient-
centred‹, individualised health care and psycho-medical self-reflexivity.
Suggestions for classif ying gender dysphoria
A diagnosis of gender dysphoria is contingent upon a classification. The de-
bate on classifying gender dysphoria is marked by considerations on securing 
health insurance coverage of the costs of sex reassignment surgery and the 
tension between perspectives that ›other‹ trans and those that consider trans a 
legitimate gender on a par with any other gender. So far, four suggestions for 
classifying gender dysphoria have arisen.
The first suggestion opts for classifying gender dysphoria as a mental dis-
order. Löwenberg and Ettmeier give two reasons for this particular preference. 
First, they argue that since there are no scientifically verified somatic findings 
that support a classification of trans as a somatic phenomenon, the psycho-
social problem remains paramount.31 In addition, they point out that there 
are other ›mental disorders‹ that continue to be classified as mental illnesses, 
despite the fact that these conditions are demonstrably influenced by somatic 
factors (Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 50). Second, the authors argue that the dis-
tinction between ›transsexuality‹ or ›transidentification‹ as non-pathological 
identities, respectively, and the clinical term ›gender dysphoria‹ mirrors the 
depathologising gesture with regard to diverse gender identities, whereas ›gen-
der dysphoria‹, defined as the distress caused by the discrepancy between the 
assigned and the experienced gender, needs for pragmatic reasons to be under-
stood as a mental disorder (ibid: 48).
31 | Becker agrees with Löwenberg and Ettmeier on the issue of somatic causes of 
transsexuality (cf. Becker 2013: 153). Apart from the lack of empirical evidence, Becker 
points out to three further shortcomings of monocausal, somatic aetiological reasoning. 
First, in her opinion any mono-causal aetiology appears improbable in the light of diverse 
transsexual developments. Quoting Nieder, Jordan and Richter-Appelt (2011: 218), 
she suggests that transsexual developments are rather conditioned by an interplay of 
biological, psychological and social factors in unique and multiple ways (Becker 2013: 
154). Second, she anticipates that potential findings in imaging techniques, such as 
e. g. magnetic resonance imaging, will once more lead to distinctions between ›real‹ and 
›unreal‹ transsexual individuals or to reinvoking the notion of the ›wrong body‹. As an effect, 
these notions will contribute to the homogenisation of transsexual individuals and ignore 
the complexity of transsexual individuals’ situations and perceptions of their respective 
bodies (ibid: 154 f.). Finally, she argues that insisting on somatic causes of gender 
re-essentialises the categories ›woman‹, ›man‹ and »transsexual desire« (ibid: 151). 
However, Becker tends to equate calls for depathologisation with the essentialisation of 
gender (ibid). When taking into consideration deconstructionist perspectives on gender in 
trans organisations, such as e. g. in TrIQ e. V. and the TGNB, this does not apply.
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The second suggestion considers developing an alternative classification in 
the ICD-11.32 Fritz argues that responding to the distress caused by the incon-
gruence between the experienced gender and the body with somatic measures 
calls into question a classification as a mental disorder. She points out that 
no other mental disorder is treated with physical interventions and court de-
cisions. Since trans individuals are dependent on medicine and health insur-
ance coverage of sex reassignment measures, and drawing upon the debate that 
arose during the Transgender Council in 2012, she tentatively suggests creat-
ing the classification ›Z‹ for trans individuals (Fritz 2013: 142).33
The third suggestion distinguishes between a preferable and a pragmatic or 
realistic solution. Ideally, Hamm and Sauer advocate a non-pathologising clas-
sification in the ICD 11 or a rule in social legislation, respectively that obliges 
health insurance companies to assume the costs of sex reassignment measures 
based on prior informed consent. Since neither option currently appears to be 
practicable in the current legal and political climate, they suggest that individu-
als involved in treating trans individuals will have to continue to operate with 
the existing diagnosis of ›gender identity disorders‹, i. e. a mental disorder.
The fourth suggestion is based on the premise that diagnostic categories 
as they exist in classification systems are in principle inappropriate means to 
deal with patients of any sort. Güldenring presents two arguments to support 
her view. First, she holds that subjective feelings cannot be captured using 
allegedly objective criteria (Güldenring 2013: 170). Second, she argues that, 
»psychiatric diagnostics measures nonconformity, deviance and the unusu-
32 | The ICD 10 GM is the German modification of the 10 th revision of the ICD. In its 
2015 version, ›Gender Identity Disorders‹ (›Störungen der Geschlechtsidentität‹) (F64) 
are subsumed in Chapter V ›Mental and Behavioural Disorders (F00-F99)‹ (›Psychische 
und Verhaltensstörungen‹). The most recent ICD 10 GM neatly distinguishes between va-
rious ›gender identity disorders‹, e. g. by codifying ›transsexualism‹ (›Transsexualismus‹) 
as F64.0 and ›dual-role transvestism‹ (›Transvestitismus unter Beibehaltung beider Ge­
schlechtsrollen‹) as F64.1 (DIMDI 2015). The 11th revision of the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases will be released in June 2018 (WHO undated).
33 | In a proposal made in June 2013, TGEU made three suggestions for a revision of 
the ICD 10. First, TGEU suggested to remove all trans-related diagnoses from the men-
tal disorder section ›F‹ in order to avoid psychopathologisation and second, to create a 
new and separate chapter called ›Gender Incongruence‹ containing the diagnosis ›Gender 
Incongruence in Adolescence and Adulthood‹ as the only diagnosis to ensure access to 
health care for all trans individuals who need or seek it. Third, the organisation suggested 
to abolish the diagnosis ›Gender Identity Disorders in Childhood‹ and rather cover clinical 
needs of children in XXI (Z) ›Factors Influencing Health Status and Contact with Health 
Services‹, hence granting pre-pubertal individuals health care without exposing gender-
nonconforming children to stigmatisation and discrimination (TGEU 2014: 2-4).
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al« (ibid), usually equating the latter with disorders requiring treatment. As 
a result, a person’s individuality is not treated with respect (ibid). The author 
suggests that rather than define and heteronomously categorise individuals, 
appropriate diagnostics ought to »respect the special nature of an individual, 
appreciate his or her desire for expression as an individual note and essen-
tial need« and »help the individual to achieve maximum self-determination 
under the conditions of a frequently limiting environment« (ibid). However, 
Güldenring remains silent on issues related to health insurance coverage of 
sex reassignment measures.
Suggestions for diagnostic and treatment models
Reconceptualising trans and gender dysphoria also raises questions about ap-
propriate diagnostic and treatment schemes. The sexological debate in Ger-
many has so far particularly discussed the necessity and function of psycho-
therapy. In the course of the debate, three models have been presented to date, 
which are based on different assumptions on trans expertise and have different 
effects on trans self-determination.
The first model regards psycho-medical diagnostics and psychotherapy as 
mandatory. Regardless of the critique that has been levied against this particu-
lar model from within sexology and, more profoundly, by trans organisations, 
Becker proposes sticking to this mode of enquiry. She reasons that trans indi-
viduals not only harbour contradictory desires. Even more so, 
many transsexuals only arrive at a clear and reflective attitude towards individual so-
matic measures in the course of a psychotherapy or the diagnostic-therapeutic pro-
cess, which among other things potentially includes an active disillusionment of too 
high expectations with regard to operations, a solution for all problems […]. (Becker 
2013: 155)
While she concedes that transsexuality constitutes a self-diagnosis, this does 
not mean that all ›patients‹ have answered all their questions. Rather, many 
»patients with a transsexual desire« voluntarily seek physicians and psychol-
ogists in the period of self-enquiry, »because they wish to gain more clarity 
about their individual transsexuality, a competent clarification of their trans-
sexual desire or ›recognition‹ (in a deeper sense) within the intimacy of a psy-
chotherapeutic relationship« (ibid: 156).
While there are to date no reliable data on the number of trans individu-
als voluntarily seeking psychotherapeutic assistance, such a desire may indeed 
emerge in some trans individuals (cf. Hamm/Sauer 2014: 16). Becker’s model 
of mandatory diagnostics and psychotherapy however does not explain why in-
dividuals who have fulfilled the tasks of self-exploration and enquiries on their 
own or by other means should have to undergo psychotherapy (cf. ibid: 17), nor 
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why psychotherapy features as a superior form of enquiry as opposed to e. g. 
peer support (cf. Seikowski 2007).
The second model suggests mandatory diagnostics and optional psycho-
therapy for individuals experiencing gender dysphoria and is inspired by the 
debate on the revision of guidelines in Germany. However, this model appears 
in two guises. Hamm and Sauer developed their variant of the model against 
the background of discriminatory experiences trans individuals make in the 
course of a transition, whereas Löwenberg and Ettmeier’s concept is inspired 
by the latest revision of the Standards of Care. While the formers’ variant is 
motivated by maximising trans self-determination, Löwenberg and Ettmeier 
focus on the clinical perspective, including thorough diagnostics.
Hamm and Sauer favour either a non-psychopathologising classification or 
a legal provision that – similar to the Argentinian Ley de identidad de género34 – 
ensures coverage of medical and surgical sex reassignment measures on de-
mand. However, in the face of the current situation in Germany they suggest 
in recognition of trans self-determination to reduce the diagnostic process to 
few appointments. Moreover, they suggest extending diagnostic competency to 
somatically oriented physicians in order to gain further independence of psy-
34 | On 08 May 2012, the Senate of Argentina approved the Ley de identidad de género, 
an Act that regulates the transition from the assigned gender to another. Section 1 
broadly defines that »[a]ll persons have the right a) to the recognition of their gender 
identity; b) to the free development of their person according to their gender identity« 
and »c) to be treated according to their gender identity«, particularly with regard to first 
names, image and sex recorded in documents proving their identity (TGEU 2013). Section 
2 defines gender identity in non-pathologising terms and suggests that an individual’s 
gender identity can manifest itself in multiple ways, possibly including, but not limited 
to, freely chosen medical and surgical means (ibid). Section 3 rules that any person who 
does not identify with the assigned gender may request an amendment of the recorded 
sex according to the self-perceived gender identity (ibid). 
The concept of self-defined gender identity runs through the entire Act. Section 4 e. g. 
specifies overall easily accessible requirements for formal gender recognition and in 
particular provides that, »[i]n no case will it be needed to prove that a surgical procedure 
for total or partial genital reassignment, hormonal therapies or any other psychological or 
medical treatment has taken place« (ibid), rendering the right to the recognition of one’s 
gender identity radically independent of psycho-medical interventions and expertise. 
Moreover, s. 11 provides that access to surgical and/or hormonal treatment to adjust 
the body to the respective self-perceived gender identity does not require any judicial 
or administrative authorisation. Rather, the only requirement is the individual’s informed 
consent. In addition, the Act rules that any health insurance company must guarantee 
the assumption of costs for medical procedures contemplated in the Act (ibid). For the 
original text in Spanish, see CDI/MECON undated).
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chiatrists and psychologists, close gaps in health care provision, reduce waiting 
time and to relieve heavily frequently specialists (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 22).
Hamm and Sauer reject psychotherapy as a diagnostic instrument for two 
reasons.35 First, they argue that in the light of the experiences made under 
the German Standards,36 the therapist becomes the decision-maker on legiti-
mate ways of expressing gender identity, and these decisions for most part have 
relied on a binary concept of gender (ibid: 15). As a result, trans individuals 
have generated narratives to match the stereotypical expectations of psychiatric 
gatekeepers. These practices put in question any meaningful psychotherapeu-
tic assistance and preclude the establishment of trustful working relationships 
(ibid: 16). Second, they point out to the lack of psychotherapeutic or psychiatric 
diagnostic evidence. According to Hamm and Sauer, proponents of compulsory 
psychotherapy assume that there are a number of mentally ill transsexual indi-
viduals, without however defining the ascriptions ›healthy‹ and ›sick‹. Moreo-
ver, they observe that psychological and psychiatric professionals mainly focus 
on conflictual developments (ibid: 17).
35 | Hamm and Sauer also reject a mandatory ›real life test‹ and invasive questions as 
diagnostic means. They oppose the former for three reasons. First, requiring a ›real life 
test‹ exposes trans individuals to discrimination and verbal and physical abuse. Second, 
individuals are forced to disclose their trans status, which infringes upon their right to 
privacy. Third, life as a publicly discernible trans individual cannot be compared with the 
situation of passing as the gender a person identifies with (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 19). The 
authors suggest that it is for the trans individual to decide whether, when and where to 
present him- or herself according to his or her gender identity (ibid: 19 f.). 
Hamm and Sauer demand banning invasive questions in diagnostic procedures, arguing 
that invasive enquiries in particular into sexual practices and sexual orientation violate a 
trans person’s privacy. Moreover, the authors consider these and comparable questions 
inappropriate in a setting marked by unequal power relations and dependency. Further-
more, Hamm and Sauer suggest that they are entirely irrelevant, since trans individuals 
live diverse sexualities (ibid: 21).
36 | In a study on violence and multiple discrimination, LesMigraS e. V., an intercultural 
group of lesbian, bisexual migrants, black lesbians and trans individuals working in the 
area of anti-discrimination and anti-violence in a lesbian counselling centre in Berlin 
(Lesbenberatung e. V.) (LesMigraS 2011), e. g. stated that in addition to discrimination 
in everyday life, half of the trans individuals interviewed had experienced discrimination 
at the workplace or in vocational training, and 44.7 % reported having made negative 
experiences in the area of health care (LesMigraS 2012: 4).
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The authors also reject compulsory psychotherapy as a means of treatment 
for two reasons.37 First, they suggest that many trans individuals have accom-
plished all necessary tasks prior to seeking an indication for somatic interven-
tions. Second, they doubt the legitimacy of a prescribed psychotherapy, since 
such a procedure violates three requirements for psychotherapeutic treatment: 
Psychotherapy is meant to ameliorate a mental disorder; the patient needs to be 
motivated, and treatment should involve economic considerations. Hamm and 
Sauer argue that none of these prerequisites apply in cases of mentally healthy 
trans individuals (ibid: 17 f.).
The second variant of this model focuses on thorough psychological or 
psychiatric diagnostics and comprehensive psychological support. Löwenberg 
and Ettmeier distinguish between a mandatory ›integrative treatment‹ and an 
optional psychotherapy.38 Their proposed treatment model suggests that a psy-
chologist, psychiatrist or neurologist should be responsible for the mandatory 
part of the treatment regimen. This so-called gender specialist is responsible 
for diagnosing gender dysphoria, conducting the differential diagnostics and 
coordinating the overall therapeutic scheme (Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 50 f.), 
such as indicating treatment for potential comorbidities, conveying informa-
tion on legal and therapeutic options, indicating somatic measures (ibid: 51) and 
referring the ›patient‹ to suitable colleagues (ibid: 52). According to Löwenberg 
and Ettmeier, the treatment schedule should provide the option for long-term 
37 | However, Hamm and Sauer suggest that optional psychotherapy, which is entirely 
detached from diagnostics would be desirable and helpful for trans individuals (Hamm/
Sauer 2014: 16).
38 | For comparison: In its 7th version of the Standards of Care, WPATH notes that a 
mental health screening and/or assessment is needed for referral to hormonal and 
surgical treatment for gender dysphoria (WPATH 2012: 28). Like Löwenberg and Ettmeier, 
WPATH holds that »psychotherapy – although highly recommended – is not a requirement« 
(ibid). Rather than outline a mandatory treatment programme, the Standards of Care 
develop principles that should inform interactions with transsexual, transgender and 
gender-nonconforming individuals seeking health care: »Exhibit respect for patients with 
nonconforming gender identities (do not pathologize differences in gender identity or 
expression); provide care (or refer to knowledgeable colleagues) that affirms patients’ 
gender identities and reduces the distress of gender dysphoria, when present; become 
knowledgeable about the health care needs of transsexual, transgender, and gender-
nonconforming people, including the benefits and risks of treatment options for gender 
dysphoria; match the treatment approach to the specific needs of patients, particularly 
their goals for gender expression and need for relief from gender dysphoria; facilitate 
access to appropriate care; seek patients’ informed consent before providing treatment; 
offer continuity of care; and be prepared to support and advocate for patients within their 
families and communities (schools, workplaces, and other settings).« (Ibid: 3)
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treatment to individuals whose gender dysphoria persists for various reasons, 
such as for example, with individuals who cannot undergo hormonal and/or 
surgical measures or whose professional and/or family circumstances do not 
allow for a social and/or somatic transition (ibid). While Löwenberg and Ett-
meier emphasise that any treatment should be patient-centred, seek individual 
solutions and should not hierarchise various measures or fulfil gatekeeper 
functions (ibid: 51), they nevertheless point to a problem Hamm and Sauer’s 
model tries to avoid, that is, encroachments on trans self-determination: 
The psychotherapeutic treatment of patients with gender dysphoria will […] in most cas-
es mean that the therapist is, in spite of all due neutrality, forced to ›participate‹. This 
happens, for example, when the therapist indicates somatic measures for adjustments 
to the experienced gender or more or less tacitly supports them or when he delays or 
impedes potentially helpful somatic measures by presenting objections. (Ibid: 56)
Like Hamm and Sauer, and for the same reasons, Löwenberg and Ettmeier 
oppose mandatory psychotherapy. Arguing that gender variance may require 
consultation (ibid: 53), there is no reason for an automatic indication for psycho-
therapy (ibid: 54). The authors advocate easy access to optional psychotherapy, 
regardless of whether comorbidities exist or not, arguing that an optional psy-
chotherapy might assist individuals featuring adjustment problems, such as 
e. g., problems relating to coming out, partnerships or self-acceptance (ibid: 
55 f.).
The third model that entered the current sexological debate relies solely on a 
trans person’s informed consent as it is practiced in the Callen-Lorde Commu-
nity Health Center (CLCHC)39 in New York City. This particular model values 
patient autonomy highly and assumes that individuals seeking health care ser-
vices are capable of self-determination, once they have been informed about the 
potential and risks of transition-related hormone therapy (Radix/Eisfeld 2014: 
34).
The informed consent model was developed for two major reasons. First, 
the model takes into consideration the specificities of the US American health 
system, including its effects on trans individuals. Radix and Eisfeld note that 
since the US lacks a comprehensive health system, a significant number of 
individuals are not health insured. This applies particularly to trans individu-
als of which 47 % in 1999 and 2000 were said to be without a health insur-
39 | The CLCHC was founded in 1983 in New York City for providing medical care for gay 
men’s sexual health. The scope of the CLCHC was gradually extended to e. g. provide 
general medical health care, offer transition-, HIV- and sexual health-related health care 
for lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans individuals. The CLCHC provides outpatient health 
care services only and no surgical interventions (Radix/Eisfeld 2014: 34).
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ance. Moreover, commercial health insurance companies usually do not cover 
transition-related interventions, and Medicaid, the statutory health insurance 
company for low-income individuals, excludes transition-related health care 
provisions (ibid: 33).
Second, the model responds to the difficulties trans individuals face when 
consulting psychologists and psychiatric professionals. Like Hamm and Sauer, 
Radix and Eisfeld observe that only those trans individuals are granted access to 
sex reassignment measures who adapt themselves to the treatment provider’s 
heteronormative and gender binary bias (ibid). These practices led the CLCHC 
to doubt the necessity of psychotherapy and psycho-medical indications for sex 
reassignment treatment (ibid).
Based on these experiences, the CLCHC developed procedures according to 
the informed consent model »which stress the necessity to provide trans-posi-
tive health care«, access to sex-reassignment-related health care provisions and 
include the entire spectrum of comprehensive health care provision (ibid: 34). 
While the revised WPATH Standards of Care suggest locating trans health care 
in the area of mental health (WPATH 2012: 36),40 the CLCHC situates trans 
health care in the field of general health (Radix/Eisfeld 2014: 35). Since trans in-
dividuals frequently face discrimination in the health care system to the effect 
of delaying access to preventative health care measures and emergency care, the 
CLCHC monitors transition-related and general health parameters (ibid: 35 f.).
While in contrast to the USA, most individuals in Germany are health-
insured,41 and whereas health insurance companies are obliged to assume the 
costs of several medical and surgical sex reassignment measures, the CLCHC 
model of informed consent is nevertheless relevant to the German debate. Not 
only do Radix and Eisfeld’s as well as Hamm and Sauer’s contributions mir-
ror trans individuals’ distrust of the psychological and psychiatric disciplines.42 
40 | WPATH explains that mental health professionals can play an important role »in 
alleviating gender dysphoria and facilitating changes in gender role and psychosocial 
adjustment« (WPATH 2012: 36). At the same time, the organisation suggests that 
protocols developed in various US community health centres, such as the CLCHC, »are 
consistent with the guidelines presented in the WPATH Standards of Care, version 7. The 
SOC are flexible clinical guidelines; they allow for tailoring of interventions to the needs of 
the individual receiving services and for tailoring protocols to the approach and setting in 
which these services are provided« (ibid).
41 | Major exceptions are unregistered individuals, usually homeless people and low-
income self-employed people.
42 | The strained relationship between trans individuals and sexological practitioners 
is also expressed by Güldenring: »With the publication of the ›cardinal symptoms‹ on 
›transsexuality‹ in 1979, Sigusch et al. (250 ff.) paved the way for the nagging, at times 
extreme, mistrust between transidentified/transsexual patients and their practitioners 
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The former also provide data on trans individuals’ ability to make informed 
decisions without psychological or psychiatric diagnostics and, by implication, 
refute the fear of so-called regretters:
Making 0.8 % and only three documented cases of reversals, the number of regrets af-
ter irreversible measures for physical gender reassignment was low. Complaints with 
recourse to legal channels were not reported. Since the mentioned rate of 0.8 % cor-
responds with the rate of 0.5 to 3 % in the WPATH care guidelines, it is fair to say that 
both models appropriately assess the patients’ ability to make suitable and informed 
decisions with regard to hormone treatment in the course of physical gender reassign-
ment. (Ibid: 39)
Reconsidering principles in diagnostics and treatment with 
trans individuals
Despite suggesting different diagnostic and treatment models with different 
implications for trans autonomy, most contributions signal a shift from diag-
nostics, in particular psychotherapy, as a gatekeeping instrument to a support-
ive means. Indicators for such a development feature in demands from within 
and outside the discipline for individualised, patient-centred health care and 
a more restrained and self-reflexive attitude of psychotherapists and psychia-
trists.
Several contributors to the debate suggest providing individualised patient-
centred care, which includes respecting a trans individual’s identity and indi-
vidual choice and sequence of measures required to secure »the best possible 
health and comfort in life« (Güldenring 2013: 170). Löwenberg and Ettmeier, 
for instance, define as the aim of an ›integrative treatment‹ to find a solution for 
the health care-seeker »that does justice to his unique identity« (Löwenberg/
Ettmeier 2014: 48). Löwenberg and Ettmeier as well as Güldenring agree that 
valuing a patient’s personality and individuality is a condition for a patient-
centred approach (Güldenring 2013: 170; Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 55), which 
includes accepting a concept of life »beyond classical gender roles« (Löwen-
berg/Ettmeier 2014: 55).
Löwenberg and Ettmeier as well as Hamm and Sauer agree that patient-cen-
tred treatment requires somatic and psychotherapeutic therapies according to an 
and left scorched earth in their wake. […] In retrospect, I [Güldenring] understand these 
›contemptuous‹ (Richter-Appelt 2012: 253) cardinal symptoms not only as Sigusch, 
Meyenburg and Reiche’s views. The authors were symptom carriers of a deeply seated 
fear of the phenomenon transidentity/transsexuality, which dominated thought in 
medicine about gender and commonly allowed for treating trans individuals apodictically 
and discriminatorily. This fear continues to be expressed nowadays through exclusionary 
behaviour in medicine and clinical psychology in Germany.« (Güldenring 2013: 166 f.)
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individual’s needs. The former e. g. suggest that an individual should have the 
choice of all possible somatic and psychotherapeutic means without hierarchis-
ing any one of them (ibid: 51 f.). Similarly, Hamm and Sauer suggest that it should 
be up to »trans individuals themselves to decide in a dialogue with clinical ex-
perts which measures are individually longed for and needed and which ones 
are not« (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 20). The authors argue that taking into considera-
tion »the diversity of trans, the desire for sex reassignment operations should no 
longer be a condition for diagnostics and […] somatic treatment« (ibid: 21).
Contributions to the debate acknowledging the limitations of binary gender 
concepts in psychology and psychiatry and the demand that psychotherapists 
and psychiatrists abandon their role as gatekeepers suggest that a process of 
self-reflexivity has begun in sexology. While the aforementioned authors estab-
lish aims of trans health care, Fritz offers a blueprint for encounters at eye level 
with trans individuals in asymmetrical settings.
Fritz suggests questioning two asymmetrical settings of which one is social 
and the other therapeutic. The author notes with regard to the former that ques-
tions are unilaterally posed to those who do not comply with the norms of the 
gender binary. In contrast, cis individuals are not required to explain or justify 
their gender identities: 
We have made ourselves comfortable in the apparent self-conceptions of the gender 
binary and are not used to questioning ourselves or to being questioned. Questions 
are posed to those who do not merge with the logic of the gender binary. Questioning 
oneself is due to their biography a lifelong process in individuals with transidentity is-
sues anyway. The asymmetry in which we operate and which also impacts on our gestalt 
therapeutic spaces becomes clear here. (Fritz 2013: 146)
The second asymmetry requiring critical interrogation is the power relations, 
including the role of the psychotherapist in a psychotherapeutic setting. Fritz 
argues that therapists are part of the dialogue, including who they have be-
come, their self-concepts, attitudes, norms and values. This applies to their 
gender identity as well as to their client’s. All these experiences impact on the 
therapeutic space (ibid: 145).
Fritz suggests that in order to create conditions for an immediate dialogue, 
it is necessary to question power relations that condition and limit it. Such a 
process includes questioning seemingly self-evident facts and allowing for a 
psychotherapist’s insecurity on behalf of him- or herself rather than a false 
security by unilaterally insisting on interpretative authority. The author argues 
that such an encounter with trans individuals will transform therapists too, 
because, 
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now we are questioned with our logic of binary gender thought and knowledge. Likewise, 
gender-normative instruments in society, law and in the health system are questioned 
that stigmatise and question individuals with transidentity issues over and over again 
(ibid: 146 f.).
4.3.3 Rethinking the psycho-medical management 
 of trans(sexualit y)
The debate on reconceptualising transsexuality, suggestions for diagnostic and 
treatment models and reflexions on the role of professionals involved in trans 
health care are part of the debate on the AWMF guidelines that are currently 
being developed. The debate on guideline development includes a renewed cri-
tique of the German Standards and trans health care management, in particu-
lar of the MDS instructions for assessment (2009) as well as general sugges-
tions for new guidelines and interim results of this process.
The critique of the German Standards in the AWMF guideline 
debate and recommendations for change
Different assessments of the German Standards notwithstanding,43 contribu-
tors to the debate on the AWMF guidelines univocally agree that the former 
43 | While all contributors agree that the German Standards are no longer up to date, if 
they ever were (cf. Hirschauer 1997: 337), they assess the contribution to trans health 
care differently. In their critical appraisal of the German Standards, Strauß and Nieder 
suggest that the German Standards constituted a »milestone«, since the compiled knowl-
edge and scientific findings on transsexuality contributed to a significant improvement 
of trans health care (Strauß/Nieder 2014: 27). However, other authors disagree with this 
assessment. Löwenberg and Ettmeier suggest that the authors of the German Standards 
dismissed the fourth version of the then HBIGDA Standards of Care, despite the fact that 
they were based on research, because the international standards questioned the ne-
cessity of psychotherapy (Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 46 f.). According to Löwenberg and 
Ettmeier, the merit of the German Standards was at the time however that they recom-
mended psycho-medical professionals to adopt a neutral attitude towards an individual’s 
»transsexual inclination« (ibid: 46). Hamm and Sauer tentatively suggest that the German 
Standards contributed to the discrimination against, and stigmatisation of trans individu-
als (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 5). I suggest that Löwenberg and Ettmeier’s as well as Hamm 
and Sauer’s assessment are more appropriate. As chapter 4.1.4 suggests, the German 
Standards were, rather than being the result of any systematic research and evaluation 
of scientific knowledge or consultations with trans organisations, informed by conserva-
tive notions of gender and sexuality, homogenising and unfounded psychopathologising 
assumptions on transsexuality and driven by the intention to control access to sex re-
assignment measures. Instead of contributing to the improvement of trans health care, 
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are outdated and flawed. Sexologists and/or trans individuals that have so far 
participated in the debate take issue with several conceptual, methodological 
and functional deficiencies.
Nieder and Strauß as well as Hamm and Sauer identify major conceptual 
shortcomings. The latter argue that in addition to the pathologisation of trans-
sexuality (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 8), the standardised and limited concept of 
transsexuality underlying the German Standards not only led to the notion of 
›real‹ and ›fake‹ transsexuality, but to the exclusion of several trans individuals 
requiring trans-specific treatment. The authors recommend to depathologise, 
destigmatise and de-discriminate trans individuals (ibid), recognise a broad 
range of trans identities and living circumstances and diverse health care 
needs44 as well as to grant maximum self-determination45 (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 
6).
Nieder and Strauß suggest that rather than focus on reducing distress 
caused by gender dysphoria, the German Standards concentrate on transsexu-
ality as the problem requiring treatment (2014: 62). As the interim report on 
the development of the AWMF guidelines reveals, the guideline work group 
has decided to reconsider the former paradigm. Drawing upon terminological 
and conceptual developments in the DSM-5, the workgroup focuses on clini-
cally significant distress caused by gender dysphoria as the issue relevant to 
diagnostics and treatment; depathologising individuals whose experienced and 
expressed gender does not coincide with the assigned gender, and avoiding the 
re-establishment of gender norms and acknowledging a diversity of non-binary 
genders and sexes, of whom the latter may also experience gender dysphoria 
(ibid: 61).
Contributors to the debate point out to several methodological deficien-
cies when creating the German Standards. Hamm and Sauer, and Nieder and 
Strauß criticise that the authors of the German Standards ignored trans organi-
sations in the process of devising the German Standards (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 
5). As a result, the then workgroup failed to capture trans individuals’ needs 
(Nieder/Strauß 2014: 62) and developed a paternalistic attitude towards them 
instead (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 11). With regard to the AWMF guidelines, Hamm 
the authors of the German Standards produced »an anachronistic document featuring 
persistent helplessness« (Hirschauer 1997: 337; cf. Hamm/Sauer 2014: 27). Given their 
lack of respect for an individual’s decision to live according to the other than the assigned 
gender, the German Standards rather resemble a milestone in the discrimination of trans 
individuals.
44 | Hamm and Sauer include trans individuals who e. g. wish to have surgery without 
hor mone treatment (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 21).
45 | The authors emphasise that the right to self-determination applies to individuals 
facing mental and psychological challenges, too.
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and Sauer demand equal participation and status of trans organisations from 
the beginning of the consultations in all relevant areas (ibid: 23).
While Nieder and Strauß agree that trans organisations should be involved 
in the process of creating new guidelines, they report that the initial attempt to 
recruit democratically legitimated trans representatives as permanent partici-
pants entitled to vote in the guideline committee46 failed (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 
65). Faced with these difficulties, the committee invited two ›non-representa-
tive‹ trans individuals to participate in the process of guideline creation, giving 
each of them a vote. In addition, the committee invited trans support group 
members based on a list of known trans support groups in German-speaking 
countries to present their experiences and recommendations for changes in 
trans health care in person and offered them the opportunity to submit state-
ments within a two-month period following the hearings (ibid: 66).
Hamm and Sauer point out to a second major methodological flaw follow-
ing the publication of the German Standards. They suggest that sexologists 
failed to revise the German Standards, even though they were heavily criticised 
right from the outset (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 5). The authors call for participatory 
research on trans health care needs (ibid: 23; 25). Nieder and Strauß agree with 
Hamm and Sauer’s assessment. They state that – unlike the German Stand-
ards – AWMF guidelines are per se subject to revision every five years (Nieder/
Strauß 2014: 66), and they suggest conducting a participatory research project 
to identify trans individuals’ needs (ibid: 67).
As an additional methodological shortcoming in the process of compiling 
the German Standards, Nieder and Strauß identify a lacking systematic litera-
ture review and formal consensus strategy (ibid: 62). In order to achieve the 
goals of improving treatment in various settings (ibid), diagnostic quality and 
results of treatment (ibid: 63), Nieder and Strauß report that the committee is 
aiming at developing the guidelines on gender dysphoria to match the rules 
applying to the highest level of quality according to AWMF regulations. The 
rules for achieving recognition according to the highest standard of quality, the 
S3-level, includes basing knowledge on systematic evidence, a representative 
guideline committee and a structured procedure to arrive at a consensus (ibid: 
64).
Finally, Hamm and Sauer address a number of functional shortcomings of 
the German Standards. As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the 
authors suggest that the German Standards facilitated psychologists’ and psy-
chiatrists’ gatekeeping role. Rather than support trans individuals, professionals 
limited options to express gender identity to those that were compatible with the 
46 | At the time, the guideline workgroup consisted of fourteen German, Swiss and 
Austrian psychiatric, psychosomatic, sexological and psychological associations and 
three professional associations (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 64 f.).
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binary concept of gender (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 15). While Löwenberg and Ettmei-
er suggest to solve this particular problem by formulating as the main aim of 
the guidelines to reduce gender dysphoria and not to attempt to change an indi-
vidual’s gender identity (Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 55), Hamm and Sauer call for 
quality standards for voluntarily sought psychotherapeutic support during a tran-
sition (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 25).47 The provisional outline of the new guidelines of 
19 Sept. 2012 indicates that the committee is contemplating measures to ensure 
the ongoing further qualification of professionals (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 67).
Referring to the inflexible standardisation of trans health care in the Ger-
man Standards and the 2009 MDS instructions, Hamm and Sauer argue that 
the rigid standardisation of treatment left, and continues to leave, little choice 
of individual timing and individually needed measures (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 
20). As such, they do not serve trans individuals, nor a health care system that 
relies on efficiency and actual requirements (ibid: 20). In order to remedy this 
drawback, the authors suggest replacing the German Standards with guide-
lines that can be used like a flexible »modular construction system«, rather 
than enforcing an »all-or-none law« (ibid). As Nieder and Strauß’s interim re-
port on the AWMF guideline development suggests, all committee members 
agree that treating gender dysphoria requires a »non-linear and multimodal 
therapy« (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 73).
Developments in advisor y body of statutor y health insurance 
company policies on issues related to transsexualit y
Trans and sexological critiques of MDK rules and practices in the 1990s went 
unheard. To the contrary, rather than redress the problematic issues, MDKs 
and particularly the in the meantime newly created MDS aggravated the strain 
on trans individuals and the professionals that treat them. Based on the MDK 
Northrhine’s perspective (Pichlo 2008) and the MDS instructions for the as-
sessment and eligibility to statutory health insurance coverage of costs of so-
matic sex reassignment measures (MDS 2009),48 this section briefly outlines 
the purpose and aims of the instructions, formal requirements for applica-
tions for statutory health insurance assumption of costs of sex reassignment 
47 | Hamm and Sauer also demand standards to ensure the quality of sex reassignment 
surgery, which would allow for redressing botched surgery (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 23). 
However, the provisional outline of the AWMF guidelines (cf. Nieder/Strauß 2014: 67) 
suggests that the committee has decided not to include any statement on standards for 
sex reassignment surgery.
48 | The MDS instructions for the assessment and eligibility to statutory health insurance 
coverage of costs of somatic sex reassignment measures will be referred to as the MDS 
instructions for the rest of the chapter.
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measures and, using examples, criteria for assessment before turning to the 
renewed critique of the instructions in the AWMF guideline debate.49
The purpose and aims of the MDS instructions can be divided into gen-
eral ones and those that specifically apply in a case of transsexuality. The MDS 
defines as the purpose of its instructions to examine whether the precondi-
tions exist for eligibility to medical services and to advise statutory health in-
surance companies accordingly (MDS 2009: 6). General aims are to realise the 
principle of solidarity by securing the equal treatment of the community of 
the insured, ensuring consistent assessment procedures, securing the quality 
of assessments and improving the collaboration of statutory health insurance 
companies and the MDS (ibid).
With regard to transsexuality, the MDS purports to carry out an additional 
assessment procedure to ›protect‹ the health-insured individual applying for 
statutory health insurance assumption of costs of sex reassignment surgery 
(ibid). Arguing that, »[t]he rarity and the complexity of the disorders, the diver-
sity of individual developments and arrangements and the special implications 
of expert assessments and recommendations in individual medical advisory 
services require consultation and an assessment by experienced experts« (ibid), 
the MDS defines as a goal of a socio-medical assessment to avoid ›false positive‹ 
diagnoses of transsexualism in cases where trans identification has emerged as 
an effect of psychiatric and/or endocrine disorders (ibid).
A comparison between the formal requirements for applications for statu-
tory health insurance coverage of sex reassignment measures reveals an in-
crease in demands on trans individuals. The MDK Northrhine and the MDS 
require the applicant to submit a substantial set of documents. Pichlo lists as 
mandatory documents a report on somatic, hormonal and, if applicable, genetic 
exclusion diagnoses; a report on endocrine findings or the course of hormone 
replacement therapy; both expert reports for a change of first names and the 
court decision, provided that they are available at the time of application;50 a 
49 | The general framework, which allows for applying for statutory health insurance com-
pany assumption of costs of sex reassignment measures, has remained unchanged since 
Banaski published his article on the criteria and proceedings for assessing transsexual 
individuals by medical advisory bodies of statutory health insurance companies in 1996. 
These can be summarised as clinically relevant distress in individual cases caused by the 
tension between an individual’s gender identity and sex characteristics that persist after 
having been treated with psychiatric and/or psychological means (Banaski 1996: 64 f.; 
Pichlo 2008: 120; MDS 2009: 12). 
50 | The demand for expert reports for a change of first names and the court decision is 
however problematic. First, the MDK Northrhine and the MDS instructions generate extra-
legal psycho-medical and legal entanglements. Second, a privacy issue is involved, since 
the above mentioned reports frequently contain intimate and confidential information on 
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detailed psychiatric report or progress report, including an indication for sex 
reassignment measures and, finally, a specialist’s report or treatment schedule 
that corresponds with the interventions the applicant intends to undergo (Pich-
lo 2008: 128). While Pichlo considers a biographical report on the applicant’s 
transsexual background optional (ibid), the MDS decided to render such a re-
port mandatory a year later. The MDS instructions specify that the biographi-
cal report should, among other details, include information on the transsexual 
background, the treatment undergone at the time of application and the ›real 
life test‹ (MDS 2009: 17).51
While the MDK Northrhine guidelines and the MDS instructions are in-
formed by the diagnostic criteria outlined in the German Standards,52 the MDS 
instructions establish more rigid criteria than the MDK Northrhine.53 This be-
comes evident, e. g. in the demands on the duration of psychotherapeutic or 
an individual and possibly on the individual’s social environment. Since some applicants 
have not applied for a change of first names prior to approaching the statutory health 
insurance company for the assumption of costs of sex reassignment measures whereas 
others have, the question arises why reports written for a different purpose would be 
required in the first place.
51 | With regard to the biographical report, the MDS instructions demand of the applicant 
to provide additional information on issues that are not necessarily transition-related, that 
might or might not be affected by a transition and ones that are definitely not indicative 
of an individual’s gender identity. The MDS instructions, e. g., require details relating to 
the applicant’s current life situation, family and partnership, education, occupation and 
employment, friends and acquaintances as well as leisure time activities and hobbies 
(ibid). The instructions do not specify how to deal with this information, leaving ample 
space for an MDK expert’s subjective interpretations and arbitrary decisions.
52 | Like the German Standards, Pichlo and the authors of the MDS instructions assume 
that neither a self-diagnosis nor the intensity of the desire to undergo sex reassignment 
surgery are reliable indicators of transsexuality. Rather, they claim that a diagnosis and 
the ability to live according to the conventions of the ›new‹ gender role as preconditions for 
indicating sex reassignment surgery can only be established in the course of an extensive 
diagnostic and psychotherapeutic process (Pichlo 2008: 121 f.; MDS 2009: 10) and a 
›real life test‹ (Pichlo 2008: 124 f.; MDS 2009: 10).
53 | Neither Pichlo nor the authors of the MDS instructions take into consideration 
developments on trans(sexuality) in sexology, let alone developments in the trans 
movement. However, Pichlo’s perspective is also informed by the version of the HBIGDA 
Standards of Care (Pichlo 2008: 121), whereas the MDS instructions rely on the German 
Standards and the international classification systems ICD-10 and the DSM-IV only 
(MDS 2009: 6). This in part explains why the MDS instructions are more rigid than the 
perspective of the MDK Northrhine.
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psychiatric treatment and the so-called real life test and in the MDS decision-
making algorithms.
While Pichlo points out that the German Standards demand at least twelve 
months of psychiatric/psychotherapeutic treatment prior to allowing hormone 
replacement therapy, he recommends six to twelve months before granting ac-
cess to trans-specific somatic health care provision instead. In doing so, Pichlo 
takes into consideration the then latest version of the HBIGDA Standards of 
Care and the actual medical care situation (Pichlo 2008: 126). In contrast, 
the MDS instructions demand that the respective formal time requirements 
for psychiatric/psychotherapeutic treatment need to be fulfilled according to 
the period the German Standards allocated to the particular somatic measure 
(MDS 2009: 16). This means as a rule no less than twelve months of psychi-
atric/psychotherapeutic treatment prior to e. g. hormone replacement therapy 
(ibid: 18) and no less than eighteen months prior to a bilateral mastectomy (ibid: 
24) or genital surgery (ibid: 26).
Pichlo’s recommendations and the MDS instructions also differ on the 
timeframe considered appropriate for a ›real life test‹.54 Acknowledging that the 
German Standards require a ›real life test‹ of at least twelve months prior to 
hormone therapy, he nevertheless suggests that a period of three to six months 
suffice (Pichlo 2008: 126). According to the MDS instructions, however, a ›real 
life test‹ should generally have been carried out for at least twelve months be-
fore cost coverage will be granted for hormone treatment (MDS 2009: 18) and 
epilation (ibid: 20) and, as a rule, no less than eighteen months for a bilateral 
mastectomy (ibid: 24)55 or any genital surgery (ibid: 26).
The specifications of the MDS finally culminate in rigid decision-making 
algorithms for every somatic intervention. With regard to hormone treatment, 
54 | However, Pichlo and the authors of the MDS instructions agree on several other 
issues pertaining to the ›real life test‹. They e. g. consider this requirement an essential 
component of the treatment schedule (Pichlo 2008: 122 and 124; MDS 2009: 10). While 
Pichlo accrues specific importance to performing the ›real life test‹ at the workplace 
(Pichlo 2008: 124), they concur on the issue that the ›real life test‹ should be practiced 
continuously in all social contexts (ibid). The authors of both instructions emphasise that 
the measure should be laid out in a socially acceptable manner (ibid). However, they do 
not explain how social acceptance and a 24/7 ›real life test‹ fit together in potentially 
highly conflictual, if not dangerous settings.
55 | In »special exceptional cases« (MDS 2009: 24), the MDS will allow an applicant to 
fall short of fulfilling the time requirement for a bilateral mastectomy in order to facilitate 
the ›real life test‹ for transmen (ibid). The instructions do not however provide for such an 
option for transwomen requiring epilation, despite the fact that the MDS suggests that, 
»male beard growth is incompatible with the outer appearance of a woman in the light of 
male-to-female transsexuality« (ibid: 20).
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the responsible MDK expert is e. g. asked to check every step in the following 
order: Has the diagnosis been secured sufficiently? Are comorbidities, in par-
ticular mental health problems, sufficiently stabilised or have they been ruled 
out, respectively? Has the psychiatric/psychotherapeutic treatment been car-
ried out correctly with regard to the nature, extent and duration? Does the ap-
plicant suffer from clinically relevant distress? Are the preconditions and the 
prognosis for the planned hormone replacement therapy positive? An answer 
in the negative to any one of these questions will inadvertently lead to a recom-
mendation for the statutory health insurance company not to cover the costs of 
hormone replacement therapy (ibid: 19).
The critique of trans health care management in the AWMF 
guideline debate and recommendations for change
The critique of trans health care management in the AWMF guideline debate 
focuses on three issues. These include the use of the German Standards by the 
advisory bodies of statutory health insurance companies, the role of psychia-
trists and psychologists in a complex framework of assessment, diagnostics 
and treatment, and general conditions for medical services offered by statutory 
health insurance companies.
All contributors to the debate object to the use advisory bodies of the statu-
tory health insurance companies, above all the MDS, have made of the German 
Standards. Löwenberg and Ettmeier as well as Hamm and Sauer note that the 
abovementioned advisory bodies have gradually converted the outdated Ger-
man Standards to a requirements specification that needs to be completed in 
order to secure insurance coverage of sex reassignment treatment (Löwenberg/
Ettmeier 2014: 46; Hamm/Sauer 2014: 15). While the MDS formally provides 
exceptions to the standard procedure, Löwenberg and Ettmeier argue that these 
can barely be implemented in practice (Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 46).56
As a result, the inflexible adoption of the German Standards by advisory 
bodies has led to inappropriate health care services for trans individuals. As 
Nieder and Strauß, Löwenberg and Ettmeier, and Hamm and Sauer point out, 
MDK practices and MDS instructions e. g. define the goals of treatment, no 
matter whether they match those of the respective trans individual.57 Moreover, 
56 | Löwenberg and Ettmeier give as an example of unrealistic treatment scenarios 
the option of psychiatric monitoring as an alternative to compulsory psychotherapy 
(Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 46).
57 | One of these controversial goals is e. g. to achieve the inner coherence and 
consistency of the individual’s gender identity (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 60), regardless of 
the fact that some individuals refuse to temporarily or permanently identify as one of the 
two legitimised genders or with any gender at all. See also de Silva 2014, Eisfeld/Radix 
2014 and Hamm/Sauer 2014.
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they demand of trans individuals to complete a fixed sequence of measures, 
regardless of whether these measures are needed,58 have proven to be harmful 
(Hamm/Sauer 2014: 19)59 or disproportionate.60
Several contributors also problematise the roles psychologists and psychia-
trists play in assessment, diagnostic and treatment procedures. Löwenberg and 
Ettmeier remark that psychotherapists currently cater for the rules and stand-
ards of health insurance companies while they at the same time try to find 
individual solutions for their clients. They suggest that the conflict resulting 
from these different requirements occasionally cannot be solved (Löwenberg/
Ettmeier 2014: 47). Similarly, Güldenring holds that medical and psychiatric 
professionals can barely do justice to the different contents, roles, relationships 
and tasks in any responsible way (Güldenring 2013: 160).
The rules and regulations that define the terms for obtaining health insur-
ance coverage for sex reassignment surgery constitute another area of conten-
tion. Hamm and Sauer e. g. address the parameters provided by social law that 
inform statutory health insurance company policy. The authors particularly fo-
cus on the Federal Social Court decision on 06 Aug. 1987, which provides that 
statutory health insurance companies are only obliged to assume the costs of 
sex reassignment surgery when an applicant displays distress. Hamm and Sau-
er believe that many trans individuals do not experience significant distress, 
nor constraint in everyday life, simply because they are aware of the option 
to transition, pursue this goal with determination and are frequently accepted 
and supported by their respective social environments. The authors argue that 
frequently distress only arises when trans individuals seeking cost coverage 
of sex reassignment surgery are turned down on the grounds that they do not 
experience sufficient distress (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 13). Rather than prevent dis-
tress, which should according to Hamm and Sauer be the main goal of trans 
health care (ibid: 20 f.), the organisation of trans health care contributes to the 
destabilisation of trans individuals.
Furthermore and as Hamm and Sauer suggest, the MDS instructions en-
sure that statutory health insurance companies do not cover the costs of in-
dividually indicated measures for those who wish to pass inconspicuously as 
one of the two legally accepted genders. Facial feminisation, body contouring, 
58 | This applies e. g. to compulsory psychotherapy which, as Löwenberg and Ettmeier 
argue, impedes a working relationship between psychotherapists and clients (Löwenberg/
Ettmeier 2014: 46).
59 | Hamm and Sauer quote findings by Fuchs et al. (2012) and Franzen and Sauer (2010) 
that suggest that the ›real life test‹ is a harmful requirement (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 19).
60 | Becker notes that the advisory bodies of the statutory health insurance companies 
make as high demands for covering the costs of epilation as for genital surgery (Becker 
2013: 157).
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speech therapy and penis-testicle-epitheses are examples Hamm and Sauer 
list to prove their point (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 14). The authors argue that the 
exclusion of the aforementioned services from the service catalogue of statu-
tory health insurance companies contravenes the right to pass and, as such, 
infringes the right to privacy (ibid: 14).61 They suggest as a remedy to include 
the right to pass in the social security statute book, hence rendering health 
insurance coverage to this effect obligatory (ibid: 22).
In addition, the contributors to the debate take issue with the procedure 
regulating cost coverage of transition-related health care. Nieder and Strauß, 
and Güldenring e. g. point out to the statutory insurance company policy of 
deciding on an application for sex reassignment surgery only after having ob-
tained a socio-medical assessment by the MDS. This additional screening has 
become mandatory, despite the fact that psychotherapists and psychologists 
have previously confirmed the indication for surgery (Nieder/Strauß 2014: 60; 
Güldenring 2013: 165).
Finally, Löwenberg and Ettmeier (2014: 46) and Güldenring address the 
effects the mesh of in part contradictory requirements have on trans individu-
als. Güldenring e. g. suggests that in contrast to the requirements for revis-
ing first names and gender status, social law regulations demand »maximum 
comorbidity« for access to sex reassignment surgery (Güldenring 2013: 165). 
Taking into consideration the extensive procedures and assessments trans indi-
viduals need to »pass like examination situations« (ibid) and the requirements 
and expectations they have to meet in order to be granted the assumption of 
costs (ibid), she poses the rhetorical question, »Can trans health ever be organ-
ised more pathologically?« (Ibid)
In summary, while contributors to the debate identify several deficiencies 
in current trans health care management, they offer different solutions with 
different implications for trans individuals. Löwenberg and Ettmeier e. g. sug-
gest psychologists and psychiatrists withdraw from the task of being an »ob-
ligatory component of the set of rules of the health insurers« and focus on 
diagnostics and integrative treatment instead. They demand that psychother-
apy should not be part of a »mandatory element« in the treatment schedule or 
even a prerequisite for inducing somatic measures (Löwenberg/Ettmeier 2014: 
57). By contrast, Hamm and Sauer demand to reduce diagnostics in general, 
curb health insurance companies and advisory body arbitrary decision-making 
and simplify procedures by establishing in social legislation the right to pass 
as a health insurance company obligation to be met (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 22). 
While the former are primarily concerned about improving the conditions for 
61 | Hamm and Sauer also suggest that statutory health insurance companies should 
assume the costs of cosmetic sex reassignment measures such as e. g. epilation pro vided 
by non-medical professionals (Hamm/Sauer 2014: 25).
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diagnostics and treatment, the latter strive to increase trans individuals’ inde-
pendence from psycho-medical professionals as well as from health insurance 
companies and their advisory bodies without endangering health insurance 
assumption of costs of sex reassignment measures.
4.3.4 Rethinking psycho-medical involvement under 
 the Transsexual Act
While the sexological debate on psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ participation 
in proceedings under the Transsexual Act was influenced by the same broad-
er social and discursive developments that shaped the debate on the AWMF 
guidelines, the debate on the Transsexual Act was also inspired by the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court decision of 11 Jan. 2011. All contributors to the debate 
agree that the Transsexual Act requires revisions, and some criticise the federal 
government for failing to introduce legislation to this effect.62 However, they 
disagree on the issue of psycho-medical involvement under the Transsexual 
Act and, as a result, make different suggestions for change. The suggestions 
mirror different assumptions on trans self-knowledge, have different implica-
tions for trans self-determination and for the relationship between medicine 
and law in this particular area.
Critique of the Transsexual Act
The psycho-medical critique of the Transsexual Act focuses on three broad ar-
eas. Sexologists object to the amalgamation of the legal and the medical realm. 
Moreover, they argue that the Act is outdated in the light of social, legal and 
62 | Güldenring, for example, argues that to this very day, the federal government 
has decided to ignore calls by sexologists and trans organisations for revisions of the 
Transsexual Act (Güldenring 2013: 161). As a result of government inactivity, she suggests 
that the legislator has tacitly tolerated inconsistencies of the Act, which allow for the 
psychiatrisation of trans individuals and arbitrary modes of assessment (ibid: 163).
Becker aptly identif ies government lack of responsiveness on the Transsexual Act as par t 
of a larger policy of non-policy. She provides a bitter critique of government inactivity with 
regard to issues related to gender and sexual orientation in general: »Since the red-green 
government (1998-2005) did not deliver on its promise to reform the Transsexual Act, 
one federal government after the other has refused this overdue reform. De facto a fun-
damental reform of the Transsexual Act has however taken place through the decisions of 
the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) that has little by little declared relevant, widely 
criticised sections of the Transsexual Act incompatible with the Basic Law and, in doing 
so, annulled them. […] Politics has obviously for a long time ceded its tasks with regard 
to dealing with gender and sexual orientation to the Federal Constitutional Court. (Becker 
2013: 148)
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discursive change. Finally, they suggest that the concept of transsexuality that 
informed this piece of legislation no longer applies.
While several authors consider the entanglement of the legal and medical 
spheres in the Act a drawback, their critique points to different effects. Becker 
e. g. argues that in contrast to the legislator’s intentions, statutory health insur-
ance companies and their medical advisory service bodies regularly misuse the 
Act by demanding that the applicants produce expert reports as a precondition 
for health insurance assumption of costs of somatic measures (Becker 2013: 
146). While this use of provisions of the Act for ulterior purposes is indeed 
unfortunate and her critique welltaken, Becker does not address the more pro-
found and lawful amalgamation of the legal and the medical realm established 
by the assessment procedure and stipulated in ss. 4(3) and 6(2) TSG.
Güldenring and Schmidt offer an ethical and methodological critique of the 
assessment procedure. Both contributors to the debate argue against psycho-
medical involvement in the legal proceedings under the Act. Güldenring offers 
two reasons. First, she holds that the Act delegates issues relating to the deter-
mination of a person’s gender to experts’ subjective perspectives (Güldenring 
2013: 163). Second, she raises objections against the psychiatrisation of trans 
individuals within the framework of the Act, claiming that it forces individuals 
to conform to the rules of the gender binary instead of making society and the 
legislator responsible for dealing with trans and gender nonconforming indi-
viduals in general as means to create a pluralist and tolerant society (ibid: 171).
Based on his experience as an expert in court proceedings for a revision of 
first names and gender status, Schmidt provides two methodological reasons 
against demanding psycho-medical assessments under the Act. He argues that 
considering that psycho-medical experts only reject few applications, the as-
sessment requirement barely contributes to improving predictions on the last-
ing stability of an applicant’s gender experience (Schmidt 2013: 176). Moreover, 
he notes that applications for reversals of the decision to change first names 
and revise gender status rarely occur. He concludes that, »[s]ince expert reports 
almost always approve of the applications […], the small number of individuals 
seeking a reconversion impressively states the applicants’ subjective expertise« 
(ibid).
Two authors address the issue of discursive, social and legal change since 
the enactment of the statute that as an effect render the Transsexual Act out-
dated. Becker observes that the poststructuralist critique of heteronormativity 
and the gender binary allowed recognising homophobic notions that informed 
the Act, mirrored in particular in the provisions that prevent apparent and de 
facto same-sex marriages and the legislator’s intention to maintain the »tradi-
tional, essentialist gender dichotomy« (Becker 2013: 146). She also points out 
to a number of social developments that require a reform of the Transsexual 
Act. Arguing that the previously rigid gender role characteristics have become 
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socially more flexible, it has become increasingly questionable to determine 
a person’s gender based exclusively on physical characteristics. Moreover, she 
observes growing tolerance with regard to ›ambiguous‹ sex characteristics and 
less social acceptance of homophobic attitudes (ibid: 147). Finally, she notes that 
the trans movement has diversified, allowing for the representation of individu-
als formerly marginalised within the social movement and society in general 
(ibid). Referring to the Federal Constitutional Court decisions on the Trans-
sexual Act, Vogel suggests that social processes affecting gender and gender 
regime are also mirrored in jurisdiction (Vogel 2013: 179).
Several authors suggest that the Transsexual Act is based on outdated medi-
cal assumptions on transsexuality. These assumptions feature in the concept 
and terminology used in the Act. Becker and Vogel point out that in contrast to 
the understanding of transsexuality as a homogeneous entity, medical science 
nowadays agrees that transsexual developments vary (Becker 2013: 147; Vogel 
2013: 181). As such, a »diagnosis of transsexuality« does not necessarily lead to 
an indication for surgery (Becker 2013: 147; Vogel 2013: 182 f.). Güldenring and 
Becker also point out to terminological flaws. They suggest that neither the 
phrase »transsexual imprinting«, nor the phrase »compelled to live according 
to their ideas« (ss. 1[1]1 and 8[1] TSG) coincide with current notions on trans-
sexuality (Güldenring 2013: 162; Becker 2013: 151).
Suggestions for a reform of trans law
Minor differences between individual suggestions for a reform of trans law 
notwithstanding, sexologists’ designs for future regulations of trans can be di-
vided into two sets. The first set of suggestions advocates continuing psycho-
medical involvement under a reformed act and is represented by Becker and 
Vogel, while the second opts for psycho-medical withdrawal from future legal 
proceedings and is advocated by Güldenring, Schmidt and Sigusch. The for-
mer necessarily implies a limitation of trans self-determination, whereas the 
latter cedes expertise to trans individuals and endorses a separation of medi-
cal procedures from future provisions for a revision of first names and gender 
status.
Before offering her suggestion, Becker discusses two further options, one 
of which would be to abolish gender as a feature of the civil status altogether. 
The second option would allow for a change of first names and a revision of 
gender status via application to the register office without a diagnosis and as-
sessment, as practiced in Argentina and suggested by the BAK TSG-Reform in 
2012. Becker rejects the first suggestion, assuming that a great number of trans 
and presumably quite a few cis individuals would be dissatisfied with such a so-
lution on the short and medium term (Becker 2013: 149). She also objects to the 
second suggestion as long as this particular solution affirms the gender binary. 
However, she suggests this problem could be solved by creating an additional 
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gender category (ibid: 150). She reckons though that it is politically unrealistic 
that the legislator will abolish the Transsexual Act.
As proponents of the first set of suggestions, Becker and Vogel propose 
a reform of the Transsexual Act, rather than entirely abolishing it, albeit for 
different reasons. They address the title of the proposed act, terminology and 
various aspects relating to the issue of experts and expert reports. 
Both contributors to the debate on the Transsexual Act agree that the Act re-
quires renaming to account for the heterogeneity of trans individuals or gender-
nonconforming individuals in general. Drawing upon the solution proposed 
by the DGfS in 2001 (Becker et al. 2001), Becker suggests calling the reformed 
statute »Transgender Act« (Transgendergesetz) (Becker 2013: 150), whereas Vogel 
suggests reducing the title of the act to »An Act to change first names and es-
tablish gender status in special cases« (Vogel 2013: 183). While both suggestions 
would offer a larger range of individuals access to gender recognition, Vogel’s 
formulation can be interpreted more broadly, allowing e. g. intersex individu-
als and individuals who do not identify as transgender to make use of the act. 
However, he limits options significantly when making suggestions for termi-
nological revisions.
Becker and Vogel take issue with the terminology in s. 1(1) TSG and sug-
gest rephrasing the section. While Becker proposes to replace the term »im-
printing« with »development« and the phrase »have felt compelled« with e. g. 
»experienced a persistent inner necessity« (Becker 2013: 151), Vogel suggests to 
replace the former expression with »due to his or her transsexual (or gender 
dysphoric, respectively) experience« (Vogel 2013: 183). Whereas Becker’s pro-
posed terminology is non-pathologising, Vogel’s reference to gender dysphoria 
in a potentially revised act re-establishes a psycho-medical diagnosis in a piece 
of legislation. In addition, Becker suggests to either abolish or at least reduce 
the requirement of having to have experienced oneself as another than the as-
signed gender for a period of three years prior to applying for a change of first 
names and a revision of gender status (Becker 2013: 151).
Becker and Vogel argue in favour of maintaining an assessment proce-
dure under a reformed act. Becker insists on involving experts other than 
trans individuals themselves, despite being aware of the fact that such a pro-
cedure can also be considered a violation of the right to self-determination 
(ibid: 154) and that such an option risks exerting applicants to abuse. Becker 
e. g. acknowledges that no act can guarantee that experts deal respectfully 
with the applicants, reflect upon their own notions of gender and are open 
to various transsexual developments (ibid: 151). In her opinion, however, ap-
plicants require assistance (ibid: 155), and this conviction seems to outweigh 
the abovementioned concerns.
Vogel advocates for continuing assessment procedures on the grounds that 
transsexuality or gender dysphoria, respectively, require extensive diagnostics, 
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differential diagnostic and counselling procedures (Vogel 2013: 183). Moreo-
ver, Vogel suggests that the legislator make provisions for granting experts 
interventionist functions (ibid: 183 f.) which could however have the effect of 
increasing expert control. Hence, while Becker’s perspective is based on the 
paternalistic assumption that trans individuals are unable to make informed 
decisions on behalf of their gender, Vogel’s perspective is in addition informed 
by pathologising assumptions.63
However, the authors suggest reducing the number of expert reports. While 
Vogel generally suggests limiting the number of expert reports to one only 
(ibid), Becker distinguishes between procedures for a change of first names 
and a revision of gender status in case the legislator decides to stick to a two-
part act. With regard to the former procedure, Becker argues in favour of either 
dispensing with an expert report or reducing the prognostic demands on these 
documents, respectively. She suggests requiring one instead of two expert re-
ports for a revision of gender status with higher prognostic demands, while 
securing the option for a reversal of a decision (Becker 2013: 150).
Both authors expand on the qualifications required to perform as an expert. 
Becker takes a stand against authorising medical experts only to compile expert 
reports, arguing that neither physicians nor psychologists are per se trained 
on issues related to transsexuality and gender identity. Rather professionals 
of either group need to acquire these particular qualifications in addition to 
their regular training (ibid: 151). Her statement however raises the question 
why physicians or psychologists should be considered more suitable as experts 
than members of other professions, such as e. g. social workers or peer coun-
sellors. Rather than specify the professions responsible for producing export 
reports, Vogel in essence suggests maintaining the broad description of experts 
as outlined in s. 4(3) TSG (Vogel 2013: 183).
Finally, Becker argues in favour of reducing the duration of the legal pro-
ceedings under the Act. She suggests as one means to this effect to dispense 
with the representative of the public interest as a participant in the court pro-
ceedings for a change of first names and a revision of gender status (Becker 
2013: 150).
When contemplating a reform of trans law, Güldenring, Schmidt and Si-
gusch’s guiding principle is to achieve maximum self-determination with re-
gard to issues related to gender identity (Güldenring 2013: 172; Schmidt 2013: 
175; Sigusch 2013: 185). Sigusch’s contribution is in addition motivated by the 
socio-political goal of achieving gender liquidity (Sigusch 2013: 187). The sex-
63 | This notion is also mirrored in the terminology he uses for the subjects. When 
referring to the heterogeneity of individuals whose experienced gender does not match 
the assigned gender, he speaks of a »heterogeneity of gender identity disorders« (Vogel 
2013: 183).
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ologists address the effects of abolishing any external assessments, demands 
on a new regulation and expand on the issue of an improper use of such a 
regulation.
Güldenring, Schmidt and Sigusch point out to a number of effects, if the 
determination of gender identity was left to the individual. Güldenring argues 
that such a solution would untangle the administrative mesh trans individuals 
are caught up in. Moreover, she argues that psychological and psychiatric re-
sources that are currently tied down in assessment procedures could be used to 
improve trans health care instead (Güldenring 2013: 172). Finally, Güldenring 
and Schmidt suggest that medicine and law would be severed from each other 
(ibid; Schmidt 2013: 176).
While concrete proposals for a new regulation differ, the proponents of pro-
found changes to trans law make a number of suggestions to avoid the short-
comings of the Transsexual Act as they have been voiced in the trans move-
ment. Güldenring, Schmidt and Sigusch advocate access to a change of first 
names and a revision of gender status with as few obstacles as possible (Gül-
denring 2013: 172; Schmidt 2013: 176; Sigusch 2013: 185). As such, they demand 
a solution that guarantees a swift, financially less costly and unbureaucratic 
processing of an individual’s desire for assignment to another than the natal 
gender (ibid) that observes, as Güldenring emphasises, human rights, in par-
ticular the right to self-determination, and does not impede individual develop-
ments (Güldenring 2013: 172).
Güldenring proposes a new act that is free of discrimination and patholo-
gisation. In addition to the abovementioned requirement, she demands that 
the act should consider recent findings and insights from disciplines and ar-
eas other than medicine and psychiatry, too, in order to produce a legislative 
text without scientifically untenable contents and phrases, such as e. g., »trans-
sexual imprinting« and »compelled to live according to their ideas« (ibid). She 
expects of such a regulation to save expenses of court proceedings, costs of ex-
pert reports and psychotherapeutic and psychiatric resources and a limitation 
of psycho-social stress and its detrimental effects on trans individuals (ibid).
In contrast, Schmidt and Sigusch argue against passing a new act. The for-
mer suggests that a declaration of one’s chosen name and gender in a register 
office and paying for the fees to this effect suffice (Schmidt 2013: 175). While 
Schmidt sympathises with the legislator’s concern to have to change an indi-
vidual’s first names and gender status once only, if possible (ibid: 176), Sigusch 
opts for a solution without any approval procedures for all individuals who have 
reached the age of majority (Sigusch 2013: 185).
Finally, Güldenring and Schmidt discuss the issue of the risk of an improp-
er or frivolous use of either the act or the declaration, respectively. Arguing that 
there are sufficient social stressors when a person decides to live according to 
another than the assigned gender, Güldenring anticipates that this scenario is 
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rather unlikely to happen (Güldenring 2013: 172). Schmidt suggests establish-
ing a waiting period of three or six months between the time of application and 
the decision, i. e. if the applicant confirms his or her intention to change first 
names and gender status after the waiting period, the decision becomes opera-
tive (Schmidt 2013: 176).
4.3.5 Summar y: Sexological constructions of gender,
 trans(sexualit y) and gender regime from 2011 to 2014
Despite a number of unresolved controversies, the course of the current debates 
on trans in sexology give reason to believe that the margin towards the recogni-
tion of gender diversity and the depathologisation of individuals who defy con-
ventional notions of gender, if not gendering as such, is shifting. This develop-
ment is e. g. mirrored in the conceptual distinction between non-pathologically 
defined gender identities, such as trans, and the clinical term ›gender dyspho-
ria‹, which focuses on the distress a gender-nonconforming individual possibly 
experiences. Moreover, several contributors to the debate call into question the 
formerly assumed essentialist basis of the two socially sanctioned categories 
›man‹ and ›woman‹. Altogether, these developments call into question the gen-
der binary. At the same time, a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, or any diagnosis 
for that matter, conceals social factors contributing to gender-related distress, 
such as social expectations to embody and ›do‹ gender.
Issues related to diagnostics are clearly more contested for several reasons, 
and the different perspectives indicate different statuses of trans individuals 
in relation to cis individuals. Means of diagnostics the dominant faction in 
sexology formerly considered central to diagnostics, such as the ›real life test‹, 
mandatory psychotherapy and physical examinations in an assessment setting, 
no longer seem to be considered state of the art. In addition, sexologists agree 
that psycho-medical interventions should provide ›patient-centred‹, individu-
alised health care rather than assume a gatekeeping function. However, they 
are divided over the issue of diagnosing gender dysphoria in the first place. 
Perspectives range from the conviction that trans individuals unlike cis indi-
viduals indiscriminately require psycho-medical guidance to those that ques-
tion any heteronomous diagnostics and opt for informed consent instead. In 
between there are perspectives that for pragmatic reasons and to varying de-
grees suggest psycho-medical guidance. While the former delegitimises trans 
self-knowledge most significantly, the second set of perspectives reveals the 
limitations of the overall social law framework within which trans health care 
takes place in Germany. The latter requires a diagnosis in order to ensure that 
health care insurances assume the costs of medical and surgical sex reassign-
ment measures.
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Reconceptualising trans and rethinking diagnostics is part of a larger 
project of devising new guidelines that will replace the conceptually outdated 
and methodologically flawed German Standards and delegitimise the widely 
criticised instructions and procedures condoned and practiced by the advisory 
bodies of statutory health insurance companies. At the time of writing, it is 
premature to anticipate the outcome of the debate on the AWMF guidelines, in 
particular with regard to issues relating to the organisation of diagnostics and 
an overdue implementation of quality standards for psycho-medical profession-
als dealing with gender-nonconforming individuals. However, there are indica-
tions that a terminological and conceptual shift from ›transsexuality‹ to ›gen-
der dysphoria‹ will take place in the guidelines, including the abovementioned 
implications for trans, gender and the gender regime, and it is to be expected 
that the process will include some trans and social scientific expertise.
While calls for trans self-determination have overall become more promi-
nent, the current sexological debate on the Transsexual Act reveals a contro-
versy similar to the one on the AWMF guidelines with regard to acknowledging 
trans self-knowledge and observing trans self-determination on the one hand 
and ensuring the subjects’ dependency on psycho-medical professionals on the 
other hand.
While sexologists disagree on the issue of future expert involvement un-
der a reformed act to regulate transitions, calls for a retreat from assessment 
procedures under the law have gained ground for a number of reasons. Sex-
ologists increasingly recognise trans self-knowledge and non-pathological gen-
dered embodiments. They critically assess their own participation in a heter-
onormative hegemonic project. Moreover, sexologists note that the increasing 
entanglements of medicine, law and statutory health insurance management 
of transsexuality with contradictory and unintended effects put a strain on psy-
cho-medical professionals and trans individuals. Finally, sexologists observe 
that the Transsexual Act lags behind rapid social developments in the area of 
gender and, more specifically, trans.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Embedded in a concept of heteronormative hegemony and using analytical 
tools from complex feminist state theories on the liberal-democratic state, this 
study analysed how sexology, the law, the political branch of the trans move-
ment and federal politics interacted to produce social change with regard to 
considering trans a viable way of embodying gender in the broader contexts of 
legislative processes related to a change of first names and a revision of gender 
status in the Federal Republic of Germany from approximately the mid-1960s 
to 2014. I will offer major findings of my analysis.
The period prior to, until the end of the legislative process leading to the 
Transsexual Act was marked by the gradual modification of the gender regime 
from the notion of a naturalised link between the sexed body and gender iden-
tity to the recognition of the complexity of gender against the background of 
homophobia, in particular the criminalisation of male homosexuality, and 
the socially deeply rooted notion of two somatically and socially polarised gen-
ders. This shift occurred unevenly in the disciplines and areas and usually in-
volved conflicts.
Well before sexology had begun to classify transsexuality as a separate en-
tity, trans individuals turned to courts for a revision of gender status under the 
Civil Status Act. Different decisions on various levels of jurisdiction underscore 
the state structure as a set of hierarchically organised institutions. While lower 
courts tended to grant a revision of gender status based on varying somatic 
conditions, higher courts in the 1960s rejected the claim, arguing that sex/
gender is somatically based and immutable and, as a result, trans individuals 
were perceived of as ›unreal‹ women and men despite the fact that the appli-
cants had undergone genital surgery. In addition, higher courts feared that the 
public order, morality and society, including marriage and hegemonic concepts 
of gender, would become undone.
Sexology intervened into the legal realm after it had isolated transsexuality 
from transvestism and homosexuality, arguing that several factors determine 
a person’s gender and that the psyche was no less determining than somatic 
conditions; that transsexuality could not be treated other than with surgery and 
that surgically altered genitalia functioned like, and had the appearance of cis 
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genitalia. Legal scholars who overall tended to be more sympathetic to trans-
sexual individuals’ claims to recognition than jurisdiction facilitated spreading 
sexological notions of gender and transsexuality in law. However, this did not 
apply to transvestites. In contrast to sexology, legal scholars’ reactions to trans-
vestites were markedly depreciative. Reactions ranged from unease to patholo-
gisation and criminalisation. The latter was more pronounced when transves-
tites engaged in homosexual acts.
The effects of this intervention were threefold. First, the concept of gender 
as a complex phenomenon allowed conceptualising transsexuality in law. Sec-
ond, sexology created a homogeneous, heterosexual subject with the desire for 
genital surgery as the defining feature and as an effect rendered other forms 
of trans embodiments and sexualities unconceptualisable. Third, sexology re-
established its power to define gender.
While higher courts continued to grapple with issues related to judge-made 
law, on 11 Oct. 1978, the Federal Constitutional Court granted an applicant a 
change of first names and a revision of gender status in the face of pending 
legislation, especially since the applicant irreversibly identified with the ›other‹ 
gender and had undergone sex reassignment surgery.
Situated in a favourable legal climate, having been exerted to continuing 
pressure from a small group of social democratic MPs since 1972, of whom 
representatives from Hamburg also had contact with a local trans lobby group, 
and pressure from sexologists, the social-liberal government tabled the draft 
Transsexual Bill. Sexologists and trans individuals were granted unequal ac-
cess to the federal political arena. Moreover, sexologists presented transsexual 
individuals as a homogeneous entity and tied in with a liberal minoritising 
rhetoric, whereas trans contributions were individual and diverse. A trans activ-
ist’s warning of constitutional pitfalls of several rules of the Bill was ignored.
However, privileged access to influencing the course of the Bill did not nec-
essarily translate directly into legislation. Rather, the Christian democratic op-
position, which enjoyed a majority in the Bundesrat, used sexological knowledge 
on transsexuality strategically to fend off challenges to conventional modes of 
gendering, assumed disruptions to cis individuals’ everyday lives and perceived 
encroachments of their rights and, above all, potential threats to marriage as 
a privileged and exclusively heterosexual institution in a debate that with few 
exceptions was marked by heteronormative perspectives. The result necessarily 
required a compromise in order to ensure the passage of the Bill.
The outcome of the legislative process in 1980 marks the culmination and 
political consolidation of a gradual shift within the gender regime by providing 
provisions for a change of first names and a revision of gender status without 
however endangering the heteronormative gender binary. In order to restore 
the gender regime, transsexual applicants were subjected to trade fundamental 
human rights, such as the constitutionally guaranteed rights to human dig-
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nity, physical integrity, marriage and family for gender recognition. Moreover, 
and in compliance with the rules of non-contentious jurisdiction, transsexual 
individuals were not recognised as experts on their own behalf, and the provi-
sions applied to transsexual individuals only. Furthermore, medicine and law 
became intertwined.
While the Transsexual Act provided for a change of first names and a revi-
sion of gender status for transsexual individuals, the conditions sparked resist-
ance. As early as on 16 Mar. 1982, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that 
the age limit of 25 years for a revision of gender status was unconstitutional. A 
lawyer and a sexologist critically commented on the Court’s refusal to render 
the age limit for a change of first names unconstitutional at the same time. 
This happened roughly a decade later.
Since the Transsexual Act prescribed permanent sterility and surgical 
measures to approximate the appearance of the ›other‹ gender for a revision of 
gender status without specifying the interventions, legal scholars and sexolo-
gists discussed this issue controversially in legal journals throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Higher courts overall interpreted the prerequisites extensively 
in cases of female-to-male transsexualism and restrictively regarding male-to-
female transsexualism.
The period since the mid-1990s was marked by a socially and legally more 
favourable climate towards homosexuality without however displacing heter-
onormativity. Fuelled by policing in transsexual support groups, an increasing 
flexibility of gender roles, queer theory and the options for communication pro-
vided by the internet, the trans movement began to grow from the mid-1990s 
onward, developing lobby organisations with heterogeneous trans(gender) 
subjects and networks operating on regional, national and supranational lev-
els. These organisations questioned hegemonic understandings of gender, 
masculinity, femininity and sexuality.
Sexologists were faced with an increasingly visible heterogeneity of trans 
subjectivities, including transsexual individuals with different sexual orienta-
tions and needs for somatic measures. These changes entered clinical catego-
ries to varying degrees, overall allowing for conceptualising a greater diversity 
of transsexual individuals. A concept of depathologisation entered the sexo-
logical debate as early as in 1991 that questioned the heteronormative gender 
binary, and another sexologist suggested respecting trans self-knowledge in 
1997. However, until the early 2010s, the majority of sexologists did not criti-
cally reflect upon pathologisation, medical surveillance, gatekeeping practices 
and medical expertise in relation to trans individuals that had characterised 
the psycho-medical conceptualisation and treatment of transsexual individu-
als from the very outset. However, terminology, definitions and the degree of 
pathologisation varied quite considerably.
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Despite disagreements on several issues, the three sexological associa-
tions devised national guidelines for the treatment and diagnostic assessment 
of transsexual individuals without external participation, defined assessment 
rules under the Transsexual Act and enshrined a narrow concept of transsexu-
ality, clear differential diagnostics, the pathologisation of transsexual individu-
als and a rigid diagnostic regimen. Sexologist associations remained immune 
to the critique by cis and trans sociologists, the then national trans organisation 
Transidentitas e. V. and from some sexologists themselves that followed imme-
diately upon publication.
The new trans organisations rejected the pathologisation of trans, psycho-
medical expertise as opposed to their self-knowledge and practices and proce-
dures they consider violations of human dignity and privacy, such as the obliga-
tory ›real life test‹, undue physical examinations, inappropriate enquiries into 
their sexual orientations and practices and a subjection to expert understand-
ings of sex, femininity, masculinity and gender. Likewise, they opposed legal 
requirements, such as mandatory sterility, sex reassignment surgery, expert 
assessments, bars to officially sanctioned living arrangements, prolonged pro-
cedures and the disenfranchisement of populations that did not fit the category 
›transsexualism‹ on the grounds that they violate basic human rights. Since 
previous governments and the then government did not attempt to revise the 
Transsexual Act, the PGG devised a suggestion for a draft bill meant to redress 
grievances that had accumulated.
This episode is remarkable in a number of ways. First, it reveals how suc-
cessful struggles around homosexuality had an enabling effect on struggles 
around trans. Second, the proposed legislation contributed to sparking a leg-
islative process. Third, it reveals how anticipated limits shaped the draft, i. e. 
how the state shapes actors before entering the terrain of the state. Fourth, 
its immediate effects suggest that on a surface level trans individuals were 
granted equal access. Fifth, the announcement of fundamental revisions also 
raised expectations in the political branch of the trans movement. Drawing 
upon continuing legal and social developments in the area of homosexuality, 
international developments in trans legislation in the first decade of the 21st 
century and being part of a broader social movement themselves that ques-
tioned singling out non-conforming genders in the first place enabled trans 
activists to demand more rights in their suggestions for law reform in this 
period than their predecessors.
Rather than follow up on its promise to comprehensively revise trans law, 
government activity dwindled to non-activity after the initial announcement to 
fundamentally revise the Transsexual Act. At the same time, trans individu-
als took to the courts. The Federal Constitutional Court took on the legitima-
tion role of the state. With increasingly rapid frequency, Federal Constitutional 
Court decisions eroded the Transsexual Act. On 18 July 2006, the Federal Con-
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stitutional Court ruled the exclusion of foreigners with permanent residency in 
the Federal Republic of Germany unconstitutional and set the first deadline for 
the legislator to devise a constitutional regulation.
While a further depathologising approach emerged in sexology, there were 
few developments in the discipline with regard to trans. With few exceptions, 
sexology had detached itself from international debates, barely engaged with 
theoretical developments that increasingly shaped thought in sociology and 
gender studies and resolved itself to surveying and policing trans rather than 
to question the own contribution to sustaining a hegemonic project. While a 
publication of the submission of the influential German Association for Sex 
Research did not question assumed sexological superior knowledge in relation 
to trans individuals’ knowledge, its emphasis on the heterogeneity of trans-
sexuality and legal constraints on trans individuals proved to be an alternative 
to the German Standards for the Federal Constitutional Court to draw upon on 
decisive issues.
Combined with overall shifts regarding homosexuality and without displac-
ing heterosexuality as a structuring principle in society, two Federal Constitu-
tional Court decisions on the Transsexual Act in 2005 and 2008 allowed homo-
sexual marriages in the context of trans, the first one with regard to the social 
perception of the relationship and the second decision in terms of civil sta-
tus. The last decision also marks another modification of the heteronormative 
gender regime under strictly defined conditions, without however displacing it.
Based on a different operational logic than e. g. jurisdiction in constitution-
al law, jurisdiction in social law began to define limits for sex reassignment in-
terventions in cases of transsexuality since the late 1990s. Moreover, the rigid 
German Standards served as a model for restrictive practices of advisory bodies 
to statutory health insurances. While individual sexologists raised objections 
to these practices, they did not however consider revising or simply discarding 
the Standards. In addition to shared grievances over continuing government 
inactivity, objections to regulatory psycho-medical practices and assumptions, 
increasingly rigid practices in the healthcare management of transsexuality as 
well as denied recognition of self-knowledge under the Transsexual Act, grow-
ing popularity of neuro-scientific research on transsexuality formed the sub-
stratum for conceptual differentiation within the social movement.
The Federal Constitutional Court had set the government a deadline for 
finding a constitutional solution for the rule of the Transsexual Act that disal-
lowed homosexual marriages in cases related to transsexuality. Expecting com-
prehensive legislation as it had been announced in 2000, divided over the issue 
of hetero- and cisnormativity and possible constitutional readings of the Trans-
sexual Act, legal scholars debated several options for a comprehensive revision. 
In addition, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen devised draft legislation that would 
have redressed a number of grievances in the trans movement and questioned 
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the gender binary. However, in 2009 the government simply implemented a 
suggestion made by the Federal Constitutional Court. 
Soon after the Act to amend the Transsexual Act had passed, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled somatic requirements under the Transsexual Act 
for a revision of gender status unconstitutional, marking another modification 
of the gender regime. While heteronormative hegemony remains in place, in-
cluding the initial heteronomous gendering process at birth, a body defined as 
male may signify a woman and vice versa under clearly defined circumstances.
This decision, psycho-medical developments in US and international guide-
line development on gender non-conforming individuals, increasingly success-
ful trans movement struggles to be heard and the appreciation of theoretical de-
velopments on gender contributed to critical reflections on the gender binary in 
sexology and initiated a process of guideline development. While this process is 
still underway at the time of writing, there are indications that depathologising 
perspectives are gaining ground, while issues of psycho-medical surveillance 
remain highly contested. Moreover, several sexologists call for disentangling 
medicine from law, an amalgamation, which had contributed to its stagnation.
The political branch of the trans movement drawing upon social construc-
tionist and poststructuralist perspectives on gender continues to define trans as 
a category that defies closure. In addition, the critique of minoritising perspec-
tives expressed for example in special acts has gained momentum. As a result 
of government reluctance to seriously address issues related to the minoritisa-
tion and stigmatisation of trans and other minoritised gendered embodiments, 
the existing structures of the trans movement are in the process of creating a 
national bureaucratic structure to facilitate exchange and communication on 
issues related to trans.
To conclude, my study revealed that social change in the broader context of 
legislative processes related to a change of first names and gender status was an 
effect of complex and uneven interactions between sexology, the law, the politi-
cal branch of the trans movement and federal politics. In the course of these 
interactions, three major social changes were achieved: Formerly disenfran-
chised embodiments defined as transsexual were recognised as subjects. The 
most severe human rights violations that were part and parcel of recognising 
the transsexual subject were redressed. There are indications that the hetero-
geneity of gendered embodiments and the gender binary itself have recently 
become a political issue.
Despite these significant changes, heteronormative hegemony restored it-
self by integrating some demands made by trans individuals, which suggests 
that the gender regime is historically specific and dynamic. Challenges to the 
heteronormative gender regime were resolved according to the principle of de-
fining these embodiments as exceptions to the rule. For instance, recognis-
ing gender as mutable in a legal sense was, and continues to be exclusively 
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applied to individuals defined as transsexual. Moreover, recognising same-sex 
marriages applied to cases of transsexuality only. The latest example for the 
period this study examined is that gender is no longer necessarily based on 
sexed physical features, whereas the practice of assigning a person to one of ex-
clusively two legitimate genders at birth remains in place. Hence, social change 
with regard to recognising all trans embodiments as viable will require further 
questioning and mobilising against hegemonic assumptions, rules and prac-
tices that govern state and society. 
Recent developments after the period of investigation in this project indi-
cate that other and occasionally overlapping struggles are successfully chipping 
away at the hegemonic heteronormative gender regime. In June 2017, the Ger-
man parliament passed a Bill allowing cis-same-sex partners to marry as of 01 
Oct. 2017, and on 10 Oct. 2017, the Federal Constitutional Court instructed the 
federal government to find a solution until 31. Dec. 2018 for a positive gender 
option other than ›male‹ or ›female‹ in regulations pertaining to a person’s civil 
status in cases of intersexuality. While it remains to be seen, whether these and 
similar future developments will displace the gender regime, they indicate that 
as a social construction, heteronormative hegemony is dynamic, contested and 
in principle negotiable.

6 ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSL ATIONS
ACTH Adrenocorticotropes Hormon Adrenocorticotropic hormone
ADG Antidiskriminierungsgesetz Anti-Discrimination Act
AG Amtsgericht Local court
AK-TS Arbeitkreis Transsexualität Kiel Workgroup Transsexuality Kiel
APA American Psychiatric Association
APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Politics and Contemporary 
History
AsylbLG Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz Asylum Seekers Benefits Act
ATME e. V. Aktion Transsexualität und 
Menschenrecht e. V.
Campaign for Transsexuality and 
Human Rights
ÄVFGG Gesetz über die Änderung der 
Vornamen und die Feststellung der 
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit
An Act to change first names and 
establish gender status
AWMF Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Wissenschaftlichen Medizinischen 
Fachgesellschaften
Association of Scientific Medical 
Societies




BEEG Gesetz zum Elterngeld und zur 
Elternzeit – Bundeselterngeld- und 
Elternzeitgesetz
Parental support and parental 
leave Act
BGB Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Civil Code
BGbl Bundesgesetzblatt Federal Law Gazette
BGH Bundesgerichtshof Federal Court of Justice
BMFSFJ Bundesministerium für Familie, 
Senioren, Frauen und Jugend
Federal Ministry for Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women 
and Youth
BMH Bundesstiftung Magnus Hirschfeld Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation
BMI Bundesministerium des Innern Federal Home Office
BMJ Bundesministerium der Justiz Federal Ministry of Justice
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BMJV Bundesministerium der Justiz und 
für Verbraucherschutz
Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection
BPI Borderline Personality Inventory
BSTc Bed nucleus of the stria 
terminalis
BSG Bundessozialgericht Federal Social Court
Bundesrat RA Bundesrat Rechtsausschuss Bundesrat Committee on Legal 
Affairs
Bundesrat RA-U Bundesrat Unterausschuss des 
Rechtsausschusses
Bundesrat Subcommittee on 
Legal Affairs
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht Federal Constitutional Court
BVerwG Bundesverwaltungsgericht Federal Administrative Court
BVT* e. V. Bundesverband Trans* e. V. Federal Association Trans
CAH Adrenogenitales Syndrom Congenital adrenal hyperplasia
CAT United Nations Convention 
Against Torture
CDU Christlich Demokratische Partei Christian Democratic Party
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women
CLCHC Callen-Lorde Community Health 
Center
CSU Christlich Soziale Union Christian Social Union
Deutscher 
Bundestag-In
Deutscher Bundestag – 
Innenauschuss




Deutscher Bundestag – 
Innenausschuss- Rechtsausschuss
German Bundestag Committee 




Deutscher Bundestag – 
Rechtsausschuss
German Bundestag Committee 
on Legal Affairs
DGfS Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Sexualforschung
German Association for Sex 
Research
DGSS Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Sexualforschung
German Society for Social 
Scientific Sexuality Research
dgti e. V. Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Transidentität und Intersexualität 
e. V.
German Association for 
Transidentity and Intersexuality
DHEAS Dehydroepiandrosteron-Sulfat dehydroepiandrosterone sulfate
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders
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ECHR European Convention on Human 
Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human 
Rights
EGBGB Einführungsgesetz zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch
German Private International 
Law
FamRZ Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Familienrecht
Journal for the Entire Family Law
FbeK Fragebogen zur Beurteilung des 
eigenen Körpers
Questionnaire for the 
Assessment of One’s Own Body
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party
FPI Freiburg Personality Inventory
ftm female-to-male
FSH Follikelstimulierendes Hormon Follicle stimulating hormone
GATE Global Action for Trans* Equality
GFSS Gesellschaft zur Förderung 
sozialwissenschaftlicher 
Sexualforschung
Society for the Advancement 
of Social Scientific Sexuality 
Research
GG Grundgesetz Basic Law
GID Gender identity disorder
GLADT e. V. Gays and Lesbians aus der Türkei 
e. V.
Gays and Lesbians from Turkey
HBIGDA Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Dysphoria Association
HuK Homosexuelle und Kirche Homosexuals and the Church
ICD International Classification of 
Diseases
ICESCR International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
IfZ Institut für Zeitgeschichte Institute for Contemporary 
History
IMAG Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe Inter-Ministerial Working Group
IVIM e.  V, Internationale Vereinigung 
intergeschlechtlicher Menschen
OII – Germany
IVTF Interessenvertretung transsexueller 
Frauen
Lobby Group for Transsexual 
Women
JW Juristische Wochenzeitschrift Legal Weekly
JZ JuristenZeitschrift The Jurists’ Journal
KG Kammergericht Chamber Court
LG Landgericht Regional court
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LSG Landessozialgericht Regional Social Court
LGBTIQ Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans 
Intersex Queer
LH Luteinisierendes Hormon Luteinising hormone
LPartG Gesetz über die 
Eingetragene Partnerschaft – 
Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz
Registered Life Partnership Act
MB/KK Musterbedingungen für 
die Krankheitskosten- und 
Krankentagegeldversicherung
Model conditions for sickness 
costs and the hospital daily 
benefit insurance
MDK Medizinischer Dienst der 
Krankenkassen
Medical Advisory Service of 
the Statutory Health Insurance 
Companies
MDS Medizinischer Dienst des 
Spitzenverbandes Bund der 
Krankenkassen
Medical Advisory Service of the 
Central Federation of Statutory 
Health Insurance Companies
MP Member of Parliament
mtf male-to-female
MUT Menschenrecht und Transsexualität Human Right and Transsexuality
MutterschutzG Mutterschutzgesetz An Act to protect expectant and 
nursing mothers
NamÄndG Namensänderungsgesetz An Act on the change of family 
names and first names
NJW Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift New Legal Weekly
OII Organisation Intersex 
International
OLG Oberlandesgericht High Regional Court
ObLG Oberstes Landgericht Highest Regional Court
OHPREG hydroxpregnenolone
OVG Oberverwaltungsgericht High Administrative Court
PassGÄndG Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Passgesetzes und weiterer 
Vorschriften
An Act to amend the Passport 
Act and further prescriptions
PCO Polyzystisches Ovar Polycyctic ovary
PDS Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus
Democratic Socialist Party
PGG Projektgruppe Geschlecht und 
Gesetz
Project Group Gender and the 
Law
PrALG Allgemeines Landrecht für die 
Preußischen Staaten
General State Law for the 
Prussian States
PStG Personenstandsgesetz Civil Status Act
Abbreviations and translations 389
R & P Recht & Psychiatrie Law & Psychiatry
RVO Reichsversicherungsordnung Social Security Code of the Reich
SCHWUSOS Lesben und Schwule in der SPD Lesbians and Gay Men in the 
SPD
SEKIS Berlin Selbsthilfe Kontakt und 
Informationsstelle Berlin
Central Support, Contact and 
Information Office Berlin
SGB Sozialgesetzbuch Social Security Code
SGB V Fünftes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch Volume 5 of the Social Security 
Code
SHBG Sexualhormonbindendes Globulin Sex hormone binding globulin
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands
Social Democratic Party of 
Germany
SPN Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks
StAZ Das Standesamt The Register Office
StGB Strafgesetzbuch Criminal Code
TGEU Transgender Europe
TGNB Transgender-Netzwerk Berlin Transgender Network Berlin
TrGG Transgendergesetz – Gesetz über 
die Wahl oder Änderung der 
Vornamen und der Feststellung der 
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit
Transgender Bill – A Bill on the 
choice or revision of first names 
and the establishment of gender 
status
TrIQ e. V. TransInterQueer e. V. Trans Inter Queer
TSG Gesetz zur Änderung der 
Vornamen und die Feststellung 
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit 
in besonderen Fällen 
(Transsexuellengesetz – TSG)
An Act to change first names and 
establish gender status in special 
cases (Transsexual Act – TSG)
TSG-ÄndG Transsexuellengesetz – 
Änderungsgesetz
An Act to amend the Transsexual 
Act
TSG-R TSG-Referentenentwurf Draft Bill to change first names 
and establish gender status in 
special cases
TSG-E TSG-Entwurf A Bill to change first names and 




Transsexual Law Reform Bill
VersR Zeitschrift für Versicherungsrecht, 
Haftungs- und Schadensrecht
Journal for Insurance Law, 
Liability and Indemnity Law
WehrpflichtG Wehrpflichtgesetz Concription Act
WHO World Health Organisation
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WPATH World Professional Association 
for Transgender Health
ZivildienstG Zivildienstgesetz Civilian service Act
ZfS Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung Journal for Sex Research
17 OHP 17-Hydroxprogesteron 17-hydroxyprogesterone
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